The operation demonstrated that helicopters not only could transport rocket crews with weapons and ammunition to firing areas far more rapidly than conventional wheeled vehicles, but that the rotary craft could airlift these weapons into places inaccessible by road. The nature of the mountainous terrain proved advantageous in that hills and valleys provided defiladed areas for loading and firing the weapons as well as protected routes for helicopter movements. An observation made by pilots for operations in other types of environment, not offering as much cover and concealment, was that the shiny blue paint on their birds would make detection easy in most surroundings and that camouflage paint would lessen the risk from enemy AA.

Transport helicopters of HMR-161 continued to augment those of VMO-6 in casualty evacuation and ferrying Marines and other frontline troops. The observation squadron maintained its policy and outstanding record of emergency flights of the wounded under any weather conditions except dense fog (electronic navigational aids still were not available). In August, various mechanical failures developed among the newly received HO5S-1 Sikorsky helicopters. These three-place observation aircraft were underpowered but superior in many flight characteristics to the HTL-4 helicopters then in the squadron. Mechanical difficulties with the newer aircraft increased until it became necessary to ground them late in October until replacement parts became available in the supply system.

Employment of transport helicopters for logistical support continued to be a principal use of such rotary wing aircraft as the end of 1952 approached. Tests earlier in the year had proved the theory that this versatile aircraft could resupply a battalion manning the MLR. The next step was to determine if the logistical support for an entire combat regiment could be accomplished by helicopter. Operation HAYLIFT, conducted during 22–26 September, the last of five operations that month for HMR-161, was to test and evaluate helicopter resupply of Colonel Moore’s 7th Marines. Plans called for delivering all Class I, III, and V items and such Class II and IV items as could be accommodated. Two loading and four unloading sites were prescribed. All but extremely valuable cargo, such as mail, was to be carried externally in slings or wire baskets.

HAYLIFT did show that at least for a short period of time—five days—a helicopter squadron, utilizing 40 percent of its aircraft, could sustain a MLR regiment. Following the general procedures employed previously with the battalion, HMR-161 found that no great changes were necessary for resupply of the regiment. Two recommendations emerged from an evaluation of HAYLIFT. One stressed the need for establishment of an operations center manned by representatives of each unit participating in the exercise. The second called for development of a more flexible loading system, one that would permit rapid weight increases or decreases of 50 pound increments, as the situation demanded. Such a method would make possible a more efficient payload for each lift.250

Transport on a larger scale in the 1st MAW was accomplished by General Jerome’s few transport aircraft reinforced by the eight R5Ds from the VMR-152 detachment. In June, the passenger-carrying operations reached the peak for the entire Korean War; that month, 17,490 troops and military-associated civilians utilized the reinforced wing transport aircraft. June 1952 was also the second busiest month in freight transportation (7,397,824 pounds, nearly double the figure for June 1951).

Squadrons that were unable to better their performance records in some cases could trace their trouble to the inability to get all of their planes off the ground. Several models were subject to spare parts shortages.251 New aircraft, the F3D-2s and the AU-1s received in June by VMF(N)-513 and VMA-212, respectively, had preceded an adequate stocking of normal replacements for worn out or defective parts. The night fighter squadron was handicapped also by introduction into the supply system of inadequate radio tubes, which burned out rapidly. The most critical shortage, however, was parts for starter units of jet engines. This deficiency was not corrected until summer. One problem never quite eliminated was the confusion of supply orders intended for the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6. It was believed that the close resemblance of Sikorsky HRS and HO5S part numbers and nomenclatures had caused the improperly-marked requisitions and mix-up.

The 1st Marine Division logistical situation during the summer and fall of 1952 was generally excellent. General Pollock’s units did not suffer from the shortage of spare parts experienced by the 1st MAW whose aircraft sometimes had to be grounded because of a missing spare part. U.S. Army support in the replacement of worn-out Marine vehicles for new Army ones proved satisfactory. No major problems arose in engineer support. Medical evacuation and treatment and the level of supplies in the five companies of the 1st Medical Battalion remained excellent.

There were two significant changes in the logistical support provided the Marine division early in the fall. One dealt with employment of the division’s 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, located in the rear support areas. Beginning in September, the companies were placed in direct support of the four infantry regiments, with liaison by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Martin, division motor transport officer. It was believed this decentralization would have the following advantages:

The other change was a shift in the emphasis of support rendered by the Korean Service Corps. During October, each of the three frontline regiments received 300 more laborers, raising the total to 800. Rear area units paid for the increase, since the KSCs were detached from support units and sent forward to the MLR.

Logistical support from the 1st Signal Battalion left little to be desired. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Morris252 when the Marines moved to western Korea, the signalmen helped establish and maintain an extensive communications net, with 5,200 miles of wire within the division and several vital links to adjacent and higher commands.253 Wiremen worked around the clock to lay and maintain the telephone lines, which suffered considerable damage from the artillery and mortar barrages. When possible, the signalmen raised the wires off the ground. The battalion set in more than 1,400 telephone poles. After the system had been installed and was working efficiently, the July floods washed away part of the major communications. By improvising and by setting up emergency equipment, the battalion was able to maintain the flow of communications traffic at a satisfactory level. Replacement items were provided by the U.S. Army on a reimbursable basis in accordance with existing directives.

In September it became apparent that the signal equipment used to maintain division communications was no longer equal to the demands placed upon it. The extensive ground area plus the number and size of reinforcing units had not only put a heavy burden on radio, telephone, and teletype equipment but also caused the depletion of reserve stocks. With the spare equipment in use, there was no pool to draw upon when units turned in defective equipment for repair. Neither were there available replacements for materiel destroyed by enemy action. Items most urgently needed were flown in from the States. Other critical parts came from Army sources in Japan and Korea. By the end of October, the communication resupply had returned to a more normal condition.

Before the month ended a different type of critical situation was to confront the division. It appeared that the enemy’s success in seizing a half-dozen outposts earlier in October had only whetted his appetite for more. Chinese eyes were turned towards positions that held still more potential value than the stepping-stones just acquired. The extreme right battalion in the division front held by the 7th Marines was the focal point of the new effort.