Immediately, plans for the recapture of both were made. At 2047, Captain John H. Thomas dispatched a platoon from his company, I/3/7, from the MLR to counterattack Warsaw. The platoon quickly took the position, for the enemy had withdrawn. At Seattle, the result was different. On 3 October, two squads from Company I departed JAMESTOWN at 0340, but came under enemy artillery fire en route to the objective. The squads worked their way forward nevertheless, but were unable to take the outpost. Captain Thomas then recalled the force, which reached JAMESTOWN at dawn. Later that day, just before dusk, air and artillery placed a smoke screen on Seattle while two squads advanced toward the outpost. When the counterattack met stiff resistance, a squad-size reinforcement228 was sent from the MLR. Together the three units attempted to retake the position, but were forced to pull back because of heavy casualties. As the infantry again regrouped, Lieutenant Colonel Bert Davis, Jr.’s 2/11 fired preparatory barrages on the Chinese occupying Seattle. At 2225 the Marines assaulted the outpost again; as before, overpowering Chinese artillery and grenades inflicted such high casualties that the counterattackers were compelled to withdraw.

By this time, action at the two outposts had resulted in 101 Marine casualties, including 13 killed. By sundown on 3 October, the regiment had been forced off the two COPs and had been able to retake only one of them. Against Warsaw, the one that the Marines had recaptured, the Chinese immediately launched a counterattack. At 0145 on 4 October a platoon struck the position. This time the Warsaw garrison held, inflicting losses on the CCF and receiving none. The Chinese made an unsuccessful attempt against Frisco at 2300 on 5 October, when a squad attempted to drive the Marines from the outpost.

The enemy’s repeated attacks and apparent determination to seize commanding terrain, plus the heavy casualties suffered by 3/7, led the 7th Marines to reinforce its MLR at 1200 on 5 October. At this time the right battalion sector then held by 3/7, was split into two sectors and the regimental reserve, 1/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki) took over the far right of the 3/7 line, assuming responsibility for Warsaw and Verdun.229 The 7th Marines thus had all three of its battalions on line with the regimental front manned, from the left, by 2/7, 3/7, and 1/7.

During the next 30 hours, the Communists launched a series of strong probing actions against the regimental outposts of the 7th Marines. Although the numerical strength used in these widespread limited objective attacks did not exceed that employed in previous large-scale outpost offensives, the scope of the operation on 6 and 7 October and the well-coordinated attacks indicated careful and detailed planning. Each move against the five outposts and two MLR positions attacked was preceded by unusually close attention to artillery and mortar preparation. This was to a degree unprecedented even when measured against those massive concentrations that had characterized Communist operations since the Chinese intervention in the war late in 1950.

Prior to the Communist general attack, the Marines made another attempt to retake Seattle. Leaving JAMESTOWN at 0600 on 6 October, a C/1/7 reinforced platoon was halted by solid resistance in the form of exploding artillery and mortar rounds. The forces returned to the MLR, reorganized, and jumped off again. At 0815, a two-squad reinforcement was dispatched from the main line. Meanwhile, the enemy, estimated at platoon reinforced strength, doubled his garrison, using troops from his outpost line. By 0900, a heavy fire fight was in progress, supported by artillery and mortars on both sides. Marines called on air in support of the attack, but the combined air and infantry action was unable to penetrate enemy defenses. Finally, at 1100, after five hours of close heavy fighting, the Marines broke contact and retired, bringing with them 12 dead and 44 wounded. Estimates of enemy losses totaled 71.

That evening, at dusk, artillery and mortar fire began falling on outpost positions across the entire regimental front and at two locations on the MLR. At the same time an estimated Chinese reinforced battalion in a coordinated effort advanced toward the Marine line and at 1930 assaulted the seven positions that had just been under artillery preparation. By midnight an estimated 4,300 rounds of artillery fire and 104 rounds of counterbattery fire had fallen on Marine positions. In the regimental left manned by 2/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Caputo) the attacks appeared to be more of a diversion—merely probes by small units, which showed little inclination to press the attack. Carson, the most western COP held by the regiment, reported that the enemy soldiers withdrew at 2050. Two hours later Reno, the next outpost to the east, radioed to the MLR that the Chinese had just ceased their attacks at that forward post. A total of 12 Marines were wounded in these two actions.

On the far right, in Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s sector, a reinforced CCF platoon poured over the Warsaw defenses at 1930. Immediately the outpost Marines called for the friendly artillery box. As these protective fires were being delivered all communication at the outpost was severed by hostile fire. Enemy artillery continued at a heavy rate. By 2000, however, communication was reestablished between the COP and MLR. The first message from the besieged outpost was a request for more artillery. With additional fire support and continued stiff outpost resistance, the Chinese at 2055 relinquished their quest to regain Warsaw.

The enemy’s most determined assaults on the night of 6–7 October were made upon a pair of outposts, Detroit and Frisco, manned by the middle battalion, 3/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Russell). Two JAMESTOWN areas in this sector were also attacked, but only briefly. The assault against the outposts was executed by a Chinese battalion which sent one company against Detroit and another against Frisco, east of Detroit. Both outposts were manned by two squads of Marines.

At Detroit, the Company G Marines reported that the initial attack made at 1940 on 6 October by a Chinese company had been rebuffed. The enemy did succeed, however, in advancing to the outpost trenchline. Strong defensive fires prevented him from exploiting this initial gain by occupying any of the bunkers, and the attackers were forced to pull back. After regrouping, the Chinese returned at 2100 and again were able to secure a foothold at the main trench.

Marine artillery assisted the outpost defenders in repulsing this new attack, but not before Chinese interdictory fires had disrupted all communications between the COP and its MLR support company. Some Chinese had also moved south in the vicinity of the MLR, but these attacks were neither persistent nor heavily supported. At 2115 the last of the enemy intruders had withdrawn from the MLR. At about this same time, 3/7 heard Detroit request overhead VT fires, but shortly after this the battalion again lost contact with the outpost.

Two squads were then sent out to reinforce the position. They were stopped, however, by heavy Chinese artillery barrages. At the outpost, Marine artillery fires had forced the Chinese to retreat, but at 0015 the enemy reappeared at the trenchline. The artillery regiment once again applied the overhead fire remedy, but with less success—the Chinese, neither retreating nor advancing, took cover in the trenches. During the long night, attempts to reestablish communications with Detroit had proved fruitless, although battalion radio operators reported that they had heard Chinese language coming over one of the Marine radio nets used by the COP. A six-man reconnaissance detail was sent forward to investigate. It returned at 0355 with the information that Detroit was now held by the enemy. Two wounded Marines had escaped; the rest of the Detroit garrison had fallen to the enemy. At 0630 the Marines withdrew after heavy fighting that had lasted more than 10 hours.

During the earlier part of the night, while the battle for outpost control raged at Detroit, reinforcements had also been dispatched to Frisco to help stabilize the situation at this adjacent Company H/3/7 outpost. Like Detroit, it had been attacked by a Chinese company, beginning about 2000. An hour and a half later some of the enemy had made their way into the trenchline, but were repulsed with the help of friendly artillery VT. Shortly after midnight the enemy again probed Frisco and reached the trenchline. At 0115, two squads jumped off from JAMESTOWN, but a rain of Chinese artillery interrupted their progress. Throughout the early morning hours of 7 October, Company H and I units were sent out from the MLR to buttress the Frisco defense and stem the enemy attack. At 0510, a reinforced platoon from the reserve company was sent to renew the counterattack. It was this Company I unit that finally restored control of the COP to the Marines.230 Another reinforcing platoon arrived at the outpost just as the Marines there had evicted the remaining Chinese assault forces. At 0715, 7 October, Frisco was declared secure.

Its precarious position, however, demanded either an investment of more outpost troops to retain possession of it or else its abandonment, in conjunction with other measures to neutralize loss of the position. At 1804 that day the latter course was instituted. The 7th Marines reported that the enemy had suffered an estimated 200 KIA and unknown WIA as a result of the bitterly contested outpost attacks on 6–7 October. Marine casualties were listed as 10 killed, 22 missing, 105 wounded and evacuated, and 23 not-seriously wounded.

In all, during the first week in October, the 1st Marine Division gave up six outposts, or forward positions, that had been sited on some of the commanding ground in the Marine area. On the division left, COPs 37, 36, and 86 were the ones most removed from the Korean MLR and thus easily susceptible to being overrun by the enemy at will and to his early reinforcement.231 The division theorized that near winter and the subsequent freezing of the Sachon would facilitate the movement of Chinese troops and supplies across the river to new positions. The enemy was now able to operate patrols east of the river without interference. At the opposite side of the division MLR, on its right flank, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle had been lost. By gaining this string of outposts, the enemy was better able to exert pressure against other Marine positions forward of the line and the critical ground on JAMESTOWN.

To counter this threat, General Pollock strengthened the outposts close to the MLR and increased his patrolling requirements. It was decided that in some cases the mission of the COP—that of providing early warning of impending attack and slowing it down—could be accomplished as effectively by using patrols and listening posts at night.

By these activities, the Marines hoped to minimize the Chinese gains and prevent the launching of new attacks against either division COPs or JAMESTOWN. The serious situation on the outposts was compounded by existing political considerations, which prevented the Marines from initiating any real offensive campaigns. Moreover, any hill taken was invariably backed up by a still higher one, controlled by the enemy. The key factor was not so much holding an individual outpost as it was to insure that the enemy was unable to penetrate the JAMESTOWN line.

More PRESSURE, More CAS, More Accomplishments232

Some of the enemy ground pressure against the outposts in September and October had been relieved by the increase in the number of air strikes received by the 1st Marine Division. De-emphasis of the Air Force interdiction strategy in favor of striking the enemy wherever (and whenever) it hurt him most had made available more aircraft for close support of ground operations.233 The UN commander, General Clark, who had given the green light to the shift in USAF policy and targets, followed the giant hydroelectric strike in June with a mass attack the next month on 30 military targets located near the North Korean Capital. During a year’s freedom from air attack (July 1951-July 1952) Pyongyang had become not only the major logistics center for combat equipment and personnel but also the focal point for command and control of Communist ground and air defense efforts.

Designated Operation PRESSURE PUMP, the 11 July strike against Pyongyang called for three separate attacks during daylight and a fourth at night. This extended time over the target would give enemy fighters more than ample time to take to the skies in defense of the Capital. Because Pyongyang “was defended by 48 guns and more than 100 automatic weapons, making it one of the worst ‘flak traps’ in Korea,”234 there was considerable hazard in the operation. Added danger to the pilots resulted from the decision to forewarn the North Korean civilian population of the air assault. General Clark explained the reason for dropping warning leaflets prior to the attack on Pyongyang:

Results indicated that both the destructive and the psychological aspects of the mission were successful. American, British, and ROK planes completely destroyed 3 of the 30 military targets attacked. Of the rest, only two escaped major damage:

Of the far-reaching effect of the leaflets, the UN commander later wrote:

The record set by the 1,254 sorties flown in this 11 July operation was to last only seven weeks. On 29 August, 1,403 sorties were employed in a new strike against the Capital. The massed raids against military targets in Pyongyang, known as the “All United Nations Air Effort” turned out to be the largest one-day air assault during the entire three years of the Korean War. Again attacking at four-hour intervals three times during daylight, Allied aircraft blasted a list of targets that “read like a guide to public offices in Pyongyang and included such points of interest as the Ministry of Rail Transportation, the Munitions Bureau, Radio Pyongyang, plus many factories, warehouses, and troop billets.”238 Of the 45 military targets in the city, 31 received moderate-to-severe damage according to post-strike photographs.

Substitution of the previous interdiction strategy by PRESSURE attacks brought increased close air support to frontline troops. As a result of this expanded number of CAS sorties, wing pilots and ground forward air controllers greatly increased their operational proficiency.239 The Marines were still not satisfied with the close support picture, however, and neither were a number of U.S. Army commanders. Some of the latter regarded General Clark as the champion of more extensive close air support missions for frontline units, but he quickly dispelled this view. Instead, he cautioned these supporters of Marine-type close air support to accept the existing procedures, which were derived from the “vast reservoir of experience ... [representing] the composite view of senior members of the Armed Forces [with] the longest and most responsible experience in close support during World War II.”240 At the same time the UN commander, on 11 August 1952, had advised his force commanders to study the factors affecting the close air support situation in Korea and comment on certain UNC proposals for improving the CAS system.

In the close air support picture for the Marines, October was a bright month. In the outpost battles of early October, the 1st MAW put 319 sorties in the air during both day and night to strike, strafe, bomb, and burn enemy positions and troops facing General Pollock’s division. A new level of achievement had been reached during the Bunker Hill battle in August. That month nearly 1,000 aircraft, predominantly Marine, loosed ordnance at targets on and near the Chinese MLR and OPLR.

During the first six months of Marine ground operations in defense of JAMESTOWN, wing squadrons and pilots had made major contributions to the U.S. air effort in Korea. On 7 June 1952, First Lieutenant John W. Andre, VMF(N)-513, piloting a World War II model Corsair on a night armed reconnaissance mission over the west coast of North Korea, shot down an enemy piston-driven Yak fighter. It was the first time that a Russian-built plane of that model had been knocked out of the skies at night by another plane. This aircraft was also the fifth kill for the lieutenant, making him the first Marine nightfighter ace in Korea.241

Nearly three months after that record, another one emerged: the first Marine to down an enemy jet with a propeller-driven aircraft. Late on the afternoon of 10 September, Captain Jesse G. Folmar and First Lieutenant Willie L. Daniels, both of VMA-312, had taken off from the Sicily to attack an enemy troop concentration reported to be south of Chinnampo, on the west coast just below the 39th Parallel. Shortly after reaching the vicinity of the target, the Marine Corsairs were jumped by a pair of MIG-15s. Two more Russian-made jets tore into the fight. During a fast exchange of cannon and machine gun fire, the Marine captain was able to score lethal hits on one of the MIGs. When four more of them picked up the chase, the vastly outnumbered Marines broke for home, heading westward in a diving turn.

Captain Folmar’s return to the Sicily was delayed almost immediately:

This damage caused the plane to rapidly go out of control. While still able to maneuver, the Marine aviator headed for the sea and as he neared it, bailed out of his Corsair and parachuted into the ocean. A rescue plane out of Cho-do picked him up and returned the captain, who had sustained a slight shoulder injury, to the carrier. Lieutenant Daniels, who had alerted the rescue force, circled his descending flight leader until he hit the water. After ascertaining that the waterborne flier’s condition was satisfactory, the lieutenant turned his plane towards the Sicily. In a short while he was safely home.

In late September, Major Alexander J. Gillis, VMF-311, assigned earlier that summer to the Air Force’s 335th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 4th Fighter Group, as an exchange pilot.243 distinguished himself by becoming not only the first naval aviator to destroy three enemy aircraft in Korea but also the second one to get a multiple killing in a single day.244 Flying in a four-plane Sabrejet formation near the vicinity of the mouth of the Yalu on 28 September, Major Gillis led another plane after two MIG-15s. By superior pilot technique and aggressive tactics, he forced one of the enemy to crash during a low altitude chase. Later on during the sortie, the Marine initiated an attack on a solo MIG, closing on it and scoring hits that caused the plane to become uncontrollable and the pilot to eject. Major Gillis also had to eject from his F-86 after it became disabled by the MIG. The incident had occurred on the Marine aviator’s 50th combat mission with the Air Force. He spent nearly four hours in the Yellow Sea before a rescue helicopter picked him up.

Another feat, this one a study in determination and perseverance, had occurred early in the summer. On 22 July, the VMJ-1 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vernon O. Ullman, had taken to the air for a photo mission over North Korea in the vicinity of Sinanju, located near the Yellow Sea 40 miles above Pyongyang. During the first of seven scheduled flights, he encountered heavy flak but nevertheless completed his first mapping run in the area. Further, the Marine flier decided that the antiaircraft menace was not going to force him to abandon the remaining part of his task. He continued. On the second of his seven runs, some 40 enemy jets (MIG-15s) appeared on the scene. These were dissuaded from close-in interference, however, by the photo escort of 24 USAF single-engine Sabrejet fighters. Thereafter, the Russian-made aircraft disappeared; Lieutenant Colonel Ullman continued, despite the intense, accurate enemy antiaircraft fire, until he concluded his mission.

The type of determination displayed by Lieutenant Colonel Ullman helped Marine tactical squadrons achieve some kind of distinction nearly every month from late spring to the fall of 1952. In May, VMF-323 (“the Death Rattlers”), then commanded by Major William A. Weir, established a squadron one-month record for number of combat sorties, 1,160, and total combat hours, 2,362.7. A high percentage of aircraft availability, 95.6, helped make this mark possible. On 1 June, VMA-312 received the congratulations of CTF 95 for its “outstanding performance under difficult conditions” during the spring months. During this period the squadron, based on board the USS Bataan, had been particularly hampered by excessive turnover of key squadron officers and flight leaders. This continual squadron rotation resulted in considerable variation in pilot indoctrination and need for field carrier landing qualification, due to the “close tolerances in pilot skill required by carrier operations.”245 Despite these difficulties, VMA-312 had scored an impressive 80-sortie mission, flown by 24 aircraft, on 18 April.

Additional recognition of professional excellence was conferred upon Marine squadrons in July. On the 17th, the senior advisor to the ROK I Corps expressed the gratitude of the corps commander for the magnificent support the 1st MAW pilots had provided during the second week of the month. All four attack squadrons in MAG-12 and both fighter units in MAG-33 had taken part in these CAS missions. A week later, eight planes from Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Miller’s VMA-323, (which, along with Lieutenant Colonel Graham H. Benson’s VMA-212, had been redesignated from fighter to attack squadrons the previous month), completed an unusually successful interdiction mission at Hago.

Located 25 miles northwest of Kaesong, the village reportedly was the site of heavy troop concentrations, active mortar positions, and antitank weapons. Leaving K-6 at 1725, the eight Marine VMA-323 pilots were soon over the target. Comprising the Death Rattler’s flight were Majors John M. Dufford, Raymond C. Holben, William H. Irvin, Jr., and Curtis E. Knudson; Captain John Church, Jr.; First Lieutenant William A. Poe, Jr.; and Second Lieutenants Stuart L. Spurlock and James S. Thompson. At 1810 their attacks were launched, using 1,000-pound bombs, napalm, rockets, and 20mm ammunition. The strike was over almost as soon as it had started, and when the Marines departed, not one building remained in useful condition. But it was not until several days later that the final results of the strike were known. Intelligence sources reported that the raid had caught the enemy troops at the evening meal; more than 500 had been killed by the Corsairs, aptly called “Whistling Death” by the Japanese in World War II.

For the remainder of the summer and into the fall Marine groups and squadrons continued their record-breaking and efficient support of ground troops and naval forces. With four squadrons (two day, one night-fighter, and one photo), MAG-33 sent 141 sorties against the enemy on 6 August. This one-day group record occurred just before the departure of Colonel Condon, who turned over the reins of the organization to Colonel Herbert H. Williamson on the 11th, and then took command of MAG-12.

Shortly before Colonel Condon relinquished command, he was particularly pleased by the success of a four-plane strike by VMF-311 (Major William J. Sims) in support of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division commanded by Brigadier General Samuel T. Williams. Major Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., strike leader, was accompanied in this flight by Captain George R. Brier and Second Lieutenants Charles E. Pangburn and Whitlock N. Sharpe. Up until this time the infantry had been particularly harassed by several enemy frontline fortifications and supporting artillery. The four pilots destroyed three bunkers and two heavy guns and also caved in approximately 50 feet of trenchline on the 7 August strike. Upon learning of the success of the Marine pilots and the conditions under which the attacks were carried out—dangerous terrain and constant ground fire directed towards the planes—the general dispatched a letter, commending the “skill, courage, and determination displayed by these pilots....”246

Another congratulatory message was received in September, this one from General Pollock for the excellent support given by MAG-12 on the 20th. With three attack squadrons participating, Colonel Condon’s group had neutralized Chinese weapons and troops at OP 36 to help prevent a takeover of the Korean position. The pilots reported well over 100 Chinese casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Chamberlain’s VMA-323 contributed most of the 23 Marine sorties. The other attacking squadrons were VMA-121 (Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Cargill, who 10 days earlier had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Crawford), and VMA-212, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maurice W. Fletcher.

September was a month of mixed fortunes in the air war over Korea. The successful CAS strikes of the 20th followed only a few days after another high point set on 14 September, when Lieutenant Colonel Cargill’s attack squadron flew its 5,000th combat sortie since arrival in the Korean theater in October 1951. Then on 15 September, General Jerome commissioned a new kind of unit in the wing, Marine Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1), whose mission was to provide electronic counter-measures (ECM) for UN aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence F. Fox headed the squadron, the only one in the naval service with an ECM primary mission in Korea.

Three days after the commissioning, a strange incident transpired. North of the UN line and at an altitude of 9,500 feet, a F-84 Thunderjet fighter, with U.S. Air Force markings and insignia, attacked a propeller-driven Air Force trainer. The slower plane immediately began defensive maneuvering, flying in tight circles. After making five turns, the trainer pilot saw the supposedly friendly jet fly off.

It was believed that such a paradoxical occurrence was due to the substantial number of F-84 losses and the enemy’s ability to piece together and fly an aircraft of that model. A few similar episodes—attacks by apparently friendly aircraft on UN planes—had previously taken place. In each case, the impostor was a model of U.S. aircraft that had suffered particularly heavy losses.

Another incident in September had dire consequences. On the 10th, MAG-33 dispatched 22 fighter aircraft from VMF-115 (Lieutenant Colonel Royce W. Coln) to attack reported troop concentrations near Sariwon, 35 miles directly south of Pyongyang. The F9F Panther jets had completed the strike and were returning to their K-3 base when they were diverted to land at K-2, Taegu, where the weather was better. Fog had suddenly swept over the field at K-3, reducing visibility to zero. Sixteen Panthers landed safely at K-2, 45 miles southwest of the Marine field at Pohang. The remaining six, piloted by Majors Raymond E. Demers and Donald F. Givens, First Lieutenant Alvin R. Bourgeois, and by Second Lieutenants John W. Hill, Jr., Carl R. Lafleur, and Richard L. Roth, flying in formation in poor weather, crashed into the side of a 3,000-foot mountain while descending.247 They would have required only an additional 600 feet of altitude to clear the summit.

Losses of Marine pilots and aircraft had been of growing concern to the wing command. The initial success of the flak suppression fires had eliminated the one successful Communist source of air defense, accurate antiaircraft firing. One result was that noncombat accidents for a while during the summer became the principal cause of pilot and plane attrition. To help reduce these operational accidents as well as the combat losses, the two Marine air groups instituted squadron training programs and also directed the adoption of several new corrective procedures. In MAG-12, for example, a study of results from the FAF policy that limited bombing runs to one for interdiction and two for CAS targets revealed a sharp reduction in hits from flak. Tactical squadron commanders in MAG-12 drew up a syllabus during September to test proposed defensive tactics for their propeller aircraft to employ against enemy jets. The carrier squadron, VMA-312, began that same month the additional practice of field carrier landing qualification at K-6 for new pilots before permitting them to operate from the carriers.

In spite of these efforts, pilot losses spiralled alarmingly in October. For the rest of 1952, the monthly totals remained near that month’s level. On the other hand, aircraft losses during October dropped sharply to 10 from the September total of 22. This lower figure was not to be exceeded until May 1953. These remedial procedures were considered at least partially responsible for the substantial decrease in aircraft losses.

In another area, a mid-October landing at Kojo, on the east coast immediately south of the 39th Parallel, did not work out as planned. The amphibious operation was in reality a feint intended to draw troops away from frontline positions and expose them to naval air and gunfire as they rushed in reinforcements. The enemy failed to rise to the bait, and actually only a few Communist troops were sighted. VMA-312 provided armed reconnaissance, tactical air operation, and naval gunfire spotting during the feint. Although they made little enemy contact, the Marine “Checkerboard” pilots operating off the Sicily gained much experience in landings and take-offs under the adverse conditions of rough seas and high winds.

Rockets, Resupply, and Radios248

Through October 1952, operational control of Korean based Marine fighter and attack squadrons was still vested in commanders other than General Jerome. Tactical squadrons continued to be directed by the FAF or Navy in their missions; the observation and helicopter squadrons were under operational control of the 1st Marine Division and utilized, as before, at its discretion.

HMR-161, commanded since 8 August by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Carey, continued its primary mission of evaluating rotary wing aircraft and their methods of employment. One tactical innovation, movement of elements of the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, was undertaken during August soon after the Bunker Hill battle. With ground-fired rockets, the problem of a tell-tale cloud of dust and brilliant flash of the rockets after each salvo had always plagued the artillerymen. This seldom went unnoticed by the enemy, who often showered the marked area with counterbattery fire. On 19 and 20 August, in Operation RIPPLE, HMR-161 and the rocket battery proved that these two units could successfully shoot and scoot to a new location and fire effectively again without drawing an enemy reprisal. This Marine Corps innovation in air mobility—the first displacement of field artillery under combat conditions—offered a major time-saving advantage. Whereas previously it took approximately a half-hour for rocket launchers to move from their bivouac area to firing position,249 deployment by helicopter could be made in a matter of minutes, a time factor that could be critical in event of an enemy attempted breakthrough.