Other activities behind the line aimed at making the Marine position on the newly seized hill more tenable. As one step in this direction, General Selden shifted most of his reserve into the zone of action. Before the end of the day remaining units of 3/7 were placed under operational control of 3/1, and 2/7 was attached to Colonel Layer’s reserve. The 7th Marines was directed to place its 4.2-inch mortars on call to the 1st Marines. Priority of artillery support went to the Bunker Hill regiment. Within the 1st Marines, the regimental commander moved two provisional platoons (118 Marines) of the reserve 1st Battalion to the 3d Battalion sector. All 81mm mortars in 1/1 were sent to the left battalion. The fire plan also called for employment of all the 60mm mortars that could bear on the crest of 124–122, with 81mm and artillery box-me-in barrage fires on the ridge and flanks.

Machine guns from the MLR were assigned missions on the crest of Bunker Ridge and 4.5-inch ripples were planned on the deep enemy approaches. Gun and flame tanks were to protect the right flank of Hill 122 where the steep draw between Bunker and the MLR offered the most dangerous approach into Bunker Hill. Supplies and fortification materials, meanwhile, were being carried forward and casualties taken to the rear by the relief party. Although 3/1 initially reported that the Bunker Hill fighting had resulted in 58 killed or wounded Marines, a later battalion count showed this number to be 34—5 killed and 29 wounded.

Most of the casualties had been caused by hostile shelling. Although the Hill 122 reverse slope afforded some cover from the Chinese artillery and mortars, the positions on the crest did not offer any protection, so Marines continued their trenchworks and other defensive preparations at a rapid pace and supporting fires were registered by 1900. The approach of night was certain to bring renewed Communist attempts to capture Bunker Hill.

At 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage reported to division that his force on Hill 122 occupied the entire reverse slope and that the Marine of I/3/1 and B/1/1 were digging in and consolidating their scant defenses. Enemy shells were still falling on both Bunker and Hill 124. Company commanders forward of the MLR estimated that as many as 400 Chinese occupied the ridge on the other side of the slope from the Marines. Since the crest of the long Hill 124–122 ridgeline was fairly level, the gentle incline of the Bunker rear slope permitted defending Marine units excellent fields of fire to the ridge crest, a major consideration in the 3/1 battalion commander’s decision to adopt a rear slope defense. Moreover, the top of the ridge could be swept with direct fire from the MLR as well as supporting weapons from the two nearest companies on JAMESTOWN. Opposing Marine and Chinese forces were thus lined up for a continuation of the battle for Bunker Hill.

It appeared that the Chinese wished to attempt a diversionary tactic of their own. To draw attention away from Hill 122 they engaged a Marine outpost east of Bunker and a KMC ambush far to the left before attacking Bunker again. In the KMC sector, shortly after 2300, an enemy infantry platoon walked into a trap near the eastern edge of the Sachon and 500 yards south of the Munsan-ni-Kaesong rail line. The brief fire fight lasted only 10 minutes before the Chinese broke contact.

Perhaps the ambush was incidental to the forthcoming attack against the Bunker complex, but this same reasoning cannot be applied to the Communist-inspired action which broke out shortly at Hill 48A, Stromboli, another friendly outpost far to the east of Hill 122. Near the right limiting point of Colonel Layer’s 1st Marines and the 5th Marines boundary, Stromboli was another Marine fire-team-by-day, squad-by-night position. It occupied a small rise 250 yards forward of the MLR and commanded the immediate sector in all directions. The entire MLR in the regimental right was dominated by the enemy-held Hill 104, a half-mile north of 48A.

Communist infantry opened the attack without benefit of any supporting arms preparation and rushed to seize Hill 48A early on the morning of 13 August, a few minutes after midnight. Defending Marines immediately responded with small arms and automatic weapons fire. By the time the outpost commander had informed battalion of the attack by radio, the far right sector of the 1st Marines line, held by Captain Clarence G. Moody, Jr.’s Company F, had also come under attack. Firing rifles and submachine guns and hurling hand grenades as they assaulted the main position, the Chinese attempted to penetrate the JAMESTOWN defenses. In spite of the enemy’s concerted efforts, the Marine line remained staunch.

At Stromboli, the Communists met with no greater success, although they did cause enough casualties to warrant the dispatch of a Company F reinforcing squad. When this unit left the MLR, at 0106 on 13 August, the Marine line was still under a heavy attack not only from Chinese infantry but from hostile artillery and mortars as well. Out at Hill 48A the outpost remained in comparative quiet until the approach of the reinforcing party. As the Company F squad neared the base of the hill, Chinese infantry that earlier had been assaulting the Marine MLR turned their rifle and machine gun fire from positions on the JAMESTOWN side of the outpost. A heavy rain of devastating mortar fire engulfed the reinforcing Marines. On order, they broke off the approach march and returned to the company rear area.

On the main line, meanwhile, Company F positions were still being bombarded by Chinese artillery and assaulted by their infantry. Casualties along the entire line forced Lieutenant Colonel Batterton to order his 1st Provisional Platoon, Headquarters and Service Company, 2/1, to the Company F command post. After the clutch unit departed the battalion area, at 0210, and approached Captain Moody’s CP, enemy fires immediately intensified. A violent fight erupted to the left of the Company F sector, but the Marines there held. The Chinese then tried to punch holes in other parts of the company line, moving eastward along JAMESTOWN. Each failure to breach the line seemed to signal a decrease in the intensity of Chinese shelling.

This easing of Communist pressure against the main line enabled the Company F commander to put into operation a new attempt at the reinforcement and rescue of Stromboli. After the initial enemy assault in the early hours of 13 August had ended in failure, the Chinese made repeated attempts to capture the outpost. At one time it appeared that a company of Chinese had overrun the hill. Later, however, the Stromboli stronghold radioed that the enemy force, subsequently identified as only a platoon, had encircled the Marine position. To relieve enemy pressure at Hill 48A, Captain Moody employed a rifle platoon which set out for the outpost at 0325.

Simultaneously, as if their intelligence had advance knowledge of the 1st Marines recovery plan, the Chinese stepped up the tempo of their attack at Stromboli. A fresh assault by the enemy was stymied by Marine superiority in hand-to-hand combat. Thereafter, close-in defensive fires continued to ring the outpost and to discourage future assaults. The approach of the second Marine rescue party eliminated much of the pressure that Communist foot soldiers had maintained around the hill position. After a 90-minute exchange of fire with the enemy, the friendly platoon penetrated the encirclement and rushed to the besieged outpost at the hill crest. At this point the Chinese disengaged and withdrew towards the north.

After their diversion against Stromboli had approached the proportions of a full-scale attack, with the enemy having reinforced from platoon to company size, the Chinese then initiated their main thrust, an attempt to retake Bunker. Captain Connolly (I/3/1) had reported that shortly before 0100 Communist mortar fire had begun falling on his positions on the southern slope of Bunker Hill. Simultaneously, Chinese artillery stepped up the rate of its barrage fires as did the assaulting close-in enemy infantry. Captain Connolly then requested the 11th Marines to place box-me-in fires around the Marine company positions on Hill 122. Artillery furnished these defensive fires almost immediately.

Shortly after 0130, the Marines in the center and right of the I/3/1 position observed a large number of Chinese, deployed into a skirmish line, headed directly for their part of the hill. The attack was accompanied by intense machine gun and rifle fire. It was countered by an equally heavy reply from Marines on Bunker. For nearly four hours the battle raged at Hill 122. Unsuccessful enemy frontal assaults were followed by attempts to dislodge the defenders from the rear. In their continuing thrust against the hill, the Chinese were repulsed by Marine coordinated support fires—tank, rocket, artillery, and mortar.

By firing on known or suspected assembly areas and Chinese infantry units advancing up the draws towards Hill 122, these Marine supporting weapons helped to preserve the status quo at Bunker. Repeated box-me-ins were also fired by the 11th Marines during the early-morning Communist attacks on 13 August. Exploding friendly mortar shells increased the effectiveness of the hill defense; nine rocket ripples183 fired by the artillery regiment further supported Marines at the critical terrain position. Tanks unleashed their deadly fire on nearby enemy outposts to neutralize them; their 90mm guns, aided by the battlefield illumination from tank fighting lights, helped eliminate Chinese foot soldiers attempting to envelop Marine positions on Bunker.

It was in this direction that an enemy force, estimated at reinforced battalion strength, headed during the early morning fighting on Hill 122. At 0330, the struggle for possession of the height had reached the climax. For an hour the issue remained in doubt. Then, as the Chinese small arms fire decreased, the tempo of the enemy’s artillery shelling increased. This, the division correctly deduced, announced the beginning of a temporary Communist withdrawal from Bunker Hill.

Although the immediate danger of the enemy onslaught had ended for the time being, Marines to the rear of the JAMESTOWN Line stepped up their defensive preparations. Division, regimental, and battalion operational plans were put into effect to prevent a Chinese victory. The seriousness of the situation on the 1st Marines right flank at Stromboli early on 13 August had resulted in the movement of one company of 5th Marines into blocking positions behind the MLR near the left regimental boundary. To the south of Bunker Hill, relief and replacement units from the division reserve, ordered into action late the previous day, maneuvered into position to strengthen the regimental front. One of these relief units, G/3/7, under command of Captain William M. Vanzuyen, had just deployed from its assembly area to pass through the ranks of an MLR company and take over the Bunker Hill positions. The Marines’ situation on Hill 122 had deteriorated so rapidly, however, that the 3/1 commander rushed two reinforced squads forward from I/3/7, the nearest MLR unit.

The Company G reinforcement unit jumped off from JAMESTOWN and arrived at Bunker shortly after sunup, where it reinforced Captain Connolly’s positions during the height of the battle for possession of Hill 122. Not long after, the Chinese initiated their withdrawal under cover of increased artillery and mortar barrages. As they left, the Communists policed the battlefield in their typically thorough manner. A Marine platoon that swept the northern slope of Bunker failed to find any enemy bodies in this area so recently abandoned by the Chinese, but did take under fire and kill seven enemy that had remained on Hill 122.

Before I/3/1 had sent one of its platoons to reconnoiter the far side of Bunker Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage ordered H/3/7, under Captain John G. Demas, forward to relieve friendly forces at the contested height. The exchange of units was completed before noon of the 13th. By late afternoon, except for Company H, all 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines units that had moved up to reinforce the 1st Marines were on their way back to the regimental reserve area. At this time the 1st Marines CO, Colonel Layer, reported to General Selden that the Bunker Hill action during 12–13 August had resulted in 24 Marines killed and 214 wounded. On the right, in the 2d Battalion sector, an additional 40 Marines were listed as casualties, including 7 killed in the Stromboli defense. Chinese known dead numbered 210, plus an estimated 470 killed and 625 wounded.184 Artillery and aerial observers reported that between 1500 on the 12th and 0600 the following morning an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 rounds of enemy fire had fallen on 1st Marines positions, the “heaviest incoming fires received by the Division since coming into the present sector.”185

The number of casualties from the Bunker Hill action was to increase further that same day with a renewed attack on the outpost. Before the Chinese again engaged Hill 122, however, they made a diversionary attack on the western flank at the extreme left of the 3/1 sector. At dusk on 13 August, the enemy shelled the Company G Marines at COP 2, the critical height overlooking the Panmunjom peace corridor. The shelling caused several casualties and lasted 90 minutes. Towards the end, Communist infantrymen moved forward and fired on the outpost. At about the same time, Company H personnel emplaced on the MLR to the rear of COP 2 began to receive artillery rounds in preassault proportions.

A ground attack in this western end of the 3/1 sector did not materialize, however. Instead, the Chinese resumed their attack on Bunker Hill. Since their temporary withdrawal early on the 13th, the CCF had repeatedly sent mortar and artillery barrages against the bastion to harass its new occupants. On occasion these well-aimed mortar rounds found their mark. Mortars interdicting a trail used for resupply of the Hill 122 defenders did inflict some casualties on two groups rushing emergency supplies forward from the MLR.

At 2100, while continuing his shelling of the left end of the 3/1 sector, the enemy lifted his preparation on Hill 122 to permit a CCF reinforced company to make a new assault there on the Marine defenders. Captain Demas called for box-me-ins to seal off his positions and illumination shells to help locate the enemy force. Utilizing the draw to the east of Hill 58A, the Chinese proceeded west to Bunker where they pitted one platoon against the center of the Company H, 3/7 line and another against the right flank. Defensive fires momentarily held off the intruders, although some were able to break through to the Marines’ fighting positions.

Those enemy troops who penetrated the Marine defenses were quickly eliminated by grenades and small arms fire. Unable to weaken the Marine defenses any further and by now sustaining sizable casualties from unrelenting Marine artillery and mortar concentrations, the Communists withdrew at 2215. Marine defenders estimated they had killed 175 enemy during this latest encounter; a firm count of 20 bodies were found on the shell-torn slopes. Company H casualties, all from enemy mortar and artillery fire, were 7 killed and 21 wounded.186 Enemy incoming was again heavy during this period, with a reported 3,000 rounds falling in the sector.

In the 3d Battalion sector, Marine and KSC stretcher bearers brought casualties to the I/3/1 CP, several hundred yards to the rear of the front line. At the command post, the critically wounded were airlifted by helicopter to the rear. Less seriously wounded casualties were placed in jeep ambulances and carried to the battalion forward aid station, about two miles away. Here a team of doctors and corpsmen examined and treated patients, discharged a few, but prepared most for further evacuation. At the 1st Marines forward aid station, patients were reexamined and their wounds redressed when required; discharge or further evacuation was also accomplished. Most of the Marines brought to this forward facility had become exhausted from vigorous activity in the high temperature and humidity which characterized the South Korean summer. The regimental aid station treated these heat cases and then released them to their units.

Company B Returns to Bunker Hill187

Division intelligence subsequently reported that the 2100 attack on 13 August had been made by an enemy battalion with a reinforced company in assault. This same unit again sent a small band of Chinese soldiers against Hill 122 at 0225 the following morning. This clash was to be the briefest of all offensives for control of Bunker Hill during the 11–17 August period. Prior to launching this four-minute fire fight, an enemy machine gun at Siberia had attempted to harass the Marines at Bunker Hill. In retaliation, Marine tanks illuminated this enemy weapon with their searchlights and immediately took it under fire with their 90mm guns, knocking it out of action. At the same time, enemy artillery attempted to shell friendly tanks. During this brief fire exchange, one tanker was wounded slightly and the lens of one fighting light was splintered by fragments from enemy shells bursting around the tanks. The inconsequential probe was made, Marines believed, not so much to seriously challenge Marines holding Hill 122 as it was to retrieve CCF dead and wounded from the major attack a few hours earlier that night.

Anticipating that a much heavier ground attack was close at hand, the 1st Marines ordered a reinforcement of the Bunker Hill position. Even before the heavy action on the 13th, this machinery had been set in motion. To this end, the 3d Battalion was to reinforce the Bunker defense by sending a 1/1 platoon to the hill and the 2d Battalion was instructed to return Company A (minus this platoon) to the reserve battalion. At 0415 on the 14th, Company E/2/1, led since 10 August by Captain Stanley T. Moak, took over from A/1/1 the responsibility for the 2d Battalion’s MLR “Siberia sector,” adjacent to the Bunker Hill area held by the 3d Battalion. The Company A reinforcing platoon arrived at Hill 122 just before dusk, preceding another CCF company attack by only a few hours.

At midnight the 1st Marines front was suspiciously quiet for a few minutes. Forward on Hill 122, there was no apparent enemy activity. Captain Demas sent out a two fire-team patrol from Bunker to reconnoiter northwest of Bunker towards the Chinese lines. Shortly after the eight Marines returned with a negative report of contact with the enemy, the regiment received a report about the outbreak of a small arms clash between defenders on the left flank of Bunker and an enemy unit farther west. At 0118 on 15 August what had initially appeared to be a minor contest suddenly erupted into a heated fire fight all along the 124–122 Bunker Ridge complex. At the request of Captain Dumas, Marine artillery fired protective boxes around the Bunker positions. This defensive maneuver held the attackers in check.

At this moment, Chinese infantrymen in the draw running alongside the 124–122–120 ridge system were massed for an assault on Bunker from the northeast. The plan might have been successful had not a fighting light from a tank on the main line intercepted the Communists in this state of their preparations. In a matter of moments, friendly artillery, mortar, and tank fire struck the Chinese and scattered the formation.

After discovering he could not successfully pull a sneak attack, the enemy reverted to his usual procedure, employing a preassault bombardment prior to his infantry assault. This preparation began at 0206; it reached the rate of approximately 100 rounds of 82 and 122mm mortar shells per minute. While supporting weapons pounded the Marines, the Chinese assault commander reorganized his attack force that the Marine shelling had scattered. Communist infantry then moved forward and fired on the Bunker Marines, who replied with rifles and machine guns and box-me-in fires. Unable to penetrate this protective mask around the positions, the Chinese gradually decreased their small arms and artillery fire until, at 0315, the rate of exploding shells at Hill 122 had dropped to only four or five per minute. Soon thereafter the small arms fire slacked off entirely and by 0400 even the mortars had stopped. Across the entire 1st Marines front, all was quiet again.

During the Company H defense of the hill, enemy losses, caused mostly by friendly artillery and mortar fire, were placed at 350, including 40 counted dead. Captain Demas’ Marines suffered 35 casualties, of whom 7 were killed. En route to the MLR after relief by B/3/1, the company suffered four more casualties, including two KIAs, all the victims of Chinese mortars.

It was not long before these weapons inflicted casualties on Company B, which had six of its men wounded even before the H/3/7 unit had reached JAMESTOWN. Another Marine at Bunker was wounded by enemy mortars later that morning. At 1640 the Communists again probed Bunker Hill, this time in company strength. Striking in daylight during a thunderstorm and without any preparatory fires, the Chinese attackers failed to achieve any tactical surprise. The defenders fired both infantry and supporting weapons; some threw grenades at the few Communists who did manage to get close to the fighting positions. At 1750, the Chinese withdrew, this time leaving 35 of their dead in the attack area. Four Marines had been wounded; five others suffering from battle fatigue were later evacuated.

Exactly when the enemy would strike next at Bunker Hill was not known by the Marines. Most believed that the Communists would return but only speculated as to when. Although the battalion felt that “the enemy was not expected to attack again for some time,”188 events were to prove otherwise. In any case, the battalion was prepared, having an adequate force on Bunker and sufficient local reserves to absorb an attack up to the strength of any received so far. Division supporting arms were readily available for commitment at critical points.

The Chinese soon put an end to the conjecture about the next attack. At 0040, 16 August, an enemy force, later estimated as a battalion, came out of positions to the west and north of Hill 122. Supported by mortars at first, and later on by artillery, the battalion sent one company against the Marine outpost. Several attacking elements were able to penetrate the defensive fires. These Chinese reached the crest of the hill and began using their rifles, automatic weapons, and hand grenades against the defenders. Captain Scranton called for reinforcements. A platoon from I/3/7 was dispatched promptly from the 3/1 sector. The reinforcements departed JAMESTOWN just as the fire fight on Bunker began to subside. By 0315, the enemy had begun his withdrawal, and another reinforcing element, I/3/1, had moved forward, this time from regiment to Lieutenant Colonel Armitage’s CP.

About two hours later a brief fire fight flared up in the Company B sector. No ground assault was made on Marine positions. The enemy force, of undetermined strength, never closed with the Marines and within 10 minutes, the firing stopped. No casualties to the Marines resulted during this exchange. The earlier clash had resulted in the death of 3 Marines and the wounding of 27. Enemy losses were estimated at 40 killed and 30 wounded.

Before it came off the hill, Company B was engaged by enemy fire three more times. At 1945, Chinese mortars (82mm) wounded two Marines. Later, heavier mortars placed 20 rounds on Hill 122, but these caused no casualties. There were some losses, however, early on the morning of the 17th when C/1/1 was relieving the Bunker defenders. Captain Scranton’s Marines sustained five more wounded from automatic weapons, five during the relief.

The second relief of Company B on Bunker brought to a close the battle that had been waged for possession of the vital hill complex. During the Hill 122 tours of Company C and other 1st Marines units that followed in August, seven more ground actions tested the Bunker Hill defenses. Only one of them, during the night of 25–26 August, was of significant size. This attack also failed to dislodge the Marines from the hill.

Supporting Arms at Bunker Hill189

It was quite natural that the flurry of ground activity during the battle of Bunker Hill created a need for increased participation from Marine supporting arms. The magnitude of infantry action during the contest for Hill 122 resulted in a monthly record to date in 1952 for the amount of air support received as well as the volume of both artillery and tank fires supporting the division. During this critical 9–16 August period, the 11th Marines played a part in every ground action except the feint attack on Siberia and the seizure of Bunker Hill, both of which were purposely executed without an artillery preparation. Medium tanks fired day and night missions during most of the infantry action. Close air support at times amounted to a strike every 20 minutes.

During the ground action around Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli, the division received close air support in amounts unparalleled for JAMESTOWN Marines to that time. Marine and U.S. Air Force pilots flew a total of 458 missions (including 27 ground controlled MPQ-14 radar bombing attacks) during five of the most critical days, 9–13 August. On two of them, the 1st Marine Division received priority of close air support along the whole EUSAK front. Fifth Air Force assigned 1st MAW aircraft to Marine requests for close air support as long as Marine aircraft were available.

The initial air strike by Marines in the Bunker fighting was on 9 August in support of counterattack plans for Siberia. MAG-33 provided a morning and evening flight of four F9F jet fighters to destroy enemy forces and defensive works on 58A (Siberia). USAF fighter-bombers attacked Siberia and other outposts nearby and enemy artillery positions supporting the Chinese forward line. On the next day, air operations, concentrating on Siberia, were stepped up considerably against enemy outposts. Thirty-five aircraft in nine missions attacked 58A with bombs, rockets, and napalm. These strikes were carried out by MAG-12 and U.S. Air Force pilots at irregular intervals during daylight hours. Air controllers reported good results. Other aircraft hit known mortar locations capable of supporting the Chinese. During the morning, Marine Attack Squadron 121 (Lieutenant Colonel Philip “L” Crawford) bombed and burned Bunker Hill. Just before sunset, F-80 and -84 jets of the U.S. Air Force dropped 15 tons of bombs on mortar positions and troops on and around Hill 120. Four F-80s also participated with eight Marine AD-2 propeller-driven attack aircraft in the morning attack on Bunker.

Air activity in support of the 1st Marines continued unabated on 11 August. Before the diversionary ground attack just after dusk that day, Marine and Fifth Air Force fliers repeated the treatment that Hills 58A and 122 had received the previous day. During daylight, supporting weapons positions were hit by FAF fighter planes. At night, MAG-12 air attacks guided by the MPQ-14 radar bombing system destroyed hostile artillery and mortars. Also during the dark, the medium bombers of the FEAF Bomber Command struck deeper in the rear at heavy weapons locations.

These Air Force bombers conducted four more controlled-bombing attacks against Chinese artillery during the early hours of 12 August, when Company B was consolidating its positions and hastily organizing the defense of Bunker Hill. After daylight and until dusk, MAGs-12 and -33 and USAF squadrons provided four-plane flights to strike troop assembly areas, supporting weapons positions, and observation posts close to Hill 122. In late afternoon, Marine pilots in four F9F Panther jets and three ADs bombed and burned the enemy side of Bunker Hill during the shelling and subsequent ground attack against the Marines on the eastern slope.

Marines flew, on 13 August, all of the daylight close air support missions in support of the actions on both Bunker in the center and Stromboli in the right of the 1st Marines sector. On 13 August, a total of 94 aircraft were committed over the regimental sector to conduct strikes in support of ground operations. Enemy Hill 104, commanding the 2/1 outpost on 48A (Stromboli), received four attacks. Fighter bombers (F4U propeller-driven Corsairs) carrying napalm, rockets, and 1,000-pound bombs, raided the hill mass at 0535. The other strikes against this key terrain-feature were made by attack and fighter aircraft during the afternoon. Other targets on the regimental right were weapons positions beyond Hill 104 and an enemy outpost one thousand yards west of Stromboli.

Most of the air support received by the 1st Marines on the 13th was directed against targets that were participating—or that were capable of taking part—in the battle on Bunker Hill. Against the enemy on the height itself, the Marines directed only three strikes, and these came late in the morning. A majority of the air attacks were dispatched against observation and command posts and the firing positions of both automatic and large caliber weapons. Chinese artillery and mortar fire had inflicted more casualties and punishment on the Marines than the enemy infantry assaults. As a consequence, the main effort of the close air support strikes was directed against these hostile supporting weapons.

After dark on the 13th, VMF(N)-513 commanded by Colonel Peter D. Lambrecht,190 took up the air offensive against the heavy firing positions in the rear of the enemy line. The squadron conducted four attacks with its night fighters. Two of its attacks were made just before sunrise.

During the remainder of the battle of Bunker Hill, the ground fighting subsided and the requirement for close air support abated accordingly. On the 14th, only four daylight strikes were flown in the 1st Marines area. These, all by Marine squadrons, were against active artillery and mortars in the defilade of Hill 120 and others to the west on the far slope of Hill 123, and Chinese outpost positions, west of 48A, which had been pestering the Stromboli garrison. There were no flights after dark on the 14th, but on the following night, two MPQ missions were flown by VMF(N)-513. Each was a single plane flight against a reported artillery location. This was the final night air action in the battle for Bunker Hill. Daylight missions in support of Hill 122 defense after the sharp decrease of attacks on the 14th numbered only seven attacks, each by four planes. These, flown by Marines, continued to emphasize the destruction of enemy artillery.

Marine artillery continued its support of ground troops and air strikes. Cannoneers of the 11th Marines fired 21 flak suppression missions during the five days beginning on 11 August. This type of close coordination between Marine supporting arms further reduced combat losses of aircraft providing CAS to the division. The Marine artillerymen had played a vital part in the defense of the besieged outposts. Lieutenant Colonel Armitage credited the box-me-in fires with an important role in thwarting each enemy attack on Bunker.191

In the 24-hour period beginning at 1800 on 12 August, Marine artillery directly supporting the 1st Marines fired 10,652 rounds. Most of the ammunition was expended in support of the Bunker Hill defense; some was used in behalf of the Marines outposting Stromboli during the Communists’ early morning diversion that day. On the 9th, the direct support battalion, 3/11 (Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Rogers), had fired about one-fourth of the 12–13 August total. Many of the shells that first day of the Bunker battle were preparatory to counterattacks for regaining Siberia.

When the retaking of Hill 58A was discarded in favor of the surprise attack on 122, the amount of artillery support was reduced, during the 1st Marines infantry preparations on the 10th and 11th, in keeping with the fire support plan. Upon seizure of Bunker, Lieutenant Colonel Rogers’ business immediately picked up and quickly reached a crescendo the following day, when the 10,652 shells fired became a Marine one-day battalion record for western Korea until the last stages of fighting in 1953. Other Marine artillery battalions fired reinforcing missions during the critical period as did the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery which fired a large number of on-call ripples. The regimental commander later recalled that “during some of the crises every gun that could bear on Bunker in the 11th Marines and reinforcing units was shooting there.”192

After a sharp drop on the 14th, the artillery support gradually decreased in proportion to the amount and strength of the enemy’s action against Hill 122. By 20 August, 3/11 was firing only 244 rounds a day. Only on the 26th, during a serious Chinese attempt to retake Bunker, did the number of artillery rounds match the intensity of the fire support rendered during the earlier part of the month.

It was not only the quantity of 11th Marines support that the infantry called for during the battle of Bunker Hill; quality was equally important. A majority of the more than 28,000 rounds that 3/11 fired during the eight days of Bunker Hill fell around the besieged outposts. Many rounds were fired in defense of MLR positions. In both of these types of protective fires, extreme accuracy and precision were required due to the proximity of enemy and friendly lines in order to prevent any “short” rounds from falling among Marine positions. Lieutenant Colonel Armitage recalled that during the height of the battle on the night of 12 August, “we did have a bad scare ... when Captain Connolly reported that friendly mortar fire was falling short.”193 The battalion immediately ceased fire with its 60mms, 81mms, and 4.2s and each piece was checked; the culprit was quickly located and within 5–10 minutes 3/1 resumed fire.

During the August battle, artillery in general support of the entire division and I Corps artillery reinforcing the fires of Colonel Henderson’s regiment, stepped up their efforts to destroy the distant and more difficult targets, including mortars and artillery. These continued to be the main cause of Marine casualties. Some of the labors of the 11th Marines gun crews did silence enemy heavy weapons, but personnel losses from enemy shellings still mounted, especially in the infantry units. To assist in the location and destruction of the enemy artillery, aerial observers spent considerable time in spotting and fixing Chinese weapons positions.

Besides these counterbattery efforts, the 11th Marines employed other artillery means to provide the additional support the 1st Marine Division requested during Bunker Hill. Two of these were the counter-counterbattery and the countermortar programs, the former being a passive defense-deception program to minimize Chinese counterbattery fires against 11th Marines weapons. Nearly every day C Battery, 17th Field Artillery Battalion, fired special request missions.194 Another type of fire, flak suppression, aided the cause of close air support pilots delivering ordnance against those Chinese positions taking Bunker Hill and Stromboli under fire. At night, illumination shells helped outpost and frontline Marines in locating groups of enemy massing for assault on Hill 122.

Mortars (4.2-inch) of the 1st Marines contributed heavily to the defense of the outposts. Operations reached a peak on 12–13 August when, in a 24-hour period, Captain Carl H. Benson’s mortar company fired 5,952 rounds—4,084 high explosive and 1,868 illuminating. In addition to their defensive fires, these hard-hitting weapons attacked Chinese mortars, automatic weapons, defensive positions, and troop formations with deadly accuracy.

No less precise and lethal were the fires of Captain Gene M. McCain’s gun tanks (Company C, 1st Tank Battalion), and the battalion flame tanks. Three of the latter had fired their 105s in support of the KMC on the morning of the 9th before the vehicles received orders to move east to join Company C temporarily. On the next day, 90s fired on enemy bunkers, observation posts, and trenches in the vicinity of Siberia and Stromboli. During 11 August, two gun tanks blasted at targets immediately beyond Siberia and others to the west of that outpost.

Towards the end of the 11th, the critical part of Bunker battle began for the tankers also. Those elements of Lieutenant Colonel John I. Williamson’s battalion supporting the diversion and the subsequent main attack pulled into positions south of Hill 122 on the MLR and to the right in the Company F sector. It was not until the next day that the tanks operating with the 1st Marines reached a peak in gun support for the Bunker fight. Beginning with the defense of Hill 122 from 1600 that day, and for the next 26 hours, the tankers placed 817 shells on targets effecting the Chinese capability of capturing Bunker and Stromboli. In addition to the heavy ammunition, the Company C tanks, augmented by the 1st Marines antitank platoon and five tanks from the division tank reserve, fired 32,000 rounds of .30 caliber machine gun ammunition.

Except on the 11th, most of the tank firing in the fight for Bunker Hill through 14 August was accomplished during the hours of darkness. On the latter date, the cannons and machine guns of the mediums blasted directly at Chinese outposts opposite Colonel Layer’s regiment. The number of rounds that day fell off considerably from the high on the 13th; on the 15th the tanks in the 1st Marines area did not fire at all. Heavy rain that had accompanied the late afternoon thundershower that day made movement forward to firing positions impractical. By the next day, however, the ground was solid enough to permit some maneuvering by the tracked vehicles. They fired 52 rounds of 90mm shells and 14,750 machine gun rounds at automatic weapons positions and bunkers on the western slope of Hill 122. This marked the final tank mission in support of the 1st Marines in the battle for Bunker Hill.

During the early part of the August fighting, tanks of the division were able to get the first real test of a technique of night support,195 and at the same time experiment with a towing device to permit retrieval of disabled vehicles under fire without getting outside the tank. The use of the lights to support both the diversionary force and the defense of Hill 122 showed the value of these instruments. Lieutenant Colonel Williamson recommended that tanks be employed in pairs, one to spot and adjust fire and the other to fire. With respect to the towing device, he considered the new piece of equipment an improvement over the manual hook-up method, but noted that the device limited tank maneuverability and had a tendency when bouncing up and down over rough terrain to dig into the ground, impeding the forward progress of the vehicle.

In Retrospect196