The actual training of troops must be completed in the company. Combat by an independent company is the exception; combat by battalion the rule. By the consolidation of four companies into one unit, the battalion, consisting of 800-1,000 rifles, is formed. The French Chasseur battalions are the only ones that consist of six companies, because their proposed independent employment, for instance, in mountain warfare, makes it more often necessary to detach small units than is the case in operations on more favorable terrain.

In the four-company organization the battalion possesses an asset which enables it to adapt itself easily to any combat situation. The battalion organization is the outgrowth of practical necessity; the regimental commander cannot handle 12-16 companies without difficulty, and an intermediate unit, the battalion, is necessary. The battalion is the practical, and the regiment, consisting of 3 or 4 battalions, the ideal unit. Regiments consisting of two battalions do not possess the same advantages, as the regimental staff becomes superfluous during each necessary division of the regiment. Two battalion regiments do indeed facilitate command; they are, however, more expensive in time of peace and are of advantage in action only when formed into brigades of six battalions each, in which case the commander has a compactly organized reserve available.

“The regiment, by reason of its history, the uniformity of its training, the esprit de corps of its officers, and its division into three battalions—thereby facilitating subdivision—is pre-eminently fitted for carrying out definite combat tasks.” (Par. 470 German I. D. R.). A glance at the map of the battle of Vionville (5B of the German General Staff work on the Franco-German war) shows that regiments, whenever they entered the field intact, fought as unbroken units throughout the battle, whereas brigade organizations were frequently broken up.

This breaking up of brigades is practically induced by the two regiment brigade organization. (Par. 471 German I. D. R.). When once the brigade commander has assigned sections or points of attack to his regiments, there remains very little for him to do. He can form a reserve only by taking two battalions from one regiment, or one battalion from each. The brigade is, however, not like the regiment, an entity of bodies of troops, but a unit assembled for tactical purposes, which may, without regard to the whole, be increased or diminished by one or more battalions in case of necessity. On the march and in action the brigade organization as a subdivision of the division cannot always be maintained; groups are frequently formed in which the normal units must be broken up. In large battles the brigade is the largest force which may yet be employed as an intact unit, although the employment of infantry by regiments will continue to be the rule. Brigade commanders are necessary for decreasing units of command and desirable for relieving the division commanders of a part of their work. In time of peace brigade commanders are useful for directing recruitment and, moreover, as connecting links between regiments and the division. The unmistakable advantages of the three-battalion organization have induced the United States to form its brigades of three regiments, each of three battalions (of 400 men each). An English division consists of three brigades of four battalions each.

4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.[45]

Earth as a covering material and, incidental thereto, the adoption of the small spade after the Russo-Turkish war, have increased in importance owing to the greater penetrating power of the modern infantry bullets. The disadvantages of the spade lie in the danger of its being misused and in the consequent impairment of offensive spirit. There is, moreover, danger that the fire effect will be impaired and subordinated to considerations of cover. The spade should therefore not be employed on every occasion, but only when the tactical purpose in view requires it.

What the weight of the portable intrenching equipment of the Japanese, Russian, and British infantry will be, is still undecided, but experiments are being made with a uniform tool. When we consider, that for the purpose of intrenching, one man requires a space of 1.20 m., and for handling his rifle a space of 0.8 m., and that when intrenching under fire all the men cannot work, it is obvious that it would be impracticable to equip each man with an intrenching tool. According to all experience, it is sufficient to furnish every other man with spade or pick. In addition to this, however, a company requires a large number of wire cutters. Only the French infantry is equipped with explosives, every regiment having 108 cartridges.

The following table shows the intrenching tool equipment available in each battalion:

5. THE LOAD OF THE INFANTRYMAN.

The load carried by the infantryman should not exceed one-third of the man’s weight (84 kg.), or not more than 28 kg. According to the “Regulations for the Employment of Infantry Equipment, M/95,” the load of a soldier whose height is 1.67 m. (the equipment consisting of new experimental pieces) is about 27 kg., distributed as follows:

COMPARISON.[51]

II. THE FORMATIONS.

1. THE ISSUE OF ORDERS.

Troops are set in motion by words of command, and, when these do not suffice, by orders. (Orders give information of the situation and the intentions of the commander, and assign tasks, but leave the recipient free to choose the method of carrying them out). When commands are given from a distance, time and energy may be saved by employing the telephone and visual signals. To these may be added shouts, signs, and the following signals: To advance, the leader raises the arm; to indicate that the command is to follow him, he extends his raised arm in the direction of march; to halt, he lowers the arm; to deploy, both arms are raised laterally to the height of the shoulders, and if necessary the direction the skirmish line is to take is subsequently indicated with one extended arm; to assemble his men, the leader describes a circle above his head with one arm. These signals may also be made with the sabre or rifle. Additional signals should be agreed upon beforehand in each separate case. If a signal is made to a body of troops in close order, it is meant, in the first place, for its leader. (Par. 11 German I. D. R.). Other signals, such as those indicating a change of direction of march, or a change in the battle formation, must be specially agreed upon beforehand. Trumpet signals are only used by troops in garrison at drills, and in barracks or billets as service calls. To prevent troops from misunderstanding signals or from obeying those not intended for them, all trumpet calls in battle, except “charge,” “fix bayonet,” and “attention,” are forbidden.

2. THE PURPOSE OF FORMATIONS. COMPARISON BETWEEN LINE AND COLUMN.

The object of assembly formations is to unite troops, usually prior to a movement, in a restricted space permitting an easy survey of the entire body. Assembly formations serve also the purpose of placing troops in readiness before starting on a march, before beginning an action, and for moving them on the battlefield when out of reach of hostile fire (columns). Route formations should permit an orderly, comfortable march of the troops, as much of the available width of road being used as possible, a space being left for orderlies and mounted messengers, and for troops which are drawn forward. In order to permit a prompt deployment of troops for action, it is necessary to reduce their depth. Columns only are suitable for moving troops. The situation existing at the moment will determine to what extent allowances may be made for the comfort of the troops, or how far considerations of comfort should be ignored in view of readiness for action, and to what extent the depth of the columns should be decreased.

The formations for moving troops (to be employed in marching across country and to be used on the battlefield) should be such as to cause the least discomfort to the troops, should make it possible to avoid obstacles, to utilize cover, facilitate changes of front and direction of march, and permit a prompt deployment in any direction. These formations are columns unless the hostile fire effect makes a deployment into line necessary.

Battle formations should be such as to permit the employment of all weapons (rifles, lances, sabres, and guns). This requirement is not satisfied by columns, but only by the line. Modern fire effect excludes every employment of close order formations under effective hostile fire and compels the most extensive deployment.

Whether line or column is the preferable battle formation is a question belonging to a bygone age. The battles of the British in Spain and at Waterloo, the engagement at Groszbeeren, and the attack of the six battalions of Borke’s Brigade (the 8th) at the Katzbach,[61] amply demonstrate that the defeat of the Prussians at Jena was not due to the employment of linear battle formations alone. In a fight with an equal opponent, formed in columns, well trained and disciplined troops, formed in line that allows of the use of all the rifles and is suitable for shock action as well, have always carried off the victory.[62] On the other hand, in the battles of the Empire we find columns formed, which of necessity excluded a large part of the men from participation in the action, but which were designed to break through the hostile battle line by sheer momentum. At Wagram, Macdonald’s Corps was formed with eight deployed battalions in rear of each other in a single column, supported on the flanks by seven and eight battalions respectively, also in column. At Austerlitz and Waterloo we find attack formations in which from eight to twelve battalions of a division were deployed one in rear of the other at distances of twenty paces. Column and line must be examined with reference to their mobility, their vulnerability and their fire and shock power.

The column possesses greater mobility and is better adapted than the line for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of the cover afforded by the ground. In a column steadiness and shock power (produced by the crowding forward of the ranks in rear) and the influence exerted by the officers, is greater than in a line.

The line is more dependent on the terrain in its movements. The characteristics of the line are great frontal fire power, weakness of the flanks, difficulty of quickly changing front, and the ever present danger of being pierced. The line has been called the formation of the bold, the column that of the weak.

On account of the increased penetrating power of infantry projectiles, especially at short ranges, a column will suffer greater losses than a line; at longer ranges the curvature of the trajectory causes bullets which pass over the first echelon to strike the second or third. On ground falling with respect to the line of sight, lines, and on ground rising with respect to the line of sight, columns are exposed to greater losses when they come within the beaten zone.[64]

3. THE COMPANY.

(a) Formation of the Company.
(Par. 83 German I. D. R.).

In the company the files are placed in two ranks according to height from right to left. Each four files form a squad or group, and the entire company is divided into three platoons (Züge). When a platoon consists of more than three squads it is divided into two sections (Halbzüge).

In the normal formation of the company, the three platoons, each in two ranks,[65] are posted on a line in numerical order from right to left. This formation facilitates firing and in garrison meets the requirements of barrack life, each two squads forming a section (Korporalschaft) under a non-commissioned officer. During the campaign of 1866 Prince Frederick Charles gave permission to arrange companies so that friends and relatives could serve together in the same squad or section. A company formed in this fashion would, of course, not look so well on parade as one formed regularly, the men according to height from right to left flank, but it would without doubt give a better account of itself in action. For details of the formation of a company and division into fractions see pars. 82-85, German I. D. R. The squad leaders and the two range finders in each platoon are posted as file closers at facing distance in rear of the rear rank of the company.

The non-commissioned officers are posted in the front rank, on the flanks and in the center of the platoons in Russia, Austria, and Switzerland. In Germany and Italy they are all posted in rear of the line as file closers, and it is their duty to supervise the men. In France a part of the non-commissioned officers are posted in the front rank, the remainder as file closers. A German company of 200 men has a front of 100 paces, or 80 m. The infantryman with field equipment occupies a space about 75 cm. square.

FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE.

(b) Division of the Company Into Three or Four Platoons.

In Austria, France, and Italy, platoons are considered as distinct bodies, so long as they have sufficient numerical strength. They are placed side by side and constitute the company in line. In Germany and Russia the company is at each formation divided into platoons of approximately equal strength. In the armies of Austria, France, and Italy, it is contended that the soldier has nothing further to learn when once he is taken up for duty in the company. All movements are executed, after preparatory commands given by the company commanders, by commands of execution or signals given by platoon commanders. The execution of movements is retarded by this procedure and the movement itself becomes clumsy. It would also seem that the multiplicity of commands in the simple, oft-repeated movements, is superfluous, especially in the weak platoons at peace strength.

The companies of all powers, those of Germany, Japan, and Belgium excepted, are divided into four platoons; each two platoons may in addition be combined into a half-company. The German, Japanese, and Belgian companies are divided into three platoons. “The platoon is not an independent subdivision by reason of the mere fact that it consists of a certain number of men, but because the term platoon denotes a force led by a man of superior intelligence. The officer commanding the platoon makes it what it should be. The strength of the platoon is therefore solely dependent upon the number of officers available.” (von Scherff).

The obvious advantage of the three-platoon organization of the company is that fewer platoon commanders are required, which fact is well worthy of attention in the mobilization of units of both Line and Reserve, especially in view of the extraordinarily heavy casualties among the troop leaders in the course of a campaign.[66]

On the other hand, it should be remembered that in armies consisting of militia it is considerably more difficult to command a platoon of 60-70 men than to command one of 40-50 men. A disadvantage inseparably connected with the four-platoon company is the small size of the platoons during peace exercises. On account of this circumstance most regulations permit the three-platoon formation when the company is small, because platoons consisting of less than ten files are of no instructional value. An advantage of the three-platoon company is the simplicity and rapidity with which changes from one formation to another may be effected.

The three-unit column of platoons is very broad for movements on the battlefield. It offers, when numbering 200 rifles, a target about 25 m. wide and only 15 m. deep. The four-unit column of platoons is better suited for movements. With a front of 17 m., its depth is only 15 m., when the distances between platoons are assumed to be 6 paces (Austria, France, Italy, Russia, 5 paces). (See p. 62).

For a company consisting of 200 rifles, the following would be the forms: