Clausewitz, in his work On War, defines war as “a continuation of state policy by other means; an act of violence committed to force the opponent to comply with our will.” The civil code is incapable of furnishing full satisfaction to individuals in cases of outraged honor, and is obliged, under certain circumstances, to allow the injured party to obtain such satisfaction by immediate chastisement of the offender or by challenging him to a duel. In like manner there is no law which could afford nations complete satisfaction for affronts to their honor; and it is obvious that it would be as impossible to abolish war in the world, in the family of nations, as it would be to abolish dueling among the subjects of a state. The total abolition of dueling would produce the same results on the life of the individual that the cessation of wars would produce on the development of the national life of every state and on the intercourse of nations with one another. “Eternal peace,” wrote Moltke on December 11th, 1880, to Professor Bluntschli, “is a dream, and not even a beautiful one; for war is a part of God’s system in ruling the universe. In war, man develops the highest virtues; courage and unselfishness, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice even to death. Without war the world would stagnate in materialism.” Treitschke ventured a similar opinion in 1869.[1] “Every nation, especially a refined and cultured one, is apt to lapse into effeminacy and selfishness during a protracted period of peace. The unlimited comfort enjoyed by society causes not only the downfall of the state but destroys at the same time all those ideals which make life worth living. Narrow provincialism or selfish and worldly activity, looking only toward the gratification of all desires of the individual, undermines the foundations of a higher moral philosophy and the belief in ideals. Fools arrive at the vain conclusion that the life object of the individual is acquisition and enjoyment; that the purpose of the state is simply to facilitate the business affairs of its citizens; that man is appointed by an all-wise providence to buy cheaply and to sell at a profit; they conclude that war, which interferes with man’s activities, is the greatest evil, and that modern armies are only a sorry remnant of mediaeval barbarism. * * * It proves a positive blessing to such a generation if fate commits it to a great and righteous war, and the more it has become attached to the comfortable habits of mere social existence, the more violent the reaction which rouses it to warlike deeds in the service of the state. * * *” “The moment the state calls, ‘My life, my existence is at stake,’ there is aroused in a free people that highest of all virtues, the courage of self-sacrifice, which can never exist in time of peace nor be developed to such an extent by peaceful pursuits. Millions are united in the one thought—the fatherland; they are animated by that common sentiment of devotion unto death—patriotism—which, once experienced, is never again forgotten, and which ennobles and hallows the life of a whole generation. * * *” The greatness of war lies in those very phases which an effeminate civilization deems impious. “A great nation must be powerful,” exclaimed Scherr, in 1870.[2] “That is not only its duty, but its nature. If opposition is encountered, a nation is not only permitted to force a way for its righteous cause and resort to war, but it is its duty to do so. War always has been, and, so long as men and nations exist on the earth, it always will be, the ultima ratio.”
[1] Das konstitutionelle Königtum in Deutschland, in Historische und politische Aufsätze, New edition, II.
[2] Das grosze Jahr, in Hammerschläge und Historien.
Since war is the ultima ratio of state policy, and as a sovereign state must insist on absolute independence in determining its affairs and its course of action, it follows that the verdict of a court of arbitration, on the larger and more serious questions, can have a decisive influence on the action of the contending parties only if the arbitrator possesses the power to enforce his decision, and is embued with a determination to use that power. Thus the Pope was able to arbitrate the question of right between Germany and Spain as to the possession of the Caroline Islands, but a like verdict could never decide the question of might between Germany and France as to the possession of Alsace-Lorraine.[3]
[3] The constitution of the old German Confederation provided for a settlement of disputes arising among its members; this verdict was to be enforced by summary proceedings when necessary. The war of 1866 proved that the paragraphs of the constitution mentioned, of necessity had to fail the moment the vital interests of two powerful states came into conflict. See von Lettow-Vorbeck, Geschichte des Krieges von 1866, I, p. 115.
The utopian plans for a universal international court of arbitration are chimerical and conjured up by idealists unacquainted with the harsh facts of reality, if their ideas are not, indeed—as are many proposals for disarmament—calculated to serve as a cloak for ambitious plans.
If diplomatic means do not suffice to adjust a dispute, then the question of right between two states at once becomes a question of might. But the existence of a spirit of fair play is taken into account nevertheless, for each party to the controversy will seek to have the justice of its cause recognized. The moral support engendered by fighting for a just cause is so great that no state is willing to dispense with it.[4] This circumstance, coupled with the growing power of public opinion and with the influence of representative government, has contributed to reduce the number of wars. Wars between cabinets, like those in the days of Louis XIV., are no longer possible. As a result of the universal liability to service, the whole nation takes part in a war; every class of society suffers and has its pursuits interfered with; everything presses to an early decision, to a prompt crushing of the opponent.
[4] “If princes wish war they proceed to make war and then send for an industrious jurist who demonstrates that it is therefore right.” Frederick II.
“Every war is just which is necessary and every battle holy in which lies our last hope.” Machiavelli, Il Principe.
This is attained by defeating the enemy’s forces, by occupying the hostile country and seizing the enemy’s sources of supply, so that he will be convinced of the futility of further resistance. (Campaigns of 1859, 1866, and 1870-71). Only in the rarest cases will it be necessary to continue the war until the power of resistance of the hostile state is completely destroyed. (American Civil War). The extent to which the enemy’s power of resistance may have to be crippled or broken, in order to compel peace, depends upon his tenacity. Political considerations will also have to be taken into account in answering this question. From the military point of view, however, the purpose of every war will always be the complete overthrow of the enemy.
Precise definitions of strategy and tactics, clearly fixing the scope of each, have been vainly sought in the past. That efforts in this direction have led to no results is only natural, as tactics and strategy are complementary subjects that often encroach upon each other, while grand tactics is frequently identical with strategy.
Von Bülow, the author of The Spirit of Modern Warfare (1798)[5], calls those movements strategical which are made outside the enemy’s sphere of information. Von Willisen considers strategy the science of communications, tactics the science of fighting. Von Clausewitz calls strategy the science of the use of battles for the purpose of the war (Jomini: “l’art de diriger les armées sur les théatres d’opérations”)[6], tactics the science of the use of military forces in battle (Jomini: “l’art de diriger les troupes sur les champs de bataille”).[7][8] General von Horsetzki (1892) defines strategy as the study of the conditions necessary for success in war. Archduke Charles calls strategy the “science of war” and tactics the “art of war”. Frederick the Great and Napoleon always employed the term “l’art de guerre” instead of the term “strategy”. None of these definitions are comprehensive enough, because they do not cover marches, outposts, the supply service, and enterprises in minor tactics. Professor Delbrück’s definition is much more appropriate: “Strategy is the science of utilizing military resources for the attainment of the object of the war, tactics the art of leading troops into and in battle.” Thiers, the French historian, instead of seeking to define strategy and tactics, contents himself with explaining the problems of each: “Le stratège doit concevoir le plan de campagne, embrasser d’un seul coup d’oeil tout le théatre présumé de la guerre, tracer lignes d’opérations et diriger les masses sur les points décisifs. Le tacticien a pour mission de régler l’ordre de leurs marches, de les disposer en bataille aux différents points, indiqués par le stratège, d’engager l’action, de la soutenir et de manoeuvrer pour atteindre le but proposé.”[9] Fieldmarshal Moltke calls strategy “the application of common sense to the conduct of war.”[10] For practical purposes it is sufficient to define strategy as the science of the conduct of war, tactics as the science of troop-leading. Strategy brings about the decision on the theater of war, while the duty of carrying it out, in the manner desired by the commander-in-chief, devolves upon tactics. Thus the strategical idea culminates on the battlefield. The concentric advance of the Prussian armies into Bohemia in 1866 naturally led to a complete envelopment of the Austrians on the field of Königgrätz. The German attack in the battle on the Hallue, Dec. 23rd, 1870, was based on the strategical requirement of driving the French from their line of retreat leading to Arras and Bapaume, by enveloping their right flank. The attempts made by the 15th Infantry Division, which was holding the enemy in front, to envelop the left wing of the French, interfered with the execution of the correct strategical plan. Thus, in following up a success, in itself quite unimportant (the capture of Bussy), the leading basic principle was forgotten. The same thing happened here that Moltke censured in his official report on the war of 1866, wherein he stated: “The higher commanders have not been able to make their influence felt down to the subordinate grades. Frequently, as soon as the divisions and brigades have come in contact with the enemy, all control over them has entirely ceased.”
[5] Geist des neueren Kriegssystems.
[6] “The art of directing armies in the theater of operations.”
[7] “The art of directing troops on the field of battle.”
[8] “Everything affecting the use of troops in battle and the regulation of their activity with reference to battle, has been included in the term ‘tactics’, while the term strategy is synonymous with ‘generalship,’ exclusive of such matters as fall into the domain of tactics.” Blume, Strategie, p. 33.
“Tactics teaches how, and strategy why, one should fight.” General v. Scherff.
Strategy determines direction and objective of the movement of armies, while the manner of execution belongs to tactics.
[9] “Strategy should devise the plan of campaign, take in with a comprehensive glance the entire probable theater of war, establish the lines of operations and direct the masses on the decisive points.
“It is the mission of the tactician to decide upon the order of march of the troops, to form them for battle at the various points determined by strategy, to begin the action, to sustain it, and to maneuver so as to attain the desired end.” Thiers.
[10] v. Moltke, Tactical Problems, No. 58 (1878) p. 133.
Archduke Charles considered the subordination of tactics to strategy a law. “Tactics should execute the conceptions of strategy; where the two come in conflict, where strategical considerations are opposed to tactical interests, the strategical considerations should, as a rule, take precedence. Tactics must occupy a subordinate place and attempt to neutralize existing disadvantages by skillful dispositions.” Clausewitz not unjustly censures Archduke Charles for placing advantages of terrain in the first rank, and for failing to attach the proper importance to the annihilation of the hostile forces. Should the demands of strategy conflict with those of tactics on the battlefield, the latter must unquestionably take precedence, since the general’s foremost thought must be the annihilation of the hostile forces. Tactical considerations should likewise govern in the selection of the direction of attack in a battle, strategical reasons for striking in this or that direction becoming effective only after the attainment of tactical success. It is true that strategy, by directing the armies and their concentration on the battlefield, provides tactics with the tools for fighting and assures the probability of victory; but, on the other hand, the commander-in-chief appropriates the fruits of each victory and makes them the basis for further plans. “The demands of strategy are silent in the presence of tactical victory; they adapt themselves to the newly created situation.” Fieldmarshal Moltke.[11]
[11] The view that the direction of attack should be governed by the possibility of easy execution in minor warfare only, is held by General v. Scherff, who says: “General v. Moltke was not influenced by the question ‘will the attack here or there be tactically easier or more difficult?’ Only the question, ‘will it there be strategically advantageous or not’ was able to determine his course with reference to measures on the battlefield.”
While Archduke Charles considers mathematical axioms the basis of the higher art of war, military history is for us the principal source from which to gather knowledge.[12]
[12] See lecture by Prince Hohenlohe: Kriegserfahrung und Kriegsgeschichte, Neisse, 1879.
“Let my son often read and meditate upon history; it is the only true philosophy. Let him often read and meditate upon the wars of the great captains; it is the only means of learning the art of war.” Napoleon I., on April 17th, 1821.
“Past events are useful to feed the imagination and furnish the memory, provided their study is the repetition of ideas that judgment should pass upon.” Frederick the Great.
In military history we have a guide by which, if we lack personal experience in war, we can test the results of our reflections and of our experience on the drillground. Military history moreover enables us to appreciate those controlling factors which, in map problems, do not appear at all, and which, in exercises on the terrain, appear only in a restricted measure. One must learn the conduct of war from the experience of others; one’s own experience is costly and is almost invariably gained too late. That experience in war, of itself, is not sufficient (aside from the fact that it is gained too late in a given case) is illustrated by the defeat of the Austrians in 1866, of the French in 1870-71, and of the British in South Africa. “Les Autrichiens,” says Colonel Foch,[13] “ont fait la guerre sans la comprendre, les Prussiens l’ont compris sans la faire, mais ils l’ont étudiée.” “Military history is neither a compilation of clever theories nor a book designed for whiling away idle moments. It is, on the contrary, a careful teacher, who, if we are attentive, allows us to view and grasp matters which we have never before been in a position to see, but which, nevertheless, are liable to confront us in the same, a similar, or a changed form, and demand unpremeditated, instant and decisive action, entailing heavy responsibilities. Military history, it is true, offers us, in the first instance, only events and their outline, conditions and phenomena, but it also presents, what the cleverest theory is unable to furnish, a graphic illustration of the disturbing elements in war, an illustration of the influences, doubts, embarrassments, unforeseen accidents, surprises and delays. It describes the course pursued by commanders and by practical military common sense in surmounting these difficulties. It prepares in advance the mental balance necessary at the moment of action; it should prepare also for the unexpected. It affords a substitute for lack of military experience, for the accumulation of which the life of the individual, prior to the moment of action, has been too short.”[14] The pedantic enumeration of a few examples in support of a stated opinion cannot suffice. It should not be difficult to find examples from military history in support of any opinion; frequently even an incorrect tactical contention can be vindicated by such examples. For in war the action taken is as often wrong as correct; the scales are turned by factors which in most cases appear indistinctly or not at all. The experiences of military history must, therefore, only be used with caution if tactical lessons are to be drawn from them. “A mere allusion to historical events,” says Clausewitz in his chapter on examples, “has the further disadvantage that some readers are either not sufficiently acquainted with these events, or remember them too imperfectly to enter into the author’s ideas, so that such students are compelled to accept his statements blindly or to remain unconvinced. It is, of course, very difficult to describe historical events as they ought to be described if they are to be used as proofs, for authors usually lack the means, as well as the time and space, necessary for such descriptions. We maintain, however, that in establishing a new or a doubtful view, a single event, thoroughly described, is more instructive than a mere allusion to ten. The principal evil resulting from a superficial reference to historical events does not lie in the fact that the author cites them incorrectly in support of his theory, but in the fact that he has never become thoroughly acquainted with those events. In consequence of such a superficial, haphazard treatment of history, a hundred erroneous views and theoretical projects are created, which would never have appeared if the author had been compelled to deduce, from a careful analysis of the connected facts in the case, what he publishes and wishes to support by historical proofs. If we have convinced ourselves of the above outlined difficulties attending the employment of historical examples, and appreciate the necessity for thoroughness in their treatment, we will come to the conclusion that the more recent military history is the most natural source from which to select examples, inasmuch as recent history alone is sufficiently known and analyzed.”[15] The events from military history mentioned in this work are cited simply as proofs of certain phenomena; the proper analysis of these proofs must be left to the student.
[13] Principes de la Guerre, 1903.
“The Austrians,” says Colonel Foch, “made war without understanding it; the Germans understood war without making it; but they studied it.”
[14] From Meinungen und Mahnungen, Vienna, 1894.
[15] On War, II, Chapter 6, p. 111.
See also Clausewitz’ remarks on “Criticism,” II, Chapter 5.
The applicatory method[16] is used frequently by preference as the system of instruction, but its creator, General von Verdy du Vernois, considers it merely a complement of the deductive method, on which it is predicated and based. “The weakness of the whole applicatory system of instruction lies in the fact that a textbook based upon it, although written by a master hand, can portray only isolated examples, and that these, studied again and again, soon lose their value in the same manner as a maneuver terrain that has become too well known. For, although we ordinarily find principles represented in a connected form, this method of instruction can only convey them in a fragmentary manner in connection with the details of the events described.”[17] The success of the applicatory method depends largely upon the individuality of the instructor, and owes its charm to the personal intercourse between teacher and pupil. Only an expert, who possesses a thorough professional knowledge, who is master of his subject, and who has the faculty of presenting it skillfully, will be able to produce imaginary scenes which faithfully represent reality and are free from objectionable features. By constant practice with specific cases, under the most diverse situations, the nature of war may in this way be taught and initiative developed as well as facility acquired in issuing appropriate, clear, and concise orders. One danger of using nothing but the applicatory method must be noted. The instructor, as representative of a definite theory, finds it comparatively easy to select the conditions governing a specific case in such a way that the theory which he represents necessarily appears to be the correct one. This is especially true when the director of an applicatory problem determines the action of the opposing side. The two methods (the applicatory, or inductive, and the deductive) must be so supplemented that the lesson in tactics clearly illustrates the purpose and object of a tactical operation and allows of the attainment of a thorough knowledge of the means necessary to gain that object.[18] “He who is able to understand the situation, has a definite purpose in view, and knows the means with which to carry out that purpose, will, by a simple mental operation, arrive in each particular case at an appropriate decision, and will be able, furthermore, to carry out that decision, provided he does not lose his head. If a clear comprehension of the purpose in view and of the means for carrying out that purpose lie within the sphere of theory, the estimate of the situation and the decision are governed by the circumstances of the particular case. Should the training in this direction lie outside the sphere of theory, it will logically belong to the domain of the applicatory method of instruction. The two methods must, therefore, supplement each other.
[16] See Kühne, Kritische Wanderungen, 4 and 5, Preface p. 5.
[17] von Boguslawski, Entwickelung der Taktik, II, p. 17.
[18] “When one attempts to establish a principle, immediately a great number of officers, imagining that they are solving the question, at once cry out: ‘Everything depends on circumstances; according to the wind must the sails be set.’ But if you do not know beforehand which sail is proper for such and such a wind, how can you set the sail according to the wind?” Bugeaud, Aperçus sur quelques détails de guerre.
If the decision is to culminate in action, strength of character is required, providing the determination to execute, in spite of unavoidable difficulties, what has been recognized as proper, and also the professional ability necessary to carry out the determination to its logical conclusion. All that theory can do toward forming this character is to emphasize its importance and to refer students to military history. The applicatory method, however, can develop strength of character by compelling the student to form decisions under pressure of a specified time limit (in solving problems) or by subjecting him to the influences of certain situations such as would be encountered in war (maneuvers). The means available in tactical instruction in time of peace, for the development of strength of character, are, however, very limited when compared with the great demands made by the abnormal conditions of war, so out of all proportion to those of peace. This should be thoroughly understood, lest we overestimate the value of these means as well as the results to be obtained from them in times of peace.
After theory has fulfilled its mission of clearly indicating the purpose and object of an operation, as well as the means by which it may be attained, and applicatory practice has performed its office of developing initiative and professional skill, a third factor is still necessary—the study of military history. From this fountain of knowledge both “theory” and “applicatory method” must draw their material; to this source they must again and again refer in order to guard against erroneous ideas of their own creation, which are often as different from reality as day is from night.”[19]
[19] F. C. v. H. (Fieldmarshal Lieutenant General Conrad v. Hötzendorf, Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army). Zum Studium der Taktik, p. 2.
Viewed as the science of the leading and employment of troops, tactics may be divided into two parts:
1. Formal tactics, or that contained in drill regulations. This portion of tactics furnishes the formations used by troops when assembled, on the march, and in action, and contains the regulations governing the conduct in battle of troops acting alone without regard to the coöperation of the other arms, and without reference to the terrain.
2. Applied tactics[20] deals with the combined action of the several arms on the march, in camp, and in action, taking into account influences of the terrain, seasons, and the time of day in field warfare. Fortress warfare should, strictly speaking, be included under this heading; that is to say, the employment of tactical principles[21] pertaining to the mobile arms, in conjunction with foot-artillery and technical troops on a prepared battlefield. The principles are the same in field and fortress warfare; the only difference between them lies in the employment of the means necessitated by the preparation of a field of battle in time of peace. Military history shows that a clear distinction between field and fortress warfare is impossible. (Sebastopol, Düppel, Plevna, and Port Arthur).
[20] v. Boguslawski, Entwickelung der Taktik, II, Chapter 23. “The higher, Grand Tactics, is the Initiation and conduct of battles—subordinate, or minor tactics, is the manner of fighting, or the battle-tactics of an arm considered in its details.”
[21] Major Gundelach, Exerzierreglement und Festungskrieg, Berlin, 1908.
Drill regulations are the accumulation of the tactical views and lessons of a certain period. They illustrate the tactical condition which becomes perceptible at the moment of a certain development of the fighting tools as represented by man and weapons. Man, in his peculiarities, in his weaknesses, is the constant. He constitutes the psychological element, inseparable from the science of combat, and as such is the definitely given magnitude; the effect of weapons, however, appears always as the variable factor. New weapons, therefore, necessitate new tactics.
It will be observed also “that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change.”[22] The history of the tactics of the 19th Century furnishes more than one instructive example of the magnitude of such “obstinate conservatism.”
[22] Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 9 and 10.
It is a marked peculiarity of manuals of instruction, that, no matter with what far-sightedness such regulations may have been originally compiled, they become antiquated in a comparatively short time. Napoleon estimated this period at ten years. Frequent changes are certainly not desirable, if tactical development is not to be interfered with and if inconveniences are to be avoided in organizing our mobile army from our peace organizations, Reservists, and Landwehr. On the other hand, the regulations must keep abreast of requirements if the conditions to which they owe their existence have changed. In his “Military Fantasies” the Prince de Ligne wrote in 1783: “An article which should be added to all drill regulations, and which, I know not why, is omitted, is: ‘Act sometimes contrary to the regulations.’ It is just as necessary to teach that one must act contrary to the regulations, as to teach the disorder of troops as it will occur in action.”
It is always dangerous to be behind the times, as troops thereby relinquish a superiority previously possessed over others, which knowledge they must later purchase, with streams of blood, in the face of hostile bullets. Of what avail, to the Austrians in 1866, to the Russians in 1877, were all their valiant assaults, made with tactical formations that had outlived their usefulness in the face of newer weapons, although made with the firm determination to conquer?
The self-sacrificing spirit and firmly rooted discipline of the troops found an insurmountable obstacle in the rapid fire of unshaken infantry. The war experiences of our regiments show that bullets quickly write a new tactics, demolish superannuated formations and create new ones. But at what a sacrifice![23] In the Franco-German war, superior leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay this price for the lesson. But how an army fares when it lacks these auxiliaries is shown by the British experiences in South Africa. The initial failure of accustomed tactical formations causes a dread of the frontal attack and finally leads some tacticians to deny entirely even the feasibility of such an attack. In peace training, therefore, set forms are of less importance; stress should be laid on developing the faculty of adaptation to changing conditions of combat and terrain.
[23] It is frequently customary on the outbreak of a war to issue “Instructions for campaign,” in order to prepare troops, trained according to superannuated regulations, for action on a strange theater of war. It is desirable to disseminate the first experiences gained in action to all parts of the army. We failed to do this in 1870, and all organizations were therefore compelled to gain this experience for themselves. Even as late as the 18th of August, 1870, the Füsilier Battalion of the 85th Infantry advanced in double column formed on the center, although the campaign in Bohemia had already demonstrated that this formation was out of date. See Moltke, Feldzug von 1859, p. 65.
Further development and justification of the principles of the drill regulations, and the modification of those principles under certain assumptions, are reserved to the science of tactics. Drill regulations should not be textbooks of tactics, but, on the other hand, a textbook of tactics should deal with formations only in so far as that is necessary to ensure a clear comprehension of the fundamental principles.
“Regulations and the science of combat are in a certain sense very different subjects. The regulations are law, authority—no doubt can be entertained on this point; but that also invests them with the character of something fixed, at least for a certain space of time. They cannot be kept up to date so as to meet quickly enough the rapidly changing and ever growing demands of modern combat: that would indeed be an unfair requirement, impossible of realization. Here must enter the science of combat, which should be independent in every direction, which should know no fixed rules, and which should point to no other authority than that of truth and reality. It is not the province of the science of combat, like that of regulations, to retain that which is in keeping with prevailing views and forms; it must take into consideration the fleeting theory and practice, ever developing and changing anew.”[24]
[24] Keim, Gegenwärtiger Stand der Gefechtslehre, p. 1.
A positive system of tactics will therefore be based upon one’s own drill regulations, from the standpoint of which it will investigate and compare the principles of the service manuals of the different powers, and finally develop the science still further by the aid of experience gained from military history and the knowledge of the effect of weapons. While these are the ever changing but nevertheless measurable factors of tactical reflection, a third, perhaps the most important factor, must be added, viz., that the leader must reckon with the action of men frequently exposed to the influence of great exertions and great mental agitation. A doctrine of tactics which does not properly appreciate the psychological element stagnates in lifeless pedantry.