For our purpose, it is sufficient to go back as far as the Franco-German war, in which breechloaders were used for the first time against breechloaders. Every German soldier carried 80 cartridges, and the 6-horse battalion ammunition wagons carried 20 additional rounds per man.[495]

When one considers the total number of cartridges expended during any campaign, it seems impossible that a shortage of ammunition could ever have taken place. In the Franco-German war, the expenditure of ammunition in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps amounted to 4,163,000 rounds (166 per rifle); in the IInd Army Corps, 1,105,600 rounds (44 per rifle); and in the Saxon Army Corps, 1,450,000 rounds (about 58 per rifle). The compilation of a table, showing the amount of ammunition expended in the Prussian army, was begun, but was soon discontinued, as it was found that the necessary data were lacking, the only information available being the record of the number of rounds issued by the reserve ammunition parks. The troops sent to the field army from the depot battalions, must have brought with them in each case a very considerable amount of ammunition, as each man carried 80 rounds, but no records are available to show how much ammunition was forwarded in this way. Furthermore, there is no record of the number of rounds actually expended and of the amount of ammunition lost or left on the dead and wounded. It is well known, that in the long periods, during which no engagement had taken place, an enormous amount of ammunition was lost on marches and in bivouacs. This applies likewise to battlefields. The commander of an ammunition column had his men pick up 22,000 rounds of needle gun ammunition in unbroken packages on the battlefield of Hühnerwasser.

A shortage of ammunition first manifested itself where the troops, on removing their knapsacks, had neglected to take out the tin boxes filled with ammunition (for example in the 12th Jäger-Battalion at Sedan),[496] or where the ammunition wagons had been sent to the rear with the field train (for example in the 50th Infantry, on January 19th, 1871, in the battle at Mont Valérien, and in the 38th Brigade, at the battle of Beaune la Rolande).[497]

The regimental histories contain only a few statements in regard to the amount of ammunition expended in the various engagements. Moreover, these statements are only approximations and, as a rule, cannot lay claim to trustworthiness.

The amount of ammunition expended in the opening battles of the war was very small, due to the training and fighting methods of the Prussian infantry, and to the support it received from the artillery. Moreover, the short range of the rifle prohibited long range firing.

“In order to hold its own against the intensity and long range of the hostile fire, the German infantry was compelled to fire more rapidly and at longer ranges than it had intended. In addition, the difficulties of fire control and fire direction were frequently increased on account of the tremendous loss of leaders. Under these circumstances, so much ammunition was expended that, among the troops fighting in the first line, the ammunition carried by the men was no more than enough. This explains why it not infrequently happened that the fighting efficiency of the infantry was impaired by a lack of ammunition. The first general shortage of ammunition occurred at the battle of Mars-la-Tour in the infantry of the IIIrd Army Corps.”[498]

On August 16th, at the battle of Vionville, the Prussian IIIrd Army Corps, whose effective strength was 21,050 rifles, expended 720,486 cartridges, which corresponds to only 34.5 rounds per rifle; yet, in spite of this, the ammunition ran short. During the lull in the battle at noon, by removing the cartridges from the dead and wounded, each man in the 35th Infantry[499] was again supplied with about 200 rounds of ammunition, which were then expended in the course of the afternoon, so that toward evening another shortage occurred.

The following figures in regard to the expenditure of ammunition during the battle of Vionville are taken from Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele, 8 and 9, by Major Kunz:

IInd Bn. Leib Regt.	12,749	rounds	for	850	rifles,	or	15	per	rifle.
Ist Bn. 40th Inf.	35,000	„	„	450	„	„	78	„	„
IInd Bn. 40th Inf.	6,650	„	„	350	„	„	19	„	„
IIIrd Bn. 40th Inf.	4,520	„	„	300	„	„	15	„	„

A very annoying shortage of ammunition occurred in those parts of the Leib Regiment which were with the 72nd and 40th Infantry Regiments in front of the wood. The retained echelons in the wood had sufficient ammunition, but the troops in front lacked the means wherewith to inform the retained units of the shortage. In the 11th and 72nd Infantry Regiments a serious shortage of ammunition occurred after they had been engaged but a short time. (In a little less than two hours, the 72nd Infantry suffered the following percentage of losses: Ist Battalion, 53.2%; Füsilier Battalion, 48.2%).[500]

The defense of the stone wall at Buzanval by the 50th Infantry (German), on January 19th, 1871, was one of the most obstinate defensive fights of the war. The numerical superiority of the enemy at this point was overwhelming and his troops were excellent, nevertheless the regiment maintained the same splendid fire discipline it had already exhibited at Lundby. The fight lasted nine hours. In his history of the regiment (p. 350), Lieutenant-General v. Boguslawski says:

“The number of cartridges fired can no longer be accurately determined. Only the war diary of the IInd Battalion contains a note showing that 14,206 rounds were expended. As the 5th Company did not fire at all, and the 7th Company was only partially engaged, by far the greater portion of the ammunition must have been expended by the 6th and 8th Companies.” The IInd Battalion, like the rest, has no record showing what ammunition was supplied to it during the battle. To cite an example: The 12th Company received about 3,000 rounds of ammunition during the fight. As the strength of this company was 180 men in round numbers, each man received 17 additional cartridges. He therefore had 97 rounds available, including the ammunition originally supplied him.

“Now, as each man still had an average of 5 cartridges on going into billets, he must have expended 92 rounds. From this we may assume that during the nine hours’ fight, he fired a little more than ten rounds per hour.”

In the battle of Beaune la Rolande, some of the companies of the 56th Infantry near Romainville had expended all their ammunition. In the 38th Brigade, only the Ist Battalion, 57th Infantry, was able to replenish its ammunition directly from the ammunition wagons near Romainville. The defenders of Beaune did not receive such assistance however, as only one ammunition wagon was brought up (by the Füsilier-Battalion, 16th Infantry), toward the close of the battle, for the units engaged there. The ammunition it contained was distributed among the men, but was not used. Organizations belonging to the IIIrd Army Corps turned over some of their ammunition, but, in general, the brigade had to rely practically on the ammunition carried by the men, for all the ammunition wagons had driven off at the beginning of the battle. Consequently, this battle was fought almost exclusively with the ammunition carried by the men—about 80 rounds per rifle. As the French attack was not simultaneously directed against the whole front of Beaune, lulls occurred in the fight, which enabled the officers to send a supply of ammunition to the most seriously threatened points of the line. In a well disciplined organization, it is not difficult to send ammunition promptly to the most seriously threatened points by simply passing it along the line. This was actually done at Beaune la Rolande. In consequence of this redistribution, at some points in the cemetery, men fired as many as 200 rounds each, but others fired only 40 or less; the result, however, was the same, for the ammunition was almost exclusively supplied from that carried by the men—80 rounds per rifle. Moreover, a great many cartridges, and even unopened packages of ammunition, were found, on November 29th, in the position occupied by the 38th Brigade.

The following figures give an idea of the amount of ammunition expended at St. Privat by the 2nd Regiment of the Guard. On August 19th, the Ist Battalion required 27,340, the IInd Battalion 17,820, and the Füsilier-Battalion 7,870 rounds to replenish their ammunition supply. When the heavy losses suffered by this regiment are taken into account, the average expenditure of ammunition cannot be considered excessive.[501]

At 10:30 P. M., on August 18th, the Rifle Battalion of the Guard managed to supply each one of its men with 20 rounds of ammunition, without drawing upon the contents of the ammunition wagons, which were left intact.[502]

The expenditure of ammunition on the French side was considerably greater in all the battles. At Champigny, every French infantry soldier carried 118 rounds of ammunition, which did not prove sufficient, however, to meet the demand. In the French Army of the Rhine, the average expenditure of ammunition from August 6th to 31st was 30 rounds, and in the fights of August 16th and 18th, 13 to 27 rounds per rifle. In individual cases, the expenditure of ammunition was far in excess of these figures. The men of Grenier’s Division, against which the attack of the 38th Brigade was directed, claim that they fired as many as 150 rounds apiece, on August 16th. In the evening, at the close of the battle, the commanding general of the IVth Army Corps reported a shortage of ammunition.[503] Shortage of ammunition caused Marshal Bazaine to fall back to Metz on August 17th. Notwithstanding the proximity of the fortress of Metz, the French VIth Corps was unable to replenish its supply of ammunition before it was attacked by the Prussian Guard. Detailed information available in regard to the ammunition expended by the 25th Infantry (French)[504] shows that each man had only 30 instead of 90 cartridges. (This was the regiment attacked by the Franz and 3rd Guard Regiments, who lost 2,160 men—9% hits). The statement made in the history of the 2nd Guard Regiment (p. 233), that every French soldier had 300 rounds of ammunition available on August 18th, cannot be substantiated by French records.

The expenditure of ammunition in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, amounted to 33 rounds per rifle and carbine on the Russian side. The following detailed statements in regard to the expenditure of ammunition are available. In the engagement at Aiaslar, on August 23rd, 1877, the Sofia Regiment expended 94 rounds, and at Karahassankioi, the 140th Infantry expended 155 rounds per man. On December 28th, 1877, the 13th Rifle Battalion expended 122 rounds per man. In this connection, it may be remarked that the Russian infantryman of that day carried 60 rounds of ammunition in his cartridge boxes. The ammunition carts carried 55 additional rounds per man, and the ammunition parks 62. If, as prescribed by the regulations at that time, only one ammunition wagon followed an organization into action, each infantryman had 78 rounds available, and each man of a rifle battalion 106 rounds.

In front of Plevna, on July 20th, 1877, the Russians expended in six hours all the ammunition carried by the men and by the ammunition carts. On July 30th, during the second assault on Plevna, they expended in four hours all the ammunition carried by the men.[505] In the engagement at Lovtcha, the 3rd Rifle Brigade only fired during the pursuit. The brigade commander explained afterwards that his ammunition had run short nevertheless. During the advance, the ammunition wagons did not follow in rear of the organizations to which they belonged, and no provision had been made for bringing up the necessary ammunition.[506]

On September 1st, 1877, the regiments which made the fruitless attack on the Omar Bey Tabia, expended the following ammunition:

63	rd	Infantry	[507]	55,296	rounds,	or	21	per	rifle
119	th	„	[507]	99,744	„	„	43	„	„
64	th	„	24,650		„	„	10	„	„
115	th	„	45,360		„	„	24	„	„

In the Kasan Regiment (No. 64), which had expended less ammunition than any of the others on this day, the ammunition began to run short at the moment when the successful and decisive counter-attack of the Turks commenced. The same misfortune befell other organizations, after the fire fight had lasted but a comparatively short time, as apparently they had neglected to remove the cartridges from the dead and wounded.

During the assault on Scheinovo, on January 9th, 1878, each man of the 11th Rifle Battalion fired 120 rounds in four hours. This is an average of 2 rounds per man, per minute.

The Turks took more advantage of the rapidity of fire of their rifles than did the Russians.[508] It is said that at Gorni Dubniac, each man had 800-900 rounds of ammunition available, and it is a fact, that the force of 3,570 men garrisoning the group of works placed 3,533 Russians out of action, in a fight lasting 9¹⁄₂ hours, while the Turkish losses in killed and wounded only amounted to 1,280 men. During the attack, some Turks managed to fire more than 100 rounds apiece. Kuropatkin found 120 empty cartridge shells beside a dead Turkish soldier.[509] In the engagement at Tashkessen (31st December, 1877),[510] which lasted eight hours, the Prisrend Battalion expended 292, the Tuzla Battalion 275, and a Rifle Battalion 263 rounds per man (30 rounds per man, per hour).

There is very little information available in regard to the expenditure of ammunition during the Russo-Japanese war. The Russian infantryman carried 120 rounds of ammunition, the 8 one-horse ammunition carts carried 6,600 rounds per company, and the 2 two-horse ammunition wagons of the battalions 14,400 rounds each. Assuming the strength of a company as 200, this would give 210 rounds per man. In the engagement at Hamatan (Yalu), several Russian organizations ran entirely out of ammunition. A number of rifle companies (the 6th Company, 11th Infantry, and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th, 12th Infantry), were able to replenish their supply without difficulty from the ammunition wagons. The following is taken from a thoroughly reliable report published in the Kölnische Zeitung of September 24th, 1905:

During the battle of Liao Yang, which lasted six days, the 138th Infantry fired 99,460, and the 139th Infantry 96,040 rounds. On September 1st, the 137th Infantry expended 189,000 rounds, in other words, nearly twice as much in one day as either of the other regiments expended in six. This excessive expenditure of ammunition was due to the very severe attacks which this regiment had to withstand on that day. These attacks were repeated on the next day and the regiment expended 169,000 rounds of ammunition. From October 13th to 18th, at Linshinpu, the 139th Infantry expended 351,800 rounds. During this engagement the Japanese succeeded in getting within 10 m. of the Russian lines. Thirty bodies were picked up at 15 paces, and 580 bodies from 100 to 150 paces from the Russian position. The 139th Infantry lost 54 men killed, and 6 officers and 250 men wounded. Major V. Tettau[511] states that during the battle of Liao Yang (30th August, 1904), the 36th Infantry expended 416,800 rounds of ammunition, and the 34th Infantry (two battalions), 250,000 rounds, or for 4,200 Russian rifles an average of not less than 160 rounds per rifle.

The Japanese infantryman carried 120 rounds, and each company had, in addition, one two-wheeled ammunition cart carrying 16,000 rounds of ammunition. When packs were removed, each man carried a bag in which were packed three days’ rations, and from 200 to 250 cartridges. The Japanese infantry invariably followed the principle that each man should be supplied with as much ammunition as possible before going into action. In the engagement at Kinchau (26th November, 1904), the 1st Infantry Division expended 64, the 3rd 54, and the 4th 143 rounds per man of the original effective strength.[512]

By way of comparison with the above, the following table shows the number of rounds to 3 kg. of the ammunition for the several rifles specified:

Paper Shells	-		Prussian smooth-bore infantry musket	85	rounds
			Prussian rifled infantry musket(new model)	55	„
			Prussian needle gun M/41-69	78	„
			French chassepot rifle M/66	90	„
Metal Shells	-		Infantry rifle M/71	69	„
			Swiss rifle, M/67, 69/71, 81	98	„
			Rifle, M/98 with loading clips	103	„

The cartridges are carried as follows by the soldier:

Germany:	45 rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front, and 60 in the knapsack;
Austria:	20 rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front, and 60 in the knapsack;
Russia:	30 rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes attached to the waist belt, in a breast cartridge box, and in a reserve cartridge box attached to the knapsack;
France:	120 rounds, in three cartridge boxes, two in front, and one behind;
England:	In eight pockets attached to the waist belt, each holding 15 rounds (in addition each soldier carries a shoulder belt holding 50 rounds);
Japan:	30 rounds in each of the cartridge boxes in front, and 60 rounds in the cartridge box behind.

The two-horse company ammunition wagon, Model 1897, has a width of track of 1.53 m., and, when empty, weighs 450 kg. Compared with the ammunition wagon Model C, 1887, which was originally designed to carry ammunition in boxes, it is lighter by 75 kg., and can be turned within a shorter radius. The wagon body is provided with double doors in front and in rear. The interior is divided into four compartments (to be emptied separately), each capable of holding 16 bundles of cartridges placed on end. Each bundle contains 15 packages of 15 cartridges in clips each. Each bundle of 225 cartridges weighs 7.25 kg.

As three bundles of cartridges are to be carried by one man, according to the Field Service Regulations (par. 480), 1 non-commissioned officer and 21 men are detailed to unload the ammunition wagon. The unloading is managed as follows: Four men take post on each side of the wagon, two handing out the bundles to the other two, who lay them on the ground. The remaining men place the bundles in piles of three in such a manner that the carrying loops of two in each pile can be interlaced and held together by a stick or a bayonet. An ammunition wagon can be emptied in this manner in four minutes. The two ammunition bundles tied together are slung over the left shoulder, the rifle is slung over the right shoulder, and the third bundle is carried in the right hand. In this way, a man can carry 21.8 kg.

The regulations are extremely thorough and deserve special attention. If an engagement is imminent, each private receives 20 additional rounds before leaving the bivouac or reserve position, and each non-commissioned officer 100 rounds from the company ammunition wagon, so that the latter is about half emptied.[517] This brings the total amount carried by each soldier up to 140 rounds, and increases the load of the privates by 0.71 kg., and that of the non-commissioned officers by about 4 kg. When troops go into action, the ammunition wagons are assembled and accompany the battalion reserve, taking as much advantage of cover as possible, so that the attention of the enemy may not be drawn to them. After the battalion reserve has been absorbed by the firing line, the ammunition wagons accompany the regimental reserve. When exposed to artillery fire, the wagons maintain intervals of twenty paces from one another. They are either placed under the orders of the battalion adjutant, or of the senior supply officer present with them, as may be directed by the battalion commander.