In large engagements, the great power of resistance possessed by well posted bodies of troops will often determine the commander of the force on the defensive to contain the enemy at one point with a strong defensive position, while at the same time assuming the offensive at another. (This was planned, but not carried out, at Dresden, in 1813, and at Troyes, early in February, 1814; carried out with success, in Lee’s operations around Richmond, during the latter part of June, 1862, and on the Lisaine in 1871; and miscarried on the Shaho, because Kuropatkin made his decision dependent upon reports in regard to the position of hostile reserves, which were non-existent in reality). Whether the offensive should be assumed while the enemy is still in the act of deploying,[460] or whether one must be satisfied with assuming the offensive at the last moment, is best determined by the relative strength of the opposing forces. When battle-fronts are short this may still be advantageous, but when the lines are long, a counter-attack can affect only a small part of the assailant’s line, while the major portion thereof successfully pushes the attack home. Then the position and the day will be lost anyway, in spite of a local success.

The initial measures taken assure freedom of action to the defense, but the commander must not await exhaustive messages. Prompt action is necessary, either for throwing back the advanced troops of the assailant, or for striking a blow at the hostile flank. In the latter case, it is an advantage if only weak reserves are struck, but hostile forces making a turning movement may also be encountered, and the commander will have to decide whether to deploy quickly and assail the enemy, or whether to take his chances in a rencontre.[461]

Even a success gained at a tactically unfavorable point will make itself felt, if it is won early enough and if the most is made of it. As a rule, tactical considerations determine where the commander should launch his reserves for the counter-attack.

The counter-attack here meant is an act of the commander of the whole force; in bodies of troops acting as part of a larger force and in numerically inferior forces, the warding off of the flank attack remains almost always the only remedy.

“The general reserve should be posted at the point from which it can best move forward, counter to the probable direction of the hostile attack, while, at the same time, making the most of the features of the ground. When only one flank is secure, the general reserve is, as a rule, placed in echelon in rear of the unprotected wing. When both flanks are in the air, nothing remains but to place sufficient reserves in readiness in rear of one flank to ward off a hostile envelopment, while retaining as strong a force as possible in rear of the other for the purpose of bringing about the decision. The echeloned general reserve must have room for development, whether this be for warding off a hostile envelopment or for making a counter-attack.” (Par. 410 German I. D. R.).

The general reserve should be posted in rear of the center of the position only when the front is short and the situation is not as yet cleared up. In this position it will frequently be exposed to the fire directed against the first line, and its entry into action will usually involve a loss of time. When adequate information is available of the measures taken by the opponent, or the nature of the ground compels him to direct his decisive attack against a wing, this alone determines the position of the general reserve.

Since the counter-attack is to take the enemy by surprise, the position of the general reserve must be concealed, and precautions must be taken to keep hostile patrols in the dark, as long as possible, in regard to its actual location. The ground over which the general reserve is to advance should be free from obstacles, so that the counter-attack can be made rapidly and with uniformity.

Since the assailant will almost invariably endeavor to direct his attack against a flank, the general reserve of the defender should be posted at such a distance in rear of the threatened wing that the troops composing it will be sheltered to some extent from hostile fire. In order that the fully deployed general reserve, when making a counter-attack, may clear with its inner flank the outer flank of the line holding the position, and not get into the latter’s zone of fire, a sufficient interval must be left between the two. This interval should increase with the size of the reserve. As a rule, the counter-attack should be launched so as to produce the decision when the assailant has arrived within assaulting distance of the defender. This requires that the general reserve and the line holding the position be separated by an interval of at least 200 m. In addition, the counter-attack must be so made that it will actually strike the assailant in flank; and this it cannot do unless the general reserve is posted sufficiently far to a flank. The center of the reserve should be launched so as to strike not only the flank of the enemy’s firing line, but that of his supports as well. If the general reserve is posted too near the first line, there is danger of it being enveloped together with the first line, and committed to purely defensive action (refusing a flank). On the other hand, if it is posted too far to a flank, its timely entry into action is not absolutely assured; the assailant may turn against it, cut it off from the defensive position, and defeat it in detail. The farther the general reserve is off to a flank, the more effectively will it strike the enemy in flank, but it will be correspondingly more difficult to conceal it. The necessity of pushing the general reserve far to a flank decreases, as the scope of the attacker’s envelopment of the defensive line increases. It may frequently be to the defender’s advantage to induce the assailant to make a far-reaching envelopment, provided the line defending the position is not placed in an unfavorable tactical situation by so doing. Since the attacker will probably have detachments echeloned in rear of his flank, the troops entrusted with the counter-attack must similarly have an echelon in rear of their exposed flank in order to protect themselves against a flank attack.

It is impossible to lay down a fixed, normal strength for the reserve. This depends upon the strength of the position, and the degree of resistance the intrenchments are capable of rendering; but, in any case, the force intended for local defense should be strong enough to compel the enemy to deploy completely, and prevent his carrying the defenses before the counter-attack is made. Large quantities of ammunition and intrenchments capable of rendering effective resistance must compensate for the shortage of men in warding off the enemy, in order that the general reserve may be made as strong as possible. The question, as to how thinly the position must be occupied, and how strong the general reserve may be made, can only be answered in each particular case. If the attack made by the general reserve is to produce any effect, it must not be undertaken with too small a force, as it could then be checked by weak detachments.

While the general reserve lies in waiting for the enemy, it may either—

1. Remain in a preparatory position, in one or more groups, and deploy during its forward movement; or

2. Take up the attack formation from the start.

The first method has the advantage, when the space required is small, of permitting the general reserve to be concealed, and allows changes to be made in the direction of march and in the dispositions.

The second, although it enables the reserve to advance promptly to the counter-attack, is rarely suitable, as the reserve in combat formation is not so easily concealed, as it is more difficult to make changes in the dispositions and the direction of march, and as this formation seems only practicable for making an advance in one direction—straight to the front.

It is of the utmost importance to know when the counter-attack should be launched. In warding off the enemy by purely frontal action, no special disadvantages result from prematurely launching the general reserve; if it enters the action too late, it will still be able to throw back the assailant who has penetrated into the position. With the counter-attack it is different; it must take place when the opponent is under the most effective fire at short range. If the counter-attack is made prematurely, especially when the reserves and flank echelons of the attacker have not as yet been used up, the latter, while, indeed, exposed to the most violent fire of the defender, will be able to take counter-measures. In that case, two entirely independent actions may result, and the counter-attack made by the general reserve may be checked by the retained echelons of the attacker and repulsed by their fire. When launched prematurely, the counter-attack will not always repulse the hostile attack; and when launched too late, it may perhaps still bring about the decision, or avert a defeat, but it will never produce decisive results.

A counter-attack made after the attacker has penetrated into the position, and while he is endeavoring to dislodge the garrisons of such supporting points as still offer resistance, reckons with the fact that the hitherto victorious assailant, exhausted and in confusion, will not be a match for a well aimed blow delivered by a considerable number of troops. However, a defender will scarcely contemplate such an employment of his general reserve; for him the important thing is to repulse the attack in front of and not within the position. Although military history presents comparatively numerous instances of such retours offensifs, this may be explained by the fact that the counter-attack was launched too late. The weakness of the assailant is but momentary, and the most must be made of this by advancing against him promptly by the shortest line. But if the assailant has had time to re-form and to bring up his batteries, it will usually be too late to make a counter-attack.

The French regulations recommend a unique procedure, which may be successful when employed against an opponent not prepared to meet it. “Under certain circumstances, counter-attacks may be combined with retreat maneuvers. The advanced troops should bring the enemy to a standstill with their fire and compel him to deploy. Then they should break off the action without becoming involved in a fight at close quarters. In this manner, the attacker is drawn onto terrain reconnoitered beforehand, where fresh troops, hidden up to the last moment, attack him impetuously under favorable conditions at a time when he is tired and worn out by a long movement.”

The most difficult thing about a counter-attack is to seize the right moment for launching it. As it is impossible to foretell how long it will take the enemy to arrive within assaulting distance, no rule can be laid down as to the proper moment for launching the counter-attack. The best plan would be to screen the movements of the reserve, and, as the attacking troops approach, to bring it gradually up to the point from which it is to move forward. A commander requires wide practical experience and great force of character to judge the situation calmly and dispassionately, while fully aware that launching the counter-attack either too soon or too late may prejudice the result. There is always danger that the suggestions which reach him from various quarters may cause him to take half-measures. The stronger the general reserve and the weaker the force holding the defenses, the more numerous and urgent will be the requests for support; and he will not find it easy to resist the temptation to grant these requests and accordingly weaken the general reserve, which is intended for offensive action.

We must now consider the question as to whether the counter-attack should rely on fire action alone, or should resort to the bayonet as well. The unexpected advance of a large body of troops against a flank of the enemy will rarely fail to produce an effect. If the enemy does not yield to fire, it is obvious that an assault will have to be made. A counter-attack made unexpectedly is, as a rule, successful at the start; but, if its commander follows up this initial success when not supported by strong reserves, a reverse may take place resulting in the defeat of the defender’s entire force.

So far we have only considered the counter-attack made against the flank of an attacker, and against the front of an enemy who has victoriously penetrated into a position. The success of a counter-attack against the enemy’s flank depends primarily on moral factors; besides, after protracted fighting, supports and reserves in rear of the flank are frequently lacking, so that the attacker cannot quickly form an adequate firing front towards a flank.[468]

Theoretically, a frontal counter-attack, i.e., one made straight to the front from a position, while the assailant is advancing to the assault on a broad front, ought to offer the least chances of success, but military history proves the contrary in those cases where the defender awaited the proper moment. This moment arrives when the defender clearly perceives that the enormous losses suffered by the attacker begin to impair the morale of his remaining men. This becomes apparent through a slackening in the attack, through an uncertainty of movement, and, finally, through hesitation, the latter being usually preceded by wavering.[469]

The moral effect of a determined counter-attack with cold steel during the closing moments of an attack will undoubtedly be great. Meckel says[470]: “Here likewise, it is of the greatest importance to bring up the supports promptly, so as to increase the volume of fire to the utmost and to produce that superiority which quite naturally resolves itself into an offensive movement. The defender who does not fix bayonets is already casting furtive glances towards the best line of retreat.”

Although such counter-attacks, directed against the strong firing line of the attacker and unsupported by the defender’s fire, were frequently successful in war, this was due to the moral effect produced on the attacker by the sudden and unexpected onset of a long line of infantry. Troops thus unexpectedly attacked, and, in addition, deprived of the support of their own artillery, almost invariably lost their heads. However, if the attacker is prepared for such an event, remains cool, meets the counter-attack of the defender with a powerful fire at short ranges, and brings up his supports, in order to follow up the effect of his fire with an offensive movement, there can be no doubt as to the result.[472]

Such a counter-attack, however, is only possible when the defender still has strong, intact reserves at his disposal, which he has kept in readiness in the closest proximity to the firing line until the decisive moment. An organization acting as part of a larger force, and whose flanks are secure, as a rule has no choice but to make a frontal counter-attack, unless offensive action is to be dispensed with altogether.

During the Russo-Japanese war such frontal counter-attacks were very frequently made. When undertaken with inadequate numbers, they were invariably repulsed by the fire of the Japanese, especially when the latter found cover in previously constructed trenches.

Provisions of Various Regulations.