11. THE USE OF THE SPADE IN ATTACK. (Pars. 157, 313, 339, 380 and 381 German I. D. R.).

“The defeat of the opponent is consummated by the assault with fixed bayonets.” (Par. 324 German I. D. R.). A premature advance to the assault, with all the peculiar features attending it, produces an aversion against the attack, an undue extension of battle lines, and makes it impossible for reinforcements to come up, except under cover of darkness.

The decision for making the assault emanates either from the subordinate leaders in the firing line or from the commander of the whole force. The latter may give the impulse for the assault by launching the reserve. This is undoubtedly the safer procedure. “When the decision to assault emanates from the commanders in rear, notice thereof is given by sounding the signal ‘fix bayonet’, which must be repeated by all the units that are to take part in the assault. At this signal the skirmishers increase their fire to the utmost. The parts of the firing line which are still in rear, move forward, as quickly as possible, to a position close to the enemy. All reinforcements in rear hasten straight to the front. As soon as the leading line is to form for the assault, all the trumpeters sound the signal ‘forward, double time’, all the drummers beat their drums, and all parts of the force throw themselves with the greatest determination upon the enemy. It should be a point of honor with skirmishers not to allow the supports to overtake them earlier than the moment of penetrating the enemy’s position. When immediately in front of the enemy, the men should charge bayonet and, with a cheer, penetrate the position.” (Pars. 346-348 German I. D. R.).

It is very difficult for a superior commander to perceive when the proper moment for making the assault has arrived, as he is compelled to remain so far in rear of the fighting line, especially where large forces are concerned, that he can only follow the general course of the attack. The first indication which he receives as to whether the enemy’s fire power has been broken all along the line, is the advance of his own firing line. He will still more rarely be able to see in time when the resistance of the enemy abates at some one point, and it will be quite impossible for him to issue orders with sufficient promptness to turn such an advantage quickly to good account.[398]

[398] “The attack fed from the rear, which may be likened to the closing of a telescope, is one of the most peculiar results of constructive theory, which seeks, by this means, to increase the energy of the first line, but only succeeds in massing too many men in front of the enemy, a better condition than which the enemy could not desire.” von Malachowski, Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik, p. 230. Incorrect estimate of the situation by the commander of the Ist Army on August 18th, 1870. F. Hönig, Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie, p. 145. Der 18. August, p. 271.

The firing line will, therefore, frequently have to take the initiative in bringing about the assault. It is absolutely necessary, especially if the enemy evacuates the position, that the firing line, quickly taking advantage of this moment, pass over to the bayonet attack. If the firing line were to wait until the reserves are up, valuable time would be lost, under certain circumstances; the enemy might recover from his temporary bewilderment and re-form, or might even receive reinforcements. In addition, hesitation on the part of the attacker would enable the enemy to gain time, evacuate the position unmolested, retire in good order, and perhaps take up a new position, or at least evade quickly the pursuing fire of the assailant. The firing line would be the first, in such a case, to perceive when and where the resistance of the enemy abates; it should therefore make the most of this knowledge and throw itself upon the part of the defender’s force that is in the act of withdrawing.

When the impulse for the assault emanates from the firing line, there is danger that instead of a general attack only a local one will result. It is impossible to conceive that the whole firing line will simultaneously consider that the moment for the assault has arrived; in general, only a part of that line at a time will come to this conclusion. Such local attacks are hazardous, however, and have some chance of succeeding only in covered terrain. A local assault made by a single battalion or company will usually attract the fire of a considerable portion of the hostile line and quite naturally dash itself to pieces against it. Even assuming that a gallantly charging unit succeeds in unexpectedly penetrating the hostile line at some one point, the defender will at once attack it in vastly superior force and compel it to retire with heavy loss. Furthermore, the failure is usually not confined to the one unit. The troops on the right and left of it, although they are perhaps farther from the enemy, and have not yet shaken him sufficiently by their fire, nevertheless join in the assault, as soon as they see the first unit rush forward. As a rule, when the decision to assault emanates from the firing line, a series of unsuccessful assaults will result. These will, however, bring good troops closer and closer to the enemy, until the great moment of definitely gained superiority finally arrives.

The General Staff account of the Franco-German war[399] very aptly describes the decisive moment for the assault: “The tension of the tactical situation was increased to the highest pitch by the prolonged fight at close range; the time was now ripe for the decision and the German corps commanders issued orders for the assault. Before this order reached the leading line, however, the German general officers on the spot had decided, at about 7:30 P. M., to undertake the assault on their own responsibility, as they considered the attack sufficiently prepared. On the signal given by them, and in many instances of their own accord, the Prussian and Saxon battalions hurled themselves, just as the sun was setting, on the position which had been so long and so tenaciously defended by the enemy.” (St. Privat). Consult, Der 18. August, pp. 525 and 571.

“When the XIth Army Corps issued from the Niederwald (near Wörth), the infantry encountered such a heavy fire from the direction of Elsaszhausen that the troops had to choose between either advancing farther or giving up the advantages that had been gained at such great sacrifices. The former course was indeed open to objection, as the troops were exhausted, as organizations were in confusion from the fighting they had just gone through, and as only three formed and fresh battalions were available.”—“General von Bose now ordered a general attack. At the signal ‘the whole force will advance’, the firing lines rushed from the Niederwald and, with loud cheers, threw themselves upon the enemy.”[400]

The assault was thus not a result of the superiority that had been gained, but an act of desperation in a situation that had become unbearable. Moreover, the success of the assault was not due to any numerical superiority of the attacker, but to the lack of initiative of the defender, and to the fact that he confined himself to purely defensive action.

It is, therefore, after all, an open question whether the initiative of parts of the line should govern the conduct of the entire force. In some instances, it certainly ought not to govern, if disaster is to be avoided. When a portion of the firing line advances, however, and the tactical situation in any way permits, neighboring units should at once conform to the movement. The units in rear, in particular, should, in this case, promptly hurry forward by the shortest route without regard to losses, support the firing line, and prevent it being repulsed. (Par. 345, German I. D. R.).

This brings up the question, as to whether the trumpeters of the assaulting units should sound the signal “fix bayonet,” in this assault, and thus bring about a prompt general assault by the entire line. This might obviously cause the troops to advance prematurely to the assault, a danger which might be brought about by the junior platoon commander. No one but the supreme commander, therefore, has the right to order this signal to be sounded when he wishes a general assault to be made. This is prescribed in the German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 347). If the commander of the firing line decides to assault, he transmits his decision to the rear by means of signals (s. s. s.). The supreme commander can still restrain the skirmishers by the signal h. h. h., or bring about a general assault all along the line by giving the signal “fix bayonet”. If a unit moves to the assault contrary to the wishes of the supreme commander, he should possess enough nerve to look on calmly while it is being defeated. It is much better for him to allow a single unit to be defeated than to cause the failure of the general attack by a premature advance.

“Although the assault should be made as nearly simultaneously as possible, this is not to be understood as meaning that all the units should penetrate the hostile position at one and the same time. Such simultaneous action is immaterial, and might, indeed, cause parts of the line who had a chance of successfully carrying out the assault, to hesitate because others are still in rear. The power of the attack would accordingly be impaired. All units that have once started must continue to advance uninterruptedly.” (Par. 349 German I. D. R.).

It depends upon the situation whether the troops intended for the holding attack finally participate in the assault itself. If they can bring an effective fire to bear upon the point of attack from an oblique direction and thereby ensure the success of the attack, they should make the most of this advantage. (Par. 340 German I. D. R.).

When the enemy advances to the frontal counter-attack, as laid down in the Russian and British regulations, the skirmishers throw themselves down for the purpose of firing. The supports in the act of moving up continue their march. If the enemy faces about, all the troops press after him.

The French regulations (par. 270) also consider such a counter-attack:

“If the attacker presses forward too hastily and if he threatens to carry the defender’s position, fresh troops, which have been assembled in a place sheltered from view, attack him energetically, while the troops already engaged increase the intensity of their fire. This powerful and energetic counter-attack produces confusion in the enemy’s ranks and compels him to retire, or at least to discontinue his forward movement until he has had time to recover.... The troops in the counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless of the cost. When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”

The German Infantry Drill Regulations contain no further rules for the conduct of the assault. If the physical and moral power of the enemy is so broken by the preceding fire fight that he commences to evacuate his position, it is quite immaterial what sort of an assault is made; the men simply fire and rush quickly after the retiring enemy. In this case the assault is nothing but a postlude of the fire fight.

A brave and well disciplined opponent who is energetically led, will not allow himself to be forced to evacuate his position by fire alone; to compel him to evacuate his position will at the very least require that an assault be threatened.

Before the Boer war, the British held the view that the effect of the fire fight alone was so great that the assault would strike nothing but an evacuated or, at most, a feebly defended position. The assault was to commence after the enemy had ceased firing and had sought protection in his trenches. The following statement is made by one who fought on the Boer side:

“The artillery supported the advance until the latter had arrived within 300 or 400 m. of the enemy; then it ceased firing. After a brief period of preparation by fire, the British infantry began the assault simultaneously in one long line. This assault, made without fire support, was repulsed without trouble by the Boer fire. On several occasions, short lines of our opponent had begun to advance, but these were in every instance forced to throw themselves down after a few moments had elapsed. Thereupon the whole British line, in my estimation at least 300-400 men strong, began to advance. One could clearly hear the British leaders call to their men to cease firing, could clearly hear the command ‘fix bayonet’, and the cheer ‘God save the Queen’! run along the British line. Then the whole hostile line rose. As they rushed toward us, they looked to me like a grayish yellow swarm, the men being almost shoulder to shoulder and the line being in places three to four men deep, just as frequently happens in charges made during our own peace maneuvers. At the same moment, we began firing. Our fire was at first somewhat wild, but was soon better controlled by our more experienced fighters calling, ‘Steady boys, steady, then none of them will reach us’. More and more men fell in the British line, and, when it had arrived within 100 or 80 paces of our position, its energy had spent itself. A part of the men threw themselves down behind boulders and fired, while the majority rushed back to the shelter of some bushes; but even there it was for the most part impossible to hold them. An assaulting enemy who does not fire, is not dangerous, even if he is numerically superior. In this case, the defender can fire a number of times, and the closer the assailant is to the defender’s position the more quickly and certainly will his force dwindle away. No one will, however, be able to induce the same men to advance again under hostile fire over an open field, that is, to expose themselves without shelter to the hostile fire.”[401]

The same lesson was learned long ago at Gorni Dubniac and at Plevna.

It is obvious that fire support is essential to the success of such an assault. This should be furnished in the first place by the artillery. In furnishing this support, artillery can employ time fire only until the infantry arrives within 300 m. of the enemy, while percussion fire may be continued until the infantry arrives within 150 m. of the enemy. During the attack on Pieters Hill (1900), Colonel Kitchener is said to have told his artillerymen that he would not censure them if two or three of their shrapnel burst in the ranks of his infantry. The following statement appears in a British memorial on the lessons of the war in the Far East: “The moral effect produced by artillery fire, which forced the defenders to take to cover and did not even permit them to raise their heads above the parapet, was so highly esteemed by the Japanese infantry that it requested the batteries to continue firing, without regard to the losses thereby inflicted in its own ranks, until it had taken the position or unfurled small national flags as an indication that fire support was no longer necessary. According to the opinion of the Japanese themselves, the losses inflicted in their infantry by their own guns were insignificant in comparison to the losses which the defender could inflict by delivering his fire undisturbed at a range of a few hundred meters, when not kept down by the attacking artillery.” According to the Austrian regulations, one unit is to remain halted for the purpose of directing its fire upon the point of attack or upon any reserves that might appear. This provision involves a grave danger, in that it may induce the leader to retain a considerable number of troops in rallying positions, instead of launching his whole force in the assault.

When fire support is deemed necessary in an attack, the artillery will perhaps be best able to furnish it until the infantry has reached a certain point. Then a moment will arrive, however, when the guns will have to cease firing, and when even the infantry units which have been left behind to support the attack, will no longer be able to direct their fire upon the enemy on account of the wide frontage of the assaulting force. The defender’s troops would have to be poor indeed, if they would not at this moment, when the assailant’s fire has practically ceased, raise their heads above the parapet for the purpose of emptying their magazines once more at the assailant, even though the fire be unaimed.

If the assault is to succeed, it is essential however, that, while the attacker covers the last 100-150 m., the defender be compelled to keep under cover. This can only be accomplished by employing fire while in motion.

This fire is practicable because the defender, who has been overwhelmed in the fire fight, has sought shelter in his works; it is advantageous, as it is only to compel the enemy to keep under cover. It would unquestionably be a mistake, and not justifiable in any case, to employ fire while in motion, when these conditions are not fulfilled, when the enemy is not completely subdued and is perhaps waiting under cover, ready to meet the assailant’s assault. Supporting the infantry assault with fire has, moreover, the additional advantage of preventing the defender from bringing up his reserves.

The following is taken from a private letter of Sir Ian Hamilton, perhaps the foremost British infantry tactician, who had the good fortune, at Elandslaagte and Doornkop, of leading his command close up to the enemy: “It is my opinion that no matter what regulations are promulgated in time of peace, the men will fire during the assault. You may rest assured that nothing will prevent their doing this. One would do well, therefore, to reckon with this factor from the very start. The greatest danger is always that the men will throw themselves down instead of continuing the advance. And, if the men have once thrown themselves down during the assault, they will rise only for the purpose of retreating.”[402]

[402] In Ausbildung der Infanterie für den Angriff, p. 63, Colonel von der Goltz makes the following statement in regard to an experiment: “As the line gradually drew closer to the defender’s position, the desire of the individual men to get into the hostile position as quickly as possible, became more and more apparent; the prone position for firing was abandoned for the kneeling position, finally for the standing position, and, quite naturally, fire while in motion resulted in the end. Fire while in motion is authorized by the regulations and is, in this case, certainly permissible. Its employment in this case may be traced to the very proper desire of not allowing the enemy, who has been held down this long, to raise himself above his parapet. This fire while in motion should not be confused with the fire while in motion formerly employed by long skirmish lines at long ranges, and condemned at that time. The latter had for its object not the keeping down of an enemy already overwhelmed, but, on the contrary, was intended to overpower an unshaken opponent.”

Russia. The attacking force approaches the enemy so close (35 m.) that the troops are enabled to throw themselves upon him. The point at which the hostile position is to be penetrated is designated and the men form in rear of their platoon leader. The reserves move at a run or by crawling close up to the firing line. If the assault is begun at a greater distance than 35 m. from the hostile position, fire while in motion is employed, “in order that the enemy may not regain his senses and may be prevented from rising above his parapet.”

During an unexpected encounter at night, on unfavorable terrain (Swiep-Wald at Königgrätz), as well as during obstinate fights for the possession of fortifications (the Grivica Work at Plevna, Scheinovo), bayonet combats are unavoidable, provided both forces are equally determined. During the fight for the possession of Servigny, on the evening of August 31st, 1870, serious hand to hand fighting occurred in the narrow village streets.[403] The Russo-Japanese war also proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that determined troops will maintain their positions until they are thrown out of them by cold steel.[404]

[403] Kunz, Noisseville, p. 51. See p. 134 supra. Fieldmarshal Moltke makes the following observations in regard to the bayonet fights of the campaign of 1859: “General Niel credits his victory at Solferino to the use of the bayonet. The question as to how often the advance to hand to hand conflict is carried out, may be left open. As a rule, it is employed only when it may be presumed that the enemy will not await the onslaught.” In his memoranda of 1865, in regard to the influence of improved fire arms on tactics, he states: “If the bayonet fights, so often mentioned in French accounts of the campaign of 1859, were stripped of their dramatic splendor, and if the simple prosaic truth could be ascertained, by far the greater number of these reports would be corrected in so far as to state that the opponent, shaken by more or less heavy losses, avoided the actual collision.”

[404] Examples: The attack on Tempel Hill on October 11th, in Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, von Lüttwitz.—The capture of works No. 17 and No. 18 by the 2nd Division, on March 1st, 1905 (Mukden).—Description by an eyewitness of a bayonet fight. Sir Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book, p. 252.—A bayonet fight occurred in the day time, in the open, when the 11th Rifle Regiment broke through the line at Hamatan during the battle on the Yalu, (see Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 39-40, p. 131), and in Bernaul’s Regiment, during the engagement at Datshishiao, on July 24th, 1904.

The defender will never retire simultaneously all along the line; frequently isolated groups and then entire units will leave his line when the superiority of the attacker’s fire becomes effective. Officers, non-commissioned officers and capable privates will endeavor to keep the weak-kneed from running away.[405]

If the assault is not made at this moment, the crisis may pass, but a determined rush by the attacker will, as a rule, bring about the decision. The threat of a bayonet attack usually decides those who have remained in the position, to make no further resistance. The attacker must make use of the moral factors in an assault, hence the importance of running, cheering, and accompanying the advance of all bodies in close order by the beating of drums and the sounding of trumpets.[406]

“The French were unable to withstand an energetic attack, when undertaken in anything like sufficient strength and accompanied by cheers and beating drums.” Boguslawski.

“Suddenly some soldier shouted: ‘Columns! Columns!’ Captain von Wobeser rose to see what was going on, but at the same moment his men rushed back and made straight for the Bois.”—“The mere launching of the attack from the direction of Point du Jour sufficed to induce the well concealed force of about 400 men, which held the gravel pits, likewise to beat a retreat that very much resembled a rout.” Hönig.

In time of peace there should be instilled in the soldier the conviction that, with the bayonet, he is a match for any opponent; that, in bayonet fighting, no other infantry is the equal of his own. The soldier should not be taught to shrink from the bayonet attack, but to seek it. If the infantry is deprived of the arme blanche, if the impossibility of bayonet fighting is preached, and the soldier is never given an opportunity in time of peace of defending himself, man to man, with his weapon in bayonet fencing, an infantry will be developed, which is unsuitable for attack and which, moreover, lacks a most essential quality, viz., the moral power to reach the enemy’s position.

“The rarity of bayonet fights does not prove the uselessness of the bayonet, but shows that opponents will rarely be found who are equally capable of making use of it. Indeed, the bayonet cannot be abolished for the reason, if for no other, that it is the sole and exclusive embodiment of that will power which alone, both in war and in every-day life, attains its object, whereas reason only tends to facilitate the attainment of the object.

“Let us assume that there exists an army which bases success in battle on fire action, and takes for granted that the enemy will not be able to get near enough to make a bayonet attack. If this army were to encounter another army which, without undervaluing the effect of fire, remembers the bayonet at the proper time, it would be filled with the most dreadful dismay when the enemy actually assails it with the bayonet. With modern rifles, bullets are unquestionably a good substitute for the bayonet at close quarters, but this is true only of troops who do not fear annihilation, i.e., troops trained to use the bayonet and capable of closing with the enemy after firing. If this is not the case, such firing at close quarters is a pure waste of ammunition, since men who are afraid to close with the enemy, if necessary at such a moment, will usually fire into the air.

“If the soldier has been taught, however, to annihilate the enemy from a distance and from behind cover, he will naturally prefer this mode of inflicting losses, since he runs very little risk of getting hurt, and will, moreover, acquire an aversion for exposing himself to danger, i.e., he will shrink from bayonet work. Hence, if we attach too much importance to marksmanship, we produce a more or less trained soldier, who may possibly be a very good shot at long ranges, but who is not especially inclined to take his chances in a bayonet fight. Incidentally, target practice develops the mentality of the man, but does not improve his morale.” Dragomirov.

Of every 100 wounds, the following percentages were produced by cutting weapons:

In time of peace the assaulting distance is to be about 150 m. During the Franco-German war, the assault against Elsaszhausen (battle of Wörth) was launched at about 300 m.[407] and that against St. Hubert at 100-200 m. from the enemy.[408] The 107th Infantry, after charging over a distance of more than 500 paces, captured a hedge which was held by the French north of St. Privat, and, in the assault against the northern outskirts of the village, a distance of 300 paces had to be covered.[409] In the attack on Le Bourget, on October 30th, 1870, the center column halted when 600 m. from the village; “then began a wild, headlong assault against its outskirts.”[410] The Japanese frequently had occasion to cross similar stretches at a run, but there were also instances where their assaulting troops had only to cover a few meters (1st Division at Kinchau, 20 m.).

If the attacker succeeds in carrying the position, he will be at a disadvantage for the moment; his troops will be in confusion and exhausted, and a large number of officers will be gone. If the defender, reinforced by fresh reserves, takes advantage of this moment, he may be able to turn the tide of the battle. The inclination of the men to pursue the enemy with the bayonet, instead of halting and making the most of the fire power of their rifles, is noticeable in all battles. The attacker will have to take steps to restrain his victorious infantry, and, as soon as opportunity offers, to pursue the enemy with fire. Under cover of this fire fresh troops or quickly assembled detachments should advance on the flanks in pursuit of the enemy. There is a wide difference between a wild, headlong rush after the enemy and a systematic pursuit. Infantry that rushes headlong to the front after penetrating a position must be brought back at any cost, unless it can enter a second position simultaneously with the enemy.[411]

In addition to pursuing the enemy with fire, the attacker should re-form his troops without regard to their original arrangement (if the enemy gives him time enough, the original organizations should be re-formed), occupy the position, replenish ammunition, and remove the prisoners. It is a mistake to mass more rifles in the captured position than can be employed to advantage, as the enemy will in all probability direct a heavy fire upon it. As soon as the fight has been decided, the echelons in rear should be halted, so that they can be employed as occasion demands. The leaders of these units will often have to act independently in such a case. (Par. 350 German I. D. R.). Preparations should be made to the end that hostile counter-attacks may be at once repulsed. These rules are particularly important when the position that has been carried is not the main position but only an advanced post.[412] These measures must be taken independently by all leaders who participated in the assault, without waiting for orders from superior authority. The pursuit should be begun as soon as possible with formed bodies of troops (if practicable, while the enemy is being pursued by fire), in order to interfere with his re-forming, to prevent his taking up route column, and to overrun his rallying positions. The battle of Beaumont consisted of a whole series of such pursuing actions. The arrival of night should by no means be used as an excuse for discontinuing the pursuit, for night above all else is the mightiest ally of a bold victor.[413]

[412] See Taktik, V, p. 359, et seq. See also the measures taken after the capture of St. Privat. Der 18. August, p. 533. The situation in Fröschweiler; Kunz. Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele, 17. pp. 109 and 153. As in peace, the signals, ‘the whole force assemble,’ and ‘the whole force halt,’ was sounded everywhere. How little the infantry was inclined to pursue is shown by the conduct of the 94th and the 32nd Infantry Regiments. Ibid., pp. 87-90. The 10th Company of the 32nd Infantry marched fully two miles to the rear to a bivouac which they had left in the morning.

[413] See Taktik, V. p. 436.

If the attack fails, it will be the duty of the commander to arrest the flight of the skirmishers who are rushing to the rear under hostile fire. It will be impossible, however, to halt these men while they are exposed to the most effective fire of the enemy. Only when the nearest cover is reached can there be any question of halting. (Par. 327 German I. D. R.). When cover is not available near at hand, the exhaustion of the troops will soon stop the flight, or the leaders may be able to face them again to the front, as soon as the hostile fire abates. However, the retreating troops will have placed quite a distance between themselves and the enemy before this can be done, and the latter, unmolested by fire from the attacker, will be able to take full advantage of the technical qualities of his rifle, unless the attacker’s artillery or cavalry prevent his doing so. No matter where the retreating troops come to a halt and face to the front, there they must stay, and, if the hostile fire permits, intrench.

The perseverance of the Prussian Guard 600-800 m. in front of St. Privat,[414] and of the British Brigade of Highlanders at Magersfontain, immediately in front of the Boer position, on December 11th, 1899, is worthy of imitation.

[414] The distance at which the first attack came to a standstill is variously given as 300 (3rd Guard Regiment and IInd Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment) and 800-900 paces (2nd Guard Regiment). See History of the 3rd Guard Regiment, pp. 276, 279 and 280; that of the 1st Guard Regiment, p. 165; that of the 2nd Guard Regiment, p. 232. “Headed by a few of the officers who still remained, the depleted lines clung to the slope; with iron endurance and self-sacrifice they maintained the dearly bought positions.” Gen. St. W., II, p. 872.

The assault on Gorni Dubniac came to a standstill at very short range, and a part of the skirmishers of the Moscow and Pavlov Regiments maintained their positions 50 m., the remaining Russian skirmishers 320 m., from the trench.[415]

11. THE USE OF THE SPADE IN ATTACK.
(Pars. 157, 313, 339, 380 and 381 German I. D. R.).

In every attack there are situations in which it may be advantageous to use intrenching tools—

The Japanese, whose mode of waging war was very cautious, fortified the initial positions from which their attacks were made, in order that they might have rallying positions in case of defeat.[416]

[416] On July 19th, 1904, the 12th Infantry Division (Ist Army) had pushed back Russian troops at Shaotao and at once fortified a position 2700 m. from the new Russian position at Yushuling. From this position the 12th Division advanced, on July 31st, as a Russian attack had not taken place. The extended fortifications facing the Russian Shaho position were made with the same end in view. The war in the Far East was one of positions, since neither army possessed sufficient freedom of action. See p. 341, et seq., supra.

2. In intrenching after making an advance under cover of darkness to within effective range of the enemy for the purpose of opening fire at daybreak. In this case, the advancing force is, as a rule, instructed to advance until it comes under hostile fire and then to intrench.[417]

[417] During the attack on Paardeberg, on February 27th, 1900, the Canadians were ordered to advance before daybreak from their trenches located 500 m. from the Boer position, and to throw themselves down and to intrench as soon as they were fired upon. This was done when the force was 100 m. from the enemy. Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 33, p. 60.

The Japanese 45th Infantry, in its advance under cover of darkness against Oerrshikiatsi (Shaho) was first fired upon at a range of 1000 m., whereupon the men threw themselves down and intrenched; when the hostile fire abated, the regiment advanced again, and when the enemy resumed his fire, it intrenched. A third advance brought the regiment within 500 m. of the defender’s position and it was able to make the assault during the forenoon of October 12th, 1904.

4. In fortifying a captured position. The want of intrenching tools in quickly putting captured positions in a state of defense, so often felt during the Franco-German war and the Russo-Turkish war, has now been removed by the introduction of portable tools.[418] The necessity of quickly preparing captured positions for defense presented itself in a number of instances.

[418] Examples: The French in St. Privat. The Germans and later the French in Noisseville. on September 1st, 1870. Villepion, on December 1st, 1870 (Hönig, Volkskrieg, III, p. 257; Kunz, Loigny, p. 49): Les Granges, on January 11th, 1871 (Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20. p. 297). Fortifying the position on the second ridge of the Green Hills in front of Plevna, on September 10th, 1877 (Kuropatkin-Krahmer, II, p. 178). Tempel Hill (Terrayama), on October 11th, 1904. In the last mentioned case three offensive returns were repulsed from the captured position, which had been prepared for defense. The fights for the possession of the village of Linchinpu (on the right bank of the Shaho, north of the railway), captured on October 14th, were still more obstinate; the position had to be prepared for defense under hostile artillery fire. (von Tettau, Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei, II, p. 136).

5. In holding ground that has been gained in an attack when further advance is impossible, that is, in situations such as confronted the infantry of the Guard on August 18th when its first attack came to a standstill. During the attack on Gorni Dubniac, in the Russo-Turkish war, the Russian Guard intrenched when a further advance became impossible. During the attack on Telish, which occurred a few days later, specific orders were issued for the troops to intrench when 1000-2000 m. from the Turkish works.[419]

As a result of the lessons gained in the Russo-Turkish war, general instructions were issued to the Russian infantry on the subject of intrenching in attack. According to these instructions, the spade was to be used in attack in the following cases: In fortifying a captured position, as a protection against a possible offensive return of the defender; in holding supporting points necessary to a continuation of the attack; and in placing rallying positions in a state of defense. The order directing troops to intrench was to be given, in all cases, by the supreme commander. The following procedure was to be observed: “Every man equipped with a spade and who is not sheltered by some feature of the terrain, places his rifle on the ground and, lying on his left side, begins to excavate a hole parallel to his body. This hole should be as long as the distance from his left elbow to his knee, as wide as the length of the spade-handle, and as deep as the width of the blade of the spade. The excavated earth and sod he places in front of his head, which he endeavors to protect as quickly as possible. When this work is completed, he rolls over into the excavated hole, and, lying on his right side, repeats the operation. When he has obtained sufficient cover, he hands his spade to the other man of the file, who proceeds in a similar fashion.”

The Japanese, on account of their numerical inferiority, found it necessary to get along with few supports and reserves, and therefore made use of the spade in terrain devoid of cover, or utilized sand bags,[420] which were carried along. In this manner, they laboriously worked their way to within assaulting distance of the enemy. In many instances, this necessitated whole days of fighting when an envelopment was impossible. Sand bags were an advantage when the ground was frozen or when the sod was not thick.

Campaign of 1859	1.67%
Campaign of 1864	4.0 %
Campaign of 1866 (Prussians)	5.4 %
St. Privat (Germans)	1.0 %
Russo-Turkish war	0.9 %