During the Boer War (1899-1902), the British infantry always attacked positions prepared for defense. Aside from the superannuated fire tactics and deficient marksmanship training of the British, their failures in the early engagements of the war may generally be traced to the following causes:—
1. Insufficient reconnaissance. This caused British detachments to be surprised, in a number of cases, by fire at short range. (Brigade of the Guards at Modder River). In many instances, the British forces were even surprised by fire while in close order formations. (Hart’s Brigade at Colenso).
2. Pure frontal attacks, in which equal forces were frequently pitted against each other. (Modder River, Magersfontain, Colenso).
3. Insufficient protection of the flanks by echelons against fire surprises carried out by small detachments.
4. Insufficient coöperation of the artillery and infantry.
5. Isolated attacks made by brigades (consisting of 4 battalions). The employment of several brigades simultaneously for concerted action was a rare exception.
6. Insufficient support of the firing line. A timely reinforcement of an organization that had already been shaken never did occur.
7. Hesitating use of reserves in the crisis of the fight. At Magersfontain only 81⁄2 battalions out of 13, and at Colenso only 6 battalions out of 161⁄2, had been seriously engaged. When Spionskop was evacuated, 11 battalions had not as yet been engaged. The attacks were begun, but not pushed home.
The combat tactics of the Russian infantry[345] (Russian I. D. R. of 1903) were based on shock action, narrow frontage, and deep formations. The bayonet training preached by Dragomirov was the result of the belief in decisive psychological impressions and the consciousness that the Russian fire tactics, based upon volley fire, were inadequate to annihilate a well concealed defender. Thus, the endeavor to cross blades with the opponent as quickly as possible, led to a headlong rush to the front, without creating the preliminary conditions necessary for pushing the attack home. The hesitation of the higher commanders to throw in every available man at the decisive stage, and the tendency, reaching down to the lowest grades, of creating detachments and separate missions, contrasted unfavorably with this splendid offensive spirit.
[345] “The Russian infantry is embued with a mixture of defensive spirit and instinct for hand to hand fighting.” Count Marenzi.
The Japanese infantry was trained according to the letter and spirit of the German regulations of 1889. It had fought shy of unhealthy tendencies after the Boer war, cultivated the independence and initiative of all leaders, and recognized the necessity of night combats and of using the spade. In addition, the way for success was carefully, almost cautiously, prepared by the commander-in-chief, who left nothing to chance. It is easy for subordinate leaders to be bold and daring, when they know that the commander-in-chief has neglected nothing to ensure victory. The principal characteristics of the Japanese combats were—
1. The cautious advance, frequently under cover of darkness;
2. The systematic preparation of the attack by the coöperation of infantry and artillery, and the determined advance along the whole front;
3. The attempt to induce the enemy to launch infantry at a point where the decisive attack was not to take place;[346]
[346] The advance of the Vth Army at Mukden.
4. The sudden launching of the decisive attack;
5. The prompt preparation of every captured position for defense;
6. The absence of pursuit.
The fights at Wafangu,[347] as well as the attack made by the Guard and the 12th Division at the Yalu[348] proceeded entirely according to German pattern.
[347] Einzelschriften über den Russisch-Japanischen Krieg, Vienna, 1906, I, p. 226. The envelopment of the Russian right flank by the Japanese 19th Brigade is especially instructive.
[348] Ibid., I, p. 79, et seq. Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 39-40, p. 123, et seq. Consult also Von Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 2.
A change took place in the tactical methods of the Japanese when the Russian artillery—whose ballistic properties were superior to those of its antagonist—brought a greater number of guns into the field, and when, in addition, the Japanese infantry became numerically inferior in the battles after Liao Yang.[349]
[349] The statements in regard to the strength of the opposing forces are still very contradictory. At Liao Yang 120,000 Japanese confronted 150,000 Russians; at Mukden the Russians had perhaps 10,000 rifles, 300 field guns, and 100 heavy pieces of ordnance more than the Japanese.
The task set commanders of armies and leaders of troops by the government, had to be met by a continuance of the offensive.[350] The peculiar character of the theater of war made it difficult to maneuver the enemy out of his strong positions; so at best nothing remained for the Japanese—unless they wished to renounce the offensive entirely—but to conquer the enemy by attacking him in front. Since the advantages of the attack—superior numbers and the freedom of choosing the point of attack—were thus dissipated, the victory had to be gained by making use of defensive expedients. As the demoralizing and retarding effect produced by fire increased more rapidly than the morale of the assailant, nothing remained but to intrench and to take advantage of the cover afforded by darkness as in fortress warfare. Moreover, the inferior forces available precluded deep formations and necessitated an immediate development of the entire force in one line. Thus the desire to push forward resolved itself into an advance along a broad front. Favored by the purely passive conduct of the Russians, this led to an envelopment of their flanks and a pressure on their line of retreat. The Japanese were able to overcome the constantly growing power of resistance of the Russian defense, because, while strictly adhering to the offensive, they availed themselves of defensive expedients although their movements were retarded thereby.
[350] C. H. Über das innere Wesen der japanischen und neuzeitlichen Offensive. Streffleur, 1907, October number.
The conduct of the attack was, of course, considerably influenced by the character of the terrain. The 1st Army, fighting in hilly country, perhaps remained true longer to regulation formations and long rushes than the other Japanese forces, but was finally obliged to resort to a wide extension of closed bodies. The IInd and IVth Armies were differently situated, as the attack over open plains fell to their lot.
Speaking generally, the following details may be given in regard to the method of attack of the Ist Japanese Army:[351] Units were pushed into action abreast; objective points were assigned to each; and certain lines or points, according to which they had to maintain touch, were indicated to subordinate units. To avoid a surprise, if for no other reason, thin firing lines were formed at the outset, and in a serious attack whole companies, in dense firing lines capable of developing a strong fire, were at once thrown in; these advanced to mid ranges in order to open fire, as a rule, under 1000 m. The Ist army had a special penchant for making rushes of 80-100 m.,[352] usually by entire companies; the assault was, in many instances, begun as far as 300 m. from the hostile position, and then pushed home; supports and reserves followed in extended formation, but assembled promptly on reaching cover. The infantry was disinclined to intrench during an advance, but never neglected to fortify quickly a captured position. In the combats of the Ist Army we will find the best lessons applicable to our conditions.
[351] Streffleur, 1907, January number.
[352] This is not true of the 4th Guard Regiment. See von Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 24: Rushes of 50 m. were made “as the men otherwise got out of breath and shot badly.” An advance was made by squads and crawling was tabooed. The new Japanese Drill Regulations warn against making rushes less than 30-40 m. long. On the other hand, according to the opinion of von Lüttwitz, the length of rushes will seldom exceed 100 m.
1. The engagement of the Guard Division at Yangtsuling on July 31st, 1904.[353]
[353] Gertsch, I, pp. 92 and 100 (Good maps). Sir Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book, I, p. 313. Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern, I, p. 57.
2. The attack made on October 11th, 1904, by the 15th Infantry Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) against Temple Hill (Terrayama), which was held by 4-6 companies.[354]
[354] Bronsart v. Schellendorff, Beim japanischen Feldheer, p. 132.—von Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 23.
Fire was opened at 900 m.; long rushes were used and firing line and supports were deployed; after a brief but violent fire action at 500 m., the hostile position was reached in a single rush and carried.
The artillery, to be sure, supported this attack with accelerated fire.
3. The attack made by the 4th Guard Regiment on October 12th, 1904, against a height south of Huaku (battle on the Shaho).[355]
[355] Ibid., p. 24.
4. The attack made by the 3rd Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) under General Matsanuga, on October 12th, 1904 (long rushes), against the heights south of Shotasko (battle on the Shaho).
Outline Sketch of the Formation of the 3rd Brigade.
Frontage about 2000 m.
4. Infantry:
5. and 6. 4. and 2. 12. and 11. Cos.
7. and 8. 1. and 3. Cos.
29. Infantry:
10. and 2. Cos.
9. and 3. Cos.
Brigade Reserve:
9. and 10. Cos. 4. Infantry.
11. and 12. Cos. 29. Infantry.
Troops in the act of coming up, but not employed:
1. and 4. Cos. 29. Infantry. and II. Bn. 29. Infantry.
First line: Eight companies (apparently entirely deployed). Interval between skirmishers 3 paces; between companies 40 paces.
The first halt (lasting seven minutes) was made at 1500 m. and the distance to 800 m. was then covered at a rapid run. The men that could not keep up, halted to recover their breath and then followed independently. At 800 m., the line opened a lively fire at will, which lasted for two minutes, and then advanced by rushes by companies (first the right, then the left companies of the battalions). During this advance the supports (2 battalions) were absorbed by the firing line. At the same time the brigade reserve approached closer to the firing line (the original distance between reserve and firing line, before the advance began, was 300 m.). The last halt for firing was made at 250 m., from the enemy’s position, and the latter was then carried in one rush. The losses amounted only to 235 men.[356]
[356] von Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 24. Sir Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book, II. Consult the same work on the unsuccessful pursuing action fought by the 3rd Brigade at the Chosenrei Pass.
In the IInd and IVth Armies, who fought, as a rule, on terrain devoid of cover, a far more cautious method of attack was produced. The distinguishing features of this mode of attack were thin firing lines (skirmishers at intervals of 5-10 paces) increasing only very gradually in density, and great frontage (a company 250, a battalion 800, and a brigade 2000-3000 m.).[357] This caused the attack to falter in many instances as soon as it had come within 400 m. of the hostile position, whereupon nothing remained but for the line to intrench and to work forward slowly from one position to another.
[357] Von Lüttwitz, Angriffsverfahren der Japaner, p. 47.
1. The engagement of the 3rd Infantry Division on October 12th, 1904, at Shiliho (battle on the Shaho).[358]
[358] Ibid., p. 26.
2. The engagement of the 5th Infantry Division, from March 6th to 9th, north of Madiapu (battle of Mukden). This division required three days to work forward from 1100 m. to within assaulting distance of the enemy’s position. Cover for men standing upright was constructed at 1100, 950, 530, 390, 300, 200, 160 and 125 m., that under 300 m. being built of sand bags.[359]
[359] Ibid., p. 52. The attack order of the 5th Infantry Division, in Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern, I, p. 121.
3. The combats of the 10th Division on March 3rd and 10th, 1904 (battle of Mukden).[360]
[360] Bronsart von Schellendorff, Beim japanischen Feldheer, pp. 217, et seq., 225, et seq., 242 and 244, et seq. On the use of sand bags, consult ibid., pp. 236 and 292.
Confidential British instructions dealing with the tactical lessons of the Russo-Japanese war, make the following deductions: “* * * * The above shows the great importance of local reconnaissance by infantry, of which considerably more must be demanded than has been done up to the present time in European armies. It shows, moreover, the advantages of thin firing lines during the preparatory stage of the action, and the insignificant effect produced by shrapnel and long range fire on such lines in which it is desirable to advance, without halting on the way, to within 1000 yards of the enemy. The necessity of gaining a superiority of fire before advancing to the assault, and the necessity of an increased supply of ammunition, are confirmed anew. It is further demonstrated that the bayonet of the infantryman is still capable of playing an important role in battle.”
The Russo-Japanese war confirms the opinion that the issue of combat is but little influenced by the formations taken up; that esprit and the determination to conquer are of far greater importance than any formation. The most difficult task that infantry can be called upon to perform consists of successfully pushing home an attack over open ground commanded by hostile fire. “It would be wrong,” said Fieldmarshal Moltke, “were one to attempt to lay down in regulations that a force should not advance over a plain against an enemy under cover. But every superior commander ought to consider what such an operation portends.” Heavy losses are unavoidable in a destructive fire fight lasting for hours.[361] The attack will not succeed so long as the enemy commands the plain with his fire. The commander of the attacking force must find ways and means to wrest this command from the enemy. All of the battles of recent campaigns have demonstrated that an attack is bound to succeed if it is thoroughly prepared by infantry and artillery fire, is undertaken by adequate forces, and is pushed with determination close to the enemy; and that such an attack is, in fact, superior to the defensive. The success of an attack on a position prepared for defense might depend upon the following preliminary conditions:
(a) Careful reconnaissance, for the purpose of determining the most favorable direction for the attack.
(b) Occupation of the foreground of the hostile position. When the foreground is entirely open, an advance must be made under cover of darkness up to the medium ranges.
(c) Preparation of the infantry attack by the closest coöperation of infantry and artillery.
(d) Timely determination of the point at which the decisive attack is to be made.
(e) Careful utilization of the terrain during the advance, so as to allow of delaying the opening of fire until the force is as close as possible to the enemy.
(f) Suitable disposition, distribution in depth, and deployment of a strong force for the purpose of bringing about a superiority of infantry fire. The organization detailed to make the attack must have its entire effective strength available for accomplishing its proper task, and not be compelled to detach parts for guarding its flanks.
(g) Ensuring concerted and simultaneous action on the part of the attacking forces. As the enemy has given up any idea of assuming the offensive, at least for the time being, the attacker should not allow the advantage to escape him of choosing time and direction of the attack.
[361] General von Schlichting, in his work Taktische und strategische Grundsätze, maintains the opinion—in contrast to General von Scherff—that open terrain commanded by hostile fire is impassable for infantry. At any rate, military history has yet to furnish proof of this.
“If the enemy decides to stand on the defensive, he renounces the initiative for the time being. The attacker will then have time to reconnoiter the hostile position and to weigh all the circumstances that favor the attack. He should not limit himself to reconnaissance by the cavalry and to observation through field glasses. Mounted officers’ and infantry officers’ patrols should supplement this reconnaissance, and complete the information gained as the enemy is approached.” (Pars. 362 and 363 German I. D. R.).
The local reconnaissance (see p. 248 supra) should be conducted with all possible care; timely directions should be given in regard to it during the approach to the battlefield;[362] the activity of the reconnoitering bodies should continually increase as the enemy is approached; and the work itself should be divided in a systematic manner. Excessive thoroughness may retard reconnaissance work to such an extent, on short winter days especially, that success may be jeopardized. (Par. 305 German I. D. R.). As a result freedom of action will be lost and the energy of the attack weakened. It would be wholly wrong to postpone the decision for making the attack until something definite is known of the strength and dispositions of the enemy. These matters are almost never cleared up until after the battle. The decision as to whether or not an attack should be made is determined primarily by the general situation. (Par. 355 German I. D. R.). The latter may force a commander to advance promptly without permitting him to await the results of the reconnaissance. The character of the terrain and the preparation the enemy is known to have made, determine whether the commander ought to attack at once, whether he ought to utilize the cover of darkness for the advance of the attacking troops, or whether he ought to attempt to maneuver the defender out of his position.
[362] According to experience the reconnaissance work generally flags during a halt, although that is the very time when an increased activity is desirable. The reconnaissance work in the IXth Corps on August 18th, 1870, from the arrival at Caulre until the advance guard opened the fight, is particularly instructive. Der 18. August, pp. 124, et seq. and 215.
The information required as a basis for this decision will, as a rule, not be obtainable without a fight. In spite of all the objections arrayed against reconnaissances in force, they cannot be avoided, if it is desired to gain prompt and certain insight into the enemy’s situation. It cannot be expected that the defender will passively permit the assailant to gain an insight into his dispositions. A feint will accomplish nothing; the enemy must be seriously engaged, so that he will show his hand.[363] Yet in spite of these combats, misapprehensions are not precluded.
[363] It was the intention of the Japanese commander-in-chief, on October 10th, 1904 (battle on the Shaho), to attack the Russian army before it had completed its concentration for battle. The advance guards of the Reserve Division and of the 5th Division encountered advanced Russian detachments at Kushutsy (Xth Army Corps), and at Wulitaisy (XVIIth Army Corps), whose weakness was, however, not recognized. In the belief that the Russian main position had been encountered, the advance on the hostile position was ordered for the night 10/11th October, the attack to take place at daybreak on the 11th. 9th Supplement to the Militär-Wochenblatt, 1906, p. 327.
It is quite natural that isolated detachments, in their endeavor to gain an insight into the hostile dispositions, may find themselves suddenly within short range of the enemy. In such a situation, the detachment should maintain its position, as its fire will frequently facilitate the approach of the other attacking troops. Almost every one of the more serious engagements furnishes examples illustrating this feature.[364]
[364] The perseverance of Nambu’s Brigade on March 7th, in the “three houses” (Yuhuntun near Mukden). Vierteljahrshefte, 1907, p. 78. The perseverance of the troops in the Palungshan works, captured on August 22nd, 1904, by being enveloped on both flanks. (Port Arthur). Streffleur, Einzelschriften, 4, pp. 81 and 91. The perseverance of parts of the IInd Battalion of the 3rd Guard Regiment in the engagement at Towan (31st July, 1904). Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern, I, p. 60.
In order to guard the reconnoitering troops from being driven back, if for no other reason, it is advisable to place in readiness an adequate force of artillery. As the artillery is protected by shields, it can take up the fight even against superior artillery with better chances of succeeding than in the past.
If the commander has decided to attack and has determined against what part of the hostile position the main attack is to be made, the foreground of the hostile position is at once occupied, and the enemy’s advanced troops forced back, so as to prevent the defender from gaining an insight into the dispositions of the assailant.
The assailant should launch as few troops as possible for initiating the action. They should avoid engaging prematurely in a fire fight with the infantry of the hostile main position, even if the terrain would permit a covered approach to short range. If the advanced troops allow themselves to be enticed into doing this, they expose themselves to the danger of suffering a defeat, and oblige the commander of the whole force to launch for their relief troops that were intended for the main attack.[365]
[365] “It is a general principle to push as close as the terrain permits to the enemy’s position with advance troops for the purpose of opening fire.”
Insufficient information in regard to the enemy and undue precipitation in issuing orders may place advanced troops in such an unfavorable situation. If the defender allows himself to be tricked into assuming the offensive for the purpose of driving off harassing detachments, so much the better for the assailant, for the latter’s artillery will then find an opportunity to fire on the enemy.[366]
[366] The French regulations hint at this. Look up the advance of French infantry during the combats around Ste. Marie aux Chênes. Der 18. August, pp. 174 and 179.
Austria. “Under certain circumstances, the covering troops will have to be reinforced at an early moment in order that a strong line may be formed opposite the enemy, but, in many cases, they will nevertheless still abstain from advancing into the zone of effective fire.” The Austrians usually employ strong covering bodies. The Germans desire to ensure simultaneous action on the part of all the troops in opening the combat.
At Spicheren the commander of the 14th Infantry Division, under the erroneous assumption that the heights of Spicheren were only occupied by troops covering the entraining at Forbach, issued orders to General von François to drive away the hostile artillery. All of Frossard’s Corps, however, was in position on the heights on which the artillery was posted.[367]
[367] Gen. St. W., I, p. 310.
At 10 A. M., on August 6th, 1870, the commanding general of the Vth Army Corps issued orders to the advance guard to cross the Sauer with four battalions at Wörth and Spachbach (1500 m. apart) and to occupy Wörth and the heights beyond, where the entire corps of Mac Mahon was in position.[368]
[368] Gen. St. W., I, p. 320.
The advance of the attacking troops, under cover of the advance guard, into a preparatory position, is made in such a manner that units are opposite their objectives when the subsequent forward movement against the enemy is begun.[369] This frequently requires a rearrangement of the forces so that even an assailant who is numerically inferior may be superior at the decisive point. A simultaneous attack from the front and flanks requires reserves everywhere and is opposed to the economical employment of the forces; it may easily lead to failure, and is justifiable only when the assailant is greatly superior in numbers or morale.
[369] The deployment of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the Guard, near Ste. Marie aux Chênes, against St. Privat. Der 18. August p. 408.
A premature deployment impairs the leader’s influence on the course of the combat and makes it difficult to change the direction of the attack. Route columns, taking advantage of all available cover, will, therefore, be retained as long as possible, and only subordinate units permitted to march directly toward their proper objectives, until the hostile fire compels a more extended deployment (development). The preparatory position is taken up in the last sheltered area in front of the hostile position, provided that that area is large enough to accommodate the attacking force when deployed for action, and to shield it from the observation and the fire of the enemy.
In country generally devoid of cover, infantry will have to be placed in a preparatory position when three kilometers or more from the enemy, even when the latter’s artillery will in all probability be neutralized by our own.
“In order to ensure the concerted advance of the various units into the preparatory position, it is advisable, especially in close country, to have them move from one covered position to another. If this is done, units whose march was favored by the nature of the ground, will not arrive prematurely within dangerous proximity of the enemy, while others who had farther to go, or whose advance was difficult, are still a considerable distance to the rear. The leader should make his dispositions so that no loss of time will result from this advance from one covered position to another.” (Par. 369 German I. D. R.).
Where large forces are concerned, the attack on a position carefully prepared for defense will consume several days, the assailant placing his artillery in position on the first day and reconnoitering under cover of infantry, which is pushed to the front.[370] The troops of the first line are pushed forward far enough before daylight so that they can intrench under cover of darkness and open fire at dawn. This will be more difficult to accomplish when covering troops or advanced positions are located in front of the hostile position. If the assailant has succeeded, on the previous day, in driving these troops back upon the main position, an advance to within effective range may be made during the night in order that the fire fight may be opened on the succeeding day. Although the chance of taking the enemy by surprise is eliminated in such a case, the advantage of having diminished the distance that will have to be crossed under fire remains.[371]
[370] The attack on fortified positions is discussed in detail in Taktik, V, p. 237, et seq., as It depends upon the closest cooperation of field artillery, foot artillery, infantry and pioneers.
[371] The engagement at Belmont, on Nov. 22nd, 1899, furnishes an interesting example of unforeseen friction. The advance, in this instance, was made during the night from a point 8 km. from the enemy.
It is difficult to find shelter for the rearward echelons, which must be kept in readiness in very close proximity to the leading line. These rear echelons must either be intrenched or at least sheltered by masks. General actions should be avoided at night.
Upon completion of the concentration for action (development), the infantry has to advance within the zone of effective infantry fire. In doing this the infantry must either pass by or through the artillery which is already engaged.[372]
During the Russo-Japanese war, the effect of shrapnel, in spite of the mediocre matériel and the lack of shields, forced the artillery of both belligerents to seek shelter on the reverse slope of heights. When this was neglected and when batteries went into position in the open, within effective range, they were quickly silenced. The fear of shrapnel caused both sides to advance cautiously, to relinquish all close order formations at an early moment, and to employ the spade extensively. This alone was evidence of the fact that the artillery had accomplished a good deal. Moreover, it was not altogether accident that the first few of the larger Japanese night attacks occurred coincidentally with the appearance of Russian artillery matériel, which was superior both as regards numbers and power. The new German I. D. R. (par. 444), in contrast with the previous edition (II, par. 82). prescribe that the infantry attack should not be postponed until a superiority of fire has been gained. Thus, the regulations draw logical conclusions from the modern armament and seek to avoid useless bombardments of hostile positions (such, for instance, as the Russians indulged in at Plevna and the British in South Africa).
“The principal duty of field artillery is to support the infantry in the most effective manner. Its duties are inseparably connected with those of the infantry. It should, on principle, always fight the targets that are most dangerous for its infantry.” (Par. 364 German F. A. D. R.).
The German Field Artillery Drill Regulations prescribe that the guns should fire over the heads of the advancing infantry (par. 375), and that single batteries should accompany the infantry attack to within close range of the enemy (par. 471). When an assault is to be made, the infantry expects the artillery to direct its fire against the point of attack until immediately before the assault begins.
“But our infantry should never be obliged to dispense with the support of artillery. The gun shields afford considerable protection, even at the short ranges. At the decisive moment the artillery should not shrink even from the heaviest infantry fire.” (Par. 369 German F. A. D. R.).
“In selecting an objective, it is essential for the artillery to consider whether, by fighting it, the infantry will be effectively supported. Whether the hostile infantry or artillery is chosen as an objective will depend upon the situation. As a rule, the hostile artillery will be the proper objective for our artillery during the preparatory stage of the action. As the distance between the opposing infantry forces decreases, it will become more and more necessary for the artillery to devote itself to the hostile infantry.” (Par. 432 German F. A. D. R.).
If the artillery is equipped with shielded guns, it can devote itself for some time to the most important target without regard to the hostile artillery, contenting itself with merely occupying the latter’s attention. (Par. 469 German F. A. D. R.). To silence artillery in a concealed position requires curved fire and a good deal of ammunition; but, on the other hand, artillery so posted cannot fire upon advancing skirmishers.[373] Therefore, the advancing skirmishers of the assailant should force the hostile artillery to leave its cover and to expose itself to the attacker’s artillery. (Pars. 330 and 496 German F. A. D. R.).
[373] This is partly due to the fact that fire cannot be adjusted quickly enough, and that it is difficult to follow moving targets. Besides, when the targets are small and numerous, they are difficult to hit.
The result of this procedure will be that the artillery of both sides will engage each other’s attention with only a small part of their guns, and concentrate the remainder on the hostile infantry. It is obvious that the infantry will very soon demand of its artillery in definite terms that it should first annihilate the hostile artillery before the infantry can think of continuing the attack.
The provisions of the German regulations in regard to the fusion of activities of infantry and artillery mark an entirely new departure. The commencement of the infantry attack is accordingly no longer dependent upon the result of the artillery combat; on the contrary, both combats are of equal importance and proceed along parallel lines; the only danger is that the infantry may make a headlong rush to the front before a superiority of fire has been gained.
Confidential British instructions, dealing with the lessons learned by the Japanese in Manchuria, contain the following: “Intrenched artillery can be permanently silenced only under very exceptional circumstances, as it will withdraw its personnel temporarily, as soon as the hostile fire becomes too hot, and resume its fire again when that of the enemy abates. The infantry attack should therefore be launched without awaiting the result of the artillery combat, but the infantry must insist upon the artillery completely engaging the attention of the hostile guns during the advance. Another reason for not awaiting the outcome of the artillery combat, lies in the great frontage of battle lines. The unsuccessful attack made by a division will then frequently cause the neighboring unit to make an immediate attack.”
Austria (1904). “The artillery must be given an opportunity and the necessary time for effectively preparing the infantry attack. So long as the artillery engaged with the hostile batteries has not achieved a noticeable success, or is not at least neutralizing the hostile artillery, the infantry attack remains a difficult undertaking.”
France. The artillery during the preparatory stage of an action: The artillery should endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as quickly as possible, without employing more guns than are absolutely necessary. The commander should give the order for the attack only when the preparation is considered sufficient.
England. The regulations emphasize the necessity of pushing infantry forward, and of supporting that infantry energetically, so as to compel the defender to expose himself. “As soon as the hostile batteries have been sufficiently silenced, or the infantry advances to the attack, the fire is directed upon the point of attack in order to prepare and to cover the assault.”
Italy. The regulations state that artillery is a supporting arm for infantry. “If the hostile artillery discloses its position from the start by employing direct fire against the assailant’s artillery or infantry, the attacker’s batteries endeavor to silence it or to draw its fire upon themselves, in order to facilitate the deployment of their own infantry. If, on the other hand, the hostile artillery remains concealed for the purpose of saving its fire for the infantry when the latter offers a favorable target upon arriving within effective range, then it would seem advisable for the artillery of the assailant not to open fire at all, or to open fire only with enough guns to cope with the available targets. The assailant’s artillery brings the fire of all its batteries into play when the defender’s artillery is compelled to come into action in order to support its own infantry against the advance of the attacker’s infantry.”
The difficulties of providing for coöperation between infantry and artillery are due to the impossibility of distinguishing at all times with certainty between friend and foe (assaulting guidons),[374] since the elimination of powder smoke and the adoption of neutral tinted uniforms; and, further, to the circumstance that, while we have a signal for increasing the range of the artillery (g.g.g.), we have none for indicating that the fire is to be concentrated upon certain points. “Uninterrupted communication with the fighting line in front must be provided for. For this purpose officers, who report by signal or by telephone, should be sent forward. These officers are primarily to ascertain how close their own firing line is to the enemy, in order that the artillery may keep up its fire as long as possible.” (Par. 376 German F. A. D. R.). In England, it has been suggested to indicate the point upon which fire is to be concentrated, by the colored ball of smoke of a special projectile. It requires strict attention on the part of the infantry to make its work harmonize with that of the artillery. Every opportunity, for example, when the hostile infantry is forced under cover by a burst of fire, should be utilized for advancing. This is particularly emphasized in France. The defender is to be blinded by a hailstorm of fragments. “Every rafale of the artillery will either cause the most advanced line to make a rush, or the troops of the rear line to come up to the firing line in order to reinforce it or to carry it forward as much as possible. Thus the rafale becomes a veritable shield for the infantry (véritable bouclier de l’infanterie).” Langlois.