The defense may repulse the enemy, but only the attack can annihilate him. The decision as to whether the force is to attack or stand on the defensive depends upon the tactical situation and the will of the commander, and not upon numerical superiority, of which one is not aware, as a rule, until after the battle.[327] Determined attacks, again and again repeated, in spite of all failures, are the surest means of gaining victory and of preventing the enemy from becoming aware of his superiority. Only pressing reasons (marked hostile superiority, necessity for awaiting approaching reinforcements, or the failure of an attack), and never favorable terrain conditions, should determine a commander to stand on the defensive. In defense the eventual assumption of the offensive is kept constantly in view. A commander who voluntarily stands on the defensive for the purpose of letting the opponent attack, and then attacks him in turn, reaps only the disadvantages and never the advantages of both the offensive and the defensive.

The attack may take various forms, depending upon whether the dispositions have to be made under hostile fire (surprise and rencontre), or whether the enemy has renounced the initiative and awaits the attack in a deployed formation, or in a position prepared for defense (deliberately planned attack). In the last case the attack requires more careful preparation and in many instances even necessitates the employment of special auxiliaries (such as guns capable of high angle fire, and engineer trains). However, the advance of a strong firing line to within assaulting distance of the enemy, and the uninterrupted fight for the superiority of fire, are common to all attacks.

Aside from the attack against an enemy in position and the rencontre there is an attack formation more closely resembling the rencontre in character, which may be called the abridged attack.[328] This attack formation is used in forestalling the enemy in occupying important points, in preventing enveloping movements, in carrying out flank attacks, in surprising the enemy, in warding off a hostile surprise, in relieving the pressure on a neighboring force, etc. It is moreover appropriate where the conformation of the ground or the time of day prohibit a use of the rifle.

1. THE SURPRISE.[330]

Insufficient reconnaissance may place a force in a situation where it will be obliged to go into action directly from route column or from a formation unsuitable for combat, against an enemy who unexpectedly opens a lively fire at short range, thus increasing the moral effect of the surprise by actually inflicting losses. The force which is taken by surprise will without doubt overrate the seriousness of the situation and will be inclined to overestimate the strength and morale of the opposing force. This must be taken into account in coming to a decision.

Above all else, it is important to develop, as promptly as possible, a fire effect at least equivalent to that of the enemy, to let the troops regain confidence, and to secure the initiative. A bold decision is best calculated to extricate a force from such a critical situation.[331] It is of little use to deploy, take cover, and open fire, when the enemy is well concealed; a decision to retire is still less to be approved, because at short ranges it is bound to lead to a complete annihilation of the force. As a rule, a defeat can only be averted, in such a case, by assuming the offensive and thus repulsing the enemy. The decision for attacking directly from route column (or, when the enemy is still at a distance, at least for deploying toward the front) is the more justifiable, since an enemy who prepares an ambuscade for us is, as a rule, conscious of his inferiority in numbers, morale, and training, and resorts to deceit because he does not dare to meet us in the open. Therefore, overwhelm the enemy with fire and then charge him with the bayonet. An impetuous advance may perhaps intimidate him, and our losses will be less, at any rate, than if we turn our backs on him and await our fate in what is at best but a poor position, as it is taken up, as a rule, during the first moment of panic. However, even if a force that is taken by surprise cannot avert disaster by making a determined counter-attack, it can at least save its honor and morale. This is equally true of the rencontre on the battlefield.

Examples of Surprises.

When two forces unexpectedly collide in close country, the advantage rests decidedly with the one that opens fire and advances to the charge first. This onslaught with cold steel should become second nature to the troops. In traversing close country, a force should be in a formation that enables it to develop an adequate fire and to make a charge in compact formation. A line formation is entirely unsuitable, as a rule, on account of the difficulties of the terrain to be overcome, and in a skirmish line the officers cannot properly control the men.

For passing through thinly scattered timber without underbrush,[335] company column is a suitable formation, and for dense woods platoons advancing either abreast or echeloned, each platoon in line of squads in columns of files. If the platoons or sections were to advance in single file, the columns would be too long, and it would be next to impossible to maintain the intervals. The six or eight small columns of files of a platoon are, on the other hand, close enough together to keep each other in view; besides, they are easily and quickly deployed for firing and charging, and can meander through the woods more readily than an organization in close order. Moreover, the leaders can exercise better control over the men than in skirmish line, which invariably bunches up at the places that are most easily passed, while connection is not maintained at all at other points and march direction and cohesion is lost. (See the passage of the Bois de Givodeau during the battle of Beaumont).[336]

2. THE RENCONTRE.[337]
(Pars. 315-317 and 352-361 German I. D. R.).

“Uncertainty and haziness of the situation are the rule in war. During marches in campaign the opponents will frequently not gain detailed information of each other until they come into actual contact. Thus the rencontre develops out of a collision of route columns.” (Par. 352 German I. D. R.).

Both forces are marching toward each other, and the collision occurs frequently at a point not intended by either; as every minute brings the heads of the two columns closer together no time is to be lost. The commander who desires to wait until he can come to a decision consonant with the results of the reconnaissance will arrive too late. The tactical situation in its entirety determines whether or not an attack should be made. If we do not take advantage of the fleeting moment the enemy will surely do so, and, as a rule, he will not be any better prepared for action than we are. Frequently the deployment from route column is not made because the commander desires it, but because it is necessary in order to avert a crisis in the leading line. The commander who is acting under hostile pressure should endeavor to regain the upper hand as quickly as possible so that he can dispose of the troops of the main body with a definite object in view. In a rencontre, the advantage rests almost invariably with the commander who quickly sizes up the situation, attacks promptly, and succeeds in throwing the opponent on the defensive. A bold, impetuous attack, which would lead to disaster in the presence of an opponent already deployed, may, in this case, be productive of victory. The direction in which the attack is made is of less importance than a prompt decision on the part of the commander and the simultaneous launching of the whole force in a definite direction. We must take the terrain as we find it. In covered terrain, the effect of the surprise will be increased still more, while in open country, the preparatory stage of the combat will soon lose that character, because the side which has an advantage as regards terrain will make use of it, and the conviction will force itself upon the opponent that victory cannot be gained by an impetuous attack alone. It will be easy for a commander to come to a decision as to the action to be taken if he is conscious of his own strength or fears that the enemy desires to avoid an attack. (The commanders of the advanced troops of the IIIrd Army Corps at Vionville). The rencontre increases the difficulties of troop leading, but makes the attack easier for the troops.

The difference between a deliberately planned attack and a rencontre is most clearly apparent in the conduct of the advance guard. Its task is to secure the prospective artillery position and to create favorable conditions for the combat of the main body. This requires that ground be gained to the front so as to enable the main body to deploy while moving forward. In addition, the advance guard should seize and hold important points, without, however, anticipating the intentions of the commander of the whole force. It is moreover desirable for the advance guard to interfere with the hostile deployment. Points lying on the flanks or in advance of the artillery position, especially if they command the latter, should be quickly seized; when necessary, the advance guard must fight for their possession. Its commander should quickly pick out the points that are important for this purpose; he should, by no means, be satisfied always to begin the fight where the point of the advance guard happens to be. Under certain circumstances the main body will have to concentrate for action farther to the rear so as to hasten the deployment and to take advantage of favorable terrain. When the enemy has an undeniable start in deployment, the commander may decide to let the opponent advance to the attack, and then bring about the decision by simultaneously launching his main body. Only thus can one in the long run avoid fighting superior numbers with an inferior force. (Par. 360 German I. D. R.). It is much easier to decide whether this or that point is of importance, than to answer the question as to whether the strength of the advance guard will suffice for the task of taking it. The reports of the cavalry in regard to the enemy’s strength and the composition and formation of his columns, will scarcely furnish an adequate basis for a pertinent answer to this question. Moreover, one will usually not be able to tell, until after the action has commenced, how far the hostile deployment has progressed. But, in any case, long hostile firing lines demand caution. However, a start in deployment is not indicated by the combat frontage alone. A factor of far greater importance is which force has been most successful in making preparations for going into action by developing its main body and by having artillery near at hand. It is artillery that clears up the situation. When an infantry division encounters a hostile force deployed on a front of 400-600 m., this does not necessarily mean that the entire division must systematically concentrate for action, as this would cause a considerable loss of time, thus giving the enemy a great advantage. The general situation and the mission of a force are of greater importance for the commander’s decision, than the state of readiness for action of the opposing forces.

Issue of orders. See Taktik, V, p. 197.

The advance guard must be promptly informed of the intentions of the commander (i.e., whether he intends to attack, to concentrate for attack farther to the rear, or to let the enemy attack[338]) and of the location of the prospective artillery position. The attack order should be withheld until the combat of the advance guard has sufficiently cleared the situation, but a development of the force should be ordered at once.

The advanced detachments should endeavor to gain a start in deployment over the enemy and cover the advancing artillery in front and flank, by quickly deploying strong firing lines and pushing machine guns to the front. After they have done this, they should promptly advance to the attack. Through this, our firing line, while in the act of deploying, runs the serious risk of suddenly encountering, at short range, the fire of superior hostile troops, at a time when all the troops approaching the field are still too far distant to increase its fire power.[339] Whether the quickly formed firing lines should at once move forward to the attack in a rencontre, depends upon the impressions received by the commander. His dispositions should be such as to compel the enemy to disclose his available forces at an early moment. Every fighting line is so sensitive to fire simultaneously delivered against its front and flank, that an attempt to turn the hostile position will instantly force the enemy to take counter-measures. If the enemy is unable to keep pace with us in deploying a firing line, if he is unable to deploy skirmish lines as dense as ours, this state of affairs should induce our commander to proceed to the attack; if the reverse state of affairs exists, he should await the arrival of reinforcements. But in order to obtain this insight into the existing situation the troops must get close to the enemy. Such an insight into the hostile dispositions cannot be gained at long range. The extent of a hostile position may perhaps be determined at long range with the best field glasses, but the strength and power of resistance of the enemy can never be gauged in this manner. If one threatens to push an attack home, however, the enemy will be compelled to show his hand. When opposed by an enemy whose strength is unknown, it will unquestionably be necessary to approach to the extreme limit of short ranges. From here the dispositions of the enemy may be clearly recognized, and, in addition, at 600-800 m., a firing line that has made a lodgment in some feature of the terrain will not as yet be exposed to annihilating losses. Misconceptions are scarcely to be avoided in such a situation. One must trust to luck and take some risks. On the other hand, the training of the infantry should afford the assurance that it will not give up the position it has once reached; it should firmly hold the ground gained, and persevere.[340]

When infantry is compelled to go into action, the necessity of occupying important supporting points and of gaining ground for the concentration for action, requires a broad front to be covered. (Par. 357 German I. D. R.). The artillery, which will arrive soon thereafter, will then bring relief to the infantry in critical situations.

In every rencontre there comes a moment when the fight is at a standstill. At this moment an attentive observer may notice that, although it is impossible to push the attack home without further reinforcements, the space in which the concentration for action is to take place, is secured against a hostile attack, or that the enemy has been deprived of the initiative and has been thrown on the defensive. This is the moment in which the commander regains the initiative and in which, by means of an attack order, he can dispose of the troops of the main body as he sees fit. The “rencontre” differs from the “deliberately planned attack,” in that, in the latter, the concentration for action can proceed smoothly as desired by the commander, while in a rencontre the opponent, for the time being, dictates the course of action. Therefore the commander should make efforts to free himself from this restraint, i.e., he should endeavor to launch his troops in a manner not influenced by the dispositions of the enemy.

The degree of control which a commander retains over the course of the combat depends upon the promptness with which he gains a general idea of the situation. For this, if for no other reason, he should be as near the head of the column as possible while on the march. The troops sent first into action, supported by the artillery, must put every available man into the fight, in order to repulse attacks made by the enemy and to enable the commander to launch the main body as an entity. In any case, the battalions of the main body should not be successively thrown into the fight as soon as they arrive, for the purpose of overcoming a temporary crisis, or for relieving the advance guard from a dilemma. The machine gun batteries, whose employment was particularly important during the preparatory stage of the fight, should be withdrawn as early as possible so as to be available as a reserve in the hands of the commander.

In bringing the main body into action, deployments by the flank should be avoided. The deployment should be initiated by subordinate units (in an infantry division, by regiments) moving out of the route column and toward the objective points determined by the purpose of the combat.[341]

Provisions of Various Regulations.

Examples.