VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY.[302] (Par. 451 German I. D. R.).

The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who knows how to use his bayonet is more than a match for the individual mounted man even on open ground; and, if he remains cool, retains his presence of mind, and uses his rifle properly while keeping the opponent constantly in view, he is even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which retains its steadiness has nothing to fear even when outnumbered by cavalry. Its main strength lies in steadily delivered fire, while cavalry relies on the possibility of making an unexpected rapid charge, on quickly covering great distances, and on the moral effect which its irresistible onslaught undoubtedly produces upon infantry. So long as there is a possibility of surprise and misunderstanding, of infantry allowing itself to become discouraged, and of the individual soldier being exposed to hunger and hardships, so long will cavalry that is energetically led be able to gain brilliant victories. Tactics would look differently upon the possibility of making a mounted charge during a battle if one or two German cavalry divisions had been on the Japanese side during the pursuit after Mukden. “If we demand of infantry that it close with the enemy after it has suffered tremendous losses, why should we not demand the same of cavalry whose mobility is disproportionately greater.” (Skobeleff’s Order for the Day, June 15th, 1882). The less the world believes in a victory of cavalry, the greater the certainty of such success. The troops should be accustomed in time of peace to the sight of charging cavalry. The recommendation made by the late General Dragomirov of the Russian army is, at any rate, worthy of consideration.[303] He proposed that cavalry ride at full speed through infantry lines deployed with three paces between files. Some infantrymen are, indeed, bound to be injured in such charges, but the wounds produced are not likely to be serious. Infantry accustomed to such charges will not lose its steadiness so easily in action as when it comes in contact with cavalry for the first time on the battlefield.

The success of the charge made by Captain Bechtoltsheim of the Austrian army at Custozza with three platoons of Sicilian Uhlans, may be ascribed principally to the fact that the Italian infantry was not accustomed to field service and lacked training. This small force of cavalry broke entirely through Pisa’s deployed Brigade (Italian) and struck the route column of Forli’s Brigade, throwing it into complete panic, so that of five battalions only one remained intact. The three platoons of cavalry, which numbered about 100 sabers, lost 2 officers, 84 men, and 73 horses killed and wounded. The charge made by three troops (Eskadrons) of the Dragoons of the Guard at Mars-la-Tour, to facilitate the retreat of the defeated 38th Brigade, and that made by two platoons of the 7th Hussars at Sapignies were likewise successful.

Any formation that permits effective firing is suitable for warding off cavalry. Skirmish lines through which a cavalry charge passes suffer losses that scarcely deserve mention. The fight is not hopeless even when the hostile troopers halt within the ranks of the infantry. When cavalry has charged through a skirmish line, the latter should be careful not to face about to fire at the troopers,[304] as that would give a second cavalry line an opportunity to approach and strike it unawares.

The supports in rear of the first line form the objective of the cavalry after it has charged through the firing line. These supports must therefore open fire on the cavalry regardless of the skirmishers in front.

The flanks of a firing line can be bent back only when that line is not exposed to hostile infantry fire. The threatened wing should never be bent forward since that interferes with the fire of adjacent units. The task of repulsing an attack directed against a flank had best be left to the supports in rear of the flanks. The German Cavalry Drill Regulations (par. 349) state, that toward the end of a fight the bulk of the supports and reserves will have been absorbed by the firing line; that the fire that such a line could direct toward a flank would be insignificant; and that at any rate a new firing line could not be formed within a short time; and, therefore, that a charge against its flank would be advantageous. This statement should be a warning for us always to retain echelons or machine guns in rear of the flanks. The most critical situation for infantry is that in which it is charged by cavalry while retiring defeated under hostile fire with no supports available to repulse the attack. A halt means annihilation; it must be left to each individual to save himself as best he can.

During the battle of Scheinovo, three companies of the 11th Russian Rifle Regiment made an unsuccessful attack and had to retreat under the pursuing fire of the Turks, while Turkish cavalry began to charge their left flank. When only 200-300 m. from the Turks, the 4th Company, which was most seriously threatened, halted and formed square as if on the parade ground. During this maneuver, all the officers and many non-commissioned officers were either killed or wounded. The heavy losses of the battalion (50%) may, in the main, be ascribed to this halt under the most violent fire of the enemy.[305]

When the cavalry charge comes more from the front, however, the hostile infantry and artillery will have to stop firing, and it may then be possible to rally or re-form the defeated force, provided the men will heed their leaders.

Units in close order can deploy quickly toward the front or flank for the purpose of firing. However, they will be able to fire in close order only when not themselves subjected to hostile fire. The front and flanks of a body of infantry in proper formation are equally strong, but, in this connection, it should be borne in mind that a deployment toward a flank, for the purpose of firing, always takes time and is apt to impair the steadiness of the men.[306]

If time admits, a position may be looked for near obstacles, such as ditches, hedges, swampy ground, etc., which impede the hostile cavalry. It is not necessary, however, for the infantry to occupy the obstacle itself; in fact, it is better to take up a position some distance away. The shortness of our rifles obliges us to form the firing unit at right angles to the line of advance of the approaching cavalry, and to avoid aiming obliquely. The provision contained in a number of drill regulations, including the French, that the bodies in close order (supports, reserves) should be formed in echelon, is objectionable, as this is apt to lead to their firing on one another (as the French infantry did in repulsing the charge made by Bredow’s Brigade and the Dragoons of the Guard at Vionville). The deployment from “broad” and “deep” column to meet a sudden cavalry charge can, as a rule, be ordered directly by company commanders on the caution of the battalion commander, the method of meeting the attack being promptly decided upon. The main thing is to be in instant readiness for firing and to protect the flanks by means of echelons.

In a deployment from “deep column,” the measures taken by the commanders of the rear companies must conform to those of the leading companies. To meet a cavalry charge coming from the right front, for example, the following scheme would be appropriate:

The 1st Company forms left front into line so that its front is at right angles to the line of advance of the cavalry;

The 2nd Company forms as a support in rear of the left flank of the first company;

The 3rd Company forms right front into line, and prolongs the line of the first company;

The 4th Company also forms right front into line, or is held in readiness as a support in rear of the right flank. In this way the approaching cavalry can be met by the fire of from six to eight platoons.

It is a very simple matter to ward off a cavalry charge directed against the flank of a marching column (form line by wheeling by squads). When the cavalry charge is directed against the head or the tail of a column, as recommended by the German Cavalry Drill Regulations (par. 350), there will not be time enough, as a rule, for the entire company or battalion to form line. It will suffice to let the leading elements form line, the rear elements moving out of the column and forming in rear of the flanks as supports.

Successful resistance does not depend upon the formation taken up; in fact the latter is of importance only when it increases the feeling of security. The morale of an organization is of more importance than the formation taken up. A proud confidence in victory and morale are the only factors which decide success, and the training of infantry should be such as to develop these qualities.

Cavalry will in many cases consider that it has gained a success if it causes infantry to discontinue a movement, or to take up formations which interfere with the highest development of its fire, or which offer favorable targets to the hostile infantry and artillery. This is especially the case where infantry is in the act of beginning an assault, when the slightest hesitation may jeopardize success. If cavalry actually begins to charge at this moment, only the bodies immediately threatened halt at the signal “attention,”[307] and face the cavalry; the remainder continue the march.

The sudden appearance of a line of charging cavalry produces such a tremendous psychological effect on troops not immediately threatened, that they either watch the attack passively, or else too many of them take a hand in repulsing it. This moment, in which the attention of the troops is so completely riveted on the cavalry, is seldom utilized for the purpose of gaining ground to the front, or for effecting a withdrawal.[308] It needs but little imagination to picture to one’s self the success which the French army could have gained at Waterloo if infantry masses had followed on the heels of Ney’s cavalry squadrons. In the battle of Vionville the German infantry fired at the most incredible angles at the charging French Guard cavalry. While Bredow’s Brigade was making its charge during the same battle, part of the infantry of the 6th Division stopped firing on the French skirmishers, to follow with intense interest the cavalry charge that was taking place on a totally different part of the battlefield. This conduct, as natural as incorrect, suggests the advisability of profiting by such moments of the enemy’s inattention for the purpose of executing a movement or holding him with our own fire. It also seems absolutely necessary to support with rifle fire the charge made by one’s own cavalry, or at any rate to prevent the hostile infantry from firing undisturbed on our troopers.

There are other reasons, however, why a sharp lookout should be kept during a hostile cavalry charge. All cavalry drill regulations recognize that a charge has greater chances of succeeding when it is made in deep formation, in successive lines, or simultaneously from several directions. The fire of the infantry is distributed, and, unless a good lookout is kept, a part of the cavalry, scarcely or not at all molested by fire, may perhaps succeed in driving the attack home. This will be the case when infantry allows itself to be enticed into developing a heavy fire in a direction from which only a feint is made, while the main attack comes from another, or from several other directions. Well led infantry will, therefore, never employ more rifles in repulsing cavalry than are absolutely necessary, while the mere threat of a cavalry charge will induce badly led infantry to develop an excessive volume of fire.

On open terrain, when the approaching cavalry is visible at a considerable distance, and when the infantry itself is exposed to effective fire, the prone aiming position is to be preferred. The men lying flat on the ground are not so easily wounded by the hostile troopers, and the horses will generally avoid stepping on them, besides which, the danger space is greater than when the men fire standing. In rolling or close country, where cavalry cannot be seen by men lying down, the aiming position kneeling or standing should properly be assumed. The losses inflicted by hostile fire must then be endured. Horses and riders are more apt to lose dash when charging an upright human wall that is spouting fire, than when charging a kneeling or prone opponent who scarcely offers an obstacle to the charge. What is of greater importance, however, is that men standing upright can more easily execute a change of front, fire on passing cavalry, and use their bayonets in case the cavalry actually penetrates their line. The British and Italian regulations very properly prescribe that the front rank of a body of infantry in close order should kneel in such cases.

As the success of infantry depends to a great extent upon the steadiness with which it receives the cavalry, it would seem to be advantageous to withhold the fire until the cavalry gets within short range.[309] General Dragomirov says in his forcible manner, “It is not the bullet which has been fired, but the bullet which is still in the rifle-barrel, and reserved for short range, that harms charging cavalry.” If infantry in line was able to repulse a cavalry charge in the past at 40 paces, with smoothbore muskets and at the first volley,[310] the chances of doing this with modern rifles would be still greater, if the “stopping power” of the 8 mm. projectiles were absolutely certain at short ranges. As this is not the case, it is necessary to open fire at an earlier moment.[311] If infantry does not fire until cavalry gets within very short range, it will have to reckon with the fact that even wounded horses will still be able to carry their riders into its ranks. However, for purposes of instruction in time of peace, it is proper to open fire late. If an infantry unit is trained in time of peace always to open fire at the medium ranges on charging cavalry, the unexpected appearance of hostile cavalry at short ranges in actual war, is more likely to bring disorder into the ranks of such a unit, than if it is trained in time of peace to reserve its fire until the cavalry has come within short range.

[309] “The best preparation against rapidly executed mounted charges is for all commanders to keep their eyes open, quickly and coolly to size up the situation, and to act with determination. All precipitation or haste would be disastrous, for it would communicate itself to the troops. Infantry has never yet fired too late upon cavalry.” Feldzeugmeister v. Wäldstatten.

[310] At Sedan, the 5th Company of the 46th Infantry fired only at 140 and 80 paces, and repulsed the charge. Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 46, p. 186. In the same battle the 9th and 12th Companies of the 87th Infantry repulsed a charge at 60 paces. Gen. St. W., II, p. 1217.

[311] The France Militaire contains the following statement in regard to the effect produced on horses by bullets from the French Lebel rifle in the engagements near Casablanca in 1907: “Many officers serving in the field observed that the small caliber bullets stopped horses only when a foot had been shattered or when a vital organ had been hit. At Casablanca, horses that had been hit by several bullets continued to gallop for a long while. This is a remarkable phenomenon, for the gentlemen of theory count as out of action every horse that has been hit by a projectile. This is entirely incorrect. Many wounded horses carry their riders into the melée and do not die until the day after the fight. This was observed on the French as well as on the Moroccan side.

“Troopers charging full tilt, with the firm determination of penetrating the hostile line, are not stopped so easily. In the first place, they would have to be hit, and that, in itself, is not such an easy matter. This is still more difficult for the infantry, if it knows the dash of the hostile troopers. Let us cultivate the dash of our cavalrymen, even if unreal situations are thereby produced in our peace exercises. If, on the other hand, we teach our troopers in time of peace to turn tail in the face of imaginary projectiles, we are training our cavalry for panic in time of war.”

At Garcia Hernandez (1812), a French square was broken by a wounded horse falling down within the ranks of the infantry. This is, however, only true of closed bodies of infantry formed in two ranks. Horses will frequently break through a skirmish line—whether or not the horses are wounded is immaterial. Men are wounded in such an event in exceptional cases only, and the wounds produced are generally insignificant.

The following episode shows the effect produced on cavalry when it attacks unshaken infantry which is in good formation and reserves its fire. During the retreat after the battle of Jena, on October 28th, 1806, the Grenadier Battalion Prinz August, threatened by hostile cavalry, did not feel equal to continue its march to Prenzlau and attempted to cross the Ucker farther down. In the expectation that a cavalry charge would be made, square was formed and the officers were told not to fire until the cavalry had approached to within 20 paces. “Meantime, the French cavalry—the brigade which had crossed at Golmitz as well as the remainder of Beaumont’s Division, under its commander, in all nine regiments—approached. The first charge was made by nine troops (Eskadrons) under the division commander. They approached at a gallop. When the expected fire did not come, the dragoons gradually reined in their horses, so that finally they were going no faster than a slow trot. At 30 paces the command “Fire” was given in the infantry and quite a number of troopers fell, the rest galloping by the square on both sides. Eight subsequent charges were repulsed in a similar manner.”[312]

We have moreover to consider, in this connection, the strength of the infantry, the formation of the cavalry, and whether the latter charges from several directions or in several successive lines. A small force of infantry, especially when it may anticipate attacks from several directions, must open fire sooner than a strong infantry force which has to contend with an attack coming from one direction only. In the first mentioned case, an attempt must be made to meet quickly, one by one, the attacks which follow each other at intervals.

It is quite a different matter when the infantry itself is not directly threatened, but can take a hand in repulsing a cavalry charge made on another unit; then it is advisable to open fire at an early moment in order to break the momentum of the charge at long range. (11th Jäger-Battalion at Wörth; 8th Company of the 46th Infantry at Sedan).

This in part determines the rear sight elevation that should be used. The sights should not be changed on the battlefield, although this has been done on the drill ground by well trained soldiers without impairing the continuity or accuracy of the fire. According to the table of ordinates of the trajectory (par. 23 German I. F. R.), a bullet fired when the sight is set at 700 m. and aim is taken at the feet of the horse, does not rise above the height of a mounted trooper throughout that entire distance. The bullets may pass entirely over the target however, when the men take too full a sight in the excitement of battle, or when, in rolling country or terrain covered with grass or crops, they cannot see the bottom of the target and aim above that line. It is better, therefore, to aim at the breast of the horse, with sights set at 600 m., and to fire as soon as the target gets within 800 m. On account of the excitement attending every cavalry charge, it is not advisable to change sights.

It is a good plan to fire one volley first and then to employ fire at will. It is not easy for infantry, while awaiting the onrushing mass of cavalry, to reserve its fire until, in the opinion of the leader, the first shot may be fired. But this waiting is of great importance to prevent the fire from becoming wild and ineffective. Since the elimination of powder smoke, there is no reason why other volleys should be fired after the first, for in the excitement of the fight the volley cannot produce a moral effect. The horses certainly find the rattling of fire at will more unpleasant than the sudden crack of a volley. The advantage of the volley, of permitting a unit to be kept better in hand, may be an important factor under certain circumstances however. The volley should, as a rule, be used by supports that are not exposed to fire. (8th Company of the 32nd Infantry at Wörth; the 1st and 2nd Companies of the 83rd Infantry, and the 5th Company of Jägers at Sedan).

Since the principal object of the fire is to destroy the cohesion of the charge, and as cavalry always closes toward the center while charging, no special importance need be attached to the distribution of the fire.

As regards relative numerical strength, a platoon of infantry consisting of 60 rifles (firing 360-500 rounds per minute), should be a match for 1-3 troops (Eskadrons), and a company of infantry, under favorable conditions, may be able to deal with a cavalry brigade.[313] Cavalry can become dangerous for infantry only when the infantry is surprised, finds no opportunity to fire, loses its steadiness and morale, or attempts to reach cover by running.

The Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville.

At half past 12 on the afternoon of August 16th, 1870, the companies of the 10th Prussian Infantry Brigade were advancing east of Flavigny towards the Metz—Mars-la-Tour chaussee. As French infantry was not on the spot to put a stop to this movement, the 3rd Lancers and the Guard Cuirassier Regiment received orders to attack. The former regiment went to the rear, as no definite objective (?) had been assigned to it.

The Guard Cuirassier Regiment was formed in two lines, 150 m. distance between them, with two troops (Eskadrons) in each line, a fifth troop (Eskadron) following as a reserve. Although hampered in its movements and thrown into disorder by abandoned baggage wagons and other camp litter that covered the ground, the regiment nevertheless made the charge with superb gallantry.

The charge struck the 6th and 7th Companies of the 52nd Infantry, under Captain Hildebrand. These companies, rifles in hand and their leader in front, awaited the French cavalry, which came into view at a distance of 1200 m. The first echelon (6th and 4th Troops) was received with rapid fire at 250 paces. On the right, the 6th Troop (Eskadron) approached to within 60-80 paces of the Prussians, but a part then turned to the rear while a few troopers turned to the left. It is said, that of the leaders only one officer and one non-commissioned officer remained in the saddle, and that only twenty cuirassiers were rallied after the charge. The left troop (Eskadron) missed its objective completely. The Prussian rear rank faced about and fired on some French troopers who attempted to make an attack from the rear and who now also received fire from other units of Prussian infantry.

During the charge, the distance between the first and second lines had become greater than at first ordered. When the first line broke in two, the second was still some 300 m. distant from the Prussian infantry and suffered some losses, probably from stray shots, which did not stop the movement however, as the fire soon ceased. German accounts, to be sure, do not mention that the second line could not be seen on account of the powder smoke, and that the fire was discontinued to let the smoke clear away. When the French line was 100 m. away it received the command chargez and the Prussian infantry again resumed its rapid fire, which shattered the attack, the leading troopers breaking down in a ditch about 10 paces in front of the Prussian line. The third line, its cohesion impaired and its advance hampered by fallen horses and riders, was just as little able to reach the Prussian companies. The right wing of the Cuirassiers raced around the left flank of the companies of the 52nd Infantry and encountered the Füsilier Battalion of the 12th Infantry, deployed in a single firing line, dense in the center. Some parts of this battalion formed squares. The charge was definitely stopped by the fire of this battalion. An attempt to rally the Cuirassiers was prevented by Prussian cavalry which now moved out. The French regiment, which had begun its attack with 575 sabers, had lost 22 officers, 208 men (36.2% of its strength), and 243 horses. According to Dick de Lonlay,[314] after this charge, the regiment was able to form only 4 troops (Eskadrons) of 62 troopers each, instead of 5 troops (Eskadrons) of 115 troopers each, which would mean a loss of 248 men. The first line had suffered the heaviest losses; in the 4th troop (Eskadron), which had lost all of its officers and non-commissioned officers, only 18 men were left.

During the attack made by two troops (Eskadrons) of Landwehr Hussars against the 1st Battalion Gyulai at Tobitschau, an Austrian square was broken by shells before the cavalry penetrated it. During the attack of Bredow’s Brigade at Vionville, the artillery was able to send its last shells against the enemy immediately past the right flank of the cavalry brigade.

The employment of cavalry in masses, contemplated in all armies, compels us to consider the case when infantry must advance over open ground in the face of hostile cavalry. Special units must then be designated, who, by means of long range fire, repulse the cavalry or keep it at a distance. At Minden (1759), Anglo-Hanoverian infantry succeeded in driving the hostile cavalry from the field, and at Vauxchamps and Etoges (14th February, 1814), Prussian infantry succeeded in breaking through the French cavalry. It will be easy to do the same thing with modern weapons, so long as cavalry is not very superior in numbers, and is not supported by infantry, machine guns, or artillery.

Infantry attacking dismounted cavalry should endeavor to bring long range fire to bear on the led horses or threaten them by a flank attack. For infantry to prolong the action at long and medium ranges is only playing into the hands of the cavalry, and besides, the better marksmanship of the infantry is bound to make itself felt at short ranges. When the infantry has once gotten to within 700 paces (560 m.) of the dismounted cavalry, it is very doubtful whether the latter will still be able to mount; at the very least, it will be difficult for it to do so (par. 362 German C. D. R.), even though the withdrawal can be effected under cover, or when fresh troops take a hand in the fight.

Provisions of Various Regulations.

England. The possibility of a successful cavalry charge is almost universally contested. When necessary, the skirmishers that are immediately threatened close in toward the center. Bayonets are to be fixed. An opportunity for successful employment of cavalry is offered when infantry has fired away all of its ammunition; when it is forced to retire; and when the approach of the cavalry is facilitated by dust, fog, or heavy rain.

Austria. Brave and steady infantry has nothing to fear from cavalry charges, so long as it retains its steadiness, presence of mind, and morale, and delivers its fire steadily and with good aim at short range.

When fighting cavalry, movements and changes of formation should be ordered only when sufficient time is available, and then only for the purpose of bringing a sufficient number of rifles into action and for better utilizing the terrain. When a cavalry charge is suddenly made from a short distance, it is better to remain in a narrow formation than to deploy hastily, provided the fire is delivered with steadiness. As cavalry frequently attacks only for the purpose of forcing the infantry to discontinue its advance, or to induce it to take up a close order formation, all units not immediately threatened by the attack should continue their movement or remain in their positions.

When a force has to cover long stretches under conditions which make it probable that a cavalry attack will be made, the battalions, companies, or platoons should be so grouped that they can quickly meet the cavalry attack in any direction, and can mutually support each other in warding it off. Staffs and vehicles should place themselves within the protected area thus formed.

The threatened units turn in the appropriate direction, properly utilizing cover and obstacles while so doing, and, when necessary, fix bayonets. Only such a part of the force is designated to fire as seems necessary for warding off the attack; the other parts continue to carry out the task assigned them. The commander retains a part of his force in readiness for warding off unexpected attacks.

“When exposed to hostile fire while warding off a cavalry charge, the men should assume the position offering the smallest target.

“If a platoon is directly attacked by cavalry, it will only in rare cases be advisable to open fire at ranges beyond 600 paces (450 m.); frequently it will be a good plan, however, to let the cavalry come up close. When the platoon participates in warding off a cavalry attack made against another unit, it may open fire at longer ranges.

“Fire at will is the principal kind of fire to be used in warding off cavalry.”

France. Infantry, no matter in what formation it may happen to be, has nothing to fear from hostile cavalry, even if the latter is in superior numbers, provided the infantry remains cool, well in hand, and makes good use of its fire.

When cavalry surprises infantry, the effect is as great as of old. Infantry should therefore carefully protect itself in all situations of combat, especially during critical moments.

If cavalry is reported, infantry can guard against all contingencies by echeloning. It should not allow itself to be diverted from its task so long as the cavalry does not begin an attack.

Any disposition that enables infantry to change front quickly to meet a charge, and to deliver a strong fire, is calculated to stop even the boldest cavalry.

When fighting dismounted cavalry, it is considered desirable for the infantry to advance quickly to medium and short ranges for the purpose of firing upon the cavalry as it mounts.

Russia. Nothing prescribed.

Japan. Infantry which, while engaged with the enemy, is forced to discontinue its movement or to change its formation for the purpose of warding off hostile cavalry, has already suffered a partial defeat. Only those fractions that are absolutely necessary for repulsing the cavalry should take up the fight against it.