The realization that troops in fortified positions only require small reinforcements or none at all, very naturally caused frontages to be increased and depth of combat formations to be decreased. Gaps in the attacking line, provided they were kept under observation, proved by no means a disadvantage.[245]

During attacks it frequently appeared that the Japanese lacked the necessary reinforcements.

INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS RIFLES ON THE DENSITY OF BATTLE FORMATIONS.[246]

Let us now recapitulate the most important points which have a bearing on combat frontage:

1. The frontage of individual units cannot be definitely fixed, as it depends upon the situation and the purpose of an action.

2. Favorable terrain, cover, and intrenchments permit an extended front to be obstinately defended with a weak force.

3. The frontage does not increase in proportion to the size of the force.

4. An organization (company, battalion, or regiment) fighting as part of a larger force is justified in deploying on a wider front than when acting alone.

The necessity for distribution in depth increases with the size of the force and with the number of units composing it Only the result can decide whether a narrow or a wide frontage was justified in a given case. A commander will endeavor to hold certain parts of the line with a weak force, posted in groups, while, at the decisive point, he will throw in every available man in order to gain the victory.

Provisions of Various Regulations.

5. COMBAT ORDERS.[247]

Modern fire effect does not permit a commander to direct the course of an action by despatching adjutants from time to time. This must be borne in mind when issuing a combat order. Such an order can only regulate the launching of the troops into action and prescribe a task as a guide for their subsequent conduct. Since leaders change during the course of the combat, the order must ensure coöperation of the component parts of the force by thoroughly explaining the purpose of the fight. The troops have a right to know what the commander expects of them; it is not sufficient to order them to occupy a certain point—they must be told whether or not they are to defend it. An order which directs troops “to oppose” the enemy, conveys an extremely vague meaning; it should specify instead whether they are “to attack” the enemy, or whether they are “to defend” a position. The subordinate leader’s pertinent question, as to the purpose of the combat, forces the commander to indicate clearly whether he intends to attack, or to stand on the defensive; whether he will fight a delaying action, or avoid a decision by withdrawing. Even the lowest grades must be informed of this decision of the commander. The troops will perform anything that is demanded of them in definite terms. On the other hand, the commander must demand that no subordinate “hide” behind an order and that, on the contrary, he act on his own initiative when an order is not received or the situation changes.

Clearly defined sections of the battlefield (par. 475 German I. D. R.) and definite combat tasks, each complete in itself (par. 293 German I. D. R.), are assigned to the tactical units to be employed in the first line (battalions in case of a regiment; regiments, as a rule, in case of a division). In attack, the order indicates the front upon which each one of the larger units is to deploy and what portion of the hostile position it is to attack. This demarcation defines the extent of the combat sections (par. 371 German I. D. R.), within the limits of which the particular unit must make the most of the accidents of the ground. In carrying out these combat tasks, unity of action is ensured by the mutual coöperation of the tactical units fighting abreast of each other (par. 475 German I. D. R.), and by the designation of a unit upon which the others regulate their movements, without, however, thereby being hampered in their endeavor to advance. (Base unit of combat). Moreover, by employing his reserves, the commander “can shift the decisive point of the action to any place desired, reinforce where he deems it advisable, equalize fluctuations of the combat, and, finally, bring about the decision.”

The first orders—those for putting the troops in motion in the desired direction—are usually verbal; more detailed orders, which are the rule from the brigade on up, are issued subsequently. (Par. 274 German I. D. R.). In most cases, the commander knows quite well what he wants, but only the effort required in expressing in writing what he desires to say, enables him to reproduce his thoughts with the necessary clearness. Even in peace maneuvers, the officer who issued an order and its recipients quite frequently disagree as to its interpretation; the superior remembers only what he desired to say at the particular moment, but not the language in which the order was couched. Written orders minimize the possibility of a misunderstanding. They have the further advantage that the recipient has in his possession a document to which he can always refer in case of doubt.

Orders should not provide for maintaining communication, for protecting flanks, and for keeping up local reconnaissance, since these matters are attended to as a matter of course, every leader being held responsible for making proper dispositions, within the limits of his command, for the performance of these duties. The higher the rank of the commander, the farther he should stay away from the scene of battle. As the commander can exercise an influence on the course of the action only by employing his reserves, he should remain near them, or, at any rate, retain their leader on his staff. If the commander selects a position too close to the point where the first line is engaged, he loses sight of the action in its entirety, and allows himself to be influenced too much by events within his immediate range of vision.[248] The subordinate commander, in selecting his position, has to consider only good observation of the enemy, communication with neighboring units, with the next higher commander, and with his subordinates.

At headquarters, the work to be performed must be carefully apportioned among the different members of the staff.

The commander, assisted by an officer of his staff, observes the enemy and his own force, while another officer maintains communication with the neighboring force and with the next higher headquarters (signal flag squads, telephone), and receives and prepares reports. (The scheme described would be appropriate for a brigade staff, for example). It is furthermore desirable to despatch information officers to neighboring troops, and to detail officers from subordinate units to receive orders.

The detailing of adjutants from subordinate units for the purpose of facilitating the issue and despatch of orders of higher headquarters is very properly prohibited by par. 83 German F. S. R.; on the march, this is permissible temporarily only. The battalion supply officers will, however, frequently be utilized as information officers, for, on the day of battle, they would thus be most profitably employed.

6. COMMUNICATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

Cyclists and mounted messengers can be employed on the battlefield only when the conditions are exceptionally favorable; even intrenched connecting posts communicating with one another by means of shouts or signals do not absolutely ensure communication in a protracted engagement. Heliographs or signal lamps are valuable only during the approach to the battlefield and in large battles.[249] The same is true of the field telegraph, by means of which, for example, division headquarters may be connected with the headquarters of the corps. In an infantry combat, only the field telephone, wig-wag flags,[250] and signal flags can be used. The employment of telephone and telegraph has the advantage of ensuring greater quiet at headquarters, since the coming and going of messengers is eliminated; on the other hand, the commander is at once informed of every reverse (which may perhaps be only temporary) and will not always be able to resist the temptation of leading subordinate commanders by apron strings. The Japanese made a very extensive use of the various means of communication, but neglected to guard against an interruption of their lines of information by installing signal flag stations. This cannot be dispensed with. In the Japanese army visual signals[251] were not used, and in the Russian army they were not adopted until October 4th, 1904. Thus means of communication did not develop beyond the rudimentary stage in both armies. According to all previous experience, telephone lines, as now operated, are practicable in attack only for the purpose of establishing communication down to brigade headquarters.[252]

Until recently, both signal and wig-wag flags were used in Germany.[253] The signal motions are made in an upright position, the Morse code, which is rather difficult to learn, being used. This method of signaling permits communication to be kept up within a radius of 7 km.; moreover, it can be used at night and in combined land and naval operations. The wig-wag signals are easily learned and entirely sufficient for communicating over distances within 3 km.; they also permit information to be despatched rapidly, as abbreviations are employed for certain frequently recurring movements. These signals possess the additional advantage that they can be made by a man while in a prone position.[254] Wig-wag signals are a very effective means of communication and will rarely fail.[255]

A commander should not exercise a constant influence on his subordinates just because modern means of communication permit him to do so, as this would destroy all initiative and independence. The permanent communication to which we are accustomed in time of peace, and the method of leading produced thereby, do not allow real qualities of leadership and initiative to develop. It is unquestionably not easy for a commander to refrain from interfering when a deployment does not progress with sufficient rapidity or not in accordance with his wishes.[256]

7. LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INFANTRY.
(Pars. 305, 319, 355, 363 and 376 German I. D. R.).

It is a strange fact that, while splendid work was done in strategic reconnaissance in the large maneuvers of recent years, not only in Germany but also in France, the local, tactical reconnaissance was less good and often deficient, so that in consequence thereof surprises were not rare. Frequently a gap occurred in the reconnoitering line when the cavalry in front of the various parts of the army was brushed aside and the stronger cavalry force deprived the weaker of the freedom of choosing its line of retreat. Occasionally, when this happened, cavalry patrols were sent out with orders to report directly to the infantry, or, at any rate, to find the hostile route columns, but this expedient was only partially successful. It must be remembered that troopers cannot ride close enough to the enemy to see anything of importance, and that they frequently are in ignorance of the very things which are of value for the infantry. In addition, the divisional cavalry is entirely too weak to perform all the tasks assigned to it. Therefore infantry and artillery should not rely upon cavalry reconnaissance. The mere fact that infantry has sent out cavalry patrols in a certain direction does not relieve it from the duty of providing for its own reconnaissance.

The greatest obstacle to infantry reconnaissance lies in the fact that its cyclists are confined to good roads; that its mounted officers cannot be withdrawn from their appropriate duties except for short periods; that, as a rule, orderlies are not available for carrying messages; and that, if officers carry messages in person, the reconnaissance is interrupted. Infantry patrols, on account of the slowness of their movements, cannot transmit messages quickly, and, as a result, such messages frequently arrive too late to be of any value. On the other hand, infantry patrols possess an advantage in that, by utilizing cover, they can get close to the enemy without being observed. The need of local reconnaissance is greater now than it was in the past, because troops can no longer change front when deployed, and because those which come under hostile fire while in close order formations may, in a short time, suffer well-nigh annihilating losses.

The primary object of local reconnaissance is to protect a force from surprise. This may be accomplished by sending out combat patrols, and by company commanders riding ahead in time. (Par. 457 German I. D. R.). The latter are likewise charged with picking out avenues of approach to selected fire positions, and the sooner they begin the reconnaissance the better, for the accidents of the ground can then be utilized to the best advantage.

The difficulties of the reconnaissance are increased when we have to reckon with the measures taken by the enemy to screen his force.[259]

Weak infantry patrols can neither break down this resistance nor create the necessary opening through which the leaders can reconnoiter in person. Stronger forces are requisite, and “reconnaissance companies” may have to be sent out toward the enemy to serve as a support for the patrols, to reinforce them when necessary, and to constitute natural collecting stations for messages. “Reconnaissances in force” are the result of these endeavors to obtain information,[260] for the defender will not reveal his dispositions unless the attacker threatens an attack. Reconnaissances in force are especially appropriate in this case, since the information obtained in regard to the position and strength of the enemy can be utilized at once. (Par. 134 German F. S. R.).

In France great importance is attached to forcibly gaining information by means of detachments of all arms which also prevent hostile reconnaissance. In minor operations the French send out infantry detachments, which, from secure hiding places, pick off observers, screen the position of their own force, and prevent the enemy from using covered avenues of approach. However, these very patrol combats may cause the commander to come to a false conclusion in regard to the hostile position. If the cavalry reconnaissance has determined that the enemy intends to accept battle within a particular area, the details of his intentions must be obtained by local reconnaissance. Then the commander will wish to know whether or not an immediate attack is feasible, or whether it is advisable to wait until nightfall for bringing up the infantry. The local reconnaissance determines where the flanks of the enemy are located; whether the position in front is the hostile main position or only an advanced post; whether the enemy has made preparations for defense; and where the hostile artillery is posted. As a rule, it will be impossible, until after the engagement has begun, to recognize a skillfully located fortified position,[261] to distinguish between the real and dummy trenches, determine the position of obstacles and estimate whether they can be surmounted with or without adequate apparatus. Then it likewise becomes necessary to find and mark covered avenues of approach.[262] In moving to new firing positions, it is important that advanced positions, masks, and dummy trenches be recognized in time. The commander of a unit on a flank should make dispositions for observation on his flank, and for permanent communication with neighboring units, even though no specific orders have been received by him to that effect. Strange as it may seem, the troops deployed on the road Gorze—Rezonville (battle of Vionville), by their failure to get into early communication with the troops which had been on the ground for some time, neglected to take advantage of the information gained by those troops.[263]

The enumeration of these tasks shows that local reconnaissance should not be restricted to the preparatory stage of the combat alone, but that it must be kept up during the whole course of the action. To the duties enumerated, we may add, occasional tasks, such as picking off staffs and signal men; sneaking up on artillery that has been incautiously pushed forward; and annoying the enemy by flanking fire. For such tasks, so-called “scouting detachments,”[264] after the Russian pattern, have frequently been recommended. Their usefulness in difficult country and in operations against the enemy’s flank and rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, if provided with ample ammunition and advancing on side roads, they can hamper the reconnaissance of the enemy, secure the flanks of their own force, ascertain the probable extent of the prospective battlefield, and finally, having made a skillful lodgment, they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is lacking. To form picked men into special organizations, as is done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. The constant transfer of their best men to the mounted infantry during the second part of the South African war was fatal to the British infantry battalions. An organization cannot dispense with its good men; it needs them to replace wounded non-commissioned officers. While everything goes without a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an organization is of little importance; the drawbacks to this procedure become apparent, however, when the line begins to waver, when, in the absence of officers, only the example of the courageous men prevents the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly appreciate the importance of psychological impressions during critical combat situations; they state: “The man who feels his courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, should look toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of non-commissioned officers and brave privates, whose example will revive his courage.” (Par. 268 German I. D. R.).

If it becomes necessary to despatch a stronger infantry force on a mission of minor importance, it will usually be better to detail an entire company than to improvise a detachment whose leader would know his men only imperfectly.

8. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TERRAIN.

The defense requires extensive, open terrain, permitting unobstructed view, while the attack requires stretches of ground hidden from the observation of the enemy and sheltered from his fire, in order that the troops may be deployed for action at the decisive ranges. A piece of ground will rarely possess all these advantages, but, nevertheless, well-trained infantry will be able to defend successfully a piece of ground that has a poor field of fire, and infantry which is energetically and skillfully led will be able to cross even an open plain.

At the longer ranges, a force will, in the first place, endeavor to keep concealed. While advancing, troops will rarely be able to take advantage of available cover, but at a halt and while firing they will be able to do so. Their taking advantage of the ground should not lead to a diminution of the energy of the advance, and should not cause parts of the force to fall behind.[268] “The terrain exerts considerable influence on the formation of troops. Open country requires that distances be increased so that the losses may be minimized, while close country permits distances to be reduced. The commander should take particular care not to let this advantage escape him, since it is often necessary in this case to reinforce the first line promptly. Close order formations may be retained longest on covered terrain.” (Par. 307 German I. D. R.).