“The wooded region in rear of St. Hubert was thickly infested with stragglers of all arms. White, red, and blue shoulder straps were to be seen in profusion; men with and without rifles; some with helmets, some with caps, some bareheaded. There were no officers present except those stretched wounded upon the ground. The superior officers riding through the valley assembled the men they found, but it proved only a small force that they gathered, for the greater portion of the men were safely ensconced to one side of the bottom of the valley.”[195] “At 5 P. M., the garrison of St. Hubert had increased to 43 companies, belonging to seven different regiments, and the result was utterly hopeless confusion.”[196]
“At 10 P. M., 48 battalions of the VIIth, VIIIth and IInd Corps occupied a space of barely 1500 m. front and a depth of 1000 m., east of the Mance ravine opposite the French position. Fortunately the enemy was so exhausted that we were able to commit the most serious mistakes with impunity under the very muzzles of his rifles.”[197]
[197] Ibid., p. 224.
“At Sedan bodies of infantry of the XIth Corps, as well as of the 46th Infantry and of the 5th Jäger-Battalion, had gotten mixed up with the 43rd Brigade during the course of the battle. The regiments of the 43rd Brigade had likewise been so disorganized that after the capture of Cazal the brigade commander had nothing at his disposal but the most heterogeneous mass of troops consisting of about a battalion.”[198]
[198] Gen. St. W., II, p. 1249.
“In penetrating into Lovtcha (1877) the foremost battalions became disorganized. The companies, and even single soldiers, stood around in irregular groups on the streets, crowded into the houses and sought cover in drainage ditches.”[199] “In one battalion of the Kasan Regiment, which was to move through the town from the left flank, officers and men threw themselves down when the enemy’s fire became effective and only with difficulty could they be induced to rise. When the regimental commander fell, everybody fled, carrying along those in rear. Only two company columns, composed of stragglers of different organizations, resisted, deployed into a dense skirmish line and, encouraged by their officers, rushed forward cheering.”[200]
[199] Kuropatkin-Krahmer, Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russich-Türkischen Krieg, I, pp. 68 and 72.
[200] Ibid., I, p. 72.
This fighting power of improvised units, when there were officers left to lead them, was displayed on several occasions at Plevna.
The IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the Kaluga Regiment (in the third battle of Plevna) after taking the second crest, thoughtlessly continued the advance in complete disorder.
“Skobeleff foresaw the coming reverse and attempted to form a reserve, but only by dint of the greatest exertions on the part of the officers was it possible to collect about 100 men belonging to various companies. The men of the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the Kaluga Regiment were scattered all over the battlefield, the companies had become completely mixed up, and it was a matter of the greatest difficulty to re-form them.”[201]
[201] Ibid., I, p. 154.
“Dense firing lines, composed of men of all the regiments, attempted to climb the opposite slope but they got only half way; 400 paces from the Turkish works they halted. The survivors of the organizations participating in the action gradually assembled in Work No. 1, which had been taken. While only a couple of hundred men had taken the work, thousands were now assembled there. Not a single company or battalion was intact, every vestige of organization had disappeared; the commanders, and officers generally, had become separated from their units.”[202]
[202] Ibid., I, pp. 236 and 238.
“Prince Imeretinski succeeded in forming stragglers into the following improvised units:
| 3 | provisional | companies | of | the | Libau | Regiment. | |
| 2 | „ | „ | „ | „ | Susdal | „ | |
| 2 | 1⁄2 | „ | „ | „ | „ | Vladimir | „ |
| 1 | detachment of 100 men of the Reval Regiment. | ||||||
“These re-formed stragglers were despatched to Skobeleff’s assistance and made a successful assault on Work No. 2 from Work No. 1.”[203]
[203] Ibid., I, p. 243.
“These stragglers subsequently formed the nucleus of the garrison of Work No. 2. During the night of the 11/12 September, the Russians succeeded in gathering 1000 more men, which were assembled in companies irrespective of the regiments to which they originally belonged. This gathering of stragglers lasted, by the way, up to the afternoon of the 12th of September. The continuance of the fight was made possible only by constantly re-forming the remnants into new organizations and then sending these forward into the fight.”[204]
[204] Ibid., I, p. 258.
The remedies provided by the regulations against these evils are, above all else: Restriction of the front of the several units, the deployment of tactical units side by side in action (instead of in rear of each other) and the use of every opportunity for re-establishing the original organizations. Other suggestions for stemming the tide of disorder as made by the author of Summer Nights Dream (1888) (platoons formed in single rank, volley firing, and constant closing toward the center) are impracticable in a serious action. The disintegrating effect of a battle is stronger than tactical cohesion. It is better to recognize this fact than to face the enemy with illusory ideas.
It is necessary to train the men in peace time to follow willingly any officer, whether he belong to their own or to another organization; and, for that reason, exercises in provisional organizations are requisite for tactical training—a large number of officers being told to fall out at these exercises to assimilate losses which would occur in action. The control of mixed firing lines by word of command of an officer is the foundation of order and troop leading, and thus a prerequisite of success in the battles of the future. In a successful engagement, the evils above mentioned are less evident than during a reverse when troops unexpectedly suffer heavy losses or receive fire from the flank or rear. Troops formed into well-organized units can well stand such a test, but in an improvised organization, composed of fractions and men of different units, especially when their own officers are absent, such a crisis may lead to panic.
The following battle episode is very instructive: The 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, deployed in line of company columns, advanced at Colombey (14th August, 1870) under French shell and Chassepot fire. The morale of the 3rd Company was visibly impaired by two shells which burst, one after the other, in its ranks, placing 15-20 men out of action. “The men began to hesitate; their steps grew shorter; and, as if impelled by an invisible power, the company executed a half right turn, another half right turn, then another and another. One would have thought the movement was being executed at command. The column was now facing to the rear, and although not running, not fleeing, it was moving back to the Brasserie with suspiciously lengthening steps. The drummer, one Borchert, did everything to bring the men to their senses; the non-commissioned officers assisted bravely, but in vain; the column continued its movement to the rear. Filled with shame and indignation, the perspiration pouring out of every pore, I shouted to the men, repeatedly commanding: ‘Company ... Forward!’ But all in vain. At that moment the battalion commander—he was called the ‘marble statue’ on account of his coolness—galloped up on his bay, shouting: ‘Look at the 5th Company over yonder; see how far it has advanced.’ Then another superior officer jumped in front of the men with the words: ‘Is there no officer here at all?’ At this instant I yelled again as if my life depended upon it: ‘You men belong to the color company; Company ... Forward!’ and the spell was broken. As if on the parade ground the Grenadiers faced to the front; obediently they executed my command: ‘To the attack! Carry arms ... Forward!’ and soon thereafter we again occupied our position between the 2nd and 4th Companies.”
The company lost many men as soon as it entered the fight, among them its company commander; then the two shells burst in rapid succession within its ranks, and this explains the temporary panic. The company lost a total of 86 men (including officers).[205]
[205] Retzlaff, Aus meinem Tagebuch.
Nothing is more contagious in the zone of danger than the example of fear or cowardice.[206] Appeals, threats, and intimidation are of little avail. The most effective remedy lies in developing the individual soldier’s initiative, in training him to act with common sense even when his officers are absent. We should send our soldiers into battle with a reserve of moral courage great enough to prevent the premature moral and mental depreciation of the individual.
[206] Some interesting proofs in support of this statement are:
The attack made by Captain Bechtoldsheim at Custozza against Italian infantry. Oesterreichs Kämpfe, II, p. 74.
The combats at the Mance ravine on Aug. 18th, 1870.
Hönig, Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie, pp. 170, 184, 193 and 215.
Sedan, Gen. St. W., II, p. 1243.
Wald- und Ortsgefecht, p. 179. (Aymard’s Division after the capture of Servigny).
Lehaucourt, Campagne de la Loire, II, p. 272. (The French Gardes Mobiles after the taking of Le Tuilerie at Le Mans).