9. REAR SIGHT ELEVATIONS AND POINTS OF AIM.

In Switzerland and Italy the employment of a single rear sight elevation, less than the actual range, is preferred, even when the range is not accurately known. The French regulations are silent on this subject. In Germany one rear sight elevation is used, as a general rule, up to 1,000 m.; beyond that range combined sights may be used in which the two rear sight elevations differ from each other by 100 or 50 m.[161]

“Rapidly approaching or receding targets are followed by making proper sight corrections, rear sight elevations being less than the range when the fire is delivered against advancing targets and greater than the range when the fire is delivered against receding targets. At short ranges the same result may be obtained by aiming lower or higher. It should be noted that, when firing on cavalry making a mounted attack, the danger space is continuous when the sights are raised to 700 m.” (Par. 192 German I. F. R.). As a general rule, the proper aiming point is the lowest line of the target. When it becomes necessary to aim at the center, to one side of or below a target, its dimensions will serve as a guide. A change in the rear sight elevation is necessary at medium and long ranges to raise or lower the sheaf of fire; at short ranges it is practicable to point higher only when the target is tall. When the velocity of a side wind cannot be estimated, it is advisable to distribute the fire over a broader front. At short ranges the selection of an aiming point may, under favorable circumstances, be left to the discretion of the individual skirmishers.

10. COMMANDS.

In recounting the several commands to be given for firing, the regulations take into consideration the logical sequence of the tasks devolving upon the skirmisher. Thus the first command draws the skirmisher’s attention to the target; the second indicates the range; the third directs him to open fire.

11. THE OBSERVATION OF THE FIRE.

The actions of the enemy are usually the only reliable indication of the location of the sheaf of fire directed against him; the observed strike of bullets is seldom so good an indication. It is especially difficult to judge of the distribution of projectiles from their strike in front and in rear of the target. Suggestions from the subordinate leaders, whose view of the target is generally restricted, are often more confusing than valuable.

12. THE EFFECT OF FIRE.

COMPARISON BETWEEN LOSSES PRODUCED BY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY FIRE.

In 1866 the Austrian artillery inflicted 16% of our losses. In 1870-71 the French artillery inflicted 8% of our losses. Up to the battle of Liao Yang the 1st Japanese Army suffered the following losses:

The figures given above under the captions “serious” (including killed), “slight,” and “very slight” wounds have, of course, only a relative value. The following figures express the average losses of Russians and Japanese:

Modern fire tactics count upon a prolonged fire for the purpose of gradually exhausting the enemy, and upon rapid fire, suddenly delivered, for annihilating him.

While a statement of the percentage of hits[162] throws some light upon the effect of the fire of an organization, under normal conditions, the number of figures placed out of action affords a standard of comparison by means of which tactical success may be measured, and aids in deciding how to distribute the fire. Differences in fire effect on like targets are best determined by comparing the number of figures hit per minute by 100 marksmen, as a great number of hits is presupposed, which is not the case when the percentage of hits is taken.

(a) Influence of Training.

Individual skill in marksmanship is of decisive importance when firing at targets of appropriate size at the short ranges. A good marksman, firing at will, may (not must) expect a hit from each round fired, at any target within 250 m., at a single kneeling opponent within 350 m., at a kneeling file within 500 m., and at a standing file within 600 m. At ranges beyond this, influences, due to the imperfections of the rifle, make themselves felt; and these influences grow to such an extent that the best marksmanship training is unable to eliminate them. A considerable number of rifles must fire in order to produce an effect; for, as some of the pieces fire short and others over, the hits are thus distributed over a greater area. But even here skill in marksmanship is apparent in that the cone of dispersion of the excellent shots produces a shot group of small diameter, that of the poorer shots one of very large diameter. Lieutenant-General Rohne computed (Schieszlehre für die Infanterie, p. 84) that when firing rifle model ’98 with the appropriate elevation at a target 1 m. high, the marksmen named in the following table would obtain the number of hits given at the ranges indicated:

This ratio changes, however, very seriously to the disadvantage of the excellent marksmen when the appropriate elevation is not used. The figure given below, in which the curves of hits are traced, shows that even poor shots may obtain better results in this case.

From this may be deduced the great importance of quickly and accurately ascertaining the range. The excellent ballistic qualities of our rifle and our thorough marksmanship training can assert themselves fully only when the range has been accurately determined. At ranges over 800 m. too great an accuracy in collective fire may be actually detrimental. In this case individual accuracy matters little; the important thing is to direct the densest portion of the sheaf of fire, with some degree of accuracy, on a target the range to which is known only in a general way. The importance of training soldiers in precise marksmanship is ethical rather than practical, for a good target shot need not necessarily be a battle marksman. For the latter a cool head is of more value than all the marksmanship skill of the target range.

(b) Influence of the Error in Estimating the Range.

At short ranges an error of estimation is offset by the flatness of the trajectory. Lieutenant-General Rohne used a probable error in estimation of ¹⁄₈ (12.5%) of the range in his computations. The Swiss Firing Regulations of 1905 count on an error of 100 m. at 500 m., 200 m. at 500 to 1,000 m., 300 m. at ranges over 1,000 m., and the average is taken to be ¹⁄₅ of the range, or 20%. For measurements with range finding instruments see p. 146, supra.

In the following table, the number of hits per 100 rounds fired, at a target 1 m. high, by the marksmen named, is shown under—

“a” When the fire is controlled and the appropriate elevation is used;

“b” When each skirmisher has selected the elevation corresponding to his estimate of the range. In this case it is presumed, however, that the ranges are generally estimated correctly. (Rohne, Schieszlehre für die Infanterie, 2nd Edition, p. 102).

The above table shows that when the elevation selected is in error, the number of hits decreases more rapidly the greater the skill of the marksman; and that an error in estimation is of less importance than marksmanship only at ranges under 800 m.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “a” AND “b.”

(c) Fire Effect as Regards Time. Number of Rounds to be Expended.

The greater the losses inflicted within a short period of time in a limited space, the greater the moral effect of the fire. It should therefore be the aim of the officer charged with fire direction to bring about a decisive effect within the shortest possible time. The leaders must bear in mind from the beginning of the fire fight that the ammunition carried is limited and that the expenditure of a certain amount is equivalent to a loss of power, and this is permissible only where commensurate results would be achieved. When once a decision has been formed to fire on a target, the ammunition necessary to accomplish the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises that of the enemy.

When the enemy is approximately equal to us in numbers, and is deployed in line at one man per meter of front, presenting breast targets only, the number of rounds per rifle, given in round figures in the following table, will be required to place about one-third of the enemy’s force out of action:[163]

In the above table it is assumed that an error of estimation of 7.5% was made and that at ranges over 1000 m. two elevations were used. Against head targets, approximately twice the number of rounds indicated above must be expended; and against exposed skirmishers, visible at full height, about half of the number of rounds given. The efficacy is increased when the fire comes from a flank. The following data are taken from an extended firing test: At 600-700 m., 200 skirmishers, firing 5000 rounds against 200 body targets, obtained 4.3% hits and placed 43% of the figures out of action; under the enfilading fire delivered by one platoon, the percentage of hits rose to 10.5%, and the number of incapacitated figures to 80%.

(d) Additional Influences Affecting Accuracy of Fire.

Errors in setting the sight, in pointing, aiming, and pulling the trigger, increase the area of the beaten zone at the expense of fire effect on the actual target selected. When we consider the excitement of men in action, and the numerous sources of error in setting the sights, in pointing and firing, it is clear that we have to reckon with the effect of misses on the field of battle more than with the really well aimed and well delivered collective fire of a considerable number of marksmen. Lieutenant Colonel Wolozkoi, late of the Russian Army,[164] attempted to obtain an approximate standard of measurement for the errors in firing made by marksmen. He bases his deductions upon the opinion that the efficacy of rifle fire in action depends entirely upon the mental and physical condition of the individual soldier at the moment; that in serious engagements this condition is such that accurate aiming cannot be expected; and finally that every skirmisher, according to the degree of his excitement or fatigue, will fire his piece at varying angles of elevation. He argues that this produces a rigid cone of dispersion, whose limits correspond to certain extreme angles of error, and whose axis (center trajectory) corresponds to a mean angle of error; that, for each class of rifles, the depth of the resulting beaten zone is constant; and that the depth of this zone increases with the range corresponding to the angles of error. It follows that the depth of this beaten zone is greater in modern rifles than in those of older pattern.

He believes that peace training will have fulfilled its mission if the skirmisher, while firing, holds his piece in the position to which he has become habituated through years of practice. This position can be none other than that in which the piece is horizontal.

Although the theory of the Rigid, Constant Cone of Misses, is not tenable in this form, because there will always be a reasonably compact core of hits (the dimensions of which depend upon the conditions indicated in the firing regulations) at the center of the cone of fire, the views of Colonel Wolozkoi have, nevertheless, a certain value for us, and find application in large, hotly contested battles, especially when the firing line has been exposed to the material and moral influences of hostile fire for a considerable length of time. At the commencement of every combat we can, at any rate, count on “aimed fire”; but instead of reckoning at all times with a 75% core of hits, 100 m. in diameter, we must become used to reckoning with a 30 and 40% core of hits, of the same diameter, produced by greater dispersion of the bullets.

According to experiments made by Colonel Wolozkoi, a good shot makes a mean angular error of ±8 minutes, when using the horizontal aiming position; a poor shot, one of ±40 minutes; the average error being ±25 minutes. In this, however, the sources of error, due to excitement on the part of the marksmen, are not considered. “The principal angular errors can be traced to the nervousness of the marksmen; and this is directly proportional to the magnitude of the danger and the suddenness of its appearance. The soldier judges the magnitude of danger by the number of hostile projectiles and by their effect. Therefore, the livelier the hostile fire, and the longer it continues, the greater the danger appears to him; while the less the effect of that fire, and the better he is sheltered from it, the less he will think himself endangered. On this account, the nervous tension of the individual soldier will reach different degrees of intensity according to the magnitude of the danger.

“Now there are combat situations where the danger is insignificant, and entire engagements in which the impression produced by danger may be called moderate; moreover, even in lively actions phases may occur in which this is equally true. The circumstances of each particular case will, therefore, determine how long it is possible to fire as prescribed in the firing regulations, and from what moment a reduction of efficacy, according to Colonel Wolozkoi’s theory, is unavoidable.

“The arrival of this moment will be postponed more or less by better discipline and training; and, in addition, at the commencement of an action, we may count on the men putting into practice, to a certain extent, what they have been taught in time of peace. However, the efficacy of rifle fire will deteriorate gradually, as the danger and the intensity of the fight increase, until it reaches the stage which Wolozkoi considers peculiar to all of the more serious actions.

“When discipline is still further reduced, the efforts of the men to keep under cover may lead them to duck even their heads and to fire their rifles at high angles. In this case the decisive short ranges would not be swept by fire, making it possible for the more determined of the two opponents to advance to the assault.

“This reduction of the efficacy of fire (i.e., the delivery of fire at high angles) may also take place when troops are surprised and, in consequence thereof, fire hurriedly. This explains why the enemy’s fire passes entirely over a body of troops which has gotten quite close to his position—by no means an unusual phenomenon in surprises.”[165]

Wolozkoi assumes that the core of hits of his constant cone is formed by projectiles fired at a mean angle of departure of less than 4 degrees, while the lower trajectories of the whole cone of fire correspond to an angle of 1 degree and 30 minutes, and the upper trajectories to one of 14 degrees and 30 minutes. If we apply these figures to a particular rifle we obtain a beaten zone containing 50% of the hits (central zone) at 560-1500 m. for the Chassepot rifle; at 1000-2000 m. for the 8 mm. rifle, and at 1200-3000 m. for the 6.5 mm. rifle. It should once more be emphasized that these figures are applicable in combat phases in which the men themselves are under fire, while firing, or deliver their fire hurriedly or with bad aim.

It must be the endeavor of peace training to prevent the occurrence of unaimed firing in battle. This necessitates careful supervision by squad and platoon leaders over the individual soldier in the firing line, and the severe punishment of every act of carelessness in pointing, aiming, and setting of the sight, in peace time. In war one must constantly endeavor to avoid opening fire prematurely, as it tires the eye and the arm of the soldier, to check any unjustifiable rapidity of fire, and to hold the men down to a steady and slow fire. This includes, in addition, the avoidance, by the leader, of haste in giving directions for firing. In defense, one will have to make every effort to withdraw one’s men from the moral effect of the attacker’s fire preparation, and to keep them in proper condition to repulse the assault. This requires the construction of splinter proofs, head cover, and, in case the hostile fire becomes too deadly, a cessation of fire, which is again resumed when the enemy attempts to advance. To carry this out properly, covered observation stations should be built, and the men instructed to line the parapet and to open fire at a signal previously agreed upon, sights having been set and ammunition replenished before they leave cover. A body of troops is not unfit to resist an assault simply because it has suffered a certain percentage of losses, but because each individual soldier is so mastered by the feeling that he is in danger of losing his life that he fires his piece without raising his head above the parapet. A body of troops in such a state will fire its projectiles in Wolozkoi’s “constant cone.”

A mobilized organization, thoroughly trained in time of peace, will still fire a by no means inconsiderable fraction of its projectiles with good aim and with the proper rear sight elevation, provided its officers are equal to their task.

(e) The Influence of Rifle-Rests in Firing.

Freehand firing increases the rate of fire. Whether the skirmisher fires freehand or from a rest is of influence on the accuracy of the single shot at short ranges. The Belgian, Dutch, and Italian regulations authorize the bayonet, in the absence of other expedients, to be stuck into the ground as a rifle-rest, while this is forbidden in Germany. Collective fire of short duration delivered at mid ranges has not been found superior because of the use of rifle-rests. Fire delivered from a rest is undoubtedly superior, however, when the barrel of the piece is heated by continued firing (position of the left hand supporting the piece when firing standing, prone, or kneeling) and when the arm of the skirmisher gets tired. When firing from a rest, high shots result from vibrations of the barrel;[166] and there is also danger, when under fire, that the men will not raise their heads over the parapet, but will fire their pieces into the air. This, as corroborated by the more recent campaigns, is why a fire fight at short range is by no means decided in so short a time as the peace performances of modern rifles lead one to suppose, for great losses do not take place until skirmishers, who have heretofore hugged the ground, rise. At Spionskop, the two opposing firing lines remained stationary for hours at 250 m. from each other.[167] The Japanese found in their attacks that at ranges from 150 to 75 paces the hostile fire had no effect.

(f) Influence of the Ground.[168]

So far we have considered only the effect of infantry fire on level ground. The efficacy of fire is, however, greatly influenced by the inclination of the ground upon which the cone of dispersion falls. Where the ground rises in respect to the line of sight, the depth of the beaten zone is decreased; where it falls in respect to the line of sight, the depth of the beaten zone is increased.[169]

Let A B B¹, in the accompanying figure, represent a horizontal plane pierced by trajectories C B and C¹ B¹, at an angle α, forming the beaten zone B B¹. If now the ground falls from B in the direction B D, it is obvious from the figure, that the angle of fall β decreases and the beaten zone B D increases. The limit of this increase is reached when the angle of slope is greater than the angle of fall of the projectile. In this case there is a dead angle beyond B and toward D. If, on the other hand, the ground be rising, the angle of fall will be C¹ D¹ B and the beaten zone[170] decreases to B D¹. The smaller the angle of fall of the projectile the greater the influence of the ground.

From this it follows that when fire direction is in competent hands the appearance of the enemy on the terrain as at B D will be fully taken advantage of, while firing on slope like B D¹ should be avoided. Troops will, however, rarely be in a position from which they can see a target on the slope B D. The efficacy of the fire will in such a case be more or less a matter of accident. A body of troops in broad formation will in this case receive a greater number of hits than a column, since each meter of front of the crest line receives a certain number of projectiles. It is otherwise, however, where the slope rises in respect to the line of sight. A line is more easily missed than a column of considerable depth on the march.