During the march the company commander goes wherever his presence may be necessary for the proper supervision of his company. Neither are platoon commanders tied to a fixed place; one officer is, however, required to march in rear of the company. The company ammunition wagons follow in rear of their respective companies, or, assembled, in rear of the battalion. In marches in campaign the field train marches separately.

The depth of the battalion on the march, without field train, is 400 m., and the depth of the field train is 100 m.

8. THE REGIMENT AND THE BRIGADE.

For a discussion of the importance of the regiment and of the brigade see page 37 supra. All movements must be executed in an orderly manner by regiment and brigade, in any formation, without breaking up tactical units, and the entity of the whole body must be preserved at the same time by a skillful use of the terrain. If necessary, a base battalion may be designated.

When regiments or brigades are assembled, the formation, disposition, intervals and distances of the tactical units depend upon the terrain and the intentions of the commander. Frequently the tactical units (battalions and regiments) are assembled in separate groups.

When considerations of the enemy and the terrain do not dictate otherwise, the battalions, each, as a rule, in deep column, are posted in one or more lines, at 30-pace intervals and distances, rear battalions covering those in front or the gaps between them. An appropriate formation will frequently be that in which route columns are placed abreast and on the same line.

In the brigade, when assembled or deployed, the regiments may be placed abreast of each other, on the same line, or in rear of each other, i.e., in line or in echelon. When the regiments are formed side by side, two adjacent independent sections are created, each commanded by a regimental commander; this insures better supervision, better control, and a more energetic conduct of the action, since the first line can be reinforced by troops belonging to the same organization. This formation, moreover, facilitates tactical combinations. It may, however, be a disadvantage that the first line is not subject to the orders of a single commander; that it is difficult to employ the reserve battalions in one body; and that the brigade commander can influence the action only by withdrawing units from the regiments for the purpose of forming a reserve.[83] The echelon formation, each echelon consisting of a regiment, is frequently used in rencontres, because troops are thrown into action directly from route column. The regimental commanders then become leaders of echelons, the first line cannot be reinforced by its own troops, and the organizations of different regiments finally become mixed. The echelon formation is proper only when the second line is intended to be used independently abreast of the first in the course of the action; for example, on a flank, for the purpose of making or warding off a flank attack.[84] When part of a larger force, the most suitable combat formation for troops is usually the one in which the regiments are formed side by side.

The disadvantages of the echelon formation, when taken up from route column, can be obviated by deploying the second regiment in rear of a flank of the first. It should be kept intact in that position until the decisive moment, although the state of the fight may, at the outset, invite a more rapid extension of front.

9. EXTENDED ORDER.

Combats are begun and carried out in extended order. The defender can be induced to disclose his dispositions, to occupy his position, and to open fire, only by the advance upon him of a skirmish line. The deployment of a thin firing line will frequently suffice to furnish the commander of the attacking force with a clue to the strength of the force holding the hostile position. In close country, skirmishers are pushed forward primarily to guard against surprise the force which sends them out, but when thrown forward only a few hundred meters in open country, such skirmishers are unable to furnish protection. The strength and density of a firing line (by means of which the fight is sustained) depend upon marksmanship, upon the purpose of the action, and upon the terrain. The poorer the marksmanship or the weapon, or the more unfavorable the field of fire, the greater the number of skirmishers needed (i.e., the denser the firing line).[85] If the enemy is merely to be kept at a distance, less skirmishers (i.e., a thinner firing line furnished with plenty of ammunition) will be required, than if the action is to be carried to a decisive conclusion.

Cohesion and order are best maintained, and the least time is lost in action, if efficient, dense firing lines are led forward as units up to the moment of opening fire. (Pars. 169, 321, 334 and 413 German I. D. R.). But on open terrain such dense firing lines would begin to suffer too great a loss at ranges at which they could not reply to the fire. Nothing remains then but to cover the available front with a very thin firing line, followed at irregular distances by thin skirmish lines which ploy for the purpose of utilizing cover or for opening fire. Skirmish lines of this description will hardly justify the opponent’s expenditure of ammunition, as he can only cover broad spaces with volley fire. On the other hand, these skirmish lines are in themselves too weak to facilitate the approach of the following echelons by their fire. Besides, it must not be overlooked that the soldier, separated by a considerable interval from his comrades in line during the advance, and withdrawn from the influence of his officers, succumbs more easily to temporary spells of weakness and is more apt to remain behind than the skirmisher in a dense firing line. The advance in several successive, thin skirmish lines is therefore only an expedient. In each case the leaders will have to decide whether, in view of the close proximity of the enemy, a united advance with dense, powerful skirmish lines is possible or advisable (for instance, when entering at once upon the decisive stage of the action). Before opening fire the firing lines must be sufficiently reinforced. (Par. 334 German I. D. R.).

This advance in thin skirmish lines stood the test both in the Boer war and in the Russo-Japanese war,[86] but we must not forget that thin skirmish lines are only maneuver formations in an attack that is to be pushed home, and that the mistake made by the British of attempting to make an attack with such weak skirmish lines should not be imitated. The Japanese also used this formation after they had once opened fire with a dense skirmish line.[87]

It might be well to mention here that thin and dense skirmish lines, when under fire, lose an equal number of men in proportion to their strength, provided the front occupied by them is the same.

RESULTS OF A FIRING TEST AGAINST THIN AND DENSE SKIRMISH LINES.

The superior effect of fire on the dense skirmish line, as expressed by the greater number of hits, and in consequence thereof, by the gradually growing number of figures hit, is apparent. It is worthy of note and at first glance strange that, presupposing the two lines considered occupy an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is the same. The explanation of this lies in the fact that in correctly distributed fire any specified front space is equally covered with hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of figures hit whether an equal number of figures is removed or added. While, however, the dense skirmish line still has 131 effectives, the weaker line has only 63 left. The casualties are therefore far more perceptible in the smaller force.

(a) The Formation of the Skirmish Line.

Skirmish line with intervals of two paces between the men is formed at the command, “As Skirmishers.” (Pars. 142 and 174-180 German I. D. R.). The skirmish line may be deployed from any formation, in any direction, either with or without first changing front. (Par. 177 German I. D. R.). A greater interval than two paces must be specifically ordered. Squad leaders hasten in front of their squads and form the framework of the skirmish line. The men follow their squad leaders absolutely. When the terrain requires it, squad leaders may increase or diminish intervals without command. In other armies (for instance, in those of Italy, France, and England) the desire to keep the skirmishers under control as long as possible, has led to advancing the platoons designated for the firing line at first in close order, the deployment being made only when the state of the action requires it. In France, the intervals between files may be increased, or a single rank line may be formed before the force is deployed as skirmishers. During an advance it will often happen that intervals are increased or diminished in accordance with the peculiarities of the terrain. The advance is continued until the command or signal “Halt” is given. If line of skirmishers is to be formed when marching to the rear, the command is first faced to the front and then deployed on the line then occupied. (Rallying position, par. 180 German I. D. R.). On varied ground, deployments will be made under cover whenever possible in order to allow of an immediate advance in skirmish line from that point. The number of platoons to be deployed depends upon the tactical situation. When three deployed platoons are formed abreast, it is difficult for the company commander to control them; but this formation is an appropriate one if a company is surprised or enters immediately into decisive action, or in cases where the battalion acting alone requires complete units in reserve for additional tasks. (Pars. 462, 463 and 469 German I. D. R.). When the battalion is engaged as part of a larger force, it is a good plan to occupy all the available front space at once with skirmishers and to maintain the intensity of fire of the firing line by constantly reinforcing it. The losses are less in this case than when the men crowd together in groups. (Italy).

Platoon and squad leaders are posted on the side of their commands facing the enemy while advancing; in moving to the rear, squad leaders are posted on the side away from the enemy, their duty being to maintain the march direction, and the platoon commanders remain in rear of their platoons (i.e., on the side toward the enemy). Russia is the only country where the leaders of a firing line are posted in the rear. In Austria one non-commissioned officer in each platoon is designated to march in rear of the advancing firing line for the purpose of supervising the skirmishers. As this non-commissioned officer is to prevent straggling, he should be selected with great care.

The platoon commander indicates the march direction to the leader of the base squad, and, accompanied by the range finders and the musicians, moves to a point at least ten paces in front of the line of his squad leaders, as a rule, opposite the center of his platoon; but he is not restricted to this position. He must possess mobility if he desires to lead his platoon skillfully on varied ground, if he expects to avoid interfering with neighboring platoons, and if he wishes to observe the enemy at the same time. The musician keeps the company commander constantly in view. (Par. 221 German I. D. R.). The range finders observe the battlefield, estimate the range to any targets appearing in view, without being specifically told to do so, communicate the range found to the platoon commander (this should not be done by shouting, as misunderstandings might result therefrom), and observe the effect of the fire. (Par. 173 German I. D. R.).

Whenever the flanks of a skirmish line are not protected by other troops or by natural obstacles, a few men under a prudent leader should always be sent out as combat patrols to the flank, or better still, to the right or left front. The patrol should under no circumstances lose connection with the command which it is to protect, but, on the other hand, should not stick so close to it that the file on the exposed flank is in a position to see as much as the combat patrol itself. As a report from a combat patrol frequently arrives too late, or cannot be made at all on account of hostile fire, signals should be agreed upon and the leader of the squad on the exposed flank of the line should keep the combat patrol constantly in view. Signal flags may also be employed advantageously in such cases.

(b) Movements in Skirmish Line.

Fire action requires steady breathing, and, on this account, all movements to the position at which the fire fight is to be taken up, should be made, as long as possible, in a free swinging stride. A careful observation of alignment or of intervals cannot be insisted upon. Cover found within the allotted front should be utilized by ploying, but this must neither interfere with the harmonious advance of the entire force nor cause a loss of the march direction. Considerations of cover for individual men should not interfere with the spontaneous progress of the movement. Orderly movements in long skirmish lines are best made by designating a certain element as the base, whose leader is far in advance of it; all neighboring leaders maintain their intervals from, and endeavor to remain approximately on line with him. This has the advantage of relieving the commander of the whole line from looking after these details and leaves him free to concentrate all his attention on the enemy. Minor changes of the march direction are executed by inclining to the right or left or by designating a new objective. More extended movements by the flank, within range of hostile fire, are possible only under cover. Changes of direction are executed like a gradual front into line, in which a temporary echeloning of the elements, or one which can be adjusted by degrees, is unavoidable. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.).

In the absence of cover, an advance in quick time will be possible only at long ranges unless the hostile fire can be kept down by fire from enfilading or commanding positions. Skirmish lines advancing without fire support over ground devoid of cover, begin to suffer appreciable losses at 1000 m. The more effective the hostile fire, the more pressing the necessity of diminishing, as far as this is possible, the periods of time during which the skirmishers present their whole bodies as targets to the enemy. This leads in itself[88] to an advance by rushes, since the whole distance separating the advancing line from the enemy cannot be covered in one rush. Double time may be employed by a skirmish line when it becomes necessary to reinforce an advancing firing line quickly, to forestall the enemy in reaching a certain point, or in moving under fire, from the covered fire position occupied, to another position. It is impossible to prescribe definitely and for all cases at what ranges the advance by rushes should be taken up and when fire should be opened in advancing by rushes, since it depends upon the intensity of the hostile fire.

The assailant will, in the first place, endeavor to advance without firing, in order to reach those ranges quickly at which his fire will begin to be effective against the well-covered targets of the defender. The skirmishers advance in strong detachments, by rushes of the greatest possible length, taking short breathing spells at each halt. Very soon, however, the hostile fire makes this advance impossible. A fire fight of variable duration must first make a further advance possible by silencing the fire of the defender. In a serious infantry engagement every step forward must be purchased by the fire of the attacking infantry. The attacker will, in exceptional cases only, continue his advance in long lines, although this must appear desirable to him, for almost invariably only a part of his force will still be able to gain ground to the front when supported by the fire of neighboring detachments. Favorable local conditions, insignificant losses, and, above all, the personality of the commander will embue a force with the determination to advance.

Time Required for Making a Rush. Strength of the Force Making the Rush.

The squad requires 5-6, the platoon at war strength about 10-15 seconds preparation for making a rush.

While the attacker covers a distance of 80 m., the defender, if in readiness, can fire 4-5 shots. This proves very clearly that, in order to be able to make such a rush, a certain superiority of fire is absolutely essential. These figures change radically as soon as the troops are seriously engaged with the enemy and come under his fire at short ranges. At short ranges, aside from the size of the target offered, attempts to advance by rushes with entire companies must very soon cease of their own accord.

The character of the terrain and the fire of the enemy play a decisive role here.

The strength of the force making the rush is intimately connected with the length of the rushes. A small, isolated force would run the risk of being fired on by its own neighboring detachments. Besides, confidence and moral courage are difficult to find in a small force. It is difficult to carry forward long lines as units. The use of long lines necessitates, as a rule, an almost complete cessation of fire, and, in addition, mutual fire support suffers. Long lines should therefore be employed only when the attacker possesses a very marked superiority of fire. In practice it has been found advantageous to make the rush with the smallest fraction led by an officer, i.e., with a platoon.

The severest test of discipline is for a skirmish line to rise and rush forward under an effective hostile fire. This movement had best be executed with precision and energy even during peace exercises. The formation and manner of execution must become second nature to the soldier, like a movement of the manual of arms, which he retains during his entire military service, and a knowledge of which he brings with him when called to the colors during mobilization. The example set by advancing leaders and the arrival of reinforcements, which move forward through the firing line, have been found to be the most effective means of carrying a skirmish line forward.

The critical moment occurs when the men rise and prepare to rush forward, for an unsubdued enemy will be desirous to prevent, by increasing his fire, any attempt to advance. The fire support afforded by neighboring detachments would seem to have a conditional value only; for, being themselves under fire, the skirmishers of these detachments cannot be expected to divert their fire from the opponent previously fired upon, to an enemy by whom they themselves are not threatened. In oblique fire, the rifles, on account of their short barrel, interfere with neighboring ones, and, in addition, expose the men advancing on the flanks to the danger of being hit by the fire of their comrades. The fire support is, therefore, restricted to hindering the hostile skirmishers directly opposite from firing on the advancing unit. When the terrain is favorable, infantry and machine guns should not hesitate to fire over the heads of their own skirmishers. The coöperation of artillery will, in any case, be of great value, and infantry will have to select those moments for advancing when the defender is driven under cover by the hail of shot.

The advance by rushes, consuming time and energy, is an expedient to which the enemy compels us to resort as the only means of gaining ground to the front. The firm determination to close with the enemy and the ever-increasing difficulty of inducing the men to advance from cover, require that long rushes be made. Short rushes are neither consonant with the nature of the attack, nor with the desire to close with the enemy. “Many halts during an advance are fatal to the offensive.” (Hönig). The powers of endurance of the men, the character of the ground, and the hostile fire, as well as the support afforded by infantry and artillery fire, influence the length of the rush. If the leader has already caused the skirmishers to rise, it is best to let them run forward so long as the physical powers of the men and the hostile fire permit. The only danger is that the men will throw themselves down prematurely, and without orders. It is rather an advantage that during the rapid advance, increasing both muscular and nervous activity, the men do not think of danger and have no time to pay attention to their fallen comrades. One fact is, however, worthy of special attention: If we train a soldier to make long rushes in time of peace, he will be able to make them in time of war, and it is easier for a leader to decrease than to increase the length of rushes in the field.

The short rushes are considered advantageous because they take the enemy by surprise, in consequence of which he is not in a condition to direct his fire on the advancing unit. Rushes should be made with startling suddenness. They should not be made in step at double time, but, on the contrary, as rapidly as possible (by rushing); by the time the enemy directs his fire on them, the skirmishers should already have thrown themselves down. Stragglers should also throw themselves down, when the men in the lead drop down behind cover, and should then endeavor to reach the firing line by crawling.

The enemy will concentrate his fire on the unit which advanced first. The fire of this unit will at the start be rather weak, getting stronger gradually. If this unit is left in its advanced position for some time there is danger of its being thrown back; all neighboring units must therefore endeavor to rejoin it as soon as possible.

The greater the superiority of our fire, i.e., the marksmanship which compels the enemy to keep under cover, the greater the length of the rushes and the rapidity with which they follow upon each other.

Short rushes with small units occur quite naturally, because the platoon leader no longer succeeds in inducing his whole platoon to rise, since his influence extends only to the men nearest him, and because the flank squads at first remain behind and only gradually try to rejoin the leading skirmishers. If only a part of the skirmishers have jumped up, it is quite natural for them not to make a long rush, but to throw themselves down before reaching the new position, because of the feeling that they have been abandoned by their comrades and the fear of running into their field of fire. Thus, in spite of the best intentions of the leader, the short rush by small units occurs. In time of peace, however, we should retain the long rush by platoons and not endeavor to give human weaknesses the force of regulations.

When once compelled to employ short rushes the following question presents itself: Is the advantage of such a small gain of ground worth the trouble of inducing the soldier to rise for making an advance by rushes? Would it, therefore, not be more profitable to crawl forward? A man crawling on his belly presents a vulnerable surface of approximately the size of a breast plate 50 cm. high. In an advance made by a large unit, or over covered terrain (fields of standing grain) crawling would be difficult (difficulty of maintaining the direction of march and reduction of the rate of advance); it would also be difficult to get men to advance to the charge after they have crawled along in this fashion for some time. The supervision of a unit crawling forward would also be exceedingly difficult. The following results were obtained in experiments made under favorable conditions: A distance of 500 m. was covered by crawling in about 10 minutes; crawling tired the men, increased the activity of the lungs to such an extent that deliberate aiming and firing was out of the question and the motion produced a noticeable swelling of arms, hands and knees.[89] The Boers occasionally used the following method: One man crept forward once or twice his own length, raising his body slightly, while the man next to him fired; then they exchanged roles and this procedure was repeated uninterruptedly. In any case, troops ought to be able to execute both the advance by rushes and the advance by crawling with or without firing. On terrain devoid of cover a skirmish line will frequently be able to advance only by crawling.

Lessons of the Boer War

: “The rushes * * * were of variable length, according to the intensity of the hostile fire; they varied from 30 to 80 m. According to the opinion of many British officers it was exceedingly difficult to induce skirmishers to rise and rush forward under hostile fire; but that once upon their feet, it became necessary to push the attack forward as far as possible regardless of the increased losses entailed by the longer rushes.”[92]

One who fought on the Boer side reports as follows in regard to the British advance by rushes: “The men rose gradually and hesitatingly. This gave the attentively watching enemy time to pour a well directed fire upon the last men who arose. Thus even short rushes made by long lines became generally too costly to be executed. Smaller groups, on the other hand, were able to move with startling rapidity. * * * Every sudden interruption of the firing that might attract the enemy’s attention should therefore be carefully avoided, but, as a rule, this is possible only when the advancing units are small.”

The British Regulations of 1896 prescribe rushes of 30-40 m., and those published immediately after the war (1902) prescribe rushes of 70-90 m., but the rush is to continue only while the surprise of the enemy lasts.

Russo-Japanese War.

In the Japanese army, the 5th Infantry Division employed short, and very short, rushes by preference, while other divisions of the 1st Army as a rule preferred long rushes. From an English work we obtain the following data in regard to the length of rushes and the expenditure of ammunition per rifle during halts between consecutive rushes in the engagement on the Shiliho on October 12th, 1904, at ranges beginning with 1,000 m.

From the table it appears that after gaining the superiority of fire, beginning with the fifth rush, at about 625 m. from the enemy, the length of the rushes increased; the last 400 m. were covered in one rush as the enemy withdrew from his position.

If we assume that three shots per minute were fired from each rifle, it follows that the attack consumed approximately 40-45 minutes.

Provisions of the Various Regulations Relative to the Advance by Rushes.

Frequently, when the men are very much fatigued, when advancing over plowed ground and through extensive grain fields, an advance by rushes will be impossible. Whether fire while in motion ought to be employed in this case should be determined. A preliminary condition for its employment is, however, that the enemy’s fire has been subdued or that he has been forced under cover. To advance against an unshaken enemy with fire while in motion must lead to the annihilation of the attacking force. While the defender scores only 12.8% hits against advancing skirmishers at 700 m., the attacker scores only 1.6% to 3.5% hits against head and breast targets. With such a discrepancy in fire effect, the attack, if employing fire while in motion, is bound to collapse, unless it has already gained a superiority of fire prior to the advance. It is unfortunate that fire while in motion is frequently employed when inappropriate during drills. The danger of men wounding each other and of the advance hesitating because the officers are not in front of the line is not to be underestimated. On the other hand, the advantages of eliminating the difficulties of inducing the men to rise, of the troops leaving their losses behind, of stragglers being more easily detected, and of keeping the entire hostile line under fire, cannot be denied. In war this method of advance will frequently result without orders while advancing to the charge after the defender has been driven under cover. (In Russia this mode of advance is prescribed).