{{Report of Major-General Talbot Coke, Officer
Commanding 10th Brigade

Attack on Spion Kop, 23rd, 24th, 25th January, 1900

Pontoon Bridge: 25th January, 1900.

In accordance with your orders, General Woodgate assumed command of the column for the night attack, and settled his rendezvous near the Royal Engineer bivouac, for 7 P.M., 23rd instant. I bivouacked on the hill upon which the Connaught Rangers’ picquets are south of Three Tree Hill.

The first shots were fired at 3.40 A.M.

The valley between my position and Spion Kop, and also the top of that feature itself, was enveloped in mist until about 8 A.M., when it could be seen that our force held the schanzes on the summit. Shortly after it was seen to be exposed to a frontal fire from rifles, and to shell fire from its left front.

In accordance with orders communicated to me by you, to send a battalion to reinforce, a signal message was sent to the Imperial Light Infantry, which occupied a covering position towards Wright’s Farm, to proceed at once to support, moving by the right flank of the kop. The 2nd Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment was ordered to the place vacated by the Imperial Light Horse.

The position of Spion Kop was now seen to be exposed to a cross fire of artillery, and by your instructions I sent the Middlesex Regiment in support.

About 11.10 A.M., in consequence of the regrettable news about General Woodgate, at your order I proceeded to the kop myself. On arrival there, I found the track leading up very much congested, and, from information received, I formed the opinion that too many men were getting into the trenches and stone cover above, and becoming exposed to the artillery fire; I accordingly checked reinforcements. Soon after this, on my way up, an urgent message was received from Colonel Hill, who commanded at this time on the right, calling for reinforcements, as his line had actually fallen back before, and lost some prisoners to the Boers, who were pressing on in front. I accordingly sent up the rest of the Imperial Light Infantry available.

I now met Major Bayly, a Staff Officer, from the 4th Brigade, who informed me that an urgent message for help had been received from Colonel Crofton, who commanded on Spion Kop after General Woodgate was wounded. General Lyttelton had accordingly despatched the Scottish Rifles as an actual reinforcement, and a battalion of the King’s Royal Rifles against the hill to the north-west of Spion Kop. It was on the further slope of this hill that one of the Vickers-Maxim guns was placed. (This battalion worked its way some distance up the hill, but its action did not materially affect the situation.)

I now again received an urgent appeal for support, this time for the centre and left. I sent the Scottish Rifles.

I now had only as a reserve Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the Dorsetshire Regiment. These I retained and they were not engaged at the actual front.

The shell fire was most galling, and was aimed not only at the summit, but at the crest of the spur leading up, along which reinforcements and parties bringing back wounded had to pass. The fire came—

1. From field guns firing shrapnel and common shell, situated, as I endeavoured to point out in a signal message to you, north-west of our position.

2. From a Vickers-Maxim, in about the same direction.

3. From a similar gun to the north-east.

All these were beyond the effective rifle fire, and our supporting artillery on and about Three Tree Hill and on the Dragoon’s Maxim position apparently could not see them; consequently they poured, unchecked, an uninterrupted cross fire on to our position from about 8 A.M. till dark—ten hours.

Losses were very heavy, owing to the numbers necessarily assembled to hold back the Boer frontal attack, established under cover, and in which they showed gallantry in pushing forward to our lines. Colonel Crofton was now reported wounded, and the command of the troops in front devolved on Colonel Hill, Commanding 10th Brigade.

So the situation continued until 6 P.M., when I wrote a report and despatched it to you by Colonel Morris, A.A.G. (I request that this document, to save labour, may be attached). I first showed this to Colonel Hill, and he concurred, even taking exception to my reference to a retirement. I had no doubt that the infantry, which had so gallantly held its own all day, would be able to continue to do so when the shell fire abated at nightfall.

I accordingly went back to my reserves, having personally handed over command at the summit to Colonel Hill.

About 9.30 P.M., in consequence of your orders, I left for your camp, leaving a Staff Officer (Captain Phillips) behind. The narrative must now be his.

About 11.30 P.M. this officer, who was sleeping, was awakened by the sound of men moving, and found a general retirement proceeding.

He allowed no one to pass after this, stopped the Scottish Rifles, and collected a large number of stragglers of the Dorset, Middlesex, and Imperial Light Infantry. Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the bulk of the Dorsets remained in position as posted in support to the front line. The other corps had gone down the hill.

He then published memorandum attached,[19] to all commanders, except Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who had gone on; but they did not act upon it, urging that they had had distinct orders from Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who, as far as I knew, was only assisting Colonel Crofton in a portion of the front line, to retire.

We now held the spur to within about 300 yards of the summit, but the summit itself was evacuated. Signal communication could not be established at the moment, as the lamp which the signalling officer counted upon ran out of oil, and some time was lost in obtaining another.

About 1.30 A.M. a person, not by his speech an Englishman, was brought in on suspicion by a picquet. He made a statement to the effect that a naval gun would shortly be brought up, and requested that it might not be fired on. This was the first intimation of any naval gun coming to Spion Kop.

About 2.20 A.M. a naval officer reported that he had one 12-pr. gun below Spion Kop, near the donga on the west. He said he had orders to take this up to the summit. When asked whether he could do so before daylight, he said he could not. As it would be impossible to move the gun in any line after daybreak, on account of hostile fire, he was told to stand by in a place of safety. Signalling communication was now opened, and the attached message[20] sent.

As Captain Phillips got no instructions, about 2.30 A.M. he ordered vehicles back to a place of safety. All regimental wagons had been sent across by the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (B), 5th Division.

Shortly after 4 A.M., there still being no orders, and a mass of transport, small-arm ammunition carts, &c., at the donga, steps were taken to cover this passage, and, with the concurrence of the Officer Commanding Dorsetshire Regiment, and Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles, certain dispositions were made with the latter battalion and about half the former. The other half of the Dorsetshire Regiment were employed in carrying away a large number of boxes (about 80) of small-arm ammunition, brought back from the front and elsewhere.

The Imperial Light Infantry, Middlesex, and Thorneycroft’s had apparently gone home. Bethune’s were dismissed.

It was now light, and Boer ‘sniping’ commenced. Captain Phillips reported to me at the donga, about 4.45 A.M., when I was in possession of your order as to the pontoon crossing.

Talbot Coke, Major-General,
Commanding Right Attack.}}

{{CASUALTIES

		Officers			Men
Date	——	Killed			Killed
		Wounded			Wounded
		Missing			Missing
January
17th to 20th	5th Division	1	12	—	26	178	—
20th	2nd     ”	—	8	—	4	102	2
21st	2nd     ”	1	8	—	13	131	5
22nd	2nd     ”	—	1	—	1	19	1
23rd	2nd     ”	—	—	—	1	14	—
24th	2nd     ”	1	1	—	4	12	—
24th	5th     ”	21	22	—	139	388	279
24th	4th Brigade	6	11	6	32	120	2
25th	2nd Division	—	—	—	—	10	—
26th	2nd     ”	—	—	—	—	3	—
21st, 22nd, 23rd, 25th, 26th, 27th	5th     ”	—	1	—	1	33	—
	Totals	30	64	6	221	1,010	289
		\		/	\		/
		100			1,520
23rd	General Barton’s force is not included in above. He lost	1	1	—	4	5	11
20th	Lost by General Lyttelton, not shown above	—	1	—	2	13	1
		1	2	—	6	18	12
		\		/	\		/
	Grand Totals	103			1,556
Losses on 24th (included above)		28	34	6	175	520	281
		\		/	\		/
	Totals	68			976

There are said to have been 243 buried on Spion Kop, so no doubt many of those shown missing were killed.}}