Report by Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren,
K.C.B., upon the Capture and Subsequent
Evacuation of Spion Kop
Capture and Evacuation of Spion Kop
Chief of the Staff,—I make the operations against Spion Kop in a separate report, because they did not enter into my original plans.
Under the original instructions of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, of 15th January, 1900, I was to act as circumstances required, but, according to instructions, was generally to continue throughout refusing my right, and throwing my left forward until I gained the open plain north of Spion Kop.
Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter’s Laager, I assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers together. I pointed out to them that, with the three and a-half (3½) days’1 provisions allowed, it was impossible to advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I expressed my conviction that this could1 not be done unless we sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and attempted to march through with our rations in our haversacks—without impedimenta.
The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong entrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by wagons, without first taking Spion Kop.
Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be sent there.
On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and told me that there were two courses open—(1) to attack, or (2) to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous day.
The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieut.-Colonel àCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.
The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s Horse, and half company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by Trichardt’s Drift.
The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he had entrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without casualties, other than three men wounded.
Lieut.-Colonel àCourt came down in the morning and stated that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was: ‘Reinforce at once, or all lost. General dead.’
He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the troops. He started at once, and was accompanied by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.
I replied to Colonel Crofton: ‘I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.’
This occurred about 10 A.M.
Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had heliographed: ‘With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.’
For some hours after this message I could get no information from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.
I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view of the situation. At 1.20 P.M. I heliographed to ascertain whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of the situation (copy attached). He stated that, unless the artillery could silence the enemy’s guns, the men on the summit could not stand another complete day’s shelling, and that the situation was extremely critical.
At 6.30 P.M. I asked if he could keep two battalions on the summit, removing the remainder out of reach of shells; also whether two battalions would suffice to hold the summit. This was in accordance with a telegram on the subject sent me by the Commander-in-Chief. Later in the evening I made arrangements to send two (naval) 12-prs. and the Mountain Battery Royal Artillery to the summit, together with half company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the entrenchments and provide shell covers for the men. I may here mention that the 17th Company Royal Engineers proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate’s force, and were employed until daylight upon the entrenchments, then upon road making and water supply.
Sandbags were sent up early on the 24th instant.
While Colonel Sim was, with this party, ascending the hill, he met Colonel Thorneycroft descending, having evacuated the position. {{For the remainder of the account of the proceedings I attach the reports made to me by Colonel Thorneycroft[17] and by General Coke,[18] together with reports on the supply of food and water rendered by officers thus engaged. The supply of ammunition was ample.}}
I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one expression of the admirable conduct and bravery shown by officers and men suffering under a withering artillery fire on the summit of the slopes, and also of those who, with so much endurance, persisted in carrying up water and food and ammunition to the troops during this day.
During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarters Staff was present on the summit, and reported direct to the Commander-in-Chief.
At sunset I considered that the position could be held next day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled, as already mentioned.
In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the vigorous protests of General Coke’s Brigade-Major, the Officer Commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.
It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether there should be an investigation into the question of the unauthorised evacuation of Spion Kop.
Charles Warren, Lieut.-General.