J. Weston & Sons photographers Emery Walker ph. sc.
Major-General G. D. Jeffreys, C.M.G.
By 1.30 the first objective was entirely in our hands, and five minutes later the advance to the second objective began, close up under our barrage. This was a complete success, as the barrage kept the enemy in their trenches, and they had not even shown themselves when the Grenadiers and Irish Guards were on them with the bayonet.
After the capture of the first objective there were only two company officers left, Lieutenant A. Lawson-Johnston and Second Lieutenant Layland-Barratt, and the attack on the second objective was practically carried out by the non-commissioned officers. Never have the sergeants of the regiment showed to better advantage. The skill with which they handled their companies or platoons, their quick grasp of an order conveyed to them, and the intelligent way in which they carried out their instructions elicited the warmest praise from the Commanding Officer.
By 1.45 P.M. the second objective was secured, and many of the enemy killed. The dug-outs in the sunken road on the right of the Grenadiers were all searched, and a large number of prisoners taken. The following message was received from Brigade Headquarters:
Prisoner you sent down states that the rest of his Company are in dug-outs or subterranean passages about 250 yards east of Lesbœufs and south of the sunken road. He appears to think they are anxious to surrender, but gives no reasons. In thinking this he seems to be more talkative than reliable.
The prisoner proved to be right, though, by the time the search of these dug-outs started, all their occupants had already run out, holding up their hands. During this second phase of the attack, the enemy appear to have offered little resistance, and many more were captured than killed.
Meanwhile the company of Coldstream under Captain Verelst which had been detailed for clearing Lesbœufs closed up in rear of the Grenadiers, according to the programme, and at 2.35 P.M. the advance on the third objective began. To this also there was little resistance, and soon the Grenadiers and Irish Guards were established in a line 100 yards east of Lesbœufs village. During the whole of their advance the Grenadiers had kept in perfect touch with the Irish Guards on their left and the 1st West Yorks on their right, and the orders were carried out almost to the minute. However, the situation on the left of the 1st Guards Brigade seemed doubtful, and General Pereira therefore sent up a company from the 3rd Battalion Coldstream to strengthen that flank.
Thus Lesbœufs passed into our hands, and these positions, which had been considered quite impregnable, were taken by the combination of the creeping barrage and a simultaneous infantry attack.
It was about this time that the only real hitch in the attack occurred. Arrangements had been made for the artillery barrage to be put down 200 yards east of the final objective, but the position of the trench was marked differently on the artillery and infantry maps, and the shells fell short. This not only caused a good many casualties amongst the men who were digging in, but also prevented the attacking force from pushing forward patrols and occupying the best ground for observation. A furious message was sent back by Captain Bailey: ”Our artillery are blowing us out. Please stop it at once,” but whether the messages miscarried or whether the maps were so inaccurate that the orders were not understood, the shelling continued for nearly two hours.
Meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream moved up by the new communication trench to the support line and thence across the open to the first objective, where they remained in support.
When the barrage eventually cleared away it was found that there were practically no Germans in front, although a good many of them could be seen running towards Le Transloy without rifles or equipment, and the enemy were not shelling us at all, no doubt because they had been obliged to move their guns. It seemed to Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny that some advantage should be taken of this situation, and he sent a message back that it was a splendid opportunity for the cavalry to go through. Lord Cavan, however, decided that the circumstances did not permit of such a move, as the front was too narrow.
Lord Cavan sent the following message to General Pereira:
Hearty thanks and sincere congratulations to you all. A very fine achievement, splendidly executed.
To which General Pereira replied:
Your old Brigade very proud to be able to present you with Lesbœufs. All ranks most gratified by your kind congratulations.
Later this message was received from General Ponsonby, commanding the 2nd Guards Brigade:
G.O.C. and all ranks wish to congratulate the 1st and 3rd Guards Brigades on their splendid success to-day.
The men were in the highest spirits, and that evening they had a quiet time even in the front trench, so quiet that there was no difficulty in getting supplies up. During the night each battalion was ordered to thin out the front line, as there were far too many men in the trench; this order was carried out, but next morning it was found that still further thinning had to be done.
Sept. 26.
On the 26th the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and Irish Guards received orders to try and push patrols on to the ridge which ran 800 yards east of Lesbœufs; but, although this might have been possible the night before, it was found to be impracticable now as the Germans had had time to recover, and had established a strong line of posts with machine-guns, so that our patrols were unable to advance more than 300 yards.
That night the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards from the 2nd Guards Brigade, and marched back to the Citadel Camp, where it arrived at 4 A.M. on the 27th, after stopping on the way at the south end of Bernafay Wood for hot food provided by the cookers.
The casualties in the Battalion were 108 killed, 222 wounded, and 12 missing, making a total of 312 excluding officers. Considering what had been accomplished this was surprisingly little, but the percentage of officers was very high, the result, no doubt, of the fact that the wire had not been cut at the first objective. Captain A. K. S. Cunninghame, Lieutenant the Hon. W. A. D. Parnell, Lieutenant M. A. Knatchbull-Hugessen, and Lieutenant G. A. Arbuthnot were killed, and Captain Harcourt-Vernon, Captain Beaumont-Nesbitt, Lieutenant A. F. Irvine, Lieutenant H. G. Wiggins, and Lieutenant R. B. B. Wright were wounded.
The following order was issued by General Pereira to the 1st Guards Brigade:
2nd Batt. Grenadier Guards—
You have again maintained the high traditions of the 1st Guards Brigade when called upon a second time in the battle of the Somme. For five days previous to the assault the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards held the trenches under constant heavy shell-fire and dug many hundred yards of assembly and communication trenches, this work being constantly interrupted by the enemy’s artillery. The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 1st Battalion Irish Guards, though under shell-fire in their bivouacs, were kept clear of the trenches until the evening of 24th September, and were given the task of carrying by assault all the objectives to be carried by this Brigade. Nothing deterred them in this attack, not even the fact that in places the enemy wire was cut in the face of rifle and machine-gun fire, and in spite of all resistance and heavy losses the entire main enemy defensive line was captured.
Every battalion in the Brigade carried out its task to the full.
The German Reserve Division, which includes the 238th, 239th, and 240th Regiments, and which opposed you for many weeks at Ypres, left the salient on the 18th September. You have now met them in the open, a worthy foe, but you have filled their trenches with their dead and have driven them before you in headlong flight.
I cannot say how proud I am to have had the honour of commanding the 1st Guards Brigade in this battle, a Brigade which has proved itself to be the finest in the British Army.
The Brigade is now under orders for rest and training, and it must now be our object to keep up the high standard of efficiency, and those who have come to fill our depleted ranks will strive their utmost to fill worthily the place of those gallant officers and men who have laid down their lives for a great cause.
C. E. Pereira, Brigadier-General,
Commanding 1st Guards Brigade.
September 28, 1916.
The 3rd Battalion
3rd Batt.
At the beginning of September the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers was at Morlancourt, being trained with the rest of the 2nd Guards Brigade. On the 9th the Brigade moved into camp at Happy Valley and on the 12th it marched to Carnoy.
The following officers of the 3rd Battalion took part in the attack of September 15, 1916:
Sept. 12-13.
On the night of the 12th the 2nd Guards Brigade was ordered to relieve the right subsection of the 3rd Guards Brigade. In the front line was placed the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards, with the 1st Battalion Scots Guards in support, while the two battalions which were eventually to undertake the attack, the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Coldstream, remained behind in reserve. Orders were given to the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards to clear away isolated posts in front, where it was reported that some Germans were lurking, and this was successfully done; but an attack that was afterwards organised with the 71st and 16th Infantry Brigades was not quite so successful.
Sept. 14.
Up to this point the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers had stayed in reserve. Its packs, greatcoats, and surplus kit were now sent into the Divisional store at Méaulte, and bombs, sand-bags, tools, flares, etc., issued to the men for the attack on the following day. The Battalion marched off by companies at 9 P.M. to take up its position.
The following orders were issued by Brigadier-General J. Ponsonby, commanding the 2nd Guards Brigade:
2nd Guards Brigade
1. The Fourth Army will attack the enemy’s defences between Combles Ravine and Martinpuich on Z day with the object of seizing Morval, Lesbœufs, Gueudecourt, Flers.
The French will attack simultaneously on the right, and the Reserve Army on the left.
The attack is to be pushed with the utmost vigour all along the line until the most distant objectives are reached. The failure of a unit on the flank is not to prevent other units from pushing on to their final objective.
As soon as the final objectives have been captured by the infantry, the cavalry will advance and will seize the high ground Rocquigny—Villers-au-Flos—Riencourt-les-Bapaume—Bapaume.
The Guards Division is to be prepared to support the cavalry on the above line at the earliest possible moment.
2. The objectives allotted to Guards Brigades are marked on the attached map as follows:
| First objective, Green (X line). | ||
| Second | ” | Brown (Xa line). |
| Third | ” | Blue (Y line). |
| Fourth | ” | Red (Z line). |
2nd Guards Brigade will be on the right. 1st Guards Brigade will be on the left. 3rd Guards Brigade will be in reserve. 71st Infantry Brigade will be on the right of 2nd Guards Brigade.
3. The Brigade will attack with two battalions in front and two battalions in support.
3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards will be right front battalion.
1st Battalion Coldstream Guards will be left front battalion.
1st Battalion Scots Guards will be right support battalion.
2nd Battalion Irish Guards will be left support battalion.
4. Battalions will be formed up on a company front in column of half-companies. Troops will be in single rank. Each battalion will therefore advance in four waves.
5. 2nd Guards Brigade Machine-gun Company will detail guns as follows:
I. Two guns to advance with 3/G.G. and two guns with 1/C.G. These guns will take position in the third wave on the inner flank of the right and left flank platoons respectively.
II. Four guns to advance with 1/S.G., and four guns with 2/I.G. Four of these guns will take position in the sixth wave on the inner flank of the right and left platoons respectively. The other four will take the same position in the eighth wave.
The remaining three guns will advance in the centre of the ninth wave.
6. Four Stokes guns will be detailed to advance on the flanks of the ninth wave.
1/S.G. and 2/I.G. will find carrying parties of one officer and fifty men each to advance with these guns.
Remaining guns will be in Brigade Reserve, with 76th Field Company, R.E.
7. The formation for attack will accordingly be as follows:
Sapping platoons will be formed up in rear of Battalion H.Q., which will move in the centre of the fourth and eighth waves. The distance between waves will be 50 yards.
8. Details of artillery barrage are given in Appendix A.
9. Nine tanks will advance from Guards Division front. They will probably start from each successive line well in advance of the attacking troops.
The action of the troops will be entirely independent of the action of the tanks, and will be carried out as ordered, whether the tanks are held up or not.
10. The assaults on successive objectives will be delivered at the following times:
Attack on X line at zero.
Attack on Xa line at zero + 1 hour.
(This second assault is limited to 1st Guards Brigade. 2nd Guards Brigade will not move till time for third assault.)
Attack on Y line at zero + 2 hours.
Attack on Z line at zero + 4 hours and 30 minutes.
11. The action of the waves of attack will be as follows:
(a) First four waves will pass over X line and lie down close in rear of the barrage, which will halt till zero + 1 hour and 10 minutes at X + 200 yards.
Fifth and sixth waves will clear up X line.
Seventh and eighth waves will clear up X line and lie down in rear of fourth wave.
Ninth wave will lie down short of X line.
(b) At zero + 2 hours all waves will advance to the Y line. Seventh and eighth waves will advance in front of fifth and sixth waves. Ninth wave will be in rear as before.
(c) On reaching Y line, first four waves will pass over Y line and lie down close in rear of barrage as before.
Seventh and eighth waves will clear up Y line.
Fifth and sixth waves will pass over Y line and lie down in rear of fourth wave.
Ninth wave will lie down short of Y line.
(d) Half an hour after reaching Y line all Commanding Officers will meet at Battalion Headquarters of 3rd Bn. Grenadier Guards, and will confer on attack on Z line.
Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, D.S.O., 3rd Bn. Grenadier Guards, if present, will command the attack on the Y line.
In the absence of Lieut.-Colonel Brooke, senior officer present will command.
Stokes Gun Sections will act in accordance with orders of O.C. attack.
12. It is the object of these dispositions to ensure a steady flow of troops so as to press the strongest possible attack against each successive objective.
Rear lines will reinforce leading lines wherever they appear thin.
No troops will be left in any objective when the attack goes on.
The task of the two leading Guards Brigades is to drive the attack through Lesbœufs to the ultimate objective by every means in their power.
3rd Guards Brigade will be in close reserve to carry out any of the following duties, as may be required:
(a) To pass through Z and press the attack behind the cavalry.
(b) To make a defensive flank, if the attack on our flanks is held up.
(c) To support the attack of the leading Guards Brigades, if held up anywhere.
13. 76th Field Company, R.E., will be in Brigade Reserve. It will be formed up in a place to be notified later, and will await orders from the Brigade.
14. Ninth Squadron, R.F.C., will have two contact aeroplanes in the air from zero to dark on Z day, and again from 6.30 A.M. to 9 A.M. on Z + 1 day.
Flares will be lit as follows:
(i.) On obtaining each objective.
(ii.) At 12 noon and 5 P.M. on Z day.
(iii.) At 6.30 A.M. on Z + 1 day.
Red flares will be used by infantry, Green flares by cavalry.
15. All transport will be packed up and ready to move forward at 1 hour’s notice after zero + 4 hours.
Brigade Transport Officer will report at Divisional Headquarters, Minden Post, at zero + 2 hours, and await orders there.
16. Separate orders will be issued regarding—
I. Supply of rations.
” ” water.
” ” S.A.A.
” ” Stokes ammunition.
” ” bombs.
II. Disposal of prisoners.
III. Medical arrangements.
17. Watches will be synchronised at 12.30 P.M. and 6.30 P.M. on Y day by telephone from this Office.
18. Brigade Headquarters will close at Bernafay Wood at 5 P.M. to-morrow and open at T.19.a.1/2.3½ at the same hour.
Acknowledge.
E. W. M. Grigg, Captain,
Brigade-Major.
13/9/16.
The following orders are supplementary to this Office No. 129/G. The latter will be amended, where required, accordingly.
1. 3/G.G., 1/C.G. will relieve 2/I.G. in the line to-night. 2/I.G. will move back to its assembling area on relief, and remain there till zero hour.
3/G.G. will march off at 9 P.M.
1/C.G. will march off at 9.30 P.M.
1/S.G. will march off at 10.45 P.M.
T.M.B. will march in rear of 1/C.G.
Company guides from 2/I.G. will be at Brigade Headquarters, Bernafay Wood, for relieving battalions at the following hours:
3/G.G. 9.45 P.M.
1/C.G. 10.15 P.M.
1/S.G. 11 P.M.
2. Forming-up will be carried out as follows:
(a) Every battalion is provided with printed boards to mark the waves and the flanks of platoons.
3/G.G., 1/C.G. and 1/S.G. will detail marking parties of 1 officer and 12 O.R. each to put these out before relief to-night. Brigade Signal Officer will provide three guides for this party to be at Brigade Headquarters, Bernafay Wood, at 7 P.M.
(b) In order to avoid the enemy barrage, all battalions will form east of the road from G of Ginchy (1/20,000 Sheet 57 C., S.W.) and the southern end of the Sunken Road in T.14.a. In order to make room, battalions will feel their right in forming up as far as a line running parallel to the direction of the attack through Ginchy Telegraph.
On starting at zero hour, battalions will incline left until the left flank is in touch with the right flank of 1st Guards Brigade.
(c) The direction of the attack is 58 degrees magnetic from the cross-roads in T.14.a.
Marking boards will be put out on a line 148 degrees magnetic from left flank mark, or 328 degrees magnetic from the right flank mark. Right and left flanks have been marked in advance by 2/I.G.
3. The dividing line between battalions in attack on X and Y lines is as follows:
X line. T.8.d.9.4.
Y line. Road junction T.3.d.5.2.
4. 2/I.G. will be formed up in two waves. First wave will clear up second German trench in X line.
Second wave will clear up first German trench in X line. Both these waves will clear up Y line.
Officer commanding 1st Bn. Scots Guards will make arrangements for clearing the part of these two trenches in his area.
5. The creeping barrage will open at zero hour on a line at right angles to the direction of the attack through cross-roads in T.14.a.
It will advance and halt thereafter as laid down in Appendix A to this Office No. 129/G.
6. Prisoners will be collected at Battalion Headquarters under Battalion arrangements, and sent back to Divisional Collecting Station, Crater Post, A.8.a.6.3, when possible.
They should be made to carry wounded when practicable.
(Signed)
E. W. M. Grigg, Captain,
Brigade-Major.
14/9/16.
The first phase of the attack of the Guards Division was to be carried out with Pereira’s Brigade on the left and Ponsonby’s Brigade on the right, while Corkran’s Brigade would be in reserve. To the 2nd Brigade was allotted a front of 500 yards, north-east of Ginchy, and the attack was to be carried out by the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right with the 1st Battalion Scots Guards in support, and the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left with the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards in support. In order to evade the heavy barrage which the Germans usually put down along the east of Ginchy and Guillemont villages, it was decided to assemble the whole Brigade east of Ginchy.
This precaution had the advantage that the assembly trench was not shelled, but there were certain disadvantages. In the first place, the assembly ground was not square with the line of attack, so that a change of direction was necessary after the attack had started, and, in the second place, it was by no means easy to keep the 2nd Guards Brigade in immediate touch with the 1st Guards Brigade. It had been intended to align the Brigade on painted boards showing the waves and the flanks of the platoons, but these showed up so bright in the clear moonlight that they were thrown away and men were put out as markers instead.
Sept. 15.
The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers was formed up in four waves, all the men being in single rank, and companies in columns of half-companies, with fifty yards’ distance between platoons. Their distribution was as follows:
At 4 A.M. the Battalion was in position and everything was ready. Sandwiches and an issue of rum were served out to the men, who then tried to snatch a little sleep. Complete silence reigned, except for the sound of the tanks making their way slowly to their places. At 6 A.M. exactly our heavy guns started, and fired about forty shells apiece in quick succession. This immediately woke up the enemy and brought down their barrage in exactly the place where it was expected, but of course there were no troops there. Orders were passed down at 6.15 to fix bayonets and get ready, and five minutes later the attack started.
The first objective or Green line lay over the ridge about 600 yards away, and it was hoped that this would be reached without any serious opposition. The ground in and around Ginchy was a battered mass of irregular ridges and shell-holes, which overlapped and stretched away into the early morning mist. Direction became a matter of the greatest difficulty, as there were absolutely no landmarks to go by. No one except the Irish Guards had seen the ground before, as it had been found impossible to send officers up during the heavy fighting of the last days. On the map it seemed a simple matter to pick out the Lesbœufs road and the church of Lesbœufs, either of which would have served as a guide, but on the actual ground, which was just a great desert of shell-holes, with our own barrage ahead and the enemy’s shells falling all round, it was practically impossible to distinguish anything.
Soon after it started off the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers came on unexpected intermediate lines. These were no more than connected shell-holes, but had served to shelter a number of Germans, who fought with the utmost bravery. The guns had not bombarded them, while the creeping barrage had passed over too quickly to do much harm. Though the men holding them were all shot or bayoneted, and the delay thus caused was very slight, it had the effect of breaking the regularity of the formation and telescoping up the men in the rear.
Almost at the outset Captain A. K. Mackenzie was hit and fell, as he led his company to the attack. Though mortally wounded, he got up again and struggled on, still waving his men forward. Once more he fell, and this time was unable to rise, but even then he managed to raise himself on one knee and cheer the company on. Afterwards he was carried down on a stretcher, but never recovered and died in the ambulance on the way. About the same time Lieutenant Raymond Asquith was shot through the chest and killed as he led the first half of No. 4 Company. He had endeared himself to both officers and men in an extraordinary degree since he joined the regiment at the beginning of the war, and his preference of service with his Battalion to the good staff appointment which he had just given up had won the admiration of all ranks. Lieutenant E. H. J. Wynne was mortally wounded by a German officer in one of the intermediate lines, and Lieutenant C. G. Gardner was killed soon afterwards. Captain G. G. Gunnis, Lieutenant A. Whitehead, Second Lieutenant H. Williams, and Second Lieutenant J. Worsley were wounded.
While these intermediate lines were being cleared, an extremely heavy machine-gun fire was opened from the right flank, where the Sixth Division had been held up at the start. The tanks which were to have flattened out the wire and helped the advance never appeared, and so it came about that, from the moment it crossed over the Ginchy ridge and came within view of the enemy’s lines, the 2nd Guards Brigade was committed to hard and continuous fighting in a position of much difficulty.
By now the Brigade had got very much mixed up, and, though still all together, continued its advance as a brigade rather than as four battalions. Whenever the leading wave met with any check, those in rear, impatient to get at the enemy, closed in on them, and thus companies and even battalions became intermingled. As an inevitable result of this quick advance the right flank of the Brigade was completely exposed, and Lieut.-Colonel Sergison-Brooke deciding that some protection was essential, threw out a company as a defensive flank to within 200 yards of the enemy’s flanking trench, to keep down the fire, while the rest of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers pressed on to the main assault.
It had been arranged that after the first objective had been captured our artillery should bombard the second objective and prepare it for attack, so when these lines were carried there was some uncertainty as to whether the advance should be continued or not. In spite of the casualties the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, with the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, continued to push on till it reached the first objective, and was able to secure it according to the specified time, though the task was no easy one. In some parts between the right and left columns of the assault, and also on the extreme right, the wire had been untouched, but as soon as any man gained a foothold in the trench he at once proceeded to clear the way by bombing. Curiously enough, though the Germans had fought with such tenacity in the intermediate lines, the garrison of the first objective offered comparatively little resistance, and surrendered in large numbers.
The men were out of breath, as the pace had been hot, and they were carrying a good weight, so a pause in this first objective was not unwelcome. The prisoners were grouped together, and sent back in batches; in one part of the line the German machine-gunners caught sight of them and turned their guns on them, but the prisoners scurried off and ran as fast as they could back through our lines.
On the right Captain Wolrige-Gordon with No. 1 Company was attempting to keep touch with the Sixth Division, and as the Battalion advanced he started firing down the enemy’s trench where the machine-guns were holding it up. At first the Germans were puzzled, but when they grasped where the fire came from their snipers got to work and accounted for many men before Captain Wolrige-Gordon could join the rest of the Battalion.
In the meantime the three battalions of Coldstream advanced in a splendid manner, carrying all before them. When men in line are going forward with no reliable landmarks to guide them, small incidents, quite insignificant in themselves, will often cause a slight change of direction without their being aware of it. On starting off the 1st Battalion Coldstream met with little resistance, and in its endeavour to rush the foremost German trenches the left flank of the Battalion moved ahead faster than our creeping barrage. Quickly realising what had happened, the men checked the pace and hung back for a little, while the right flank of the Battalion still pressed on. The check was momentary, but caused the whole Battalion to swing slightly to the left. This led the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream in the 1st Guards Brigade also to ease off slightly to the left, and, as often happens, the slight deviation was exaggerated as the advance continued, and soon all the Coldstream battalions were moving in a northerly instead of a north-easterly direction. A switch trench running at an angle into the German main line gave them the impression that they were going in the right direction, as it seemed square with their advance. The 2nd Battalion Irish Guards swung with the 1st Battalion Coldstream, but the 1st Battalion Scots Guards followed the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers.
While this was happening the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers from the 1st Guards Brigade, having completely lost sight of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream as it passed through the enemy’s barrage, continued to advance according to its orders, and eventually forced its way to the first objective, where to its surprise it found itself between the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion Irish Guards.
The situation was most complicated, and yet all was well. The Division, as a Division, had swept everything in front of it, although not quite in the order in which it should have moved. But parts of the German trenches remained untouched, and these had to be dealt with before any farther progress could be made. When the 1st Battalion Coldstream began to swing to the left, a gap was made between the two front battalions of the 2nd Guards Brigade, which widened out as the advance progressed. Observing this, Captain Oliver Lyttelton pushed up 100 men of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers to fill the intermediate space, but as the gap gradually extended, and the smoke and dust made it impossible for them to see where they were going, these hundred men were able to keep touch with the 1st Battalion Coldstream only, and became detached from the rest of the Battalion.
Progress towards the first objective was made very difficult by the failure of the Sixth Division to take the Quadrilateral. As soon as the attacking lines showed themselves they were met by a sweeping fire from the enemy’s machine-guns on the right flank, and were mown down. After the first objective had been entered, and Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, Coldstream Guards, was organising an attack upon the second objective, it was discovered that the whole of the first objective was not entirely secured. An attack was immediately made on that portion of the line still occupied by the enemy, and Lieut.-Colonel Guy Baring, who commanded the 1st Battalion Coldstream, in attempting to gain touch with the remainder of the Brigade from which he had, for the moment, been separated, left the trench to advance over the top of the ground when he was struck by a bullet in the head and instantly killed.
Lieut.-Colonel Campbell then ordered Captain Lyttelton to bomb down the trench together with a party of the 2nd Irish Guards under Lieutenant Mylne. But hardly had they started when the Germans came running down the trench, holding up their hands. They were being pursued by another bombing party, composed, not of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers as might have been expected, but the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers.
Now that the whole of the first objective was in our hands the advance towards the second objective at once took place. On the extreme right no ground could be gained, but farther towards the centre the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers reached a position which it assumed to be the second objective, but was in fact, according to the report from the aeroplanes, half-way between the first and second objectives.
During this last advance Captain Stanhope and Second Lieutenant Jackson were killed. Lieutenant W. Stainton was reported missing, and there were several conflicting stories as to what had happened to him. Second Lieutenants Thrupp and Cassy were wounded, as well as Second Lieutenant Cornish, who behaved with great gallantry and was recommended for a Military Cross.
As to whether it would have been possible to push on at once into Lesbœufs, accounts vary. Certainly those in front thought that had reinforcements come up the town would have fallen into our hands without further opposition. It was not known, however, that the right flank of the Division was absolutely unprotected, and that the farther the Division advanced the more perilous its position was bound to become. Even if Lesbœufs had been taken, it is difficult to believe that it could have been held against counter-attacks with the right flank thus in the air.
The sight of the Germans retiring hastily towards Bapaume and withdrawing their field-guns proved too tempting for some adventurous spirits, and patrols were organised to press on towards Lesbœufs. After consulting their maps, Captain Sir Ian Colquhoun, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, and Captain Lyttelton, 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, determined to keep the Germans in front of them on the move, and they were joined soon after by Major Rocke, Captain Alexander, and Lieutenant Mylne of the Irish Guards. Sir Ian Colquhoun had already won a reputation as the bravest of the brave, and was credited with having killed a large number of Germans in personal combat. The others were very much of the same type—officers who were never content with simply carrying out their orders, but would instantly take advantage of any weakness in the German defence to drive a success home.
Having collected about twenty men, Sir Ian Colquhoun pushed forward to reconnoitre towards Lesbœufs, followed soon after by Major Rocke and Captain Alexander with some men of the Irish Guards. Captain Lyttelton called on the men of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers who were near, and brought the whole party up to about 120. This party pushed on, and met with no opposition for 800 yards. At this stage they found themselves in an unoccupied trench running along the bottom of a little gully, with standing crops in front of them. They could have pushed on into Lesbœufs, but owing to their small numbers and, as they expressed it, the ”draughtiness of their flanks,” they decided to hold on where they were and send back for reinforcements. Messages were accordingly despatched to the Brigade Headquarters, and were marked, “To be read by all officers on the way.”
This daring attempt to capture more ground from the enemy was quite a feasible operation, but its success undoubtedly depended on whether reinforcements could reach them before the Germans returned. For so small a party to try and do anything more than hold the trench until an adequate force arrived would have been madness. Every possible precaution was taken against surprise, and Lewis guns were placed on each flank. From 1 P.M. onwards this gallant little band waited and waited for the reinforcements which never arrived. Meanwhile, finding that the British attack had spent itself, the Germans began returning in small bodies, and soon after 5 P.M. a whole battalion was seen advancing. The position of this party was now becoming serious. Gradually the Germans were moving round each flank, and even getting to their rear.
At 6 P.M. they were still doggedly holding on to their trench, being fired at from all sides, when suddenly a company of the enemy, 250 strong, charged them in front. The surprise was complete, as the standing crops hid the Germans till the last moment. With 250 of the enemy rushing a trench occupied by less than 100 British troops, one might have thought it only a matter of time before our men were all killed or taken prisoners. But the men who had followed Major Rocke, Sir Ian Colquhoun, and Captain Lyttelton were naturally stout fighters, and when the order to retire was given they actually contrived to disengage themselves and get away, after killing a good number of the enemy. Captain Lyttelton, finding himself surrounded, threw his empty revolver at the Germans; thinking it was a Mills bomb, they ducked, and gave him time to scramble out of the trench and escape.
Even then, had the Germans only stayed where they were and fired at the retreating party, they might have inflicted considerable losses, but they came running on, firing from the shoulder, and so allowed these gallant men to rejoin the main British line with astonishingly few casualties. When once they were safe, the pursuers were greeted by such a deadly fire from our trenches that numbers of them were killed, and the rest scattered in all directions.
Meanwhile General Ponsonby pressed for the 3rd Guards Brigade to be sent up, but the reports which reached General Feilding from the air showed that the troops in front were not in the positions ascribed to them, and as the situation on both flanks of the Division was unsatisfactory, and the Germans were reported to be massing between Morval and Lesbœufs, he considered that it would be impossible to throw forward all his reserves. However, the 4th Battalion Grenadiers was ordered to reinforce the 2nd Guards Brigade, and told by General Ponsonby to strengthen the right flank.
Sept. 16.
All that night the right flank of the 2nd Guards Brigade was being bombed, and Captain J. Hopley, who behaved with great gallantry, at one time had his men standing back to back and firing both ways. The next day, September 16, the 2nd Guards Brigade was relieved by the 61st Infantry Brigade, who continued the attack, and secured the next objective.
The percentage of officers killed and wounded in the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers was exceptionally high; out of 22 officers who went into action, 17 were killed or wounded. Lieut.-Colonel Sergison-Brooke was wounded almost at the start. Captain A. K. Mackenzie, Captain the Hon. R. P. Stanhope, Lieutenant E. H. J. Wynne, Lieutenant Raymond Asquith, Lieutenant W. A. Stainton, Lieutenant C. G. Gardner, Second Lieutenant G. D. Jackson were killed; Captain G. G. Gunnis and Second Lieutenant E. G. Worsley were mortally wounded, and subsequently died; Captain F. J. V. B. Hopley, Lieutenant W. Champneys, Lieutenant A. O. Whitehead, Second Lieutenant M. Thrupp, Second Lieutenant D. W. Cassy, Second Lieutenant G. M. Cornish, Second Lieutenant H. St. J. Williams, and Second Lieutenant J. F. Worsley were wounded.
Amongst other ranks the casualties were 395 killed and wounded.
On September 20 the 3rd Battalion moved into bivouacs at Carnoy, where it remained until the second attack of the Guards Division on the 25th. The 2nd Guards Brigade was then, however, in reserve, and, owing to the complete success of the attack, its services were not required. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers was in Corps Reserve during the attack, but returned to the Brigade in the evening. On the 26th Lieutenant C. C. Carstairs and Second Lieutenant C. F. Johnston joined.
The 1st Battalion
1st Batt.
At the end of August the 3rd Guards Brigade went through a period of training which lasted until September 7; during this time it stayed in billets at Ville-sous-Corbie. Captain E. Sheppard joined the 1st Battalion Grenadiers on September 3. On the 8th the Brigade moved up into the line and took over Ginchy, which had just been captured by the Sixteenth Division. The 4th Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards were placed in the front trenches, while the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion Scots Guards were in reserve.
The officers who went up with the 1st Battalion were:
| Lieut.-Colonel M. E. Makgill-Crichton-Maitland | Commanding Officer. |
| Capt. E. H. J. Duberly | Adjutant. |
| Lieut. R. P. le P. Trench, M.C. | Bombing Officer. |
| Lieut. A. V. L. Corry, M.C. | Lewis Gun Officer. |
| Capt. W. D. Drury-Lowe, D.S.O. | King’s Company. |
| Lieut. G. F. Pauling | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. B. G. Samuelson | ” ” |
| Capt. A. C. Graham | No. 2 Company. |
| Lieut. E. B. Shelley | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. E. G. L. King | ” ” |
| Capt. E. N. E. M. Vaughan | No. 3 Company. |
| 2nd Lieut. O. F. Stein | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. C. C. T. Sharp | ” ” |
| Capt. L. G. Fisher-Rowe | No. 4 Company. |
| 2nd Lieut. R. H. P. J. Stourton | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. W. H. Lovell | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. L. de J. Harvard | Sapping Platoon. |
The rest of the officers, as well as the Sergeant-Major, Senior Drill-Sergeant, and Company Sergeant-Majors, remained behind with the Transport.
Sept. 10-11.
At 3.30 A.M. on the 10th the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards reported that it had completed the relief of the 48th Brigade, and was digging in on a line 200 yards east of the south-east corner of Delville Wood to 100 yards north of Ginchy on the Flers road, and 250 yards east of the Lesbœufs road. Its left was in touch with the 164th Brigade, but its right was in the air. Meanwhile the 4th Battalion Grenadiers was relieving the 47th Brigade between Guillemont and Leuze Wood. But although both these battalions were carrying out their orders correctly, there was a gap of at least 600 yards between them, owing doubtless to the fact that the troops they had to relieve were not quite in the positions they had been reported as occupying. The 47th Brigade had been held up by the Quadrilateral, while the 48th Brigade on its left had advanced some distance.
On learning this, Brigadier-General Corkran decided to employ some companies from the battalions in reserve to fill up the gap, and accordingly instructed Lieut.-Colonel Maitland to send one company to support the 4th Battalion Grenadiers and another company to the Welsh Guards. No. 2 Company, under Captain Graham, was despatched to Arrow Head Copse in support of the 4th Battalion Grenadiers on the right of the Brigade, and while going on ahead to find Lieut.-Colonel Lord Henry Seymour, Lieutenant E. King was hit by a rifle bullet in the leg, and Lieutenant E. B. Shelley and Lieutenant Llewellyn were wounded shortly afterwards. Captain Vaughan, with No. 3 Company, was instructed to place himself under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel W. Murray-Threipland, while the rest of the Battalion remained a little distance behind in case of emergency.
Hardly had the Welsh Guards finished their relief, when they were attacked, and had to fight hard to maintain their position. Coming on in great force as early as 3 A.M., the Germans began to press back the right of their line from the sunken road. Every available man had been hurried to the front line, where the casualties were thinning out the ranks to an alarming extent, and even the 100 Grenadiers who had been sent up as ammunition carriers had to be put in as supports. The Welsh Guards had lost a good many officers and N.C.O.’s, and matters were beginning to look serious when Captain Vaughan arrived with No. 3 Company of the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, having passed through a barrage of 5·9 shells near Trônes Wood in artillery formation. He was at once sent off by Lieut.-Colonel Murray-Threipland to take over the line on the right of the Welsh Guards and relieve the Munster Fusiliers, who had had some very heavy fighting and were much shaken. Second Lieutenant Stein went on with the leading platoon, and the relief was carried out by sections and completed by noon.
It was anything but a pleasant position, as both flanks were in the air, and the Company was occupying an extended front at right angles to the trench occupied by the Welsh Guards. Captain Vaughan was told that the attack would probably come from the left, and made his dispositions accordingly. He placed two sections in shell-holes in échelon on the left, and established a double block at that end of the trench with a strong bombing section, supported by a Lewis gun; the other Lewis gun he stationed on the right flank. Second Lieutenant Sharp was in charge of the left of the Company and Second Lieutenant Stein of the right.
The day proved quiet and uneventful, the enemy showing no inclination to advance, but at 10 P.M. their attack began. Coming on in four waves, they not only succeeded in getting between No. 3 Company and the Welsh Guards, but even gained a footing in the front trench. The Lewis gun on the left did excellent work, but the men in the bombing post were all knocked out. At the same time the Welsh Guards were heavily attacked all down their line, and Lieut.-Colonel Murray-Threipland sent a message to Captain Vaughan to say that his front line was falling back somewhere to the centre of Ginchy, and asking him to fill up the gap between them until reinforcements could be brought up. Captain Vaughan replied that his left flank was in contact with the enemy, and he could not, therefore, throw back that flank, but that he had double-locked the trench on that side; if reinforcements did not reach him soon, he would endeavour to protect his flanks as best he could.
This Company’s situation was now becoming precarious. It had the enemy at each end of a very long trench; enemy in front of it and enemy behind it. It was short of bombs and practically out of ammunition. At one time it had some of the enemy actually in the trench, but fortunately their bayonets were still left to them, and not a German survived to dispute possession with them. Apparently the enemy did not know that this was an advanced trench, thinly held; probably he thought it was his old line 100 yards farther back. In any case he found it a hard nut to crack, in spite of his superior numbers and obvious advantages. The men of No. 3 understood that if they gave way it would go hard with the Welsh Guards, and refused to yield an inch. Sergeant Whittaker showed great courage and skill with the bombing party, and was responsible for killing a large number of Germans, as well as holding up the enemy’s attack on the left.
Both Second Lieutenant Sharp and Second Lieutenant Stein were wounded, in addition to many N.C.O.’s, and 56 men in all were killed, but the rest fought on and made it plain to the enemy that they had no intention of retiring. When the ground was afterwards cleared, over 100 Germans were found dead in front of the trench, amongst them being a captain named von Hahen and two other officers. Throughout this difficult operation Captain Vaughan directed the proceedings with great coolness, and his messages were clear, precise, and cheerful. His stubborn defence of his trench undoubtedly saved the Welsh Guards from being surrounded.