1. The Battalion will be relieved to-night by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream Guards and part of the 41st Brigade on the left, and will form up on the assembly area S.W. of Ginchy.
2. Companies will detail guides as follows to be at H.Q. at 7.30 P.M.:
No. 1 Company, 4 guides.
No. 2 Company, 4 guides.
No. 4 Company, 8 guides.
No. 3 Company will not wait to be relieved, but will move off to place of assembly east of the Waterlot—Guillemont road. On relief, Nos. 1, 2, and 4 Companies will march to H.Q. of No. 3 Company, where they will draw rations and water. They will then move on to their positions in assembly area, where fresh meat, sandwiches, and rum will be issued.
3. The assembly march will be carried out in absolute silence, and there must be no smoking, and no lights shown. Between dawn and zero (about 6 A.M.) there will be no movement.
4. Companies will each detail one N.C.O. to report at H.Q. of No. 3 Company at 6 P.M. to get rations ready for issue, also one officer to be at H.Q. No. 3 Company at 4 P.M. to be shown forming-up positions. Companies are responsible for reconnoitring the route to H.Q. No. 3 from their present positions.
5. Dress.—All men will carry two bandoliers S.A.A. and two Mills bombs. This must be made up before leaving the trenches. Every third man will carry a shovel, every fourth man a pick. Two days’ rations will be carried.
6. Forming-up.—Companies will form up as under on the assembly:
| 350 Yards Frontage | ||
| No. 1 Coy. | No. 2 Coy. | A. |
| 100 yards. | ||
| No. 3 Coy. | No. 4 Coy. | B. |
Line of platoons at forty yards’ intervals. 3/G.G. lines are A and B. Lateral pegs on the company frontage at ten yards apart. Forward direction time boards are five yards apart, one central line and two on tanks.
7. The Brigade will attack at zero on the morning of 15th on the left of the Division. Six tanks will co-operate on this Divisional front.
First objective T.8.a.2.5—T.8.d.3.7.
Second objective T.2.a.9.4—T.8.b.2.3.
Third objective T.3.a.5.9—T.3.L.2.6.
Fourth objective N.3.a.0.9—N.34.C.9.0.
8. Infantry will advance to the attack of—
The first objective at zero.
The second objective at zero + 1 hour.
The third objective at zero + 2 hours.
The fourth objective at zero + 4 hours 30 minutes.
9. The attack will be carried out as follows:
The 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream will attack and capture the first, second, and third objectives. The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards will move in rear of the two Coldstream battalions. When the latter advance to the assault of the second objective this battalion will occupy the first objective until the 1st Battalion Irish Guards has passed through them. They will then follow and support the Irish Guards in their attack on the fourth objective. The rôle of this Battalion is to form a defensive flank, if necessary, and to support the attack of the Irish Guards. The Irish Guards will attack the fourth objective.
10. The Battalion will advance in the same formation as it forms up (two lines at 100 yards’ distance of two companies each in lines of platoons at 40 yards’ interval). If it comes under rifle or machine-gun fire it will deploy into extended order.
11. When the Coldstream have captured the first objective the Battalion will halt until zero + 1 hour, probably in the old British front line.
12. Battalion Headquarters will move about the centre of the two rear companies. A dressing-station will probably be established in the old British front line.
13. As soon as the final objectives have been captured by the infantry, the cavalry will advance and seize the high ground ahead.
14. The first line transport will be packed up and ready to move forward at one hour’s notice after zero + 4 hours.
W. R. Bailey, Capt. Adjt.,
2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards.
September 14, 1916.
The officers of the 2nd Battalion who took part in the operations from September 15 to 17 were:
Sept. 15.
At 5 A.M. on the 15th the tanks were seen moving slowly forward on the left flank of the Brigade, but they apparently aroused no suspicion, and did not attract any fire. Punctually at 6.20, the zero hour, the two Coldstream battalions started off, and immediately came under a terrific fire from the enemy’s machine-guns. The unevenness of the “jumping-off line,” and the total absence of any recognisable landmarks in that desert of shell-holes, made a certain loss of direction inevitable. The leaders of the assault were mown down, but the remainder, undeterred by losses, pushed on until they were within twenty yards of the sunken road. It was a red-letter day in the history of the Coldstream, for with the 1st Battalion Coldstream from the 2nd Brigade there were three battalions of Coldstream all in line.
When they reached the sunken road there was a momentary check, as the leading companies had lost a large number of officers or non-commissioned officers. Lieut.-Colonel J. Campbell saw that to pause for a moment in the attack would mean failure, and dashed forward. Knowing that in the infernal roar of rifle and machine-gun fire no commands could possibly be heard, he had provided himself with a hunting-horn, which he now blew. The familiar sound, piercing the din, instantly arrested the attention of the men, and they at once followed their Colonel. Straight into the midst of the enemy they went with an irresistible rush, and got to work with the bayonet.
Large numbers of Germans were killed or taken prisoner, and four machine-guns were captured, in addition to a number of trench mortars. The casualties in the 2nd Battalion were considerably increased by the fact that the tank, which should have passed over the place where the machine-guns were posted, never reached its objective, and consequently a gap of 100 yards was left where it should have gone.
On reaching the road the Coldstream battalions did not halt, but swept on down the valley, where they found another entirely unexpected German line. Their losses had been very heavy, especially among the officers; in the 2nd Battalion Coldstream there were only two officers left besides the Commanding Officer. Yet so splendid were the rank and file that they “carried on” as if they still had officers at their head. The fact that the whole Coldstream Regiment was in line leading the Guards Division undoubtedly lent an additional impetus to the whole attack. When they reached what they thought the third objective, Lieut.-Colonel Campbell reported their position to General Feilding, but Lord Cavan, who had received reports from aeroplanes, discovered that it was not the third but the first objective that the Coldstream were occupying, and sent back at once to say so.
Again the three Coldstream battalions had to go forward in the face of a withering fire, and were joined soon after they started by No. 2 Company 2nd Battalion Grenadiers under Captain Cunninghame and parties from the Irish Guards. But with a heavy barrage from the enemy’s artillery, in addition to the machine-gun and rifle fire, an advance was no easy matter. It was asking a great deal even of a regiment like the Coldstream to face such a terrible ordeal a second time, but when they were clear of the German barrage the note of the hunting-horn once more rang out and warned them that Lieut.-Colonel Campbell was in front, calling upon them to follow. Without hesitation the line again swept forward, and the second objective was reached.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers started off, moving forward by platoons in artillery formation some 350 yards in rear of the Coldstream. With it came Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny, who was easily distinguished as he marched along, for he wore a forage cap in place of a helmet. When the Battalion reached Ginchy a heavy German barrage came down on the men, who were almost blinded by the shells. Fortunately, the bulk of the barrage was chiefly on the south side of the village, but huge shells, bursting at the appalling rate of one a second, were shooting up showers of mud in every direction, and the noise was deafening. All this in addition to a fierce rifle fire, which came from the right rear. Though the softness of the ground prevented many shells from exploding, there were naturally a considerable number of casualties. Captain M. K. A. Lloyd was killed as he came along with his half company through the barrage, and Lieutenant Macmillan was slightly wounded in the knee, but was able to go on. Lieutenant Hasler, who was severely wounded in the stomach, never recovered from his wound, and about the same time Second Lieutenant J. Arbuthnott was also fatally wounded.
Twenty minutes later Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny decided to push on, and the Battalion emerged from the barrage with its right on the Ginchy—Lesbœufs road, but nothing could be seen of the two Coldstream battalions. It turned out afterwards that the leading battalions of the 2nd Guards Brigade, which were on the right, had started off in the wrong direction, and had consequently pushed the Coldstream battalions in the 1st Guards Brigade too far to the left, so that they were no longer in front of their support. The orders given to the Grenadiers were to keep their right on the Ginchy—Lesbœufs road, and this they had managed to do in spite of the barrage. Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny knew he was in his right place, but was totally unable to understand what had happened to the Coldstream battalions.
He sent a message to General Pereira and received the following reply:
Your pigeon message timed 7.45 A.M. not quite clear. Irish Guards reported their Headquarters in Green line (first objective) and in touch with 41st Brigade on left at 8.45 A.M. You state no signs of Coldstream. Presume they are pushing on to next objective. Am sending bombs up.
Throughout the day it appears to have been assumed that the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was in touch with the two Coldstream battalions, but although the Coldstream were fully aware of the position of the Grenadiers, the Grenadiers had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the Coldstream.
Almost immediately after the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers cleared the barrage it came under machine-gun fire from the left front and rifle fire from the right rear. Instead of finding itself, as it expected, in rear of the Coldstream, it was suddenly confronted by a trench full of the enemy. This was the first objective, which the men naturally imagined had been taken by the Coldstream. Here they were in artillery formation instead of in line, marching forward under the impression that the two battalions of Coldstream were in front of them. To approach the trench with any prospect of success it was necessary to deploy into line, and in doing this they lost very heavily. Our creeping barrage had, so to speak, run away, and there was now no artillery support of any kind.
The companies on the right pushed on into the Green line, the first objective, and there gained touch with the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers in Ponsonby’s Brigade, which was attempting to stop the Germans turning its right flank. Here Lieutenant Jesper was wounded, and Lieutenant Macmillan, who had gone on in spite of the wound in his knee, was struck a second time in the left thigh. The attack of the Division on the right had failed, with the result that the right flank of the Guards Division was dangerously in the air. On the left there was a considerable gap, which caused great trouble, as it happened to be opposite one of the enemy’s strong points. Lieutenant A. T. A. Ritchie was wounded as he was trying to deal with this difficult situation, and Sergeant Lyon, who took charge of his platoon, was soon afterwards shot through the head.
One platoon of No. 1 Company with a machine-gun went out and succeeded in forming a defensive flank, thus preventing the Germans, who were in considerable strength, from working behind us. The greater part of the casualties in the 2nd Battalion occurred about this time. Although three of our machine-guns reached the first objective, two were instantly required on the right flank, as the Sixth Division had failed to take the Quadrilateral; this left only one to deal with the Germans on the left. The centre of the Battalion then rushed a part of the Green line and bayoneted all the Germans who did not surrender, making prisoners of the rest. One German soldier who was taken in this way thought it too dangerous to wait for an escort and ran off towards our supports, holding up his hands as he went.
Meanwhile the left of the Battalion was still held up outside the wire of the first objective, as the two Coldstream battalions had apparently passed still farther to the left. As soon as the companies in the centre entered the trench which was the first objective, the enemy started bombing down it from the left. The Grenadier bombers ran short of bombs and were powerless to stop the rush. The situation looked ugly, when Company Sergeant-Major J. Norton, who was lying outside the wire, gathered some men together and led a bayonet attack against the German bombers. This momentarily relieved the situation.
All available bombs were then collected, and a party began to work up the trench, but on reaching the enemy they were driven back with great loss. The situation again became critical, as the Germans were slowly driving our men back. Captain Harcourt-Vernon, finding that the supply of bombs had given out, determined not to waste any more men’s lives in what must necessarily be a one-sided contest, and organised a bayonet charge over the top.
Calling on the Adjutant, Captain Bailey, to come with him, he led the charge and took the German bombers completely by surprise. Many of them were killed before they realised what had happened, and forty to fifty more in rear all surrendered. Captain Harcourt-Vernon himself, on arrival at the enemy’s trench, was confronted by a stalwart German who immediately held up both hands and was made a prisoner, but Captain Bailey’s man proved a fighter although, happily, a bad shot. Captain Bailey missed him with the first three shots of his automatic pistol, but despatched him with the fourth.
The Grenadier bombers, having managed to find some more bombs, now worked along the trench to the left, and the Germans who had escaped from Captain Harcourt-Vernon’s bayonet attack broke and ran across the open to their support trench. Having cleared the line for some distance, the Grenadiers began to consolidate. Two small parties of the enemy tried to return but were dealt with by Lewis guns. Lieutenant Crookshank, who was in charge of these guns, was wounded by a H.E. shell which exploded a few yards in front of him, and Captain Lord Lascelles, who was explaining to Captain Beaumont-Nesbitt what he wanted him to do, and had just sent for a runner, was hit by a bullet and had his arm broken.
Meanwhile No. 2 Company under Captain Cunninghame had pushed forward, and got into line with the 3rd Coldstream, some 500 yards to the left front of the remainder of the Grenadiers, who were in the first objective, with the 3rd Grenadiers on their right and a mixture of men from the Guards Division on their left. The Irish Guards had followed the Coldstream, and had been able to send up some platoons to support them.
When the aeroplanes reported that the two Coldstream battalions were not at the third but between the first and second objectives, General Feilding despatched the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards from the 3rd Brigade, which was in reserve, to support them. But their position was not accurately known, and only one company with two Lewis guns reached them.
During the afternoon Lord Cavan had issued orders for the third objective to be bombarded by heavy artillery. On hearing this, General Pereira strongly protested, as he believed that two of his battalions were already occupying that position. But Lord Cavan was so well satisfied that the aeroplane reports were correct that he overruled the protests, and the bombardment took place.
Further and costly attempts to retake the lost ground were made by the enemy during the evening, but all their counter-attacks were easily repulsed. The position in the evening was this: the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream and the Irish Guards, with one company of the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and one company of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, were holding the second objective. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was holding the first objective to the right, with its right flank on the Ginchy—Lesbœufs road and in touch with the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers.
Sept. 16.
Nothing of importance happened during the night of the 15th, and the 1st Guards Brigade remained in the same position throughout the 16th, when it was subjected to a terrific shelling. That evening the troops in the first objective were relieved by the 59th Brigade, and those in the second objective by the 62nd Brigade. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was relieved by the 15th King’s Royal Rifles and retired about five miles to bivouacs, where it arrived dead-beat, having had practically no sleep for five days. It slept through the whole day on the 17th.
The casualties throughout the 13th, 14th, and 15th were: killed and died of wounds 108, 235 wounded, and 12 missing—total 365, excluding officers. Amongst the officers, Captain M. K. A. Lloyd was killed, and Lieutenant H. Hasler and Second Lieutenant J. Arbuthnott were seriously wounded and died a few days later, while the following were wounded: Captain Lord Lascelles, Lieutenant T. Parker Jervis, Lieutenant M. H. Macmillan, Lieutenant A. T. A. Ritchie, Lieutenant H. F. C. Crookshank, Second Lieutenant T. W. Minchin, Second Lieutenant N. McK. Jesper, Second Lieutenant D. Harvey, and Second Lieutenant C. C. Cubitt.
Captain J. Andrews, R.A.M.C., was also wounded, but insisted on remaining at duty. His gallant conduct throughout these three days elicited much praise from the Commanding Officer.
General Pereira addressed the following message to the 2nd Battalion:
2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards.
As your Brigadier I wish to say in a few words how deeply I appreciate the gallant work done by you in the recent operations at Ginchy.
On the 12th September you took over Ginchy trenches, and the following night you drove the German out of Ginchy Orchard; this work caused you one hundred casualties, but by your fine work you cleared the ground for the advance on September 15, and ensured that it would not be held up at the very beginning.
On September 15 your first advance was through a heavy artillery barrage, but owing to the splendid discipline of your Regiment, you went through it as if on parade.
Your opportunity came later on when you cleared trenches at the point of the bayonet, having run out of bombs, and when you charged a trench strongly held and in the face of machine-gun fire.
You have shown the Germans what they have to expect when they meet the pick of the British Army.
In the near future you may be called upon to do as much again, and I know that you will not fail.
C. E. Pereira, Brigadier-General,
Commanding 1st Guards Brigade.
In the Field,
September 18, 1916.
Sept. 17-20.
The 2nd Battalion remained at the Citadel from September 17 to 20 with the rest of Pereira’s Brigade. The weather was wet and cold, and the Brigade was busily employed in absorbing drafts. On the 19th a conference of Commanding Officers was held at Brigade Headquarters, when the frontage and objectives for the attack which was to take place on the 25th were outlined. As the front allotted to the Brigade was 700 yards, it was decided to attack with three battalions in front and one in support; but when this scheme was subsequently changed, and the frontage decreased to 500 yards, it was proposed to entrust the next attack to the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Irish Guards, with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Coldstream in support.
On the 20th the Brigade began moving in companies from the Citadel to relieve the 61st Brigade. It was still very wet, and the roads were blocked by transport in a sea of mud. The weather had now broken, and owing to the cold nights the men took their greatcoats with them, though the rest of their spare equipment was stored as before.
Sept. 20-24.
The two Coldstream battalions remained in the front line from the 20th to the 24th, while the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Irish Guards, who were to undertake the attack, were bivouacked in Bernafay and Trônes Woods. The 3rd Guards Brigade was employed in digging an assembly trench about 150 yards in rear of our front line. The fact that the trench was completed only the night before the attack accounted for the Germans being, apparently, ignorant of its exact situation, for although they shelled all the other trenches this one escaped their notice. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was put on to salvage work and carrying during the days that preceded the attack.
On the 21st the following orders were issued by Brigadier-General Pereira:
SECRET.
1st Guards Brigade Order, No. 77
21st September 1916.
1. The Fourth Army will renew the attack on Z day, in combination with the attacks by the French to the south and Reserve Army to the north.
2. (a) The Guards Division will form part of the attack of the Fourteenth Corps.
(b) 1st Guards Brigade will attack on the right and 3rd Guards Brigade on left of Guards Division.
(c) 18th Infantry Brigade of Sixth Division will be attacking on the right of 1st Guards Brigade.
Attacking Troops—
3. The attack of 1st Guards Brigade will be carried out by 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards on the right and 1st Bn. Irish Guards on the left.
The 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards will be in support on the right and 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards in support on the left.
Preliminary Bombardment—
4. A steady bombardment of hostile positions will begin at 7 A.M. on Y day and will be continued to 6.30 P.M. It will begin again at 6.30 A.M. on Z day.
Night firing will be carried out nightly from 6.30 P.M. to 6.30 A.M.
There will be no intensive fire previous to zero hour.
Forming-up Areas—
5. Forming-up areas, boundaries, and objectives are shown on the attached map.
The first objective is marked Green.
The second objective is marked Brown.
The third objective is marked Blue.
Formation for Attack—
6. The 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards will form up in two lines—one in the firing line and one in the support line.
The 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards will form up in the communication trench from T.8.a.9.4 to T.3.c.3.8.
The 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards will form up in the trench from T.8.a.9.4 to T.8.d.5.5.
The 1st Guards Brigade Machine-gun Coy. will assemble with one section at the head of 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards—one section in rear of 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards and one section on right of 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards.
The 1st Guards Brigade Trench Mortar Battery will form up with two guns on right of front line and two guns on right of support line.
The 75th Field R.E. and work platoons will form up in trenches T.8.d.
7. The infantry will advance to the attack of the Green line at zero—to the attack of the Brown line at zero + 1 hour. To the attack of the Blue line at zero + 2 hours.
Barrages—
8. (a) 50 per cent of Field Artillery barrage will be used for creeping barrage, and 50 per cent for stationary barrage.
(b) In all cases the stationary barrage will lift back when the creeping barrage meets it.
9. (a) At zero the creeping barrage will start 100 yards in front of our front-line trenches. It will advance at the rate of 50 yards a minute until it is 200 yards beyond the Green line, when it will become stationary.
(b) At zero + 1 hour, the creeping barrage will start 200 yards in front of the Green line, and will advance at the rate of 50 yards a minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond the Brown line, when it will become stationary.
(c) At zero + 2 hours the creeping barrage will start 100 yards in front of the Brown line, and will advance at the rate of 50 yards a minute until it has passed 100 yards beyond the Blue line, when it will become stationary.
(d) Other permanent barrages are being arranged along certain sunken roads.
Tasks—
10. (a) The task of the Division is to press the attack through to the Blue line. A sufficient flow of troops will be maintained from zero onwards to ensure that the Brown line is strong and well supported.
(b) The attack on all objectives will be carried out by 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards on the right and 1st Bn. Irish Guards on the left.
The 2nd and 3rd Bns. Coldstream Guards will be in support under command of Lieut.-Colonel J. V. Campbell, D.S.O.
Method of Assault—
11. The assault will be carried out by leading battalions in two waves of 75 yards’ distance.
Action of Support Battalions—
12. As soon as the front and support lines are vacated by 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards the 2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards and 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards will occupy them.
All movement to these lines by supporting units should be by the communication trench from T.8.a.9.4 to T.8.c.3.8.
Similarly 2nd and 3rd Bns. Coldstream Guards will occupy the Green and Brown lines as soon as they are vacated by 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards.
As soon as the 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards have gained the Brown line, 2nd and 3rd Bns. Coldstream Guards will each send a company as clearing-up parties in Lesbœufs. These two companies must shelter in shell-holes behind the Brown line during the pause on that line. They must on no account be mixed up with 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards and 1st Bn. Irish Guards. They will carry a special supply of P. bombs and Mills grenades for dealing with cellars.
The 2nd and 3rd Bns. Coldstream Guards are responsible for making good each objective as captured, and for guarding either flank if threatened, paying special attention to the right flank.
Lieut.-Colonel J. V. Campbell, D.S.O., commanding supporting battalions, will be prepared to give such additional support as may be required to carry out the attack on the final objective—bearing in mind the necessity for holding positions already captured.
Machine-guns—
13. (a) At the first favourable opportunity after the Green line has been captured, O.C. Machine-gun Coy. will send one section forward to it. In this line and in his subsequent move to the Brown line two guns will always be on the right flank, ready to assist in the formation of a defensive flank.
(b) Similarly, when the Brown and Blue lines have been captured, one section will be sent forward to help in the consolidation of each of these lines.
Thus when the final objective has been captured there should be four guns in the Blue line and eight in reserve in the Brown line.
Stokes T.M. —
14. (a) Previous to the assault two guns will be established on the right of the Brigade area. These two guns will move forward at the first favourable opportunity and establish themselves on the right of the Green line.
(b) Two other guns will be in reserve in the front line, and will only move forward to the Green line if ordered to do so by Lieut.-Colonel J. V. Campbell, D.S.O., or by the Brigadier.
R.E. and Work Platoons—
15. 75th Field Coy. R.E. and Work Platoons will move forward from their assembly area to the trench about T.8.b.3.0, as soon as this trench is clear of 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards. They will be ready to move forward on receipt of orders from Brigade H.Q. and consolidate ground gained. O.C. 75th Field Coy. R.E. will detail one officer and three orderlies in liaison with O.C. supporting battalions.
Patrols—
16. When the Blue line has been gained, patrols will be sent forward, and any ground from which good observation can be gained will be occupied.
Such points will be consolidated and eventually joined up with our line.
Contact Patrol and Flares—
17. One contact aeroplane will be in the air from zero till 6.30 P.M. on Z day. Flares will be lit by leading infantry lines on obtaining each objective and also at 6 P.M. on Z day.
18. Watches will be synchronised at 7 P.M. on Y day and at 9 A.M. on Z day.
First Line Transport—
19. Ammunition portions of first line Transport will be collected on the south-west side of Bernafay Wood to the south of the Guillemont—Montauban Road, and remainder of first line Transport in the neighbourhood of Minden Post by 12 noon on Z day.
Brigade Transport Officer will detail an orderly to be in waiting at Advanced Divisional H.Q. Bernafay Wood, and will himself be at Minden Post from 12 noon on Z day to receive instructions.
Prisoners—
20. Prisoners will be sent back to the Corps Cage at the Craters A.8.a under escort. In future correspondence will not be taken off prisoners except off officers. Officers’ documents will be removed as soon as they are captured and sent to the Corps Cage with their escort.
Dumps—
21. An advanced Brigade Dump of bombs—S.A.A.—Stokes mortar ammunition—R.E. material and rations has been established about T.8.c central.
Equipment—
22. The equipment to be carried by assaulting troops will be the same as that laid down for the attack on September 15.
23. Arrangements have been made for the Brigade on our right to open enfilade machine-gun and trench-mortar fire on the Green line from about T.9.d.3.9 at zero. This fire will be continued until the creeping barrage passes beyond the Green line.
Medical Arrangements—
24. Medical arrangements will be notified later.
Brigade Headquarters—
25. Brigade Headquarters will be at T.19.a.½.3½. An advanced Brigade Report Centre will be established in the communication trench T.8.b—T.3.c on September 22.
Pigeons will be supplied to the battalions on Z day as follows:
3 to 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards.
3 to 1st Bn. Irish Guards.
6 to 3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards.
As soon as all pigeons have been released pigeon men must return at once to Brigade Headquarters.
26. Z day will be September 23. Zero hour will be notified later. It will probably be in the afternoon.
Acknowledge.
M. B. Smith, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 1st Guards Brigade.
A Memorandum from the Brigade-Major on the lie of the land followed.
1st Guards Brigade, No. 262
2nd Batt. Grenadier Guards—
The forthcoming attack differs from the last in that the whole scheme is not such an ambitious one. The distance to the first objective is about 300 yards, to the second objective 800 yards, and to the last objective about 1300 yards. In each case the objective is a clearly defined one, and not merely a line drawn across the map.
Between our present front line and the first objective there is only “No Man’s Land.” During the next two nights this should be actively patrolled to ensure that our attack is not taken by surprise by some unknown trench, and in order that Officers and N.C.O.’s may have a knowledge of the ground.
It would also be of great assistance to the Artillery if reports as to the actual distance to the Green line were sent in.
The ground slopes down to Lesbœufs, beyond which there is a distinct hollow with a plateau the same level as Lesbœufs beyond. On reaching the final objective Officers and N.C.O.’s should understand the necessity for pushing patrols out to command this hollow and give warning or prevent counter-attacks forming up here.
Large-scale maps of Lesbœufs have been sent to all battalions. These should be carefully studied by all Officers and N.C.O.’s, and especially by those of the companies detailed for the cleaning up of Lesbœufs.
All runners and signallers should know the position of the advanced Brigade Report Centre, and that the best means of approach to it will probably be down the communication trench T.3.c and T.8.b.
Finally, it cannot be too much impressed on assaulting troops the necessity for clinging to our own barrage. It will be an attack in which this should be comparatively easy and on which the success of the whole operation may depend.
M. B. Smith, Captain,
Brigade-Major, 1st Guards Brigade.
September 22, 1916.
The Operation Order by Lieut.-Colonel de Crespigny, Commanding 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, was as follows:
22/9/16.
Map Ref. 57.c.S.W.
1. Intention.—The Fourth Army will renew the attack on Z day in combination with the attacks by the French to the south and Reserve Army to the north.
1st Guards Brigade will attack on the right of the Division.
3rd Guards Brigade will attack on our left.
18th Infantry Brigade will attack on our right.
2. This Battalion will be on the right of the 1st Guards Brigade.
1st Bn. Irish Guards will be on the left.
2nd Bn. Coldstream Guards will be in support on the right.
3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards will be in support on the left.
3. Formation of Attack.—The Battalion will form up in two lines, one in the firing line and one in the support line, care being taken that bayonets do not show on the top of the trenches before zero.
Front Line.—No. 1 Coy. on left, No. 2 Coy. on the right.
Support Line.—No. 3 Coy. on left, No. 4 Coy. on the right.
Forming-up areas, boundaries, and objective as shown on map at Headquarters, to be copied in.
4. First objective is marked Green. Second objective Brown. Third objective Blue.
5. Task.—To press the attack through to the Blue line, a sufficient flow of troops being maintained to ensure that the Brown line is strong and well supported.
6. (a) At zero the creeping barrage will start 100 yards in front of our front-line trenches. It will advance at the rate of 50 yards a minute until it is 200 yards beyond the Green line, when it will become stationary.
At zero Nos. 1 and 2 Coys. will advance to the attack of the Green line, followed at 75 yards’ distance by Nos. 3 and 4 Coys., who will not stop at our old front line but will push on into the Green line. On reaching the Green line companies will at once reorganise.
(b) At zero + 1 hour the creeping barrage will start 200 yards in front of the Green line, and will advance at the rate of 50 yards a minute until it is 200 yards beyond the Brown line, when it will become stationary. At zero + 1 hour Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. will advance to the attack of the Brown line, followed by Nos. 1 and 2 Coys. at 75 yards’ interval.
(c) At zero + 2 hours the creeping barrage will start 100 yards in front of the Brown line and will advance at the rate of 50 yards a minute until it has passed 100 yards beyond the Blue line.
At zero + 2 hours Nos. 1 and 2 Coys. will attack the Blue line, followed by Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. at 75 yards’ distance. The Battalion will consolidate on the Blue line and hold it at all costs.
(d) Other permanent barrages are being arranged along certain sunken roads.
When the Blue line has been gained, patrols will be pushed forward at once to seize and hold any point from which good observation can be obtained.
7. Lewis Guns.—Each company will have one Lewis gun: the remainder (four) under Lieut. Knatchbull-Hugessen will move up with the second wave and be prepared to act against hostile machine-guns in the village or forward objectives or against counter-attacks. They will also be ready to form a defensive flank to the right or left.
8. Mopping Up.—The dug-outs in the first and second objectives will be promptly dealt with by Nos. 3 and 4 Coys. As soon as the Battalion has gained the Brown line, the 2nd and 3rd Batts. Coldstream will occupy the Green line, and will each send clearing parties of 1 Coy. to clear the village of Lesbœufs.
9. Dress and Equipment.—Greatcoats will not be carried, and arrangements will be made for them to be collected before moving up.
Following will be carried: Per man—three sand-bags, two bandoliers, two Mills bombs, one day’s rations, one iron ration. A large percentage of each company will carry slung shovels. Flares will be carried by every officer and platoon sergeant, and the remainder of the flares and rockets will be distributed among the companies. V.P. lights should be distributed among companies, men carrying one or two in their pockets.
Water-bottles must be filled before starting, and men must be very sparing in their drinking.
10. All S.A.A. and bombs to be taken off casualties, whenever possible, and dumped in the nearest objective.
11. One contact aeroplane will be in the air from zero till 6.30 P.M. on Z day. Flares will be lit by leading troops on obtaining each objective, and also at 6 P.M. on Z day.
12. Communication.—A party of signallers will accompany the second wave and lay a telephone line from the jumping-off place to the Green line, afterwards extending it to Brown and Blue lines.
Battalion Headquarters will not move from the jumping-off place until the Green line has been captured.
13. Watches will be synchronised at 7 P.M. on Y day and at 9 A.M. on Z day.
14. Prisoners.—If prisoners are taken they must be sent out of the way, to prevent blockage in the trenches.
The Corps Cage is at the Crater A.8.a.
In future correspondence will not be taken off prisoners except off officers. Officers’ documents will be removed as soon as they are captured, and sent to the Corps Cage with their escort.
15. Dumps.—An advanced Brigade Dump is at T.8.c central.
16. The Brigade on our right will open enfilade machine-gun and mortar fire on the Green line from about T.9.d.3.9 at zero, and continue until the creeping barrage has passed Green line.
17. Z day and zero will be notified later, but zero will probably be in the afternoon.
18. Miscellaneous.—(a) Assaulting troops should keep as close behind our creeping barrage as possible.
(b) There will be no intense artillery fire before zero.
(c) All troops should watch for any messages which aeroplanes may drop.
W. R. Bailey, Capt. and Adjt.,
2nd Batt. Grenadier Guards.
Sept. 25.
The following officers of the 2nd Battalion took part in the attack on the 25th:
| Lieut.-Colonel C. R. C. de Crespigny, D.S.O. | Commanding Officer. |
| Capt. the Hon. W. R. Bailey | Adjutant. |
| Lieut. M. A. Knatchbull-Hugessen | Lewis Gun Officer. |
| Lieut. A. F. Irvine | No. 1 Company. |
| 2nd Lieut. G. A. Arbuthnot | ” ” |
| Capt. A. K. S. Cunninghame | No. 2 Company. |
| Lieut. H. G. Wiggins | ” ” |
| 2nd Lieut. F. H. G. Layland-Barratt | ” ” |
| Capt. W. H. Beaumont-Nesbitt | No. 3 Company. |
| Lieut. A. McW. Lawson-Johnston | ” ” |
| Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon | No. 4 Company. |
| Lieutenant the Hon. W. A. D. Parnell | ” ” |
| Lieut. R. B. B. Wright | ” ” |
| Capt. J. Andrews, R.A.M.C. | Medical Officer. |
The remainder of the officers remained with the transport.
Late on the night of the 24th the Brigade was informed that zero hour would be 12.35 P.M. the next day. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers moved up that night from Bernafay Wood to relieve the 2nd Battalion Coldstream in the trenches preparatory to the attack, with its right on the Ginchy—Lesbœufs road. On arrival at the assembly trench No. 1 Company was placed on the right and No. 2 on the left, with No. 3 and No. 4 in support. The trenches were so narrow that the men were unable to sit or lie down, and had to remain standing all the next morning, shoulder to shoulder.
Punctually at 12.35 P.M. the attack was launched, and immediately the creeping barrage was put down by our artillery with great accuracy 200 yards in front of the attacking force. The necessity of getting men across No Man’s Land as promptly as possible after zero had been found from experience to be of paramount importance, and the Grenadier and Irish Guards therefore did not hesitate for a moment, but dashed forward in two waves. The enemy must have had some very accurate information about our intentions, for the attackers had hardly left their trench (it was three-quarters of a minute after zero) when they put down a heavy barrage on our front trenches, as well as on the support and communication trenches.
The leading wave of men was able to get close up under our creeping barrage, and the Irish Guards found no difficulty in capturing the first objective at the point of the bayonet. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers would have had an equally simple task but for the fact that the wire in front of them, which was in standing crops and therefore hidden, had been very little damaged by our artillery fire. There seemed no possibility of getting through it, with the Germans so close, and for the moment the whole advance of the Grenadiers was held up.
Captain A. Cunninghame, Second Lieutenant G. A. Arbuthnot, Lieutenant W. Parnell, and Lieutenant Irvine at once ordered their men to lie down, and the four gallantly advancing by themselves proceeded with the utmost coolness to cut gaps in the wire. Their one thought seems to have been that the attack must not be checked on any account, and as the task of cutting the wire meant almost certain death, they never thought of sending on any of their men, but decided to do it themselves. Captain Cunninghame, Second Lieutenant G. Arbuthnot, and Lieutenant Parnell were killed, and Lieutenant Irvine was wounded, but sufficient room was made for the men to go through, and the Grenadiers swept forward into the first objective.
Apparently the line was strongly held by the enemy, and a large number were killed and one man taken prisoner, while three machine-guns fell into our hands. Lieutenant H. Wiggins, who was on the extreme right, was trying to creep down the fire-swept sunken road when he was struck by a fragment of a shell which burst near him. Lieutenant Knatchbull-Hugessen brought up the Lewis guns by the sunken road and did great execution with them. He was still directing the fire of his guns, although wounded and covered with blood, when a shell pitched on the road near him and killed him.