Emery Walker Ltd.
Attack on Gonnelieu & Gauche Wood
December 1st 1917
In the 2nd Battalion the attack was undertaken by No. 1 Company under Lieutenant Cornforth on the right, and No. 3 under Lieutenant Acland on the left, each in two lines of two platoons, followed at a distance of 250 yards by No. 4 under Lieutenant Westmacott, and No. 2 under Lieutenant Browning, in similar formation. Lieut.-Colonel Rasch went on ahead with the Company Commanders to reconnoitre the forming-up ground, whilst the Battalion followed after breakfast, and picked up tools on the way. At 6.30 the artillery support, which was most attenuated, opened and searched the wood and the ravine behind it. No tanks had yet put in an appearance, and, after giving them ten minutes’ grace, the attack was launched without them.
The enemy retaliated with a heavy barrage, most of which fortunately fell behind the advancing troops, but the machine-gun fire made it doubtful whether any one would ever reach the wood. When the attack opened, all four companies advanced at a great pace over the intervening grass land, which rose in a gentle slope up to the wood. It is difficult to understand why, with the machine-guns posted at the edge of the wood, the enemy did not wipe out the whole Battalion. Ignoring all regulations about short rushes, both officers and men went straight for the wood as fast as they could. They instinctively felt that the only chance was to cover the mile of naked slope in the shortest possible time. In all probability the German machine-gunners in the half-light of the morning became flurried, at seeing this formidable attack sweeping over the ground, for, although the fire was very hot, the bullets passed over the men’s heads, and it was not until they had nearly reached the wood that casualties occurred. Here the fringe of German machine-guns, established at the edge of the wood, began to take heavy toll, and then began perhaps the fiercest fighting of all. When the leading companies reached the wood, it became a struggle of man to man. But the Germans soon found that with the bayonet they were no match for the Grenadiers. Back into the wood they were forced, and then-down into a hollow in the centre of it. Their machine-guns were all captured, and, although some fought stubbornly, most of them were driven slowly up the incline on the far side into the corner of the wood. Second Lieutenant Pearson was killed as he went through the wood, and Second Lieutenant Harbord, whilst most gallantly rushing a machine-gun, received wounds from which he died later in the day. Lieutenants Cornforth, Drummond, Dent, Kendal, Acland, and Magnay were all wounded, and the Battalion lost many valuable N.C.O.’s.
This left Lieutenant Browning and Lieutenant Westmacott responsible for the whole Battalion front, and to them the success of the attack was largely due. Between them they reorganised and controlled the whole line, making their dispositions with great skill. On reaching the wood, Lieutenant Westmacott faced part of his company to the right flank, to guard against a counter-attack from the south. Hardly had he done so when about seventy Germans appeared; they were met with steady rifle-fire from the wood, and wavered for a moment, uncertain as to what they should do, but they finally made for the wood. Our fire, however, was too steady for them, and accounted for all but a handful of men, who were taken prisoners. Soon afterwards another party of sixty appeared from the same direction, but they also were met with so well-directed a fire that they were staggered, whereupon the men of No. 4 Company charged them with the bayonet.
Lieutenant Westmacott now decided that he must push his men farther forward on the right flank of the wood, so as to command the valley, which lay between the wood and the village of Villers Guislain. He had just moved forward his company, and prolonged the right with two platoons of No. 2 Company, when some dismounted cavalry, consisting of the 18th Bengal Lancers and a detachment of the 7th Dragoon Guards, appeared from the same direction as the enemy attacks. Their orders had not enabled them to attack simultaneously with the 2nd Battalion, and it was in all probability this delayed advance that precipitated the two unfruitful attempts of the enemy to gain the wood. Their arrival was of the greatest value, and at Lieutenant Westmacott’s suggestion they proceeded to reinforce the other companies, which were meanwhile fighting their way through the wood. Several tanks had by now put in an appearance, although the majority had been knocked out before they reached the wood, by a most accurate shell-fire directed by a low-flying aeroplane. The lack of any particular trench for the surviving tanks to attack made their fire ineffectual, and their presence seemed to attract the shells of all the German batteries in the neighbourhood, causing many casualties in the Battalion.
Lieutenant Layland-Barratt, who had been assisting Lieutenant Browning to reorganise the companies in the wood, was wounded by a splinter of a shell, and had to retire to a dressing-station. This left only Lieutenant Browning in the wood, and Lieutenant Westmacott and Lieutenant Loftus outside.
Lieut.-Colonel Rasch went up to the line, and organised a readjustment of the companies. Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Corbyn, commanding the 18th Bengal Lancers, was asked to withdraw his men to the centre of the wood so as to form a reserve, and dig a support line on some commanding ground in the wood. The dash and fighting spirit of all ranks of this regiment, and the help and experience which Colonel Corbyn gave at that critical moment, made the greatest impression on the Battalion, and enabled the Grenadiers to realise how great a loss his regiment suffered, when he was killed by a shell later in the afternoon.
In a letter describing this attack an officer of the 18th Bengal Lancers wrote:
We then occupied the captured trench sandwiched in between the Grenadiers and Coldstream.… I have now seen His Majesty’s Guards in action and fought alongside of them, and I take off my hat to them. They can die like gentlemen, without a groan. Four of our men were carrying a Guardsman who appeared to be suffering considerably. I asked him who he was, and he instinctively straightened himself as best he could and said, “A Grenadier,” his tone implying how proud he was to be one, and, what I also thought, “how magnificent they were.”
The comradeship between the two regiments was later marked by the presentation of a Grenadier Bugle, with an inscription, which the Battalion gave to the 18th Bengal Lancers. Subsequently the Lancers presented the 2nd Battalion with a silver statuette of a mounted Bengal Lancer, on the plinth of which was the following inscription: “To Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O., and Officers of the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, as a memento of Gauche Wood.”
On the return of Lieut.-Colonel Rasch, Captain Harcourt-Vernon went up to the line, taking with him some ammunition and also a company of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream, under Captain H. Brierley, M.C., which had been sent to prolong the right flank, still dangerously in the air. In the afternoon a party of Strathcona’s Horse began an attack, and made very little headway. Half a squadron came into the wood, but was withdrawn later to link up the right of the Brigade line with the remainder of Strathcona’s Horse.
Shelling continued almost without cessation during the rest of the day, but no further enemy action developed, and about 10 P.M., in heavy rain, the Battalion began to be relieved by the Deccan and Poona Horse and one company of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, under Captain Ridley, and marched back to bivouacs in Gouzeaucourt Wood. There it remained until December 5, when the Guards Division was relieved, and retired out of the area of operations. The casualties in the Battalion were 153 killed, wounded, and missing; among the twelve Company Officers who went into action, one was killed, one died of wounds, and seven were wounded. The percentage of N.C.O.’s killed was also very high, including many first-rate sergeants. Three field-guns and twelve machine-guns, in addition to many prisoners, were captured in this attack. The Battalion proceeded by train to Beaumetz, and went into billets at Berneville, where it remained until, the end of the month.
The following officers joined during December: Second Lieutenant F. J. Langley, Lieutenant G. B. Wilson, Second Lieutenant R. T. Sharpe, Second Lieutenant C. C. T. Giles, and Second Lieutenant S. C. K. George.
The 3rd Battalion
3rd Batt.
During the last ten days of October and the first week of November, the 3rd Battalion was in good billets at Moule. During that time, Lieutenant G. W. Godman, Second Lieutenant G. H. R. Hoare, and Second Lieutenant E. C. Long arrived. On the 21st the Battalion was inspected by the Duke of Connaught, and lined both sides of the Calais—St. Omer road. On the 25th the whole Guards Division was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig.
Nov. 10.
On November 10 the march south began, and the 3rd Battalion proceeded to Enquingatte. On the following days it marched through Heuchin, Hernicourt, Houvin, Bailleulval, Courcelles-le-Comte, Beulencourt, and Le Bacquiere to Ribecourt, which it reached after a fortnight’s hard marching. There the men had twenty-four hours’ rest, during which they managed to collect a considerable amount of salvage, and on Nov. 26. the 26th they quietly took over the line, round the south-east edge of Bourlon Wood, opposite the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, from the 3rd Battalion Coldstream. That evening Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade received orders to attack a front, extending from the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame to a point about 1000 yards east of the centre of Bourlon village—that is to say, a front of about 3500 yards. The intention to attack Fontaine was only decided upon at the last moment after much discussion, and even General Sergison-Brooke himself knew nothing of it till the afternoon of the 26th. The orders reached the 3rd Battalion only as it was on its way up to relieve the 3rd Battalion Coldstream.
Attack on Fontaine
The first objective, which was to be the main line of resistance, ran through the road junction at the east end of Fontaine to the northern edge of Bourlon Wood. The second objective was the station and the eastern outskirts of Fontaine, which was to become the outpost line. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers was to be on the right, the 1st Battalion Coldstream in the centre, and the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards on the left. The first objective of the 3rd Battalion was half-way through the village, including the church on the right, after which it was to push its outposts on to the road leading from Fontaine to La Folie Wood.
As soon as Colonel Thorne received his orders, he rode off, and collected the Company Commanders, as the Battalion was moving through Flesquières. Detailed orders were dictated, and the maps were carefully marked. Two hours later the Company Commanders overtook their companies, and the relief began. No. 1 and No. 3 Companies, under Lieutenant Bowes-Lyon and Second Lieutenant G. Hoare, were to form the first line, with No. 2 and No. 4, under Captain Beaumont-Nesbitt and Captain Hughes, in support.
The following officers took part in the attack:
The night was bitterly cold, with snow and sleet soon after midnight. At 5.30 A.M. Colonel Thorne, accompanied by the Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Carstairs, went round the line and found all the companies ready for the attack, which started at 6.20, after a very short and light artillery preparation. It was practically dark, and as the sleet had turned to a steady drizzle of rain it was difficult to see more than a few yards ahead. The tanks were late, but it was decided not to wait for them, and the signal to advance was given. Directly the 3rd Battalion left its trenches, it was met by a heavy machine-gun fire from a small house 200 yards to its right front, as well as from the line of trenches, just east and south of Fontaine, and began to suffer casualties. On reaching the German line, the wire was found to be uncut, and this, combined with the absence of the tanks, nearly ruined the success of the whole movement.
In spite of these difficulties, however, Nos. 1 and 3 Companies got through the wire, and captured the trench, but their losses were very heavy. It was asking a good deal of a battalion to advance against a number of machine-guns, with strands of uncut wire intervening, and it was truly a marvellous performance to take the enemy’s trench under such conditions. Actually Lieutenant Bowes-Lyon with No. 1 Company managed not only to penetrate the wire, but to seize the machine-guns in the small house.
Second Lieutenant G. Hoare, who was on the left with No. 3 Company, was wounded in the face by a bullet, as he arrived at the enemy’s wire, and Second Lieutenant A. C. Knollys took over command. This company was more fortunate than the others, for after it had penetrated the enemy’s wire and was entering Fontaine, the tanks came up, and enabled it to secure the first objective without much trouble or many casualties. The difficulty was the mass of isolated houses, which were admirably suited for defence, and which provided good cover for the enemy’s machine-guns. The first house on the north side of the road held up the advance, until Second Lieutenant Carrington with some of No. 4 Company came up in support of No. 3, and seized the house, together with all its occupants. On the south side of the road the enfilade machine-gun fire was terrific, and before the men could reach the shelter of any house, Captain Beaumont-Nesbitt was killed. The two companies in support now came up, and the Battalion continued from this moment to fight practically as two half-battalions. No. 1 and No. 2 Companies suffered most, and all the officers and most of the N.C.O.’s were killed or wounded. In the village it became a difficult matter to distinguish between the houses held by the enemy and those occupied by our men, and thus several parties were cut off.
After some very fierce fighting the Germans were slowly driven back all along the line. Lieutenant Bowes-Lyon, who had gallantly rushed on, was killed, and Lieutenant Worsley shared the same fate. The remaining officers of these two companies were all wounded: Second Lieutenant Hollins through the foot, Second Lieutenant Cooper through the arm, and Second Lieutenant Long in the face and arm. A dozen men of one party, without an officer, fought their way through to the church, where they joined up with some men of No. 3 Company.
The first objective was now secured, although the price paid had been heavy, and the village had to be mopped up. Here was another difficulty: the companies were so weak that they could not even find enough men to escort the prisoners they had taken. Then the ammunition began to run short, and the supply of bombs became alarmingly low. The enemy remained in possession of two derelict tanks, captured in an earlier attack, and from the trenches just south of the village were able to keep up a harassing fire. Captain Hughes, when he came up with No. 4 Company, determined to push on, but could find no signs of No. 2 Company in the labyrinth of houses. He divided his company into two parties, one of which he himself led to attack the trench on the Cambrai road, while the other, under Second Lieutenant Carrington, was ordered to secure the Station road as far as the Crucifix. Both parties secured their objectives, and began to consolidate their position.
It was shortly afterwards discovered that the right flank of No. 3 Company was in the air. At the time nothing was known of the failure of No. 1 and No. 2 Companies to carry their objective, and in anticipation of their arrival a defensive flank of a sergeant and twelve men with a Lewis gun was formed. The valley to the south of the village was filled with the enemy, and under the wall of the churchyard there was a deep dug-out full of Germans, one of whom was so placed at the entrance that he could not be seen. Every time a bomb was thrown from round the corner he fired at the thrower’s hand, and managed to kill one man and wound another. As no phosphorous bombs were available, a guard was placed over the entrance, and the dug-out was left for future treatment.
But it was beginning to dawn on the remaining officers of the 3rd Battalion that all was not well, since not only did no reinforcements arrive, but the troops on the left seemed to be in great difficulties. Colonel Thorne went round, and told all the parties he saw to hold on where they were, until reinforcements came up, but the men were being shot at from houses in all directions. A determined counter-attack by the Germans, who seemed to be in some force, drove back Captain Hughes’s platoons, and Second Lieutenant Sir J. Hanham was wounded, but the tables were soon turned when the tanks came up, and poured a terrific fire into the retreating enemy. Captain Hughes, who had dealt successfully with a very complicated operation, was now wounded, and Second Lieutenant Carrington took command of No. 4 Company.
The situation had begun to look very precarious. The houses in the village, most of which were undamaged, might easily mask the advance of considerable numbers of the enemy, and the men did not know how long they could hold on to their position, without being cut off. Although the tanks had done wonders in clearing the streets, as well as the trenches along the embankment, they were of very little assistance in the village itself, where so many houses were still untouched by artillery fire. The enemy’s shells, which never ceased to fall, combined with the snipers’ bullets, made the position anything but pleasant.
Two companies from the 4th Battalion were ordered up, but the situation demanded more drastic measures, and before these small reinforcements even started, the enemy made very heavy counter-attacks, first from the railway-cutting north-east of Bourlon Wood, on the left flank of the 1st Battalion Coldstream, then against the junction of the 1st Battalion Coldstream and 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, while a third took place round the southern edge of the village. Colonel Thorne decided to hold the village with three centres of resistance, one from the cross-roads in the centre of the village to the south corner of the village beyond the church, under Second Lieutenant Knollys, the second at the cross-roads in the centre of the village, under Lieutenant Mackay of the Machine-Gun Guards, with two machine-guns, and the third on the left from the cross-roads to the right flank of the 1st Battalion Coldstream, under Second Lieutenant Ball. At the same time Lieutenant Carstairs was sent up with six men, to get touch with Lieutenant Carrington, who with thirty men was stubbornly holding on to the position he had gained.
These measures would have been very effective if it had been merely a matter of clinging on till reinforcements arrived, but as these depleted companies could not expect to hold their own for long unsupported, Colonel Thorne determined to go back himself, and press for more troops to be sent up. It now appeared that there was a gap of nearly 500 yards between the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Coldstream, and that the enemy were creeping through. But so intent were they on cutting off the Coldstream that they did not appear to notice the Grenadiers, with the result that they were heavily enfiladed. They retired precipitately, but their retirement was only momentary, for in a short time they returned with two machine-guns. At the same time Germans were reported to be advancing from the north in large numbers, while the counter-attack against the Irish Guards was developing with renewed vigour.
The position of the 3rd Battalion was now perilous in the extreme. They were outflanked, and the enemy in front was visibly increasing in numbers. Lieutenant Mackay with the centre party was forced to retire before a large number of the enemy, and his withdrawal rendered the position of both Second Lieutenant Knollys and Second Lieutenant Ball untenable. Quite apart from the danger of being cut off, these platoons were not nearly strong enough to resist any attack in large numbers.
Thus No. 4 Company, under Second Lieutenant Carrington, was practically cut off, with the enemy already behind it. It had held on under the impression that another brigade would come to its support, but found itself in danger of being surrounded. So the men faced about and fought their way back to the original line. No attempt was made to hold the old German front trench, for it was without a field of fire on the east, and the wire was all on the wrong side, while it could be raked by fire from the buildings on the western end of the village at a range of about fifty yards.
This, as already remarked, was one of the only failures in which the Guards Division took part. This splendid Brigade had been practically decimated, and no advance had been made. The first objective had been taken, and in some places even the second objective was reached, but all the work was wasted, owing to the failure of the higher command to bring up any reinforcements.
The casualties were: Three officers killed and six wounded; while among other ranks the total casualties were 270.
Nov. 28.
On the 28th the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, 1st Battalion Coldstream, and 2nd Battalion Irish Guards were relieved by three battalions of Seymour’s Brigade, and remained in support in La Justice area. That night the Guards Division was relieved by the Fifty-ninth Division, and withdrew to Trescault, Metz-en-Couture, and Bertincourt.
On the 29th Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade moved from Trescault to Bertincourt. There they remained until the dramatic news arrived that the Germans had broken through our line, when it moved to Gouzeaucourt Wood, where it bivouacked in the open, but its services were not required. Dec. On December 1, when De Crespigny’s and Seymour’s Brigades attacked Gauche Wood and Gonnelieu, it was in reserve, and that evening it relieved De Crespigny’s Brigade in the front line and occupied chalk trenches, in part of Gauche Wood, and in bitterly cold weather, with no coats or blankets, until December 4. During those four days there was the usual amount of shelling, but no attack was made by either side. On the night of December 1 the Germans brought up teams of horses to remove two field-guns, which had been abandoned within twenty yards of the trenches by Villers Guislain, occupied by No. 3 Company, but were driven off by rifle and revolver fire. On December 4 the 2nd Brigade was relieved by the 1st and 2nd South African Regiments, and retired from the area of operations with the rest of the Guards Division. On the 7th the Battalion moved to Simencourt, where it remained till the end of December. The following officers joined during December: Second Lieutenant W. A. Pembroke, Captain N. C. Tufnell, Lieutenant C. H. Bedford, Lieutenant W. Champneys, Second Lieutenant E. J. Bunbury.