In a letter of 27 June 1942 Himmler gave consent in principle to this plan and instructed Greiser to discuss the individual measures in detail with the security police first, in order to assure an inconspicuous accomplishment of the task. (NO-244, Pros. Ex. 201.) On 21 November 1942 Greiser informed Himmler that the examinations which were to be carried out in order to separate the curable and incurable would be executed by Professor Hohlfelder and his X-ray battalion. He estimated that the first utilization of the method would be in approximately six months. He further stated:

In this letter, Blome stated that among the Polish population of the province, at least 35,000 persons were suffering from open tuberculosis, and besides this number, about 120,000 consumptives were in need of treatment. This constituted an enormous danger to the German settlers in all parts of the province. In order to make further German immigration possible, counter measures were to be taken soon. Blome then outlined the three ways for the practical elimination of the danger of infection:

As to the first proposal he stated:

Blome pointed out that one of the practical difficulties of outright extermination of all tubercular Poles was that it might provide excellent propaganda material for the enemies of Germany, especially with regard to the strong Catholic feelings of the Italian nation and “all the physicians of the world.” He therefore considered it necessary that Hitler himself personally decide on this step. Should Hitler consider this radical solution as unsuitable, preparations for the execution of the plan as outlined in points 2 and 3 should be made. The exclusive settlement of all tubercular Poles, irrespective of whether they were curable or incurable, would remove the danger of infection for the German settlers. These Poles should be used for labor. Not only the tubercular Poles of the Warthegau, but also those in Danzig-West Prussia, those of the administrative district of Zichenau, and of the Province of Upper Silesia should be isolated in the same settlement. He stated:

Finally Blome advocated as the most practicable solution the creation of a reservation similar to the reservation for lepers. Within the reservation, the strict isolation of the strongly contagious could easily be achieved. In this way the danger of infection would be removed and the problem of the German consumptives in the province would be overcome. (NO-250, Pros. Ex. 203.) Blome admitted that the expression “special treatment” which he used in the letter meant the killing of the tubercular Poles. (Tr. p. 4791.)

Himmler approved Blome’s plan to create a reservation for tubercular Poles, incurable and curable alike, in a letter to Greiser dated 3 December 1942. It would be possible to exploit this action for propaganda purposes, whereas on the other hand, outright extermination of those inflicted with open tuberculosis would take too long, as the X-ray examinations of the Polish population would require at least six months. (NO-251, Pros. Ex. 204.)

That at least some of the tubercular Poles were exterminated, while the others were taken to death camps where they were left to die, is proved by the affidavit of the defendant Rudolf Brandt. (NO-441, Pros. Ex. 205.) Brandt tried to explain, not to say repudiate, this affidavit by testifying that he made the statements on the basis of documents shown to him in pretrial interrogations. He stressed the point, however, that he insisted the wording of one sentence be changed. This sentence originally read: “As a result of the suggestions made by Blome and Greiser, 8-10,000 Poles were exterminated”! He changed the expression “8-10,000” to “numerous.” (Tr. pp. 4890, 4953.) This proves in itself that Brandt did not make his statement in exclusive reliance on the contents of the documents shown to him in pretrial interrogations (Tr. p. 4891) but also on the basis of the knowledge he obtained as collaborator of Himmler. The documents do not show the execution of “numerous” Poles. Moreover, Brandt states in these documents that Dr. Blome visited Himmler from time to time and supported Greiser’s suggestions. There is no document in evidence or in the possession of the prosecution which would give the basis for this statement. It is, therefore, clear that Brandt’s statements are founded upon knowledge which he obtained from Himmler.

Without a doubt, Rudolf Brandt is as well advised on the crimes which are the subject of this trial as any man in Germany. There is no reason whatever for refusing to give full weight to the pretrial statements of Brandt. There has been no proof that these statements were obtained by fraud or duress. Brandt’s testimony before the Tribunal can be summed up in one sentence: “I remember nothing.” Aside from a description of Himmler’s personality, he contented himself with giving answers to leading questions by his attorney which were calculated to reveal him as a disembodied stenographic automaton—something in the nature of a proficient half-wit. Surely his pretrial affidavits are entitled to more weight than the blatant nonsense which was his testimony.

Blome denied that he ever planned or suggested that Poles suffering from open tuberculosis should be exterminated and that the remainder should be put in reservations and left there to die (Tr. pp. 4578, 4790-1) but he is contradicted by the proof of his own making.

c. Selection from the Argumentation of the Defense

EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR THE DEFENDANT
BLOME^[90]

Probably the most serious accusation against Dr. Blome seemed to be the allegation that he had proposed the murder of 25,000-30,000 tubercular Poles and had taken part in carrying out this plan. The evidence clearly shows, however, that this accusation is quite unfounded. I maintain on the contrary (a) it is not true that Dr. Blome approved or supported this murderous plan, and (b) it is also untrue that this plan was ever carried out. It is true, however, that it was Dr. Blome himself who prevented this devilish plan. It was Dr. Blome who, by his clever intervention saved the lives of the 25,000-30,000 tubercular Poles who were to be “liquidated.”

The documents show that this plan originated with Gauleiter Greiser and Reich Leader SS Himmler. Blome was then assigned to this matter because it was known that he had for many years made the fight against tuberculosis the aim of his life, and because he built his cancer institute in the same Gau which Gauleiter Greiser governed. Blome stated his attitude to this plan clearly at the time in the well-known letter of 18 November 1942. (NO-250, Pros. Ex. 203.) He discussed the three possibilities which existed and explained the pro’s and con’s of each of these three possibilities in detail. These three possibilities were either “Liquidation,” i. e., the murder of those Poles suffering from incurable tuberculosis, their internment in isolated institutions, or lastly, their settlement in a reservation. In his letter of 18 November 1942 (Appendix 25) he definitely rejected the first possibility and advocated the latter.

In this, Blome was completely successful. Greiser was so much impressed by Blome’s arguments that he no longer dared to carry out the liquidation of the Poles which had been decided upon. In fact, he submitted Dr. Blome’s memorandum to the Reich Leader SS Himmler, so that he should obtain a decision from Hitler himself. (NO-249, Pros. Ex. 202.) This was already a remarkable success for Blome, because Himmler had already ordered the liquidation of the Poles. Blome’s arguments made such an impression even on the bloodhound Himmler that, contrary to Greiser’s expectations, he cautiously put the matter before Hitler again and obtained his definite ruling. It should be remembered that this in itself would no longer have been necessary, because not only had Conti agreed to the murder, but from Greiser’s covering note of 21 November 1942 it is obvious that Hitler had also given his approval to the extermination of the Poles before.

Thereupon, after a subsequent examination of the matter, Hitler withdrew the extermination order and thus Himmler had no alternative but to do the same. This is clearly proved by Himmler’s letter of 3 December 1942. (NO-251, Pros. Ex. 204.)

The extermination of the Poles did not take place; this is due to Blome.

Although these facts are incontestably proved by the documents presented, the prosecution nevertheless upheld the charge against Blome. This evidently was due to the peculiar wording of Blome’s letter to Greiser of 18 November 1942. The prosecution in their speech of 19 December 1946 described this letter a “devilish masterpiece of murderous intent.” In considering this case, the prevailing conditions should be borne in mind. Dr. Blome knew that the tuberculous Poles were lost, that their murder had been decided upon, unless it was possible on some grounds to change Hitler’s mind at the last moment. The statement of the witness Dr. Gundermann (Blome 1, Blome Ex. 8) proved that Blome at that time, as is confirmed by Blome’s own testimony (Tr. pp. 4574-78), strove for days for a successful wording of his letter; he repeatedly drafted the letter, then rejected the wording again, and finally introduced arguments in the letter which he hoped would be successful. From the very beginning he was aware, of course, that his intervention was bound to fail and have no success if he described Hitler’s planned extermination of the Poles as a crime and downright murder and solemnly protested against it. In this way Blome would have achieved nothing for the Poles, but would have had to expect to be brought before a court himself and sentenced for sabotaging an order of the Fuehrer, or to have disappeared in a concentration camp without any legal sentence. With such simple method as entering a solemn protest by calling on the laws of humanity or of justice nothing would have been achieved with Hitler, especially when he had already made up his mind and had decided on a certain matter and had already given the necessary orders for execution; in such cases Hitler was usually inaccessible and would not listen to any counterproposals. Dr. Blome knew this, of course, just as well as, for instance, the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube, who in connection with a similar problem (sterilization), in his letter of 24 August 1942 (NO-039, Pros. Ex. 153) pointed out the importance of “enemy propaganda,” as he considered this most likely to be successful. Dr. Blome therefore looked for reasons which would perhaps have a decisive influence on Hitler and these were either the Church or other nations. It is understandable that Hitler, in view of the tense situation at that time, in the middle of the Second World War, did not want to break completely with the Church, and he also had to consider the opinion of foreign countries so as not to antagonize neutral states. Dr. Blome speculated on these two points. In his letter of 18 November 1942 he emphasized in a skillful manner, and with full determination, these two points of view, and with those two references he achieved full success. (NO-250, Pros. Ex. 203.)

It may now be realized why Blome, in the early part of his letter, tried to give Hitler the impression that he (Blome) fully agreed with the plan as such for the extermination of the Poles, and why he even pretended that everything was already prepared for the execution of this plan. Hitler had, so to speak, only to press the button and 25,000-30,000 Poles would be done away with. This was merely a trick which Blome used in order to ensure a favorable consideration of his second and third proposals (internment or reservation).

If Dr. Blome had written that he declined to approve such an order of the Fuehrer, that, in consequence, no preparations for its execution had been made, and that he would rather resign than become a party to a mass murder, then Hitler would have had his customary outburst, and Blome would have been finished as far as he was concerned; he would, of course, have entirely disregarded the protest of such a “saboteur,” and in the interests of so-called “reasons of State,” the Fuehrer’s orders would have been strictly carried out. To prevent this, Dr. Blome had to pretend for the time being, that he was ready to acknowledge the Fuehrer’s orders as a matter of course and, where possible, to participate personally in their execution, if Hitler, as Head of the State, so desired. However, when weighing the pro’s and con’s, Dr. Blome was able to bring to the foreground points of view against the plan of extermination which conceivably might greatly impress Hitler.

Blome’s letter of 18 November 1942 can only be explained thus, and was intended in this way. (Blome 1, Blome Ex. 8.) So Dr. Blome, on the strength of this letter, cannot be convicted. For it is certain that Hitler thereupon dropped his plan and completely rescinded his orders for the murder.

This success, which could hardly have been anticipated because of Hitler’s obstinacy and vainglory, completely justifies the defendant Blome. It proves that Blome’s conception was the right one and that his manipulations saved the lives of the Poles.

Another matter helped Blome considerably, which must not be overlooked here. Shortly before, Hitler had cancelled the continuation of the Euthanasia Program. Apparently he did this under the influence of numerous protests which had been made by the two Christian Churches. The reaction abroad also played a considerable part in this because mass destruction of the insane had been taken up repeatedly by the foreign press with particular reproaches against the Nazi regime. Dr. Blome made use of these points of view which had proved effective in the case of the Euthanasia Program, and they also produced telling effects in the case of the tubercular Poles.

Why did the prosecuting authorities maintain the accusation against. Dr. Blome in spite of all this? Apparently this was solely on account of an affidavit by the codefendant Rudolf Brandt. In his affidavit of 24 October 1946 Rudolf Brandt completely suppresses the letters which cause the complete rescinding of the plan for murder. (NO-441, Pros. Ex. 205.) He is silent about these letters, although it can be proved that they passed through his hands, were initialed, and handed down to lower offices by him.

During his examination by the defense, Rudolf Brandt was charged with untruthfulness. He was unable to offer an explanation, failed to answer, and was forced to submit to the charge of untruthfulness, of deliberate untruthfulness. Altogether, Rudolf Brandt has made an amazing number of affidavits; he has, without scruples, supplied the prosecution with practically every affidavit desired for the incrimination of codefendants, and with equal readiness, he has given affidavits for these same codefendants which directly contradicted his former assertions. What he confirms under oath today, he denies under oath tomorrow, and vice versa. However, it must be stated that the affidavit which Rudolf Brandt made against Dr. Blome, dated 24 October 1946, was the climax of his mendacity. After the experiences in this trial, and after having become acquainted, as we have, with a man like Rudolf Brandt, it would be ridiculous even to consider attaching any weight to the affidavit of a man such as we have got to know in Rudolf Brandt. His affidavit of 24 October 1946 has been entirely refuted by documents introduced by the prosecution. It is unnecessary, therefore, to examine to what extent Rudolf Brandt’s untruthfulness can be traced to his state of mental health.

During the session of 9 December 1946 the prosecuting authorities announced:

This evidence has not been produced so far by the prosecuting authorities, although the defense, during the session of 17 March 1947, referred in particular to this lack of evidence. The assertions of a Rudolf Brandt in this respect cannot be evaluated as “evidence,” even if it had not been completely retracted and even if it had not already been completely refuted by additional documents submitted by the prosecution. If the prosecuting authorities had succeeded in producing the witness Perwitschky, who had already been proposed in 1946, and who had been approved by the Tribunal, then his testimony would have produced additional clear proof that Blome actually prevented the proposed mass murder.

We know that later fate of these Poles who suffered from incurable open tuberculosis from the affidavit of Dr. Gundermann, the highest medical officer of the Warthegau (the territory in which the tubercular Poles were to be liquidated). (Blome 1, Blome Ex. 8.) The fight against tuberculosis was a legal task of the Public Health Offices which were subordinated in the Warthegau to the witness Dr. Gundermann. As a result of difficulties caused by the war, it was not possible to accommodate during the war, either in restricted institutions or in a segregated area, those suffering from tuberculosis; these two possibilities, which had been examined in a letter dated 18 November 1942 from Blome to Greiser were therefore out of the question for the time being. (NO-250, Pros. Ex. 203.) Therefore, the tubercular Poles were provided for according to the same legal regulations which applied to tubercular Germans in Germany proper. Legal regulations notwithstanding, a separate Tuberculosis Welfare Office, with Polish physicians and nurses, was established in the various health offices of the Warthegau. (Blome 1, Blome Ex. 8.) Therefore, the contention of the prosecution “that the accommodation of sick Poles in restricted institutions resulted in the comparatively rapid death of the sick” or, that the transportation of the sick into a reserved area meant that, “they were left to their fate, provided with few physicians and with few or no nursing personnel,” is devoid of application. (Tr. pp. 757-59.)

It should be observed, however, that these proposals by Blome (for internment or reserved areas) did not originate from him, but had already been discussed during the meeting of the German Tuberculosis Society in 1937, and went back to proposals which had already been worked out years before by English research workers in tuberculosis on instructions from the International Tuberculosis Commission, and which had been generally approved. (Blome 14, Blome Ex. 6.) Therefore, even if the existence of these proposals had been known, it cannot be said that they contradicted in any way the laws of humanity. According to widespread views held by the responsible circles, such measures are necessary if tuberculosis, from which millions die yearly, is to be fought effectively, and if the healthy portion of the population is to be protected effectively against the dangers of infection through incurable tubercular patients. In this case, the protection of the healthy population against infection appears more important than consideration for the unrestricted liberty of incurable patients.

d. Evidence