These are quite interesting explanations that the ultimatum was by Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Göring; that Lieutenant General Muff, the military attaché, was along just to answer a technical question, and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and telegram for troops. But, perhaps to understand this conversation, we must try to create again the actual physical scene of the time and place as Göring talked over the phone. I quote eight lines from Page 11 of the English text, about in the middle, Part W:

May it please the Tribunal, I have practically come to the end of the material relating to the aggression against Austria. In a moment I shall take up quite briefly the effects of the Anschluss, some of the developments which took place after the German troops marched across the border. What is to come after that is an epilogue, but before developing the epilogue, it may be appropriate to pause briefly for just a moment. I think that the facts which I have related to the Tribunal today show plainly certain things about the defendants involved in the conspiracy, and among the conspirators who particularly took action in the Austrian matter were Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart, Ribbentrop, Von Neurath, and Göring.

First, I think it is plain that these men were dangerous men. They used their power without a bridle. They used their power to override the independence and freedom of others. And they were more than bullies squeezing a smaller foe. They were very sly bullies. They compounded their force with fraud. They coupled threats with legal technicalities and devious maneuvers, wearing a sanctimonious mask to cover their duplicity. I think they are dangerous men.

In accordance with the directive of March 11, our Document C-182, Exhibit USA-77, the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak, 12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people announcing the invasion, and purporting to justify it. I refer again to Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, Page 140, Number 27, “Proclamation of Hitler.” The British Government and the French Government filed protests. The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz, and they both expressed their joy over the events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. I refer to the speech of Seyss-Inquart at Linz on 12 March 1938, as contained in the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 144, Number 28-a, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and which you will find translated in our Document 2485-PS.

For a view of what was happening in Vienna, I offer in evidence our Document L-292, telegram 70, American Legation, Vienna, to the American Secretary of State, 12 March 1938, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-78. I quote it in full:

The law-making machine was put to work immediately on the task of consolidation. For all of this material I shall merely refer the Tribunal to the German sources and to the document number of the English translation, but I think I need not offer these legislative acts in evidence but shall merely invite the Court to take judicial notice of them.

First, Miklas was forced to resign as President. I refer to Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 147, Number 30-b. Our translation is in our Document 2466-PS.

In this connection the Court will no doubt recall Göring’s telephone conversation as shown in Document 2949-PS, that in view of Miklas’ delay in appointing Seyss-Inquart, Miklas would be dismissed. Seyss-Inquart became both Chancellor and President.

He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938 for the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated into the Reich Statute of Reunion, passed the same day, German law. I cite for that the Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 237, Number 21, a translation of which will be found in our Document 2307-PS.

This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the German Reich. By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided (by the way, on the Constitutional Law to which I just referred there appear as signatories the following names:

Adolf Hitler, Führer and Reich Chancellor; Göring, General Field Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; Frick, Reich Minister of the Interior; Von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Hess, Deputy Führer.)

By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides, and I quote:

Similarly, the Austrian action violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provides:

This basic Constitutional Law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10 April 1938 on the question of reunion, but this was a mere formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union declared in the law. It could not undo Germany’s union with, and control over, Austria.

To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured under conditions of occupation of Austria by troops, it is not necessary to do more than review some of the acts passed within the month.

Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his own command and required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander. A translation of the pertinent document will be found in our 2936-PS, and I refer to the instruction of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army, March 13, 1938, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 150.

Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an oath of office swearing allegiance to Hitler, Führer of the German Reich and people. Jewish officials as defined were not permitted to take the oath.

I refer to a decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the administration of oath to the officials of the Province of Austria, March 15, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 245, Number 24, the translation being in our Document 2311-PS.

Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich Laws, including the law of 1933 against the formation of new political parties, and the 1933 Law for the Preservation of Unity of Party and State.

I refer to the first decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the introduction of German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 247, Number 25, the translation being in our Document 2310-PS.

Hitler, Frick, and Göring ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. I cite the order pursuant to the law concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 16, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 249, Number 25, translated in our 1060-PS.

In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to insure acceptability of the German regime, it may be noted that Goebbels established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna.

I cite the order concerning the establishment of a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna, March 31, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 350, Number 46, translated in our Document 2935-PS.

The ballot addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German soldiers” asked the voters whether they agreed with the accomplishment and ratification on March 13, 1938 of the reuniting of Austria with Germany.

I cite the second order concerning plebiscite and election for the Greater German Reichstag of March 24, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 303, translated in our Document 1659-PS.

The ground work was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13.

Then, the importance of Austria in further aggression. Could we run that screen up, or is the chart still behind it? Well, the Court will remember the chart.

The seizure of Austria had now formed that lower jaw to the head of the wolf around the head of Czechoslovakia. Germany’s desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria and her determination to execute that aim in the way and at the time that she did—that is, with threat of military force, quickly, and despite political risk—was due to the importance of Austria in her further plans of aggression.

The conference held November 5, 1937, planning for aggressive war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food through expulsion of a million people and the effective increase in fighting strength, in part through the improvement in the frontier.

I cite again Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25. Austria was to yield to Germany material resources, and moreover, she provided ready cash taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government.

One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk and Schacht for the transfer to the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. I refer to the order for the transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank, March 17, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 254, Number 27, translated in our 2313-PS.

Austria also yielded human resources. Three months after the Anschluss there was enacted a decree requiring the 21-year-old men, Austrian men, to report for active military service. I refer to the decree regarding registration for active military service in Austria during 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 634, translated in our 1660-PS.

And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position of the German Army. I invite the Court’s attention to a document which I introduced in the case on preparation for aggression, L-172, Exhibit USA-34, which was a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the German Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the Gauleiter. Only one page of that lecture appears in this particular document book, and I quote from one paragraph on Page 5 of the English text, which is Page 7 of Jodl’s lecture, which reviewed the situation in 1938:

The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of this second phase of their aggression and to take over Czechoslovakia.

Logically, if the Tribunal please, we should proceed at this point with the story about Czechoslovakia. For reasons that I explained earlier in the week we have had to change our plans somewhat from a strictly logical order, and the plan at present is that on Monday I shall go forward with the Czechoslovakian part of the aggressive war case.

At this point it is planned by our staff to show a motion picture, and it will take some few minutes to make the physical arrangements in the courtroom, so that if the Court should feel like recessing, those arrangements could be made.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell me how long the showing of the picture will take?

MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is about an hour.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes then, shall we now, or until the picture is ready?

[A recess was taken.]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Sir, supplementing what Mr. Alderman has said, we have had to readjust our presentation to some extent. Tomorrow morning, a witness will be offered for interrogation. Then Mr. Alderman on Monday; and Sir Hartley Shawcross will make the opening statement for the British Empire on Tuesday morning.

The film this afternoon, at the request of defendants’ counsel, made in writing to the Court, has been exhibited to defendants’ counsel on day before yesterday evening in this courtroom. I personally requested Dr. Dix to convey the invitation to Defense Counsel to witness the film. Eight of them came. Dr. Dix advised me kindly that he would not come unless he was forced to come.

I now present Mr. Dodd, who will have charge of the presentation.

MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution for the United States will at this time present to the Tribunal, with its permission, a documentary film on concentration camps. This is by no means the entire proof which the prosecution will offer with respect to the subject of concentration camps, but this film which we offer represents in a brief and unforgettable form an explanation of what the words “concentration camp” imply.

This subject arises appropriately in the narrative of events leading up to the actual outbreak of aggressive war, which, as Mr. Alderman’s presentation shows, was planned and prepared by the Nazi conspirators. We propose to show that concentration camps were not an end in themselves but rather they were an integral part of the Nazi system of government. As we shall show, the black-shirted guards of the SS and the Gestapo stood ranged behind the official pages of the Reichsgesetzblatt.

We intend to prove that each and every one of these defendants knew of the existence of these concentration camps; that fear and terror and nameless horror of the concentration camps were instruments by which the defendants retained power and suppressed opposition to any of their policies, including, of course, their plans for aggressive war. By this means they enforced the controls imposed upon the German people, as required to execute these plans, and obliterated freedom in Germany and in the countries invaded and occupied by the armies of the Third Reich.

Finally, we ask the Tribunal in viewing this film to bear in mind the fact that the proof to be offered at a later stage of this Trial will show that on some of the organizations charged in this Indictment lies the responsibility for the origination, the control, and the maintenance of the whole concentration camp system: Upon the SS, the SD—a part of the SS which tracked down the victims—upon the Gestapo, which committed the victims to the camps, and upon other branches of the SS which were in charge of the atrocities committed therein.

Commander James Donovan will introduce the film with a statement explaining its source and its authenticity.

COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN, USNR. (Prosecution Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I refer to Document Number 2430-PS, concerning the motion picture entitled “Nazi Concentration Camps” and to the affidavits of Commander James B. Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel George C. Stevens, Lieutenant E. R. Kellogg and Colonel Erik Tiebold contained therein. The affidavits of Colonel Stevens and of Lieutenant Kellogg are also contained in the motion picture, and thus will be in the record of the Tribunal. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now, however, read into the record those affidavits not appearing in the film.

THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of any objection by the Defense Counsel, we don’t think it is necessary to read these formal affidavits.

COMMANDER DONOVAN: Yes, Sir. The United States now offers in evidence an official documentary motion picture report on Nazi concentration camps. This report has been compiled from motion pictures taken by Allied military photographers as the Allied armies in the West liberated the areas in which these camps were located. The accompanying narration is taken directly from the reports of the military photographers who filmed the camps.

While these motion pictures speak for themselves in evidencing life and death in Nazi concentration camps, proper authentication of the films is contained in the affidavits of the United States Army and Navy officers to which I have referred.

As has been stated, this motion picture has been made available to all defense counsel and they possess copies in their Information Room of the supporting affidavits duly translated.

If the Tribunal please, we shall proceed with the projection of the film, Document 2430-PS, Exhibit USA-79.

[Photographs were then projected on the screen showing the following affidavits while at the same time the voices of the respective affiants were reproduced reading them.]

[The film was then shown.]

COL. STOREY: That concludes the presentation.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 30 November 1945 at 1000 hours.]

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Prosecutor for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Colonel Amen will represent the United States this morning.

COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I propose to call as the first witness for the Prosecution, Major General Erwin Lahousen.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to state that the evidence of the witness whom you propose to call must be strictly confined to the count with which the United States are dealing, Count One.

COL. AMEN: May I have a moment to discuss that with the Chief Counsel of the United States?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, so far as I know the Prosecution . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Would you state for whom you appear? Do you appear for the Defendant Keitel?

DR. NELTE: Yes. As far as I know, an agreement was reached between the Prosecution and the Defense, to the effect that whenever possible, questions to be brought up in the proceedings on the following day should be announced beforehand. The obvious purpose of this very reasonable understanding was to enable Defense Counsel to discuss forthcoming questions with their clients, and thus to assure a rapid and even progress of the Trial.

I was not informed that the witness Lahousen was to be called by the Prosecution today, nor was I told on what questions he was to be heard.

It was particularly important to know this, because today, I believe, the witness Lahousen was not to be heard on questions connected with the Prosecution’s case as presented during the past days.

THE PRESIDENT: That is the contrary of what I said. What I said was that the witness was to be confined to evidence relating to Count One, which is the Count that has been solely discussed up to the present date.

DR. NELTE: Do you mean, Mr. President, that in order to enable the Defense to cross-examine the witness, there will be a recess after the interrogation by the Prosecution during which Counsel may discuss the questions with their clients? The witness Lahousen, as far as I recall, has never until now been mentioned by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to hear Counsel for the United States upon the agreement which counsel for the Defendant Keitel alleges, namely, an agreement that what was to be discussed on the following day should be communicated to defendants’ counsel beforehand.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of no agreement to inform defendants’ counsel of any witness, nor of his testimony; nor would I want to make such. There are security reasons involved in disclosing to Defense Counsel the names of witnesses, which I don’t need to enlarge upon, I am quite sure.

We did advise them that they would be given information as to the documentary matters, and I think that has been kept.

As to witnesses, however, a matter of policy arises. These witnesses are not always prisoners. They have to be treated in somewhat different fashion than prisoners; and the protection of their security is a very important consideration where we are trying this case, in the very hotbed of the Nazi organization with which some of Defense Counsel were identified.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Justice Jackson, that that is sufficient. If you tell the Tribunal that there was no such agreement, the Tribunal will, of course, accept that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of nothing of that character, relating to witnesses. That does apply to documents.

We find it very difficult to know just the meaning of the ruling which the Court has just announced. Count One of the Indictment is a conspiracy count, covering the entire substantive part of the Indictment. There are problems, of course, of overlapping, which I had supposed had been worked out between the prosecutors until this morning. It is impossible, trying a conspiracy case, to keep from mentioning the fact that the act, which was the object of the conspiracy, was performed. In fact, that is a part of the evidence of the conspiracy.

I know I don’t need to enlarge upon the wide scope of evidence in a conspiracy case. I think, perhaps, the best way to do is to swear the witness, and that the other prosecutors, if they feel their field is being trespassed upon, or the judges, if they feel that we are exceeding, raise the objection specifically; because I don’t know how we can separate, particularly on a moment’s notice, Count One from the other Counts.

We have tried our best to work out an arrangement that would be fair, as between ourselves and the other prosecutors, but we find it impossible always to please everybody.

With the greatest deference to the ruling of the Court, I would like to suggest that we proceed. I don’t know just what the bounds of the ruling might be, but I think the only way we can find out is to proceed, and have specific objections to the specific things which anyone feels have been transgressed; and in doing that, I want to say that we do it with the greatest respect to the ruling, but that we may find ourselves in conflict with it, because of the difficulty of any boundary on the subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer?

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I must return to the matter raised by Doctor Nelte, namely his statement that before the beginning of the Trial the Defense and the Prosecution reached an agreement to the effect that the next day’s program should always be made known to the Defense on the previous day. Such an agreement was actually reached, and I cannot understand why the Prosecution was not informed of it. We considered the possibility and then reached this agreement in a conference with Doctor Kempner, who was acting as our liaison man. I should like further to point out the following:

The Prosecution stated that for security reasons the Defense could not be furnished with the names of witnesses to be called during the next day’s proceedings. The press however received, as early as yesterday, information on the witnesses to be called today. We heard of this through representatives of the press this morning and, as far as I know, the information also appeared in today’s papers. I cannot understand, therefore, why it was withheld from us, and why we were told that for security reasons, it could not be communicated to us. I think this amounts to a mistrust of the Defense’s discretion that is quite unjustified. It is, furthermore, incorrect that we are now receiving documents in good time; they still reach us belatedly. For instance, a document which is to be dealt with in court today was put on our desks only this morning, moreover, in a language which many of the defending counsel cannot understand, since they do not have complete mastery of English.

As I have already submitted this complaint to the Prosecution in writing, may I ask the Tribunal to reach a decision in this matter as soon as possible.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is quite correct that the name of the witness who is to be used today was given to the press. The question of our policy as to giving witnesses’ names was submitted to me last night after Court recessed, because we had not been using witnesses heretofore; and I then stated to Colonel Storey that witnesses’ names must not be given to the Defense Counsel for security reasons.

He communicated that, I believe, to Doctor Dix. I found that later it had been given to the press. They, of course, have had adequate information therefore as to this witness. However, I am speaking about the policy. We cannot be under an obligation to inform these counsel of the names of witnesses who will be called, who are here in Nuremberg, but not in prison; the situation does not permit that. Neither can we furnish transcripts of testimony or that sort of thing of witnesses in advance.

Now we want to give the Defense Counsel everything that, in the fair conduct of the Trial, they ought to have. They are now receiving much more than any citizen of the United States gets on trial in the courts of the United States, in some respects, as to advance information and copies and help and service, and I do think that to ask us to disclose to them in advance either the names or substance of testimony—oftentimes the substance would disclose the witness—would not be proper. It was stated yesterday that we would take up a witness today.

THE PRESIDENT: We have already heard two of the counsel on behalf of the Defense. Have you anything to add which is different to what they have said?

DR. DIX: Yes, I believe I can explain a misunderstanding and clarify the whole problem.

Mr. President, as far as I am informed—I do not know what was discussed in my absence—the situation is this:

Though discussions took place, no agreement was reached between the Prosecution and the Defense. There is, as Your Lordship knows, only a decision of the Tribunal regarding documents; that decision is known and I need not repeat. As far as witnesses are concerned I think I may assume that we are all agreed that the desire of the Defense to know the names of witnesses ahead of time is justified.

The Tribunal must decide to what extent security reasons interfere with this desire, which is in itself justified. That is a matter which the Defense cannot determine. I think I understand Mr. Justice Jackson correctly in saying that if the press is being told what witnesses will appear on the next day, then it is a matter of course that the same information should be given to Defense Counsel at the same time. This was only a series of unhappy circumstances, which can be overcome by mutual understanding and good will.

As I said, I do not know what was agreed upon before I was present here. I cannot therefore contradict my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, in this matter. I think it possible, however, that the misunderstanding arose as a result of the decision of the Court to have documents submitted to us 48 hours in advance and to have the film shown to us beforehand, a decision which led my colleague to the conclusion—and I consider it a justified conclusion—that all matters of this sort were to be submitted to us in advance. We do not, of course, expect to be informed of the contents of the witness’ testimony.

After this elucidation I should like to state my request that in the future we be informed as soon as possible which witness is to be called; and I should also like to ask that the security considerations be guided by the knowledge that the Defense as a body is reliable, determined and capable of assisting the Court in reaching its verdict by submitting to the discipline of the proceedings. I ask, therefore, that the cases in which the security officer believes that he should not communicate the name of the witness beforehand, should be reduced to an absolute minimum.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the submissions which have been made to them on behalf of Defense Counsel with reference to what shall or what shall not be communicated to them. With reference to the witness whom the United States desire to call, they will now be permitted to call him. With reference to what I said about confining his evidence to the first count, the Tribunal thinks that the best course would be for the other prosecutors to have the opportunity now to ask any questions which they think right, and that they may have the opportunity, if they wish, of calling the witness later upon their own counts.

As to cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, that will be allowed to them in the most convenient way possible, so that if they wish to have an opportunity of communicating with their clients before they cross-examine, they may have the opportunity of doing so. Now we will continue.

COL. AMEN: May we have General Lahousen brought before the Tribunal? What is your name?

ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): Erwin Lahousen.

COL. AMEN: Will you please spell it?

LAHOUSEN: L-a-h-o-u-s-e-n.

COL. AMEN: Will you say this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think the witness had better sit down?

COL. AMEN: I think he should be allowed to sit down, particularly since he has a heart condition which may be aggravated.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may sit down.

COL. AMEN: Where were you born?

LAHOUSEN: I was born in Vienna.

COL. AMEN: On what date?

LAHOUSEN: On 25 October 1897.

COL. AMEN: What has been your occupation?

LAHOUSEN: I was a professional soldier.

COL. AMEN: Where were you trained?

LAHOUSEN: I was trained in Austria, in the Military Academy in Wiener-Neustadt.

COL. AMEN: Were you immediately commissioned as an officer?

LAHOUSEN: In 1915 I was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the infantry.

COL. AMEN: Did you serve in the first World War?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, as second and first lieutenant in the infantry.

COL. AMEN: Were you promoted from time to time thereafter?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I was promoted under the normal regulations valid in Austria at the time.

COL. AMEN: By 1930 what rank had you attained?

LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I was a captain.

COL. AMEN: And commencing in 1930 did you take any additional training?

LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I entered the Austrian War School, which corresponds to the Military Academy in the German Army. There I received the training of an officer of the General Staff.

COL. AMEN: How long did this training last?

LAHOUSEN: This training lasted 3 years.

COL. AMEN: In 1933 to what regular army unit were you assigned?

LAHOUSEN: In 1933 I was serving in the Second Austrian Division, that was the Vienna Division.

COL. AMEN: What type of work did you do there?

LAHOUSEN: I was an intelligence officer; that branch of the service for which I was already destined at the end of my training.

COL. AMEN: Did you then receive a further promotion?

LAHOUSEN: I was promoted normally in accordance with the regulations valid in Austria, and roughly at the end of 1933 I became a major. About 1935 or the beginning of 1936 I was transferred to the General Staff, and in June, or at any rate, in the summer of 1936, I became a lieutenant colonel of the Austrian General Staff.

COL. AMEN: And were you assigned to the Intelligence Division at or about that time?

LAHOUSEN: I entered the Austrian Intelligence Division which corresponds technically to the Abwehr in the German Army. I must add that an Intelligence Division was only added to the Austrian Army about this time, i.e. 1936; before that year it did not exist. Since it was planned to re-establish within the framework of the Austrian Federal Army the military Intelligence Division which had ceased to exist after the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, I was trained to assist in organizing this division within the framework of the Austrian Army.

COL. AMEN: After being assigned to the Intelligence Division, how were your activities principally directed?

LAHOUSEN: My responsible chief, or more exactly, the responsible chief at that time, was Colonel of the General Staff Böhme. He was the division chief to whom I was subordinate, the Chief of the Intelligence Division, the man to whom I was responsible, from whom I received my orders and instructions; later on it was the Chief of the Austrian General Staff.

THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you shorten this, Colonel Amen? We really need not have all this detail.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. It is, however, I think important for the Tribunal to understand more of this information than you ordinarily would by virtue of the fact that he was taken over subsequently to a corresponding position in the German Army, which I did want the Tribunal to appreciate.

Now, will you state to the Tribunal what your principal activities were after being assigned to the Intelligence Division? What information were you interested in and seeking to obtain?

LAHOUSEN: May I repeat—I don’t know if I understood you correctly—I was a member of the Austrian Intelligence Division, and not of the German Abwehr.

COL. AMEN: After the Anschluss, what position did you assume?

LAHOUSEN: After the Anschluss I was automatically taken into the High Command of the German Armed Forces, where I did the same work. In that position I was then a member of the Abwehr and my chief was Admiral Canaris.

COL. AMEN: And what was the position of Admiral Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: Canaris was at that time Chief of the German Abwehr, the German Intelligence.

COL. AMEN: And will you explain briefly the responsibility of the principal departments of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris?

LAHOUSEN: When, after the Anschluss in 1938, I entered the Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were three Abwehr divisions, and the division called “Ausland,” and together they formed the organization known as “Ausland-Abwehr.” That was the set-up of the organization in my time. How it was composed before I became a member of it, I cannot say exactly.

COL. AMEN: And what were your duties?

LAHOUSEN: First, I automatically came into Abwehr Division I. That was the division concerned with collecting information. It was also called the Secret Information Service. I worked under a divisional chief, the then Colonel in the General Staff Pieckenbrock, whom I knew already from my Austrian past. I also knew Canaris from my time in Austria.

COL. AMEN: Admiral Canaris was your immediate superior?

LAHOUSEN: Admiral Canaris was my immediate superior.

COL. AMEN: From time to time did you act as his personal representative?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, in all cases and on all occasions when his actual deputy—namely, Colonel Pieckenbrock—was not present, or when Canaris, for one reason or another, considered it necessary or advisable to have me appear as his representative.

COL. AMEN: And in this capacity did you have any contact with Field Marshal Keitel?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you also have contact with Jodl?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, occasionally, but to a much lesser extent.

COL. AMEN: And did you occasionally attend conferences at which Herr Hitler was also present?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I attended a few of the sessions or discussions at which Hitler was present and which he conducted.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal whether the leaders of the Abwehr were in sympathy with Hitler’s war program?

LAHOUSEN: I have to make clear in this connection that, at that time, we chiefs in the Abwehr were deeply influenced and captivated by the personality of Canaris, his inner bearing was perfectly clear and unequivocal to a small group of us.

COL. AMEN: And was there a particular group or groups in the Abwehr who worked against the Nazis?

LAHOUSEN: Within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were two groups which in their aims and actions were closely connected, but which, nevertheless, must somehow be kept apart.

COL. AMEN: And what were those two groups?

LAHOUSEN: Before I answer this question, I must briefly picture the personality of Canaris, who was the spiritual leader and focus of this group.

COL. AMEN: Please make it as brief as you can.

LAHOUSEN: Canaris was a pure intellect, an interesting, highly individual, and complicated personality, who hated violence as such and therefore hated and abominated war, Hitler, his system, and particularly his methods. In whatever way one may look on him, Canaris was a human being.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you refer back to the two groups of which you spoke and tell me about each of those two groups and their respective memberships?

LAHOUSEN: One might characterize the first of the groups as Canaris’ circle. It included the heads of the Amt Ausland-Abwehr:

Canaris himself as its spiritual leader; General Oster, Chief of the Central Division (the head of the Abwehr); my predecessor, Lieutenant Colonel Grosscurth, who had introduced me into the circle of Canaris in Vienna in 1938; the Chief of Abwehr Division I, Colonel Pieckenbrock, who was a close friend of Canaris; Pieckenbrock’s successor, Colonel Hansen, who was executed after July; my successor, Colonel Von Freytag Loringhoven, who committed suicide on 26 July 1944, before arrest; also, in a somewhat different way, what applies to all these persons, the Chief of Abwehr Division III, Colonel Von Bentivegni, and then various people in all these divisions, most of whom were executed or imprisoned in connection with the events of July 20, 1944.

I must also name here a man who did not belong to this group but who knew of the actions designed to prevent the execution or issuing of orders for murder and other atrocities, namely, Admiral Bürckner who was Chief of the Ausland Division at that time. Those, in the main, are the leaders of the first group called the Canaris circle.

The second and much smaller group was centered around General Oster as its spiritual leader. This group included members of the Ausland-Abwehr who, as early as 1938—I recognized this clearly by 1939-40 and later on—were actively concerned with schemes and plans designed to remove the originator of this catastrophe, Hitler, by force.

COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of the group to which you belonged; that is, Canaris’ inner circle?

LAHOUSEN: On its political motives or aims, I was not informed. I can only reiterate the thoughts and considerations which I, since I was one of Canaris’ most intimate confidants, knew well. His inner attitude, which influenced and moulded not only my own actions but also those of the other men whom I mentioned, can be described as follows:

We did not succeed in preventing this war of aggression. The war implies the end of Germany and of ourselves, a misfortune and a catastrophe of very great extent. However, a misfortune even greater than this catastrophe would be a triumph of this system. To prevent this by all possible means was the ultimate aim and purpose of our struggle.

The sense of what I have just said was often expressed by Canaris among the group of which I am speaking.

COL. AMEN: Now, did this group of which you and Canaris were members meet frequently?

LAHOUSEN: I must explain that his group or circle was not to be regarded as an organization in the technical sense, or as a sort of conspirators’ club. That would have been quite contradictory to Canaris’ nature. It was rather, a spiritual organization of men holding the same convictions, of men who had vision and knowledge—their official functions provided them with knowledge—of men who understood each other and acted, but each in his own way and in accordance with his own individuality.

This is also the reason for the differentiation of which I spoke earlier. The same demands were not made on each individual, but Canaris always approached the person whose attitude he knew from personal knowledge to be the most suitable to carry out a certain task.

COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations at these official meetings, at which Canaris expressed his views with respect to the use of force in Poland, for example?

LAHOUSEN: These and similar methods were repeatedly, I may say always, discussed in our circle and they were naturally repudiated by all of us.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Canaris said about the Polish war at the time of its commencement?

LAHOUSEN: I very clearly recall the hour at which Canaris entered, completely shattered, to tell us that the situation had after all become serious, although it had earlier appeared as if the matter might still be postponed. He told us then: “This is the end.”

COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations with Canaris and the other members of your group with respect to eliminating Nazis from your staff?

LAHOUSEN: While I was still in Vienna, before I took up my post in the OKW, I received instructions from Canaris not to bring any National Socialists with me to his department in Berlin. I was also instructed, whenever possible not to employ Party members or officers sympathizing with the Party in my division, especially in high positions. Thus the actual organization. . . .

COL. AMEN: Did Canaris keep a diary?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, Canaris kept a diary. He did so even before the beginning of the war—a diary to which I personally had to contribute and did contribute much.

COL. AMEN: Was it a part of your duties to make entries in that diary?

LAHOUSEN: No, it was not a part of my actual duties, but it naturally fell to me to write entries on the conferences which I attended with Canaris or as his representative.

COL. AMEN: And did you keep copies of the entries which you made in Canaris’ diary?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I kept copies, with Canaris’ knowledge and approval.

COL. AMEN: Do you have the original of some of those copies with you here today?

LAHOUSEN: I do not have them on me, but they are available here.

COL. AMEN: And you have refreshed your recollection in reference to those entries?

LAHOUSEN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of Canaris in keeping such a diary?

LAHOUSEN: As a truthful answer to this question I must repeat what Canaris himself said to me on this subject: