Afternoon Session

If the Tribunal please, needless to say, when I cite Adolf Hitler, I don’t necessarily vouch for the absolute truth of everything that he presents. This is a public speech he made before the world, and it is for the Tribunal to judge whether he is presenting a pretext or whether he is presenting the truth.

In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect training of a military nature. This included not only the training of military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other para-military organizations, such as the police force, which could be, and were absorbed by, the Army.

These are shown in other parts of the case presented by the Prosecution. However, the extent of this program for military training is indicated by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of 90 billion Reichsmark during the period of 1933 to 1939 in the building up of the Armed Forces.

I have another volume of the Völkischer Beobachter, Volume 52, 1939—I think the issue of 2 and 3 September 1939—which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-39; and there appears a speech by Adolf Hitler, with his picture, under the heading which, if I may be permitted to try to translate, reads: “The Führer Announces the Battle for the Justice and Security of the Reich.”

That is a speech, if the Court please, by Adolf Hitler, on 1 September 1939, the date of the attack on Poland, identified by our number 2322-PS, and I read from the bottom of Page 3, the last paragraph starting on the page:

“For more than 6 years now, I have been engaged in building up the German Armed Forces. During this period more than 90 billion Reichsmark were spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be shaken.”

The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early development is illustrated by a reference to the secret training of flying personnel, back in 1932, as well as the early plans to build a military air force. A report was sent to the Defendant Hess in a letter from one Schickedantz to the Defendant Rosenberg for delivery to Hess. I suppose that Schickedantz was very anxious that no one but Hess should get this letter, and therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal delivery.

This document points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized as to enable their transfer into the military air force organization.

This letter is our Document 1143-PS, dated 20 October 1932, and I now offer it in evidence as U. S. Exhibit 40. It starts: “Lieber Alfred” (referring to Alfred Rosenberg), and is signed: “Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo.” Amo, I think, was the first name of Schickedantz.

“Dear Alfred: I am sending you enclosed a communication from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential man”—Vertrauensmann—“which indeed is very interesting. I believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our long friend.”

I suppose that means “our tall friend.” I may interpolate that the Defendant Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, identified this “big friend” or “tall friend” as being one Von Alvensleben.

“I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere. Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo.”

“Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to provide for the case of the armament of the Air Force.

“Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred to Colonel Von Willberg, at present Commander of Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichswehr, is going on leave of absence.

“(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air-lines in such a way as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.

“(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to be done within the organization for military flying of the Stahlhelm”—I believe that means the “steel helmet”—“which is being turned over to Colonel Hänel, retired.

“All existing organizations for sport-flying are to be used for military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization, proprietor, and crew, in the proportion of 10-20-20. . . . Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organization.”

The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German Navy in this rearmament program, secret at first.

When they deemed it safe to say so, they openly acknowledged that it had always been their objective to break Versailles.

In 1937 the Navy High Command published a secret book entitled The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935. The preface refers to the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The table of contents includes a variety of Navy activities, such as saving of coastal guns from destruction as required by Versailles; independent armament measures behind the back of the Government and behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection of the U-boat arm; economic rearmament and camouflage rearmament from 1933 to the freedom from the restrictions in 1935.

This document points out the significant effect of the seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature of the rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy, which was only hampered in so far as concealment of rearmament had to be considered in compliance with the Versailles Treaty.

With the restoration of what was called the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935 and the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, the external camouflage of rearmament was eliminated.

We have, if the Court please, a photostat of the German printed book to which I have referred, entitled Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles (The Fight of the Navy against Versailles) 1919 to 1935, written by Sea Captain Schüssler. It has the symbol of the Nazi Party with the swastika in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed “Secret”, underscored. It is our Document C-156. It is a book of 76 pages of text, followed by index lists and charts. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-41. I may say that the Defendant Raeder identified this book in a recent interrogation and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time to make progress in naval development. I should like to read from this book, if the Court please, the preface and one or two other portions of the book:

“The object and aim of this memorandum, under the heading ‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich Navy, after the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow, did not rest but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man Navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so create, by the work of soldiers and technicians, the primary condition for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more clearly the services of these men, who, without being known in wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal and responsibility in the service of the fight against the Peace Treaty. Thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, themselves and their positions unrestrainedly in the partially self-ordained tasks. This compilation makes it clearer, however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Führer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament in the coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial, and spiritual power, could the work of the soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will.

“Signed, the Compiler.”

Now I wish to invite the Court’s attention merely to the summary of contents because the chapter titles are sufficiently significant for my present purpose.

“I. Defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the Ruhr, 1923).

“1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction.

“2. Removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine weapons.

“3. Limitation of destruction in Helgoland.

“II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lohmann case in 1927).

“1. Attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich Navy.

“2. Contribution to the strengthening of patriotism among the people.

“3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.

I am ashamed to say, if the Court please, that I am not familiar with the story about Captain Lohmann.

“4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm.

“5. Building up of the Air Force.

“6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm.

“7. Economic rearmament.

“8. Miscellaneous measures: a. The N. V. Aerogeodetic; b. Secret reconnaissance.

“III. Planned armament works countenanced by the Reich Government but behind the back of the legislative body from 1928 to the seizure of power in 1933.

“IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in camouflaged form (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, 1935).”

Now if the interpreter who has the original German volume will turn to Chapter IV, Page 75—“Aufrüstung”—Concealed rearmament under the leadership of the Government of the Reich (from 1933 until military freedom in 1935):

“The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of decisive influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.

“While the Reichsrat approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which could only take a decisive attitude toward the rearmament of the Armed Forces. The Government took over the management of the rearmament program upon this foundation. . . .”

“This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General Von Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the Armed Forces, received far-reaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the Armed Forces. The whole organization of the Reich was included in this work. In view of these powers, the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duties of the accounting office of the German Reich.”

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary doctor, had received thereby a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered in so far as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the ordinary budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit for the provision of labor, which was made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schüssler, afterwards Commodore Foerste. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget.”

“When the Führer, relying upon the strengthening of the Armed Forces, executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned limitation on rearmament works, namely, the external camouflage, was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land, and in the air, for one and a half decades, and carried by the newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the Armed Forces, and as a part of it, the Navy, can lead with full strength towards its completion, the rearmament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world.”

If the Tribunal please, at this moment I have a new problem about proof which I believe we have not discussed. I have in my hand an English translation of an interrogation of the Defendant Erich Raeder. Of course he knows he was interrogated; he knows what he said. I don’t believe we have furnished copies of this interrogation to defendants’ counsel. I don’t know whether under the circumstances I am at liberty to read from it or not. If I do read from it I suggest that the defendants’ counsel will all get the complete text of it—I mean of what I read into the transcript.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the counsel for the Defendant Raeder any objection to this interrogation being read?

DR. SIEMERS: As far as I have understood the proceedings to date, I believe that it is a question of a procedure in which either proof by way of documents or proof by way of witnesses will be furnished. I am surprised that the Prosecution wishes to furnish proof by way of records of interrogations, taken at a time when the Defense was not present. I should be obliged to the Court if I could be told whether, in principle, I, as a defense counsel, may resort to producing evidence in this form, i.e. present documents of the interrogation of witnesses; that is to say, documents in which I myself interrogated witnesses the same as the Prosecution without putting witnesses on the stand.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if interrogations of defendants are to be used, copies of such interrogations should be furnished to defendant’s counsel beforehand. The question which the Tribunal wished to ask you was whether on this occasion you objected to this interrogation being used without such a copy having been furnished to you. With regard to your observation as to your own rights with reference to interrogating your defendants, the Tribunal considers that you must call them as witnesses upon the witness stand and cannot interrogate them and put in the interrogations. The question for you now is whether you object to this interrogation being laid before the Tribunal at this stage.

DR. SIEMERS: I should like first of all to have an opportunity of seeing every record before it is submitted in Court. Only then shall I be able to decide whether interrogations can be read, the contents of which I as a defense counsel am not familiar with.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn now and it anticipates that the interrogation can be handed to you during the adjournment and then can be used afterwards.

Afternoon Session

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. I should like to ask the Tribunal to note the presence and appearance, on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of Mr. A. I. Vishinsky of the Foreign Office, and General K. P. Gorshenin, Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet Republic who has been able to join us in the Prosecution only now.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal notes what Mr. Justice Jackson has said, and observes that Mr. Vishinsky has taken his seat with the Soviet Delegation of Chief Prosecutors.

DR. SIEMERS: In the meanwhile during the lunch hour I have seen the minutes. I should like to observe that I don’t think it is very agreeable that the Prosecution should not depart from their point that the Defense should only receive the documents during the proceedings, or just before the proceedings, or at times, even after the proceedings. I should be grateful if the Prosecution could see to it in the future that we are informed in good time.

Yesterday a list of the documents which were to be presented today was made in our room, number 54. I find that the documents presented today are not included in yesterday’s list. You will understand that the task of the Defense is thereby rendered comparatively difficult. On principle, I cannot in my statement of today, give my agreement to the reading of minutes of interrogations. In order to facilitate matters, I should like to follow the Court’s suggestion, and declare that I am agreeable to the minutes presented here being read. I request, however—and I believe I have already been assured by the Prosecution to that effect—that only the part be read which refers to Document C-156, as I had no time to discuss the remaining points with the defendants.

As to the remaining points, five other documents are cited. Moreover I request that the part which refers to the book by Kapitän zur See Schüssler, should be read in full, and I believe that the prosecutor agrees with this.

THE PRESIDENT: I understood from the counsel for Raeder that you were substantially in agreement as to what parts of this interrogation you should read. Is that right, Mr. Alderman?

MR. ALDERMAN: If I understood the counsel correctly, he asked that I read the entire part of the interrogation which deals with Document C-156, but I understood that he did not agree for me to read other parts that referred to other documents. I handed counsel the original of my copy of the interrogation before the lunch hour, and when he returned it to me after the lunch hour, I substituted in his hands a carbon copy. I didn’t quite understand his statement about documents being introduced which hadn’t been furnished to the defendant. We did file the document book.

MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is that the document book contains all the documents except these interrogations. They did not contain the interrogation.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you in agreement with him then, that you can read what you want to read now, and that it is not necessary for you to read the parts to which he objects.

MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. I understand he objects to my reading anything other than the part concerned with C-156. I would anticipate that he might be willing for me to read the other parts tomorrow.

This deals with the book which I offered in evidence this morning, Document C-156, Exhibit USA-41. The Defendant Raeder identified that book, and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time make progress in naval development. I refer to the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder at the part we had under discussion:

“Q. I have here a Document C-156, which is a photostatic copy of a work prepared by the High Command of the Navy and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the work.

“A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.

“Q. Was that an official publication of the German Navy?

“A. This Captain Schüssler (indicating the author) was a commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, it was an idea of this officer to put all these things together.

“Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?

“A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he tells here in the foreword.

“Q. And in the preparation of this work he had access to the official Navy files and based his work on the items contained therein?

“A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, and he would have had the files which were necessary.

“Q. Do you know whether, before the work was published, a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for comment?

“A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it only when it was published.

“Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?

“A. It was a secret object. I think all upper commands in the Navy had knowledge of it.

“Q. It was not circulated outside of Navy circles?

“A. No.

“Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained in the work, regarding the circumventing of the provisions of Versailles?

“A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word of the Versailles Treaty, but in order to have some advantages. But the flying men were exercised 1 year before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They did not belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were developed, but not in Germany and not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built only much later, when we began to act with the English Government about the Treaty of 35 to 100, because we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so, in order to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but we tried to have advantages.

“Q. Would a fair statement be that the Navy High Command was interested in avoiding the limiting provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding personnel and the limits of armaments, but would attempt to fulfill the letter of the Treaty, although actually avoiding it?

“A. That was our endeavor.”

MR. ALDERMAN: Now the rest of this is the portion that counsel for the defendant asked me to read:

“Q. Why was such a policy adopted?

“A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war by the danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia, and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this way; and so all our efforts were directed to the aim of having a little more strength against the Poles should they attack us. It was nonsense to think of attacking Poland in this stage by the Navy. A second aim was to have some defense against the entering of French forces into the Ostsee (East Sea), because we knew that the French had the intention to sustain the Poles. Their ships came into the Ostsee, Gdynia, and so the Navy was a defense against an attack of Poland and against the entrance of French ships into the East Sea; quite defensive aims.

“Q. When did this fear of an attack from Poland first show itself in official circles in Germany, would you say?

“A. In all the first years. They took Vilna; in the same minute we thought they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the German Government Ministers, the Army and Navy Ministers—Gröner and Noske.

“Q. Then those views, in your opinion, were generally held and existed perhaps as early as 1919-1920, after the end of the first World War?

“A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and about those years in the beginning I cannot give you a very exact picture, because I was then 2 years in the Navy Archives to write a book about the War and the fighting capacity of cruisers. For 2 years I was not with those things.”

MR. ALDERMAN: Likewise the same kind of planning and purposes are reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy. Although a copy of the book has not been found by us, the project was to have been written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler’s personal military historian. We have found the table of contents; it refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes of documents, which evidently were intended as the working materials for the basis of chapters, to be written in accordance with the table of contents. The titles in this table of contents clearly establish the Navy planning and preparation to get the Versailles Treaty out of the way and to rebuild the naval strength necessary for aggressive war.

We have here the original captured document which is, as I say, the German typewritten table of contents of this projected work, with a German cover, typewritten, entitled Geschichte der Deutschen Marine, 1919-1939 (History of the German Navy, 1919-1939). We identify it as our series C-17 and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-42. This table of contents includes such general headings—perhaps I had better read some of the actual headings:

“Part A, 1919—The Year of Transition. Chapter VII: First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects.

“(a) Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of naval offices in Civil Ministries et cetera. (For example: Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Helgoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade Canal et cetera into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934: Noske’s proposal of 11. 8. 1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin; formation of the Naval Arsenal Kiel.)”—With a reference to a group of documents numbered 75.—”

“(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns.

“(1) North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts.)”—referring to the group of documents numbered 85.—

“(2) Baltic (taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pillau and Swinemünde; salvage for the Army of 185 movable guns and mortars there.)”—I may interpolate that when the British offer in evidence the Treaty of Versailles, you will see the detailed limitations which this document indicates an effort to avoid.—

“(3) The beginnings of coastal air defense.

“Part B, 1920-1924—The Organizational New Order. Chapter V: The Navy. Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty. Foreign countries.

“(a) The Interallied Control Commissions.

“(b) Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich Government and the legislative bodies.

“(1) Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and automatic weapons.

“(2) Limitation of demolition work in Helgoland.

“(3) Attempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from 1923.

“(4) The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of ‘sports’ unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in naval recruitment).

“(5) Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since 1920 (projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, Argentina, and Finland; torpedo testing).

“(6) Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe (preservation of airdromes, aircraft construction, teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air-raid defense, training of pilots).

“(7) Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.

“Part C (1925-1932—Replacement of tonnage). Chapter IV: The Navy, the Versailles Treaty, foreign countries.

“(a) The activities of the Interallied Control Commission (up to 31. 1. 27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace Commission).

“(b) Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case.

“(1) The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation) their significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work from 1935.

“(2) Preparation for the restrengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, relationship to Spain, Argentina, Turkey; the first post-war U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927 . . . 250-ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an anti-U-boat school.

“(3) Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparation for a Naval Air Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Severa, later Luftdienst”—or Air Service—“GMBH; Naval Flying School Warnemünde; air station list, training of sea cadet candidates, military tactical questions ‘Air Defense Journeys,’ technical development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development Do X et cetera, catapult aircraft, arming, engines, ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland flight 1925, and the seaplane race 1926.

“(4) Economic rearmament (‘The Tebeg’—Technical Advice and Supply Company as a disguised naval office abroad for investigating the position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other war economic questions).

“(5) Various measures (the NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret investigations).

“(c) Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich Government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928 to the taking over of power).

“(1) The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and carrying on of other work.

“(2) Finance question (‘Black Funds’ and the ‘Special Budget’).

“(3) The Labor Committee and its objectives.

“(d) The question of Marine attachés (the continuation under disguise; open reappointment 1932-1933).

“(e) The question of disarmament of the fleet abroad and in Germany (the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931; the League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).

“Part D (1933-1939—The German Navy during the military freedom period).”

—which goes beyond the period with which I am at the moment dealing. A glance at the chapter headings following that will indicate the scope of this proposed work. Whether the history was ever actually written by Scherff, I do not know.

I would like to call attention just to the first two or three headings, under this “Part D—The German Navy during the military freedom period”:

“I. National Socialism and the question of the fleet and of prestige at sea.

“II. Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State.”—The main heading III in the middle of the page—“The Rearmament of the Navy under the direction of the Reich Government in a disguised way.”

The policy development of the Navy is also reflected from the financial side. The planned organization of the Navy budget for armament measures was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political objectives. Military political development was accelerated after the withdrawal from the League of Nations.

I have here, if the Court please, a captured document, in German, headed “Der Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934,” and marked in large blue printing “Geheime Kommandosache” (Secret Commando Matter), which is identified as our C-153. It has the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end. I assume it is the facsimile; it may have been written with a stylus on a stencil; I can’t tell. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-43. It is headed with the title: “Armament Plan (R. P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase.” This document of 12 May 1934 speaks of war tasks, war and operational plans, armament targets, et cetera, and shows that it was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. It shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period.

“The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for the realization of this target; this again requires a co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organization of financial measures over a number of years, according to the military viewpoint, is found in the armament program and provides: (a) for the military leader a sound basis for his operational considerations, and (b) for the political leader a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time.”

“All theoretical and practical R-preparations”—I assume that means armament preparations—“are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period.”—And “without any alert period” is underscored in the original.

The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-boat construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain ships. Work on U-boats had been going on, as already indicated, in Holland and Spain.

The Nazi theory was rather clever on that. The Versailles Treaty forbade rearming by the Germans in Germany, but they said it didn’t forbid them to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland.

Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval negotiations with England. We have a captured document, which is a manuscript in German script, of a conversation between the Defendant Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. It is not signed by the Defendant Raeder. I might ask his counsel if he objects to my stating that the Defendant Raeder, in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, admitted that this was a record of this conversation and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end.

That document is identified in our series as C-189, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-44.

It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the ‘Karlsruhe.’ ”

“1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement of D. and E. (defensive weapons).

“Führer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton ships. Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may not be stated.

“2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on, the Fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35-centimeter guns (like the King George class.)

“3. The Führer demands to keep the construction of the U-boats secret, in consideration of the Saar plebiscite.”

In order to continue the vital increase of the Navy, as planned, the Navy needed more funds than it had available; so Hitler proposed to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy.

We have another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder and Hitler on 2 November 1934. Of this I have a photostatic copy of the German typed memorandum, identified as our C-190. This one, again, is not signed, but it was found in Raeder’s personal file and I think he will not deny that it is his memorandum. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-45.

It is headed: “Conversation with the Führer on 2. 11. 34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the ‘Emden’.

“1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need he will get Dr. Ley to put 120 to 150 million from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later, in a conversation with Minister Göring and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.

“2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have six U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political situation in the first quarter of 1935,”—that’s the following year, foreseeing—“he stated that he would keep this point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence.”

“The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June ’35 according to plan.”

The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets was a program encouraged by the Navy, so that this industry would be able to supply the requirements of the Navy in case of need.

We have an original German document, again headed “Geheime Kommandosache” (secret commando matter)—a directive of 31 January 1933 by the Defendant Raeder for the German industry to support the armament of the Navy.

It is identified in our series as C-29. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-46:

“Top Secret.

“General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German armament industry.

“The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German armament industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing ‘self-sufficiency’ would in any case make such participation superfluous.

“However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the following contradictory corrective points:

“a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to a certain extent.

“b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German armament industry lies mainly in the military-political sphere. It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the deliveries to our Armed Forces. Its capacity must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over and above our own requirements.

“c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy, are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits, are not merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and foremost, to expand their output from the point of view of military policy.

“d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German armament industry and preparing the way for it in every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the world.

“e) If, however, the German armament industry is to be able to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be kept secret under all circumstances, in the interest of the defense of the country, is comparatively small. I would like to issue a warning against the assumption that at the present stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.

“f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by the Navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the purchasers are not made confident that something better is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need.”

This Navy program of surreptitious rearmament, in violation of the Treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazis came into power, is illustrated by a 1932 order of the Defendant Raeder, Chief of the Naval Command, addressed to the main Naval Command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo-tubes for S-boats. He ordered that torpedo-tubes be removed and stored in the Naval Arsenal, but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using only the permitted number—that is, permitted under the Treaty—at a given time, and storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective S-boats was constantly increased.

We have this German order, with the facsimile signature of Raeder, with the heading: “Der Chef der Marine Leitung, Berlin, 10 February 1932.” Our series number is C-141. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-47, the order for concealed armament of S-boats. That is C-141. I read from the first paragraph of the text: