We have shown in a preceding article[276] that every primitive being proceeds from three extrinsic principles—the final, the efficient, and, if we may so call it, the eductional or pro-material principle; that is, the term out of which the being is educed, which term, as we there remarked, holds the place of the material principle still wanting.
We are now ready to prove that every primitive being has also three intrinsic principles, not more, and not fewer—a truth the knowledge of which is of the utmost importance in philosophy, as it enables the student to point out without hesitation everything that may enter into the constitution of primitive beings, with the gratifying certainty that, when he has once reached the said three principles, his analysis is perfect, and can go no further. But as our proposition is altogether universal, its demonstration will need the employment of arguments drawn from the most abstract of all philosophical notions; and our readers must bear with us if we fill a portion of the following pages with dry, though not abstruse, reasonings. The determination of the first constituents of things needs precision, not ornament, as it is nothing more than the drawing of the outlines by which the whole building of metaphysics is to be encompassed.
Our first proof is based on the following consideration. Of every existing being two things are cognizable: the first, that it is, the second, what it is. In other terms, all complete being is knowable both as to its existence and as to its nature or essence. But while the existence of any given being is simply affirmed as a fact, the essence is understood as an object. Now, nothing can be understood which does not present itself to the intellect under the form of an intelligible ratio; for to understand is to see a relation of things, as intelligere is nothing but inter-legere,[277] "to read between"—a phrase which clearly implies two definite terms, between which a definite relation is apprehended. Accordingly, nothing is intelligible, except inasmuch as it implies two correlatives; and, therefore, since every essence is intelligible, every essence implies two principles conspiring through mutual relativity into an intelligible ratio. These two principles of a primitive essence are themselves intelligible only as correlated; for the constituents of a primitive essence are not other essences, as is evident; and therefore cannot have a separate and independent intelligibility. They are therefore absolutely simple and unanalyzable, and of such a relative character that they cannot exist, or even be conceived, separated from one another. The same is true of existence also, which has no separate intelligibility, as it is utterly simple and unanalyzable, and cannot be conceived or affirmed, except with reference to the essence to which it may belong. It follows, then, that every primitive being can be resolved into three simple principles, of which two constitute its real essence, whilst the third—viz., existence—completes the same essence into real being. Such is our first proof.
A little reflection will now suffice to determine the general nature of the two essential principles just mentioned, and to obtain at the same time a second proof of our proposition. Existence is the actuality of essence. Now, actuality can spring only from actuation; and actuation necessarily implies an act, which actuates, and a term, which is actuated. Therefore the two constituents of any primitive essence must be a real act whose intrinsic character is to actuate its term, and a real term whose intrinsic character is to be actuated by its act; whilst the actuality of the essence follows as a simple result from the mutual conspiration of these essential principles. Accordingly, every primitive being involves in its constitution three principles—viz., an act, its term, and the actuality of the one in the other. This last is called the complement of the essence.
Readers accustomed to intellectual speculations will need no additional evidence to be satisfied of the cogency of the two preceding proofs. But those who are less familiar with philosophy may yet want some tangible illustration of our reasonings before they fully realize the nature of the three principles and of their relations. We hope the following will do. Physicists show that if a material point moves for a time, t, with a uniform velocity, v, through a space, s, the relation of the three quantities will be expressed by the equation—
sv = t
It is plain that the three quantities, s, v, t, are the three intrinsic principles of movement. In fact, the velocity, v, is the act, or the form, of movement; whence the epithet of uniform applied to all movement of constant velocity; the amount, s, of space measured is the term actuated by the said velocity; the time, t, is the duration of the movement, that is, its actuality; for as movement is essentially successive, its actuality also is successive, and constitutes a length of time. Here, then, we have most distinctly the three principles of movement. Let us remark that the first member of the equation is the ratio of the term to its act, and therefore represents the essence of movement; whilst the second member exhibits the duration of its existence. The sign of equality between the two members does not mean that the essence of movement is the same thing as the existence of movement, but only that both have the same quantitative value. For it should be remarked that, although a ratio is usually defined as "the quotient of a quantity divided by another of the same kind," nevertheless the quotient is not exactly the ratio, but its result or value; and is not the equivalent of the ratio in quality, but in quantity only. In pure mathematics, which are exclusively concerned with quantities, the distinction between the ratio and its value may not be important; but when a ratio is viewed in its metaphysical aspect, the distinction is of great consequence. For a metaphysical ratio is not looked upon as the ratio of two quantities, of which the one is the measure of the other, but as the ratio of two realities, of which the one actuates the other, and which, though belonging to the same kind of being, are, however, of a relatively opposite character, as is evident from the very example we are considering. The space, s, and the velocity, v, are, in fact, conceived as quantities of the same kind, only because velocity is mathematically expressed in terms of the space measured through it in a unit of time; yet velocity is certainly not space, but is that by which matter is compelled to move through space; so that while the extent of the space measured in a unit of time corresponds to the velocity with which it is measured, velocity itself has no extension, but intensity only. Hence the ratio of space to velocity, metaphysically considered, is a ratio of extension to intensity, or of potency to act, as we shall presently explain.
The third proof of our proposition is very simple. The intrinsic principles of being must correspond to its extrinsic principles, each to each respectively. For were any of the extrinsic principles not represented in the principiated being by something real proceeding from it, and corresponding to it, such an extrinsic principle evidently would principiate nothing, and would be no principle at all. Now, we have seen that the extrinsic principles of primitive being are three. It is evident, therefore, that its intrinsic principles likewise must be three. The extrinsic principles, as before stated, are God's volition of bringing something into existence, the term of its eduction, and the creative power exerted in its production. Hence it follows that every thing created must contain within itself an act as the product of the Creator's action, a term as an expression of the term of its eduction, and an actuality as the accomplishment and fulfilment of the volition of bringing it into existence.
We may here remark that the act of the created being is produced by God as its efficient cause, proceeds from God's omnipotence as its efficient principle, and is produced through action as the proximate reason of its causation and principiation.
The term of the created being, on the contrary, comes out of mere nothingness, acquires its reality through the mere position of an act, is not made, but actuated, and therefore has no efficient cause, but only a formal principle, the reality of which is the sole reason why the term is called real, and the disappearance of which would leave nothing behind. As a spherical form, by the necessity of its own nature, gives existence to a geometric centre, without need of an efficient cause, so does the essential act to its essential term. Let the spherical form be annihilated, and the centre will be gone; let the essential act vanish, and the essential term will have vanished together with it.
Finally, the actuality of the created being proceeds from the act and the term as making up its formal source, or the principium formale quod; while the formal reason, or the principium formale quo, of its proceeding is the actuation of the latter by the former, and the completion of the former in the latter; for to actuate a term is to give it actuality, and to be actuated is to become actual; and therefore the result of such an actuation is the actuality of the act in its term, and of the term in its act, or the complete actuality of the created essence and of the created being.
Thus the whole being, by its act, its term, and its complement, points out adequately and with the utmost distinction the three extrinsic principles whence it proceeds.[278]
The fourth proof is as follows: Every created being possesses an intrinsic natural activity and an intrinsic natural passivity. It possesses activity; for every creature must have an intrinsic natural aptitude to reveal, in one way or another, the perfections of its Creator, as such is the end of all creation; but to reveal is to act; and, therefore, every creature possesses its intrinsic aptitude and determination to act—that is, activity. It also possesses passivity; for all contingent beings are changeable, and therefore capable of receiving new intrinsic determinations; and such an intrinsic capability is what we call passivity, or potentiality. The consequence is, that every creature possesses something by reason of which it is active, and something on account of which it is passive; which amounts to saying that every creature possesses its intrinsic principle of activity, or, as it is styled, its act, and its intrinsic principle of passivity, or, as we call it, its potency or its potential term. Hence the well-known fundamental axioms of metaphysics: "Every agent acts by reason of its act," and "Every patient suffers on account of its potency."[279] Now, since the same being that can act can also be acted on, it is evident that that by reason of which it can act, and that on account of which it can be acted on, are the principles of one and the same actual essence, and therefore conspire into one formal actuality, which completes the essence into being. Accordingly, in all creatures, or primitive complete beings, we must admit act and potency as the constituents, and actuality as the formal complement, of their essence.
These four proofs more than suffice to show that all primitive complete beings consist of act, term, and complement as their intrinsic principles. But, as I am satisfied that on the right understanding of such principles the soundness of all our metaphysical reasonings finally depends, I think it necessary, before we proceed further, to make a few considerations on their exact notion, character, and attributions.
The term of a primitive being owes its reality to its act. Before its first actuation, it had no being at all; it was only capable of acquiring it, and therefore was, according to the language of the schools, a reality in mere potency; since everything that has no being, but can be actuated into being, has received the name of pure potency.[280] Now, pure potency, though it is nothing real, is infinite and inexhaustible; not that nothingness can have any such intrinsic attribute, but simply because no limit can be assigned to the possible eduction of beings out of nothing through the exercise of God's infinite and inexhaustible power. And it must be added that such a potency is thus infinite not only with regard to the substances that can be created out of nothing, but also with regard to the accidents which can be produced in those substances, and with regard to the modes resulting from the reception of such accidents. This being admitted, it is evident that, when the term of a created being acquires its first reality, a pure potency is actuated by an act; but is not actuated to the full amount of its actuality, which is infinite and inexhaustible. Indeed, no act gives to its potency the plenitude of all being; but every act gives that being only which corresponds to its own specific nature. And therefore the term of a primitive being, though actuated in its first actuation as much as is needed to make it the real term of a determinate essence, remains always capable of further and further actuation; in other words, such a term is still, and always will be, entirely potential in regard to all other acts compatible with the nature of the first by which it is actuated.
Hence we come to the conclusion that every created being, for the very reason of its having been educed out of nothing, retains potency, as the stamp of its origin, in its essential constitution. All creatures, then, are essentially potential, and therefore imperfect; as potency means perfectibility. God alone is free from potency, as he is the only being that did not come out of nothing.
A second conclusion is that the essential term of a created being may be considered under two aspects—viz., as to the reality it borrows from its act, and as to the potentiality it inherits from its previous nothingness. Hence such a term must be called a real potency; the word real expressing the fact of its actuation, and the word potency expressing its ulterior actuability. Reality and potentiality constitute passivity.
It is not unusual to confound substance with the term actuated by a substantial act. Of course, the term cannot be thus actuated without the substance becoming actual; but, though this is true as a matter of fact, it does not follow that substance can be confounded with its intrinsic term. Sphericity actuates a centre; and yet the centre thus actuated is not a sphere, but only the intrinsic term of sphericity. In like manner the act actuates its potency; but this potency is not the substance itself; it is only one of its constituents.
The potential term, such as it is found in material substance, is called the matter. Hence all that plays the part of potency in any being whatever is called its material constituent, although such a being may not contain matter properly so called. Thus we say, for instance, that the genus is the material part of an essential definition, because the genus is potential respecting some specific difference, by which it may be further determined. In such cases the word material stands for "that which receives any determination," whether it receives it in fact or in thought only. In English, the words material and immaterial are sometimes used in the sense of important and unimportant. This meaning may be perfectly justifiable, but is not adopted in philosophy.
With regard to the act by which the essential term of a being is first actuated, it is necessary fully to realize the fact that this act is neither God's creative power nor God's creative action, but something quite different. It is true that all actions are measured or valued by their effects, that is, by the acts in which they end; thus we measure the amount of motive action by the quantity of movement[281] produced. Nevertheless, it is quite evident that the production of a thing, and the thing produced, cannot be confounded with one another. And, since action is nothing but the production of an act, the action and the act produced cannot be confounded with one another, even though they are represented by one and the same word. Thus the action of a painter is not the painting (substantive), although such an action is also called "painting" (participle). Again, the momentum of a falling drop of rain is not the action of the earth, although it is directly from it. And in the same manner the act produced by the Creator is not his creative action, though it is directly from it. Still less can we confound the act produced with the power by which it is produced; for though every effect is virtually contained in its efficient power, we know that it is not contained formally; otherwise the painting should pre-exist within the painter, and the momentum of the falling drop within the earth. As, then, the momentum of the falling drop has no formal existence in the earth, but only in the drop itself while it is falling, so also the act which proceeds from God has no formal existence in God, but only in the term actuated. To say that a created act is God's creative action or creative power, is no less a blunder than to say that a circle described on a blackboard is the power or the action of describing it.
The act which actuates its essential term, in the case of material substance, is called the form. Hence all that plays the part of an act in any being whatever is called its formal constituent. Thus we say that the specific difference is the formal part of the essential definition, because the difference is conceived as actuating the genus into species. In such cases the word formal stands for "that which gives any determination," whether it gives it in fact or in thought only.
Finally, the actuality of the created being corresponds, as we have already explained in the preceding article, to the finality of creation, inasmuch as it perfects the essence into being. This actuality has received different names, according to the different light in which it can be viewed and the different connotations of which it affords the ground. It is called the complement of the essence, its formal existence, its formal unity, its individuality. It is called "complement" of the essence, inasmuch as it satisfies all its requirements, and completes it into actual being; its "formal existence," inasmuch as it is the formal result of active and passive actuation; its "formal unity," inasmuch as it arises from two principles conspiring into unity of essence, and therefore of existence also; its "individuality," inasmuch as it is the unity of a concrete being; for individuality is nothing but "that on account of which a thing is formally one in its concrete being."
Some philosophers of the Scotistic school hold that "individuality" and "formal unity" are different things. They say that formal unity is not individual, but universal; because it does not include in its conception the individuative notes. They accordingly teach that the universal is to be found to exist formally in the individual; whence they have been surnamed Formalists, or Ultra-realists.[282] But it is not true that the formal unity does not include in itself the individuative notes. In fact, all existing essence contains in its own principles the adequate reason of its individuation, and therefore it cannot, by the real conspiration of its principles, be formally one without being individual also. Accordingly, formal unity, though universal in our conception, is individual in the thing itself.
It is evident that the actuality resulting from the act giving, and the term receiving, existence, exhibits itself as existence given and received—that is, as complete real existence. On the other hand, all real result has a real opposition to the formal principles of its resultation; for all that really proceeds has a real relative opposition to that from which it proceeds. A real relative opposition is therefore to be admitted between the real essence and its formal existence; and consequently essence and existence must be considered as really distinct. Not that the essence of a real being does not imply its existence; but because in the essential act and the essential term existence is contained only radically or virtually, not formally, in the same manner as the conclusion is virtually contained in the premises from which it follows, or as equality is contained in the quantities from whose adequation it results. Hence, as in the logical order the formal conclusion is distinct from the premises in which it is virtually implied, so also in the real order is the formal existence of any being to be distinguished from the real principles of the essence in which it is virtually implied. As, however, the act and the term, notwithstanding their real relative opposition and distinction, identify themselves really, though inadequately, with the essence of the actual being, so also the actuality of the being, though having a real relative opposition to the act and the term from which it results, identifies itself really, yet inadequately, with the complete being of which it is the actuality.[283] Whence we conclude that every primitive being, though strictly one in its physical entity, consists of three metaphysical constituents really distinct from one another on account of their real relative opposition.
We must here notice that the last of these three constituents—actuality—is scarcely ever mentioned by the scholastic philosophers. They, in fact, consider all natural beings as constituted of act and potency only. It may have appeared to them that by simply stating the fact of the concurrence of act and potency into one actual essence, the fact of the unity and actuality of that essence would be sufficiently pointed out. They may have had another reason also for omitting the mention of our third principle; for in speculative questions it is the essence of things, and not their existence, that comes under consideration; and essence, as such, involves two principles only—viz., the act and the term, as we have stated above. It is obvious, then, that in their analysis of the "quiddity" of beings, they had no need of mentioning our third principle. A third reason may have been that the act and the potency, or the form and the matter, in the opinion of those philosophers, were two things separable, as the Aristotelic theory of substantial generations implied; whereas the actuality of the being was not considered as a third thing separable from either the form or the matter, and therefore was not thought worthy of a separate mention.
But, the reality of this third principle being universally admitted, there can be no doubt about the convenience, and even the necessity, of giving it a distinct and prominent place in the constitution of any complete being. This has been already shown in the preceding pages; but, for the benefit of those who have never paid special attention to the subject, we will give a summary of the principal reasons why in metaphysical treatises the actuality of being should be methodically granted as distinct a place among the intrinsic principles of things as is allotted to the essential act and its term.
First, then, all being that has existence in nature is something complete, not only materially—that is, by having its term—but also formally, by having its own complete constitution or actuality. The difference between material and formal completion will be easily understood by an example. The sculptor carves the marble and makes a statue. The marble is the material term, and the figure resulting in the marble is the formal term, of his work. Hence the work of carving is materially complete in the marble and formally complete in the figure,[284] which is the actuality of the statue as such. And it is evident that, in speaking of a statue, such a figure is as worth mentioning as the marble and the carving. And therefore, as in the analysis of being we give a prominent place to the term which completes the act, we should do the same with regard to the actuality, which completes the essence. A writer in the Dublin Review, who has cleverly treated this subject, makes the following remark: "The constituents actus and terminus, or forma and materia, are recognized in the schools. The third constituent is not expressly mentioned there. But you hear of essentia and esse; and esse is the complementum. I have a fancy that the much-canvassed distinction between the ἐνέργεια and the ἐντελέχεια of Aristotle is really this, that ἐνέργεια is the actus, and ἐντελέχεια the complementum."[285] This remark is very judicious; for it is as certain that the complete being consists of essence and existence as it is certain that the essence consists of act and term; and, moreover, there is no less a distinction between the essence and its existence than between the act and its term. Hence the same reasons that led metaphysicians to give a conspicuous place to the act and its term in the analysis of the essence, show that a similar place should also be given to essence and its actuality in the analysis of the being.
In the second place, the formal complement of being is the only ground on which many different and opposite things can be predicated of one and the same being; as, for instance, activity and passivity, action and passion, to be, to be one, to be good, etc. It is, therefore, important not to leave in the shade that principle, without which no unity of being can be conceived.
Thirdly, an explicit knowledge and mention of such a complement is indispensable, in a great number of cases, when we have to explain how accidental modes not received in a substance can intrinsically belong to that substance—a thing which will never be radically explained without an explicit reference to the formal complement of the being in which those modes are to be found.
Fourthly, in the intellectual as well as in the sensitive nature the appetitive faculty cannot be accounted for, nor distinguished from the cognoscitive, unless we have recourse to this same formal complement, which constitutes the affectibility of the same natures—a truth which we must here simply state, as its demonstration belongs to special metaphysics.
Fifthly, it is unwise to expose the reader to the danger of confounding things having a metaphysical opposition to one another; for instance, the uniting with the union accomplished, the constituting with the complete constitution, the actuation with the actuality. But if the actuality is kept out of view when we give the principles of beings, such confusion will be almost unavoidable. I believe that it is owing to the omission of this third principle that even great philosophers have not unfrequently mistaken attitudes for acts, and actualities for forms.
Sixthly, after we have analyzed a primitive complete being, and found it to consist of three intrinsic principles, it is nothing but reasonable to keep them all equally in sight, and to make them all serve in their turn for the simplification of metaphysical investigations; especially as the distinct recollection of the act, of its term, and of the actuality of both will also draw the student's attention to the corresponding extrinsic principles—viz., to the creative power from which that act proceeds, to the nothingness out of which that term was educed, and to the last end for which that actuality obtained a place in the real order of things.
Lastly, by the consideration that these three intrinsic and relatively opposite principles constitute one primitive complete being, it becomes possible to account philosophically for the known fact that every creature bears in itself, in vestigio at least, as S. Thomas puts it, a more or less imperfect image of God's unity and trinity—a topic on which much might be said, were this the place for discussing the analogy between beings of different orders.
A few corollaries. From the resolution of complete beings into their intrinsic principles, and from the different character of these principles and of their principiation, a number of useful corollaries can be drawn, among which the following deserve a special attention:
1. It is a great mistake, and one which leads straight to pantheism, to assert, as Gioberti did, that creatures are not beings, but only existences. For if creatures have their own actual essence, they are not mere existences, but complete beings; and, if they have no essence, they cannot exist; as all existence is the actuality of some essence. Hence to assert that creatures are not beings, but only existences, amounts to saying that creatures have no essence, and that their existence is the existence of nothing—that is, non-existence. Moreover, mere existence is a simple actuality, and does not exhibit an intelligible ratio; hence, if creatures were mere existences, they would be intrinsically unintelligible, not only to us, as Gioberti pretends, but to God himself, who certainly does not understand what is intrinsically unintelligible. There is no need of insisting on such an unavoidable conclusion.
That the same assertion leads straight to pantheism is likewise evident. In fact, the absurdity of admitting existences which would be existences of nothing could not be escaped but by trying to pin them on the substance of God himself, and by saying, with the pantheist, that all such existences are nothing but divers actualities, or attitudes, or forms assumed by the divine substance. Thus, to escape one absurdity, we would fall into another.
2. Inasmuch as the actuality of a given essence makes a given thing formally complete, one, and perfect according to its entitative degree, it is to such an actuality that everything owes that it is formally good, and that it answers to the finality of its creation. Such a goodness implies two things: the first, that every creature is good in its absolute being, for it is in such a being that God's design is fulfilled of communicating his goodness outside of himself; the other, that every creature is good in its relative being also—that is, in its intrinsic aptitude and determination to manifest God's perfections in a manner and degree proportionate to the kind and degree of its entity. Accordingly, every created being is good not only as it is a thing, but also as it is a principle of action. In the first capacity it fulfils the immediate end of its creation, and in the second it fulfils by its action the ultimate end for the sake of which it has been made to exist.
3. Hence we further infer, that the essence of every created being is its nature also. For nature is a principle of motion, according to Aristotle, whether motion is taken as the action proceeding from that nature itself, or as the reception of an action proceeding from an extrinsic agent. Now, we have seen that all creatures are manifestative of God's perfections, and therefore that they have in themselves an act which is a principle of action; on the other hand, we have also seen that every creature has its potential term, and therefore passivity, or receptivity of new determinations. Accordingly, every created being, by the very nature of its essential constituents, is a complete principle of motion. Essence and nature are, therefore, the same thing in reality, though they are distinguished from one another in our conception. S. Thomas considers that these three words, nature, essence, and quiddity, apply to one and the same thing viewed under three distinct aspects; the word nature meaning the essence of the thing as connoting operation, since there is no natural being without active power; whereas the word quiddity means the same essence viewed as an object of definition; and the word essence is used to express the fact that in it and through it a thing has its own being.[286] Whence it follows that a complete being is no sooner endowed with existence than with activity, and is no sooner a being than an individual nature. And therefore a complete being and a concrete nature are really one and the same thing. Malebranche's theory, denying that creatures have any true causality, is therefore utterly untenable, as it cannot be reconciled with the first principles of metaphysics.
4. The entity of the active power contained in the nature of any being cannot be anything else than its essential act; that is, the very act produced by God in its creation. In fact, we have just seen that in all creatures the essence and the nature are the same reality, and that the constituents of the nature are nothing but the constituents of the essence. Accordingly, the nature of every creature consists of an essential act and an essential term; the one being its principle of activity, as the other is its principle of passivity. "The form," says S. Thomas, "is that by which the agent acts," and "By what a thing is, by that it acts," and "The principle of being is the principle of acting," and "Every agent acts inasmuch as it is in act." These axioms are accepted by all real philosophers. Hence the active principle of any complete being, and its essential act, are the same thing in reality, though they are distinguished from one another in our conception, in the same manner as are nature and essence; for the essential act connotes the intrinsic term of the essence, to which the act is essentially terminated, whilst the active principle connotes any extrinsic term to which the action proceeding from the same act is, or can be, accidentally terminated. This is what S. Thomas means when he says that "a natural form is a principle of operation, not inasmuch as it is the permanent form of the thing to which it gives existence, but inasmuch as it has a leaning towards an effect."[287] Such a leaning (inclinatio) should be taken to mean a natural ordination or determination to act.
Philosophers agitate the question, whether created substances act by themselves immediately, or by the aid of accidents. The Scotistic school holds the first opinion, whilst the Thomistic supports the second. For reasons which it would take too long to develop in this place, we are inclined to believe that natural accidents are not active, and that their bearing on the action of substance is not of an efficient, but of a formal, character; by which we mean that accidents have no play in the production of effects, except inasmuch as their presence or absence entails a different formal determination of the conditions in which the agent is to exert its power. It is true, indeed, that created substances never act independently of accidental conditions; but it is true, at the same time, that they always act by themselves without the aid of accidents, inasmuch as the active power they exert is so exclusively owned by them that it cannot even partially reside in any of their accidents.
As the active principle is really nothing else than the act by which the agent is, so also the passive principle is really nothing else than the essential term by which that act is completed. Here again the same reality presents itself under two distinct aspects; for the phrase essential term connotes the essential act by which the term is essentially actuated, whilst the phrase passive principle connotes any accidental act by which the same term is liable to be accidentally actuated.
5. Since a being possessing its three intrinsic principles is so fully and adequately constituted as to require nothing additional to exist, it is obvious that such a being contains in its perfect constitution the sufficient reason of its aptitude to exist non in alio et non per aliud, but in se et per se; that is, in itself and by itself. Now, to exist in itself is to be a substance, and to exist by itself is to be what philosophers call suppositum—i.e., a thing having separate subsistence; and, therefore, such a being, if simply left to itself, will be both a substance and a suppositum. In fact, the essential act of a created being, though always needing positive conservation on account of its contingency, needs no termination to, or sustentation from, a subject, as it already holds under itself its own intrinsic term, by which it is sufficiently terminated and sustained. And in the same manner, the essence of a complete being needs no union with any extraneous nature to be made completely subsistent, as it is already sufficiently complete on account of its formal actuality and individuality. Thus it is manifest that nothing positive is to be added to a complete being in order to make it a substance and a suppositum; it suffices to leave it alone without further sustentation and without further completion. By the first of these two negations, the being will exist non in alio, but in itself; and by the second it will subsist non per aliud, but by itself. Hence it is that the first negation is called the mode of substance, and the second the mode of the suppositum.
6. To be, to be true, to be one, to be good, to be a thing or a being, are convertible expressions so far as their real objective meaning is concerned, and are distinct only on account of their different connotations. A thing is called a being, inasmuch as it has existence. It is called true, inasmuch as its act suits its term, and vice versa. For the objective truth of things—i.e., their metaphysical truth—is nothing but their intelligibility; and the whole intelligibility of a being consists in the agreement of an essential act with its essential term; that is, in this: that the one adequately satisfies the wants of the other, and thus constitutes with it one perfect intelligible ratio or essence. Hence the termination of the proper act to the proper term makes a thing objectively true; just as the application of the proper predicate to the proper subject makes true a proposition. This objective or metaphysical truth is perfectly independent of our knowledge of it; it has, however, the reason of its being in God's intellect, in which the archetypes of all that is intelligible are contained, and to which the whole ideal order is to be traced as to its original source. A thing is called one on account of the formal unity of its essence and of its existence. It is called good, objectively and metaphysically, inasmuch as it is materially and formally complete in the manner above described, and consequently perfect, so as to require no further intrinsic endowment to exist.
The objective goodness of any being arises from its truth; for it is the mutual fitness of the essential act and of the essential term that accounts for their mutual agreement in unity of existence; whence it follows that the being will naturally exist in itself, and subsist by itself, without any further addition, as though finding rest in its own reality. But, that in which anything finds rest is its own good; and therefore everything that exists in itself completely is good to itself, while its act and its term, as the intrinsic factors of such a goodness, are good also, but only of an initial and relative goodness—viz., so far as the one is good to the other. Lastly, the word thing expresses the whole being as it is in its concrete essence—that is, the whole reality implied in its three intrinsic principles. Thing in Latin is res; and res, as well as ratio, are connected with the verb reor (to judge) in the same manner as pax (peace) and pactio (compact) are connected with the verb paciscor (to make a compact); and accordingly, as peace implies the compact, of which it is the result, and by which its conditions are duly determined, so also res implies the ratio, of which it is the concrete result, and by which it is confined between the bounds of a determinate quiddity. Whether the English words thing, thought, and to think bear to one another the same relation as the Latin res, ratio, and reor, we are not ready to decide.
7. The verb to be has not exactly the same meaning, when applied to a complete being, as when applied to its constituent principles. Of the complete being we say that it is simply and completely. Of the essential act we also say that it is, but not absolutely nor completely, because it has no existence apart from its term; existence being the result of the position of the one in the other. Of the essential term we should not say precisely that it is, but rather that it has being. This adjective predication is here employed, because the being of the term is wholly due to its act, without which the term would be nothing, as we have already shown; and therefore the term is not a being, but only has the being borrowed from its act, just as the geometric centre has no being but that which it receives from the circumference. Of the complement we do not say that it is, or that it exists, because the complement is the formal existence, not of itself, but of the being of which it is the complement, and therefore must be predicated of the existent being, not of itself. Thus we cannot correctly say that loquacity talks, nor that velocity runs: and for the same reason we should not say that existence exists; for as it is the woman that talks by her loquacity, and the horse that runs with its velocity, so it is the complete being that exists by its own existence.
Nevertheless, the verb to be, when used in a logical sense to express the existence of an agreement between a predicate and a subject, or any other mental relation between objects of thought, applies equally to all things conceived, whatever their degree of reality; because, inasmuch as such things are actually known, they are all equally actual in our intellectual faculty.
And now, with regard to the essence itself of a complete being, the question arises whether it should be held to be, or to have being, in the sense of the distinction already made. S. Thomas seems to hold that the essence of creatures cannot be said to be, but only to have being; for he teaches that in creatures the essence is to its existence as a potency is to an act. If this doctrine were to be applied to possible essences only, we might admit it without discussion; but the holy doctor seems to apply it to the actual essence also; for "to be," says he, "is the most perfect of all realities, because it performs the parts of an act with regard to them all; as no thing has actuality but according as it is; and therefore to be is the actuality of all things, even of the forms themselves; and for this reason existence is not compared to any existing thing as a recipient to that which is received, but rather as that which is received to its recipient. For when I mention the existence of a man, or of a horse, or of anything else, existence stands for something formal and received, and not for that to which it belongs."[288]
It is clear, however, that the actuality of anything is not an act really received in the essence of the thing as in a potency. For, according to S. Thomas himself, nothing is educed from potency into act, except through an act which is not originated by that potency; and therefore no potency contains in itself the formal reason of its actuation, but all potency is actuated by an act originated by an extrinsic agent. Now, such is not the case with real essences; for every real essence contains in itself all that is required to give rise to its actuality, as we have proved; and consequently, as soon as the essential act actuates the essential term, the actuality of the essence springs forth by spontaneous resultation, as the consequence from the premises, with no need of an extrinsic agent producing a new act. Granting, then, that existence is something formal, as S. Thomas truly says, yet it does not follow that it is an act received; it is only a resulting actuality. And therefore the real essence is not the potency of existence, but its formal reason. Existence is the complement of real essence, and presupposes it; and consequently gives it nothing but the real denomination of existent—and, perhaps, this is all that S. Thomas intended to teach, though his words seem to imply a great deal more. For, on the one hand, he very often employs the word potentia, not in the sense of passive potency, but in that of virtuality; and, on the other, he frequently gives the name of forms to those formalities from which things receive their proper denomination, and considers them as received in the things to which they give such a denomination. But in such cases their reception is of course only logical, not real, and accordingly the thing denominated by them is only a logical, not a real, potency, as it already possesses the reality of that by which it receives its special denomination. Thus we say that in man rationality is to animality as act is to potency; but this is true in a logical sense only, because man's animality implies in its constitution a rational soul, and therefore is already in possession of rationality.
To conclude: the essence of all actual beings is to be said to be or to exist rather than to have being or to have existence; and in the same manner the essence of a possible being is to be called a potency of existing rather than of receiving existence, so far, at least, as it is considered in connection with its intrinsic principles. The reader, if not accustomed to metaphysical investigations, will think that we, in this last question, have only amused ourselves with splitting hairs; to correct such a judgment, he has only to ask himself whether between being rich and holding borrowed riches the difference be important or trivial.
TO BE CONTINUED.