CAUTION
Keep the decontamination solution out of the patient's eyes.
(2) Trauma specialist care. During clothing removal, the clothing around bandages, tourniquets, and splints was cut and left in place.
l. Step 9. Dispose of contaminated waste. Dispose of contaminated bandages and coverings by placing them in a plastic bag and sealing the bag with tape. Place the plastic bags in the contaminated waste dump.
m. Step 10. Proceed through the shuffle pit to the clean treatment area. Have the decontaminated patient proceed through the shuffle pit to the clean treatment area. Make sure that the patient's boots are thoroughly decontaminated by stirring the contents of the shuffle pit with his boots as he crosses it. The patient will remove his combat boots and socks at the entrance of the clean treatment area or CPS; remove the protective mask at the entrance to the clean treatment area or inside the ambulatory air lock of the CPS.
The decontamination station as established for chemical agent patients is also used for biologically contaminated patients. The eight-man patient decontamination team is required for biologically contaminated patient decontamination procedures.
a. Remove the patient's personal effects. Place the patient's personal effects in a clean bag and label with the patient's identification. If they are not contaminated, give them to him. If his personal effects are contaminated, place the bagged items in the contaminated storage area until they can be decontaminated, and then return them to the patient.
b. Remove the Field Medical Card. Remove the FMC by cutting the tie wire and allowing the FMC to drop into a plastic bag. Keep the FMC with the patient.
c. Remove the patient's clothing. Patient decontamination team members first apply the 5 percent hypochlorite solution to the patient's clothing and the litter. Then, remove the patient's clothing as in decontamination of chemical agent patients. Bandages, tourniquets, and splints are not removed. Move patient to a clean litter as described for a chemical agent patient. Place patient's clothing in a plastic bag and dispose in the contaminated waste dump.
d. Decontaminate the patient's skin. Bathe the patient with soap and warm water or apply the 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution. The trauma specialist places a new tourniquet ½ to 1 inch above the old tourniquet, and then he removes the old one. The trauma specialist removes bandages and decontaminates the skin and wound with the 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution; he replaces the bandage, if needed, to control hemorrhage. Splints are disinfected by soaking the splint, cravats, and straps with the 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution.
NOTE
Use a 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution to decontaminate patients suspected of being contaminated with mycotoxins.
e. Transfer patient to hot line. Two decontamination team members move patient to the hot line. Request assistance from two other decontamination team members to transfer him to a clean litter as described for chemical agent patients. Place the patient's FMC in the plastic bag on the clean litter with him. Two trauma specialists from the clean side of the hot line move the patient from the hot line to the clean treatment/holding area.
a. Remove the patient's personal effects. Place the patient's personal effects in a clean bag and label with the patient's identification. If they are not contaminated, give them to him. If his personal effects are contaminated, place the bagged items in the contaminated storage area until they can be decontaminated, then return them to the patient.
b. Remove the Field Medical Card. Remove the FMC by cutting the tie wire and allowing the FMC to drop into a plastic bag. Keep the FMC with the patient.
c. Remove the patient's clothing. Patient decontamination team members first apply the 5 percent hypochlorite solution to the patient's clothing. Then remove the patient's clothing as in decontamination of chemical agent patients. Bandages, tourniquets, and splints are not removed. Place patient's clothing in a plastic bag and dispose in the contaminated waste dump.
d. Decontaminate the patient's skin. Have the patient bathe with soap and warm water or apply the 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution. If the patient is unable to bathe himself, a member of the decontamination team must bathe him. The trauma specialist places a new tourniquet ½ to 1 inch above the old tourniquet, and then he removes the old one. The trauma specialist removes bandages and decontaminates the skin and wound with the 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution; he replaces the bandage, if needed, to control hemorrhage. Splints are disinfected by soaking the splint, cravats, and straps with the 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution.
NOTE
Use a 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution to decontaminate ambulatory patients suspected of being contaminated with mycotoxins.
e. Direct patient across hot line. Direct the patient to cross the hot line to the clean treatment area. His boots must be decontaminated at the hot line before he enters the clean treatment area.
NOTES
1. Remember, do not remove clothing from an ambulatory patient unless he requires treatment in the clean treatment area of the BAS or clearing station. Only spot decontaminate the patient's clothing and evacuate him to the next level of care.
2. Place cutting device used in this procedure in a container of 5 percent hypochlorite solution when not in use. Most ambulatory patients will be treated in the contaminated treatment area and returned to duty. Upon removal of an ambulatory patient's clothing, he becomes a litter patient. The BAS and clearing station do not have clothing to replace those cut off during the decontamination process. The patient must be placed in a PPW for protection during evacuation (Figure G-7).
The practical decontamination of nuclear-contaminated patients is easily accomplished without interfering with the required medical care.
NOTE
Patients must be monitored by using a radiac meter (AN/VDR2, AN/PDR27, or AN/PDR77) before, during, and after each step of the decontamination procedure.
a. Remove patient's personal effects. Patient decontamination team members remove the patient's personal effects and place them in a plastic bag. Place plastic bag in a clean holding area.
b. Remove patient's clothing. Patient decontamination team members remove the patient's outer clothing as described for chemical agent patients. Do not remove bandages, tourniquets, or splints. Move the patient to a clean litter. Place the patient's contaminated clothing in a plastic bag and move the bagged clothing to the contaminated waste dump.
NOTE
Patients arriving at the MTF in MOPP will only have their MOPP removed. They can remain in their BDU unless contamination is found on it.
c. Spot decontaminate patient's skin. Wash exposed skin surfaces with soap and warm water. Wash the hair with soap and warm water, or clip the hair and wash the scalp with soap and warm water.
d. Transfer patient to hot line. Move the patient to the hot line. Two trauma specialists from the clean side of the hot line move the patient into the clean treatment area.
a. Remove patient's personal effects. Have the patient remove his personal effects and place them in a plastic bag.
b. Remove patient's outer clothing. Have the patient remove his outer clothing (or have a decontamination team member assist him). Place his contaminated clothing in a plastic bag and move the bagged clothing to the contaminated waste dump.
NOTE
Patients arriving at the MTF in MOPP will only have their MOPP removed. They can remain ambulatory in their BDU unless contamination is found on it.
c. Spot decontaminate patient's skin. Have the patient wash his exposed skin surfaces with soap and warm water. Wash his hair with soap and water, or clip the hair and wash the scalp with soap and water.
d. Transfer patient to hot line. Direct the patient to move to the hot line. Decontaminate his boots by stirring the shuffle pit contents with his feet before he crosses into the clean treatment area.
NOTE
If a new protective overgarment is not available, after treatment, the ambulatory patient must be placed in a PPW for protection during MEDEVAC to the next level of care MTF. Thus, he becomes a litter patient for evacuation.
Medical units must have protection from NBC attack and contamination to survive and function effectively. The extent of protection provided is only limited by the resources available and efforts of unit personnel. Protection as simple as an individually dug foxhole or as elaborate as the subbasement of a concrete building may be used. Expedient protection from the effects of biological and chemical agents are usually much less labor intensive.
The level of protection from radiation is expressed in terms of shielding. Material is available on the battlefield to construct/prepare expedient fallout shelters that offer substantial shielding against gamma radiation (see Table H-1). Generally, the denser or heavier the material, the better shielding it offers. The degree of protection afforded by a fallout shelter is expressed as a "protection factor," or a "transmission factor." The protection factor is simply the fraction of the available radiation dose that penetrates the shelter and reaches those inside compared to the radiation received by an unprotected person. Thus, a protection factor of 2 indicates that an individual in the shelter receives one-half of the radiation dose he would receive if unprotected. A protection factor of 100 (associated with about six half-value thicknesses) indicates that only 1/100 or 1 percent of the radiation dose reaches the inside. Transmission factors are expressed in percentages, or in decimals. Either refers to that fraction of the ambient unshielded dose that is received by personnel within the shelter. Fallout gamma transmission factors for some common shelters are shown in Table H-2.
Table H-1. Shielding Potential of Common Materials—Fallout Gamma Protection
| MATERIAL | 1/2 VALUE LAYER THICKNESS[*] | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| STEEL | 1.8 CM | (.7") | ||
| CONCRETE | 5.6 CM | (2.2") | ||
| EARTH | 8.4 CM | (3.3") | ||
| WATER | 12.2 CM | (4.8") | ||
| WOOD | 22.4 CM | (8.8") | ||
[*] 1/2 VALUE LAYER THICKNESS—THICKNESS OF A GIVEN MATERIAL WHICH REDUCES THE DOSE OR DOSE RATE TO APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF OF THAT FALLING UPON IT. | ||||
Table H-2. Transmission factors for Nuclear Radiation[*]
| INITIAL | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| ENVIRONMENTAL SHIELDING | NEUTRONS | GAMMA | RESIDUAL |
| BUILT-UP CITY AREA (IN OPEN) | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.7 |
| FOXHOLES | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| FRAME HOUSE: | |||
| FIRST FLOOR | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.5 |
| BASEMENT | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| MULTISTORY BUILDINGS: | |||
| TOP FLOOR | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.1 |
| INTERMEDIATE FLOORS | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.02 |
| LOWER FLOOR | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| BASEMENT | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.01 |
| SHELTER, CLOSED 91 CM (3 FT) | |||
| (EARTH COVER) | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.005 |
| ARMORED VEHICLES: | |||
| ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| TANKS | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| WOODED FOREST | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 |
| [*] INSIDE DOSE = TRANSMISSION FACTOR TIMES OUTSIDE DOSE. | |||
a. In many cases it will be unnecessary to construct field expedient or other types of fallout shelters. There are many structures and terrain features available that afford a degree of fallout protection. Existing fallout shelters are tunnels, caves, culverts, overpasses, ditches, ravines, and man-made structures. The best existing shelters are basements. Figure H-1 shows typical protection provided in buildings. Windows can be sandbagged or covered with dirt from the outside to provide additional protection.
Figure H-1. Typical shelter protection provided in buildings.
b. Planners should attempt to locate HSS units near existing shelters, whenever possible. However, if an HSS unit is already established, or must be established where fallout shelters are not available, then a shelter must be constructed. Elaborate shelters are not required, since they usually only need to be occupied for a few days. There are a number of field expedients that will serve to save personnel and patients even though they may not be comfortable for those few days.
c. When engineer support is available, a bulldozer trench about 2.7 meters (9 feet) wide and 1.2 meters (4 feet) deep can be dug (Figure H-2). The length of the trench will be determined by the number of patients/personnel to be sheltered. About 0.6 meter (2 feet) length of trench is required for each person to be sheltered. These trenches reduce exposure of personnel lying on the floor to about 20 to 30 percent of the radiation that they would receive in the open. Protection and comfort can be improved, as time permits, by digging the trenches deeper; undercutting the walls (care must be taken in this option; the earth may cave in); erecting tents over the trenches; and providing improved flooring. When used with other individual and collective protection measures, bulldozer trenches provide adequate fallout shelters for most situations; they can be provided in a minimum of time and effort. Trenches should not be dug in areas subject to flooding during rainstorms; a berm should be formed on the uphill side of the trench to direct water around the trench in the event rainfall occurs in the area. Undercutting will not be possible in sandy soil; also some form of support to keep the walls from caving in is required.
d. Dug-in tents (Figure H-3) for hospitals provide more comfort and require less movement than the bulldozer trench; however, they have two drawbacks. First, they offer far less radiation protection than the bulldozer trench, and second, they require considerably more engineer effort. This option should work well with GP tents, but will probably be hard to accomplish with the TEMPER.
e. Sandbagged walls around the hospital tents, as shown in Figure H-4, or lightly constructed buildings provide protection from fallout. Sandbagged walls 1.2 meters high give significant protection (20 to 40 percent transmission factor); however, the effort required to achieve the protection is such that it is marginally feasible. Sandbagging is an effective means for supplementing other shelters by—
f. When other shelters are not available, HSS units must prepare foxholes and trenches for patients and unit personnel. As time permits, improve these shelters by deepening, covering, undercutting, and sandbagging.
Figure H-4. Sandbag walls around tents.
a. When CPS systems are not available, well-sealed shelters (TEMPER, ISO, and GP) can significantly minimize or prevent the entry of CB agents. The ventilation system must be turned off, and kept off, before, during, and after the attack. The shelter must be totally sealed during this time to maximize protection. Table H-3 provides examples of protection values for well-sealed shelters. For example, a well-sealed TEMPER will only permit 1/60 of the CB agent outside to enter the shelter. If a persistent agent is used, be aware of agent off-gassing hazards. Persistent agents can penetrate TEMPER fabric and create a vapor hazard inside. In a CB agent attack, ensure that all staff and patients are protected by wearing their MOPP or are in PPWs.
Table H-3. Ratio at Nonpersistent Agent Concentrations (Inside/Outside) for Different Shelters
| SHELTER | RATIO INSIDE/ OUTSIDE |
|---|---|
| TEMPER TENT | 1:60[*] |
| GENERAL PURPOSE TENT, MEDIUM, WITH COTTON LINER | 1:50 |
| GENERAL PURPOSE TENT, LARGE, WITH COTTON LINER | 1:30 |
| ISO SHELTER | 1:60 |
| [*] THE VENTILATION SYSTEM MUST BE TURNED OFF ON ALL SHELTERS TO PROVIDE THIS LEVEL OF PROTECTION. | |
b. Sealing shelters to prevent entry of CB agents does not require elaborate materials or procedures.
(1) Materials needed for sealing shelters include, but are not limited to the following:
(2) All vulnerable areas must be sealed. Seal—
NOTES
1. Do not allow any entries/exits to shelters during a CB attack.
2. In hot climates the heat load will rise in sealed shelters with the ventilation system turned off. Personnel must carefully monitor each other and the patients. All personnel must drink plenty of water to prevent heat injuries; see FM 21-10.
Water supplies in areas with NBC contamination and in surface water supplied by runoff from such areas will most likely be contaminated. The contamination of water, whether intentional or inadvertent, may reach concentrations that will produce casualties. By special methods of analysis, the presence of contamination can be determined. Treatment of contaminated water requires chemicals and equipment that are only available to quartermaster water purification units; individuals or units should not attempt to treat their water. Decontamination of water is only undertaken when uncontaminated sources are not available; then ONLY with the approval of the medical authority (PVNTMED or surgeon).
a. Detection of nuclear contamination in water is accomplished by using the AN/PDR77, AN PDR/27 or AN VDR/2 radiac meters.
CAUTION
DO NOT allow the probe to come into contact with the water source; allow at least one inch of air space between the probe and water surface.
b. Detection of BW agents in water is accomplished by the use of field biological water test kits and specially designed collection and detection kits. The specialty kits will be provided as needed, and will be available to PVNTMED and supporting medical laboratory personnel. When required for the President and Secretary of Defense purpose, samples must be collected and prepared for shipment to the supporting medical laboratory. A chain of custody document must be prepared by the collector and maintained as the sample(s) is being transported to the supporting medical laboratory and throughout its transit to the CONUS laboratory. See Appendix F for details on suspect BW sample collection, packaging, chain of custody, and handling.
c. The Chemical Agent Water Testing Kit, M272, provides a rapid field test to detect chemical agent contamination in water. The test must be conducted before the water is treated with chlorine; the chlorine will affect the accuracy of the test for chemical agents.
When contamination is discovered the following actions are taken:
a. Mark the water source, using the standard NBC contamination markers, and ensure that personnel do not consume the water until approved.
b. Notify the commander that the water source is contaminated and unfit for drinking, food preparation, and personal hygiene.
c. Notify the supporting water production unit, such as the quartermaster water production and distribution unit of the contaminated water source.
d. The commander establishes safeguards to prevent personnel from using the contaminated water supply.
e. An alternative source of uncontaminated water is sought and used. The primary source for obtaining water is from quartermaster-operated water production and distribution points. Other sources are considered only when quartermaster-operated faculties are not available. Alternative sources that may be considered include—
f. Contaminated water must not be used until it has been treated by quartermaster water production and distribution units or other equally capable water purification units and approved for use by the medical authority.
Contaminated water requires additional equipment and supplies to remove the contamination. Quartermaster water purification and distribution units are equipped to perform these duties. See FM 10-52 for details.
a. Food Susceptibility. Stored, transported, and prepared food is susceptible to NBC contamination throughout the TO. Planning for any battle or operation must include food protection from contamination; food contamination detection; and contaminated food disposition (decontaminate or destroy).
b. Countermeasures. There are three primary countermeasures to overcome or reduce the NBC hazard to food:
(1) Contamination avoidance.
(2) Nuclear, biological, and chemical agent detection.
(3) Nuclear, biological, and chemical agent decontamination.
c. Priorities. The priorities for conducting NBC countermeasures are—
(1) Contamination avoidance. Contamination avoidance includes using natural and fabricated barriers to prevent, or significantly reduce the spread of contamination. Also, using specific procedures for entry and exit between contaminated and uncontaminated areas reduce the potential for spreading contamination. Use of these barriers and procedures may reduce the subsequent need for detection and decontamination.
(2) Detection, measurement, and identification. These activities are essential for determining the presence, extent, and nature of NBC contamination. This information is essential in identifying the existence of uncontaminated supplies, or decontamination requirements.
(3) Decontamination. Decontamination removes the contaminant and provides food that is safe for consumption.
d. Decontamination. Decontamination efforts require an extensive amount of labor, time, and supplies. The use of hasty decontamination is emphasized. That is, decontaminate just enough to sustain operations and keep fighting, rather than to make a contamination-free environment. Normally, decontamination efforts will be limited to the packaging and packing materials. Food decontamination will only occur in critical situations where other food supplies are not available. Most decontamination is performed in or very near the AO. Before beginning decontamination procedures, divide exposed food items into groups based on protection of item at time of exposure. These groups establish priorities based on ease of decontamination and the ability to monitor the food.
(1) Group I—Canned or packaged items exposed only to a chemical agent vapor.
(2) Group II—Canned or packaged items that are contaminated on the outside with a liquid chemical agent, a biological agent, or radioactive fallout.
(3) Group III—Unpacked or poorly packaged items that have been exposed to any NBC agent.
(4) Group IV—Food contaminated through the food chain.
An adequate defensive posture for a chemical attack will also protect food against biological contamination and radiation fallout.
a. Operational Rations. Operational rations include, but are not limited to, MREs; unit group ration (UGR), A; unit group ration, heat and serve; and medical diet supplement.
(1) Packaging materials and storage methods normally protect these rations. The packaging and packing of operational rations protect the contents from deterioration. As a result, the contents are protected from moisture, to include chemical liquids, chemical vapors, and biological agents. Operational rations delivered to an AO will usually have increased levels of packaging and/or packing protection. Operational rations are substantially protected while contained in the shipping cases, especially if protected with an overlay of fiberboard, shrink wrap, or film wrap.
(2) Enclosed storage is used whenever possible. Refrigerated warehouses, cold storage rooms, and even prefabricated refrigerators and trailers provide excellent protection. Underground shelters, caves, and tunnels that can be made airtight provide maximum NBC protection. Buildings provide protection depending on how well they can be closed and sealed. The basement of a building is a good storage place. However, keep in mind that chemical vapors tend to seek out low-lying areas. Storing rations indoors will protect them from liquid droplet and fallout contamination unless the building is damaged by an attack. Complete protection against chemical vapors is only offered by airtight closed spaces like cold storage facilities.
(3) Chemical protective measures are to be integrated into daily logistical operation to avoid the contamination of operational rations. Maximum use is made of alarm and detection equipment, overhead shelter, shielding materials, and protective covers. Back up stocks of operational rations should be dispersed to minimize the risk of destruction or contamination.
(4) An NBC Protective Cover or similar equipment will help greatly. The NBC Protective Cover is discarded and replaced upon becoming contaminated; it reduces overall decontamination requirements; and it improves the survivability of supplies and equipment. The NBC Protective Cover provides 24-hour protection against liquid chemical contamination. Detection paper used on the NBC Protective Cover will rapidly identify a contaminated cover.
b. Bulk and Fresh Foods.
(1) Field expedient or improvised storage may be the only choice available under high-risk conditions. Expedient storage for food supplies may be a natural or man-made depression lined to protect contents against moisture, and then covered with earth and sod. The earth gives good protection against all forms of chemical or biological contamination and nuclear fallout.
(2) Foods are only stored outdoors or in partially protected areas when absolutely necessary. Only cases of foods packed in cans, bottles, or airtight foil or film wraps, and foods packed in sealed boxes or multilayered wrappings can be subjected to exposed storage. Partial protection is provided by open sheds, temporary roofing, or tents. When subsistence must be stored in the open, give as much protection as possible. Protection material may include NBC Protective Covers, tarpaulins, tarpaulin sheds, or any other available covering such as plastic sheeting. Tarpaulins and other treated or waterproof coverings do not prevent contamination by chemical vapors, but they do reduce contamination from liquid agents. Canvas will keep out more than 95 percent of liquid contamination for a short period of time after the attack. The canvas must be removed soon after the attack to prevent the agent from seeping through onto the subsistence; placement of spacers between the covering and the food will greatly reduce this problem. Even the thinnest material will offer some protection and is better than nothing at all. Therefore, food supplies must be covered by whatever material is available.
a. Contamination.
(1) Following a nuclear detonation, food can become contaminated in three ways:
(2) Consumption of food contaminated with radioactive fallout may cause a risk of radiation injuries from internal radiation; that is, radiation from radioactive sources within the body. Most isotopes will pass through the digestive tract or be excreted very quickly. However, the intestinal tract may receive a considerable dose. Some isotopes are more hazardous because they are absorbed from the digestive tract and enter the metabolism of man and animals.
(3) Operational rations are safe when surface decontamination is performed before breaking the package. Operational rations stored close to ground zero may become radioactive from induced radiation. It is more likely, however, that the food will be damaged or destroyed by the blast and thermal effects of the nuclear explosion.
(4) Bulk and fresh food stored in the open without protection will be contaminated. Decontamination is very difficult and time-consuming. Efforts should be made to ensure proper packing to prevent food contamination from radioactive fallout. Packing made from hard and nonporous materials, such as plastic or multilayer cardboard with a smooth surface, should be used. In addition, storage facilities should be enclosed to avoid the entry of fallout. Any material used as a protective cover will give some protection against nuclear fallout. Protection against induced radiation, blast, and thermal effects requires a hardened shelter or underground storage.
(5) Food supplies require protection throughout the chain of production or procurement. Protection of the civilian-based food supply includes countermeasures along the production chain. Meats and milk are the most vulnerable products because of the possibility for concentration of radioactive isotopes (Strontium, Cesium, and Iodine). The primary, and possibly the only, protection of animal products is to keep the animals indoors and to avoid contaminated fodder. Immediate slaughter of food animals is recommended if there is a shortage of uncontaminated fodder. Also, food animals exposed to fallout should be considered fit for consumption and slaughtered using routine procedures. Unharvested crops cannot be protected.
b. Inspection and Monitoring.
(1) Fallout close to ground zero, especially after a surface burst, may be visible as dust. The presence of dust is an immediate indicator of contamination. Fallout on unprotected food produces a grittiness that is unpleasant and warns against eating the food. The degree and means of food protection (packaging and storage faculties) must be considered. Food in a building that remains intact should not receive enough contamination to be dangerous when eaten.
(2) Veterinary units have the AN/VDR2 Radiac Set and UDR13 dosimeter to conduct ground or aerial surveys for gamma radioactive contamination levels in an area. The measurement of the external gamma radiation in the fallout area is an indication, but not a quantitative measure, for the degree of hazard from food contamination. These units also use the AN/VDR2 Radiac Set for point detection of gamma and beta radiation sources. Food monitoring is conducted in an area with low background radiation. If the storage area is contaminated, the food must be moved to a cleaner area for monitoring. With the AN/VDR2, the initial food monitoring is performed with the probe cover in place and the probe passed approximately 6 inches from the surface. If the reading is twice the background dose rate, the food is considered contaminated. If the reading is not above the background level but contamination is still suspected, place the probe closer to the food with the beta probe cover off. Monitor meat and fish with the probe cover off; pass the probe approximately one-half inch from the surface of the food.
(3) Monitoring food contaminated through the food chain is more complicated; depending on the detection instrument used, special procedures must be followed. Gamma and beta emitting radionuclides in small volumes may be detected using radiac sets such as the AN/VDR2; however, alpha emitting ones cannot. They are rough instruments and may be used only for screening surface contaminated food. To evaluate the hazards; the isotopes contributing to the radioactivity must be identified. Surface contaminated food will contain a mixture of isotopes with some more hazardous than others, depending upon whether they are used by the body. Milk will contain mostly I-131, Cs-137, Sr-89, and Sr-90. Meat and fish will contain mostly Cs-137. To verify I-131, Cs-137, Sr-89, and Sr-90 contamination, samples must be sent to laboratories equipped to analyze the samples.
(4) All newly selected food supplies must be surveyed. Begin continuous monitoring immediately following receipt of a fallout warning, or when increased levels of radiation are detected by periodic monitoring.
(5) Periodic monitoring is needed to establish baseline levels of background radiation in the environment and various food products. This monitoring is performed during peacetime, when possible, and throughout the time US forces are deployed in a TO.