"Resolved, That the United States cannot, without a sacrifice of their rights, honor, and independence, submit to the late edicts of Great Britain—and France."
The question was then taken on the first clause of this resolution, and carried—yeas 136, nays 2.
The question being about to be put on the remaining part of the resolution, viz: on the words "and France"—
The question then recurred on the second member of the first resolution; and the same being taken, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 113, nays 2.
The main question was then taken that the House do agree to the said first resolution as reported to the Committee of the Whole, in the words following, to wit:
"Resolved, That the United States cannot, without a sacrifice of their rights, honor, and independence, submit to the edicts of Great Britain and France:"
And resolved in the affirmative—yeas 118, nays, 2.
A division of the question on the resolution depending before the House was then called for by Mr. David R. Williams: Whereupon, so much of the said resolution was read, as is contained in the words following, to wit:
"Resolved, That it is expedient to prohibit, by law, the admission into the ports of the United States of all public or private armed or unarmed ships or vessels belonging to Great Britain or France, or to any other of the belligerent powers having in force orders or decrees violating the lawful commerce and neutral rights of the United States."
The question then recurring on the first member of the original resolution, as proposed to be divided on a motion of Mr. D. R. Williams, and hereinbefore recited, a division of the question on the first said member of the resolution was called for by Mr. Gardenier, from the commencement of the same to the words "Great Britain," as contained in the words following, to wit:
"Resolved, That it is expedient to prohibit, by law, the admission into the ports of the United States of all public or private armed or unarmed ships or vessels belonging to Great Britain."
The question being taken that the House do agree to the same, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 92, nays 29.
A farther division of the question was moved by Mr. Elliot, on the said first member of the resolution, on the words "or France," immediately following the words "Great Britain," hereinbefore recited: And the question being put thereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 97, nays. 24.
And on the question that the House do agree to the second member of the said second resolution, contained in the words following, to wit:
"Or to any other of the belligerent powers having in force orders or decrees violating the lawful commerce and neutral rights of the United States:"
It was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 96, nays 26.
The question then being on the residue of the said resolution contained in the following words:
"And, also, the importation of any goods, wares, or merchandise, the growth, produce, or manufacture, of the dominions of any of the said powers, or imported from any place in the possession of either:"
The question was taken, and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 82, nays 36.
The main question was then taken that the House do agree to the said second resolution, as reported from the Committee of the whole House, and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 84, nays 30, as follows:
Yeas.—Lemuel J. Alston, Willis Alston, jun., Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, Joseph Barker, Burwell Bassett, William W. Bibb, William Blackledge, John Blake, jun., Thomas Blount, Adam Boyd, John Boyle, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, George W. Campbell, Matthew Clay, Joseph Clopton, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, Joseph Desha, Daniel M. Durell, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, Jas. Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Francis Gardner, Thomas Gholson, jun., Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Isaiah L. Green, John Heister, William Helms, James Holland, David Holmes, Benjamin Howard, Reuben Humphreys, Daniel Ilsley, John G. Jackson, Richard M. Johnson, Walter Jones, Thomas Kenan, William Kirkpatrick, John Lambert, John Love, Nathaniel Macon, Robert Marion, William McCreery, John Montgomery, Nicholas R. Moore, Thos. Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, John Morrow, Roger Nelson, Thos. Newbold, Thomas Newton, Wilson C. Nicholas, John Porter, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Matthias Richards, Benjamin Say, Ebenezer Seaver, Samuel Shaw, Dennis Smelt, John Smilie, Jedediah K. Smith, John Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Clement Storer, John Taylor, George M. Troup, James I. Van Allen, Archibald Van Horne, Daniel C. Verplanck, Jesse Wharton, Robert Whitehill, Isaac Wilbour, David R. Williams, Alexander Wilson, and Richard Wynn.
Nays.—Evan Alexander, John Campbell, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden, John Culpeper, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, jun., Jas. Elliot, William Ely, Barent Gardenier, John Harris, Richard Jackson, Robert Jenkins, James Kelly, Philip B. Key, Joseph Lewis, jun., Matthew Lyon, Josiah Masters, William Milnor, Jonathan O. Mosely, Timothy Pitkin, jun., Josiah Quincy, John Russell, James Sloan, L. B. Sturges, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Jabez Upham, Philip Van Cortlandt, and Killian K. Van Rensselaer.
And on the question that the House do concur with the Committee of the Whole in their agreement to the third resolution, in the words following, to wit:
Resolved, That measures ought to be immediately taken for placing the country in a more complete state of defence:
It was unanimously resolved in the affirmative.
On motion of Mr. George W. Campbell,
Ordered, That the second resolution be referred to the committee appointed on so much of the Message from the President of the United States, at the commencement of the present session, as respects our relations with foreign powers, with leave to report thereon by way of bill or bills.
On motion of Mr. George W. Campbell,
Ordered, That the third resolution be referred to the committee appointed, on the 8th ultimo, on so much of the said Message from the President of the United States as relates to the Military and Naval Establishments, with leave to report thereon by bill, or bills.
Miranda's Expedition.
Mr. Love called for the order of the day on the report of the committee on the subject of the thirty-six persons confined in Carthagena, South America. The following is the resolution reported by the committee:
Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to adopt the most immediate and efficacious means in his power to obtain from the Viceroy of Grenada, in South America, or other proper authority, the liberation of thirty-six American citizens, condemned on a charge of piracy, and now held in slavery in the vaults of St. Clara, in Carthagena, and that the sum of —— dollars be appropriated to that purpose.
Mr. D. R. Williams moved to postpone the consideration of the subject indefinitely. Negatived—50 to 36.
The House then went into a Committee of the Whole on the subject—39 to 33.
Mr. Love moved to amend the resolution by striking out the words in italics, and inserting "authorized to request."—Carried, ayes 54.
Those gentlemen who supported this resolution in the debate were Messrs. Love, Lyon, Bacon, Nelson, Sloan, and Wilbour. Those who opposed it were Messrs. D. R. Williams, Taylor, Smilie, Macon, and Southard.
The gentlemen who opposed the resolution, among other objections, contended that an agreement to the resolution would but involve the Government in difficulty without answering any good purpose; that it would in fact be aiding the attempt of a certain party to prove that the General Government had some connection with this expedition originally, which it certainly had not; that the facts set forth in the petition were wholly unsupported by evidence; that these persons had engaged themselves in a foreign service; that they had become weary of the privileges of freemen, and had entered into a hostile expedition against a foreign country, and, in so doing, had been taken, condemned for piracy, and immured as a punishment for that offence; that the British Government, having been at the bottom of this business, was the proper power to release these persons, and indeed had applied to the Spanish commander for the purpose; that even were the United States bound by the laws of justice or humanity to intercede for these persons, they knew not to whom to make application, and would probably meet with a refusal, perhaps a rude one, if any judgment could be formed from the present situation of our affairs with Spain; that if gentlemen wished for objects on which to exercise their humanity, they might find them in the lacerated backs of our impressed seamen, without extending it to criminals. In reply to an observation of Mr. Lyon, that if we did not get these men Great Britain would do so, and employ them to extend her naval force, Mr. Macon replied, if she did, she was welcome to keep them; but she was in the habit of supplying her navy with seamen from our vessels, without the trouble which the acquisition of these men might occasion her.
In reply to these objections, and in support of the resolution, the humanity of the House was strongly appealed to. It was urged that the Government could in nowise be involved by an appeal to the generosity of the provincial government; that these men had not wilfully committed piracy, but had been deluded under various pretences to join the expedition; that they had joined it under a belief that they were entering into the service of the United States; that, even admitting them to have been indiscreetly led to join the enterprise, knowing it to be destined for a foreign service, yet, that they had been sufficiently punished by the penalty they had already undergone; that it was wholly immaterial what inference any persons might draw from the conduct of the United States in this respect, as to their concern with the original expedition; that such considerations should have no weight with the House; that if these poor fellows were guilty, they had repented of it; and Mr. Nelson quoted on this point the Scriptures, to show that there should be more joy over one sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine who have no need of repentance. In reply to an intimation that it was not even ascertained that they were American citizens, Mr. Bacon observed that one of them had been born in the same town in which he was, and was of a reputable family.
The resolution was negatived by the committee—49 to 31.
The committee rose and reported the resolution, which report the House agreed now to consider—ayes 57.
The question of concurrence with the committee in their disagreement to the resolution, was decided by yeas and nays, 50 to 34.
On motion, the House adjourned.
A new member, to wit, Joseph Story, returned to serve in this House, as a member for the State of Massachusetts, in the room of Jacob Crowninshield, deceased, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.
Captain Pike's Expedition.
On motion of Mr. J. Montgomery, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill making compensation to Z. M. Pike and his companions.
[The first section of this bill grants to Captain Pike and his companions a certain quantity of land. The second section allows them double pay during the time they were engaged in exploring the western country.]
Mr. Stanford moved to strike out the first section of the bill; which was negatived—53 to 38.
The second section was stricken out—42 to 35.
A considerable debate took place on this bill, in which Messrs. Montgomery, Lyon and Alexander supported the bill, and Messrs. Macon, Durell, Stanford and Tallmadge opposed it.
The bill being gone through, was reported to the House.
Division of the Indiana Territory.
Mr. Thomas, from the committee appointed on the thirteenth instant, to inquire into the expediency of dividing the Indiana Territory, made a report thereon; which was read, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next. The report is as follows:
That, by the fifth article of the ordinance of Congress for the government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the river Ohio, it is stipulated that there shall be formed in the said Territory no less than three, nor more than five States; and the boundaries of the States, as soon as Virginia shall alter her act of cession, and consent to the same, shall become fixed and established, as follows:
The Western State shall be bounded by the Mississippi, the Ohio, and Wabash rivers; a direct line drawn from the Wabash and Post Vincennes, due north, to the Territorial line between the United States and Canada, and by the said Territorial line to the Lake of the Woods and Mississippi.
The middle State shall be bounded by the said direct line, the Wabash, from Post Vincennes to the Ohio; by the Ohio, by a direct line drawn due north from the mouth of the Great Miami, to the said Territorial line, and by the said Territorial line.
The Eastern State shall be bounded by the last-mentioned direct line, the Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the said Territorial line: Provided, however, and it is further understood and declared, that the boundaries of these three States shall be subject so far to be altered, that if Congress shall hereafter find it expedient, they shall have authority to form one or two States in that part of the said Territory which lies north of an east and west line drawn through the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan. And whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State Government: Provided, the constitution and government so to be formed shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles; and, so far as it can be consistent with the general interest of the Confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and when there shall be a less number of free inhabitants in the State than sixty thousand.
By the aforesaid article, it appears to your committee that the line fixed as the boundary of the States to be formed in the Indiana Territory is unalterable, unless by common consent; that the line of demarcation, which the Wabash affords between the eastern and western portion of said Territory, added to the wide extent of wilderness country which separates the population in each, constitute reasons in favor of a division, founded on the soundest policy, and conformable with the natural situation of the country. The vast distance from the settlements of the Wabash to the present seat of Territorial government, renders the administration of justice burdensome and expensive to them in the highest degree. The superior courts of the Territory are, by law, established at Vincennes; at which place suitors, residing in every part of the Territory, are compelled to attend with their witnesses, which, to those who reside west of the Wabash, amounts almost to a total denial of justice. The great difficulty of travelling through an extensive and loathsome wilderness, the want of food and other necessary accommodations on the road, often presents an insurmountable barrier to the attendance of witnesses; and, even when their attendance is obtained, the accumulated expense of prosecuting suits where the evidence is at so remote a distance, is a cause of much embarrassment to a due and impartial distribution of justice, and a proper execution of the laws for the redress of private wrongs.
In addition to the above considerations, your committee conceive that the scattered situation of the settlements over this extensive Territory cannot fail to enervate the powers of the Executive, and render it almost impossible to keep that part of the Government in order.
It further appears to your committee, that a division of the said Territory will become a matter of right under the aforesaid article of the ordinance, whenever the General Government shall establish therein a State Government; and the numerous inconveniences which would be removed by an immediate separation, would have a direct tendency to encourage and accelerate migration to each district, and thereby give additional strength and security to those outposts of the United States, exposed to the inroads of a savage neighbor, on whose friendly dispositions no permanent reliance can be placed.
Your committee have no certain data on which to ascertain the number of inhabitants in each section of the Territory; but, from the most accurate information they are enabled to collect, it appears that west of the Wabash there are about the number of eleven thousand, and east of said river about the number of seventeen thousand, and that the population of each section is in a state of rapid increase.
Your committee, after maturely considering this subject, are of opinion that there exists but one objection to the establishment of a separate Territorial Government west of the river Wabash, and that objection is based on the additional expense which would, in consequence thereof, be incurred by the Government of the United States. But, it is also worthy of observation, that the increased value of the public lands in each district, arising from the public institutions which would be permanently fixed in each, to comport with the convenience of the inhabitants, and the augmentation of emigrants, all of whom must become immediate purchasers of these lands, would far exceed the amount of expenditure produced by the contemplated temporary government.
And your committee, being convinced that it is the wish of a large majority of the citizens of the said Territory that a separation thereof should take place, deem it always just and wise policy to grant to every portion of the people of the Union that form of government which is the object of their wishes, when not incompatible with the constitution of the United States, nor subversive of their allegiance to the national sovereignty.
Your committee, therefore, respectfully submit the following resolution:
Resolved, That it is expedient to divide the Indiana Territory, and to establish a separate Territorial Government west of the river Wabash, agreeably to the ordinance for the government of the Territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, passed on the 13th day of July, 1787.
Mr. Thomas, from the same committee, presented a bill for dividing the Indiana Territory into two separate governments; which was read twice and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next.
A motion was made by Mr. Wynn, that when this House adjourns, it will adjourn until Tuesday morning, eleven o'clock: And the question being taken thereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 60, nays 45.
Another member, to wit, John Rowan, from Kentucky, appeared, and took his seat in the House.
Naval Establishment.
The amendments of the Senate to the bill sent from the House for employing an additional number of seamen and marines, were taken up. [The amendments propose the immediate arming, manning, &c., all the armed vessels of the United States.]
Mr. G. W. Campbell expressed a hope that the House would disagree to the amendments. The President was already authorized by law to fit out these vessels, whenever, in his opinion, the public service should require it; and the expense which would attend them was a sufficient argument against it, if no urgent occasion existed for their service, which he believed did not.
Mr. Story entertained a very different opinion from that of the gentleman from Tennessee. In case of war there must be some ships of war of one kind or other; and it would take six months at least to prepare all our ships for service. At present they were rotting in the docks. If it were never intended to use them, it would be better to burn them at once than to suffer them to remain in their present situation. He believed if out at sea they might be useful and would be well employed. Why keep them up at this place, whence they could not get out of the river perhaps in three weeks or a month? He believed that a naval force would form the most effectual protection to our seaports that could be devised. Part of our little navy was suffered to rot in the docks, and the other part was scarcely able to keep the ocean. Could not a single foreign frigate enter almost any of our harbors now and batter down our towns? Could not even a single gunboat sweep some of them? Mr. S. said he could not conceive why gentlemen should wish to paralyze the strength of the nation by keeping back our naval force, and now in particular, when many of our native seamen (and he was sorry to say that from his own knowledge he spoke it) were starving in our ports. Mr. S. enumerated some of the advantages which this country possessed in relation to naval force. For every ship which we employed on our coasts, he said, any foreign nation must incur a double expense to be able to cope with us. The truth was, that gentlemen well versed in the subject, had calculated that it would require, for a fleet competent to resist such a naval force as the United States might without difficulty provide, four or five hundred transport ships to supply them with provisions, the expense of which alone would be formidable as a coercive argument to Great Britain. He wished it to be shown, however small our naval force, that we do not undervalue it, or underrate the courage and ability of our seamen.
Mr. Cook followed Mr. Story on the same side of the question. He compared the nation to a fortress on which an attack was made, and the garrison of which, instead of guarding the portal, ran upon the battlements to secure every small aperture. He thought their attention should first be directed to the gates, and that a naval force would be the most efficient defence for our ports.
Mr. D. R. Williams called for the yeas and nays on the amendments.
Mr. Smilie said that raising a naval force for the purpose of resisting Great Britain, would be attacking her on her strong ground. If we were to have a war with her on the ocean, it could only be carried on by distressing her trade. Neither did he believe that these vessels of war would be of any effect as a defence. They did not constitute the defence on which he would rely. If we had a navy, it would form the strongest temptation for attack upon our ports and harbors. If Denmark had possessed no navy, Copenhagen would never have been attacked. The only way in which we could carry on a war on the ocean to advantage, Mr. S. said, would be by our enterprising citizens giving them sufficient encouragement. Were we to employ a naval force in case of war, it would but furnish our enemy with an addition to her navy. He hoped the House would disagree to the amendments of the Senate and appoint a committee of conference.
Mr. Dana said that the amendments sent from the Senate presented a question of no small importance to the nation. Without expressing any opinion on the question, it appeared to him to be at least of sufficient importance to be discussed in Committee of the Whole. Coming from the other branch of the Legislature, and being so interesting to the nation, he wished that it might be discussed fairly and fully; and, therefore, moved a reference to a Committee of the Whole.
Messrs. Dana, Tallmadge, and Story, urged a reference to a Committee of the Whole on account of the great importance of the subject, on which a full discussion would be proper; and Messrs. Macon, G. W. Campbell, and Holland opposed it, because the seamen proposed by the original bill were now wanted, and the subject of the amendment was already referred to a Committee of the Whole in a distinct bill. Motion lost, 58 to 55.
Mr. Macon observed, that the immediate expense of this arrangement, if agreed to, would be at least five or six millions of dollars, and but four hundred thousand were appropriated by the bill. When he compared this bill with the report of a select committee made to the House of Representatives, he said he was astonished. A part of that report was a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in which the very number (two thousand) contained in the bill as it went from this House, was desired. Mr. M. adverted to the observation of Mr. Story, that it would cost Great Britain as much to keep one frigate as it would cost us to keep two. He thought the expense would be about equal. The expense of the transportation of provisions would be counterbalanced by the difference of expense between the pay of the British and American seamen, the latter being double of the former generally. He objected to this bill from the Senate because no estimate accompanied it. He thought they would go far enough if they gave the departments all that they asked. This House had indeed as much right to judge of the force requisite, as any other department; but he did not wish to be called upon to supply a deficit in the appropriation, which never failed to occur even in the ordinary appropriations for the Navy Department. Give the four hundred thousand dollars asked for, and the deficit in the appropriation will be at least ten times the amount of the sum appropriated.
Mr. Cook contended strenuously in favor of a naval force. He detailed the advantages which would accrue to the nation from a few fast sailing frigates. He said they were essentially necessary to defence. He expatiated on the difficulty with which any foreign power could maintain a force on our coast.
Mr. Holland did not profess to have much knowledge on this subject, but he said it did not require much to overthrow the arguments of gentlemen on the subject. What defence a few frigates would be to the extensive coast of this country, he could not understand. There certainly never had been a time when this country should rely on a maritime force as a sufficient protection. Indeed, he said, if we had fifteen or twenty or more sail-of-the-line, he should hesitate much before he would go to war with Great Britain, because these would undoubtedly be lost. Our power of coercion was not on the ocean. Great Britain had possessions on this continent which were valuable to her; they were in the power of the United States, and the way to coerce her to respect our rights on water, would be attacking them on land. He said he certainly did not undervalue the disposition and prowess of our seamen; and it was because he valued them, that he did not wish them to go into an unequal contest, in which they must certainly yield. Gentlemen might understand naval matters; but it was no reason that they should therefore understand the efficiency of a naval force. There was sufficient evidence in history to warn the United States against it.
Mr. Troup said he rose but for the purpose of stating facts which struck him as being applicable to the subject before the House. He referred chiefly to an extract of a letter written to himself and published in the paper of to-day. [Mr. T. then read the extract which appeared in the National Intelligencer on the 9th instant.] In addition to these facts, letters had been received, in the course of this morning, containing further particulars, which he begged leave to state to the House. After the officer (commander of a British armed vessel) had been forced on board his vessel, and while lying in our waters and within our jurisdiction, he had fired several shots at pilot-boats, passing and repassing, had been very abusive, and threatened the town with what he called vengeance; and, in addition to these facts, letters had reached Savannah from Liverpool, giving satisfactory information that vessels of fifteen or twenty guns had been fitted out for the purpose of forcing a cotton trade with South Carolina and Georgia. This information, Mr. T. said, came from unquestionable authority. And it was because he was unwilling that the people of this country should longer submit to the abuse of British naval officers; because he was unwilling that they should be exposed to the insolence of every British commissioned puppy who chose to insult us; because he was unwilling that armed vessels should force a cotton trade, when every man knew that nine-tenths of the people of Georgia would treat as traitors the violators of the embargo; it was for this reason that he was disposed to vote for the amendments from the Senate. The great objection which had been taken to them was the expense which they would produce. Economy, Mr. T. said, was a good thing in time of peace; but if this contracted spirit of economy predominated in our war councils, if we were forced into a war, so help him God, he would rather at once tamely submit our honor and independence than maintain them in this economical way. If we went to war, we ought not to adopt little measures for the purpose of executing them with little means; neither should we refuse to adopt great measures, because they could not be executed but with great means. It was very true that, in war as well as in peace, calculation to a certain extent was necessary; but, if they once resolved on an object, it must be executed at whatever expense. He was no advocate for standing armies or navies, generally speaking; but, in discharging his duties here, he must be governed by the circumstances of every case which presented itself for his decision, and then ask himself, Is it wise, politic, and prudent, to do this or omit that? He said he would never go back to yesterday to discover what he had then said or done, in order to ascertain what he should now do or say. Political conduct must depend on circumstances. What was right yesterday might be wrong to-day. Nay, what was right at the moment he rose to address the House, might, ere this, be palpably wrong. Conduct depended on events, which depended on the folly or caprice of men; and, as they changed, events would change. It might have been a good doctrine long ago that this country ought to have a navy competent to cope with a detachment of the British navy; it might have been good doctrine then, but was shocking doctrine now.
At that time England had to contend with the navies of Russia, Denmark, France, Holland, Spain, &c. Now England was sole mistress of the ocean. To fight her ship to ship and man to man, and it was impossible that gentlemen could think of fighting her otherwise, if they fought her at all, we must build up a huge navy at an immense expense. We must determine to become less agricultural and more commercial; to incur a debt of five hundred or a thousand million of dollars, and all the loans and taxes attendant on such a system, and all the corruption attendant on them. He should as soon think of embarking an hundred thousand men for the purpose of attacking France at her threshold, as of building so many ships to oppose the British navy. It was out of the question; no rational man could think of it. But that was not now the question. It was, whether we would call into actual service the little navy we possessed. It was not even a question whether we would have a navy at all or not. If that were the question, he would not hesitate to say that even our present political condition required a navy to a certain extent, to protect our commerce against the Barbary Powers in peace, and in time of war for convoys to our merchantmen. He only meant a few fast-sailing frigates, such a navy as we have at present, for the purpose of harassing the commerce of our enemies also. He therefore thought our present naval force ought to be put in service. As far as the appropriation ($400,000) would go, it would be employed; but if Congress should hereafter see cause to countermand or delay the preparation, they would have it in their power to do so by refusing a further appropriation.
Mr. D. R. Williams said it was his misfortune to differ with gentlemen upon all points on the subject of the navy. He was opposed to it from stem to stern; and gentlemen who attempted to argue in favor of it as a matter of necessity, involved themselves in absurdities they were not aware of. When money had been appropriated for fortifications, there had been no intimation that it would be necessary to prop them up with a naval force. If our towns could not be defended by fortifications, he asked, would ten frigates defend them? The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Story) had even gone so far as to say that a single gunboat could sweep one-half of our harbors. If a single gunboat could now sweep most of our harbors, Mr. W. said he should like to know what eleven hundred and thirty vessels of war could do, even when opposed by our whole force of ten frigates! The gentleman from Massachusetts had said it would be cheaper to keep these vessels in actual service than in their present situation. Mr. W. said he supposed that the gentlemen meant that they would rot faster in their present situation than if they were at sea. He said he was for keeping them where they were, and would rather contribute to place them in a situation where they would rot faster. Mr. W. combated the arguments that employing the navy would afford relief to our seamen, and that the maintaining a navy on our coast would be more expensive to an European power than the support of a larger naval force by us. And he said we should never be able to man any considerable fleet except the constitution were amended to permit impressments, following the example of Great Britain.
The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Story) had said that except we begun with this bill, and got his fast-sailing frigates, we should never regain our rights. If that were really the case, Mr. W. said he was ready to abandon them. He considered that the sort of maintenance of our rights adverted to by the gentleman from Massachusetts, would be destructive to those rights. Gentlemen must have forgotten that when Hamburg was in the greatest state of prosperity, she did not possess even a single gunboat. Why! there was not wealth enough in this whole nation, if every one were to carry his all, thus to maintain our rights against the navy of Great Britain. If we were carried into a war, and every thing really seemed to be tending that way, we must rely upon the enterprise of our citizens; and that, when set at liberty, would be found more desperate than the navy of any country. When we arrived at the end of the Revolutionary war we had but one frigate, and the best thing we ever did was to give that one away. The State of South Carolina had not yet got clear of the curse. She embarked one frigate in the general struggle, and she had not rid herself of the debts incurred by it yet. Private enterprise must be depended upon. The people from the Eastward had shown in the last war what they would do. When vessels were loaded with sugar they would fight like bull-dogs for it. He recollected a story, he said, of one of our privateers being beat off by a Jamaica man, whom they attacked. The captain not liking to lose the prize, and finding his crew disheartened, told them she was full of sugar. "Is she?" said they, "by G—d; let us at them again." They scarcely ever failed in their enterprises.
In allusion to the case at Savannah, Mr. W. regretted that an insult should be offered to the people of the country. The insult at Savannah had by this time been redressed, he had no doubt. He had no information to induce him to believe so, but the knowledge that the sloop-of-war Hornet was stationed off Charleston, and of course cruised near the place. The Hornet was perfectly adequate to drive any vessel of twenty guns out of our waters. She was one of the best vessels of the United States, and as well officered as any. [Mr. Troup observed that the Hornet was off Charleston. Now, he wanted a frigate at Savannah.] Mr. W. said that Savannah was the very place where gunboats would be perfectly effectual. He meant to make no reflection against the proposer of the gunboat system, but he did against those who had only given one-half of the system, and omitted the other—the marine militia. And now, when an attack was menaced at Savannah, gentlemen wanted a frigate! If nine-tenths of the people were opposed to the evasions of the embargo law, Mr. W. said it would not be evaded. The evaders would be considered as traitors—as the worst of traitors. As to preparing a force for the protection of navigation, the gentleman from Georgia must well know that the whole revenue of the United States would not be competent to maintain a sufficient number of vessels to convoy our merchantmen.
Mr. W. concluded by saying, that he wished the nation to be protected, and its wrongs to be redressed; but when he reflected that at Castine the soil had been most abominably violated, he could not view the insults in our waters as being equal to it; for, said he, touch the soil and you touch the life-blood of every man in it.
Mr. Durell considered the present subject as one of the most important which had been introduced at this session. It would indeed be difficult to reason gentlemen into a modification of a principle to which they were opposed throughout; but he trusted that this House was not generally so disposed. He believed that a large majority of the House were at the present moment in favor of embargo or war, because the House had been so distinctly told by a committee on our foreign relations, that there was no alternative but submission; and almost every gentleman who had the honor of a seat within these walls, had committed himself on the subject, either to persevere in the embargo or resort to war. What would be the object of a war? Not the right of the soil, not our territorial limits, but the right of navigating the ocean. Were we to redress those wrongs, those commercial injuries, on the land? Not altogether, he conceived. Would it be good policy, he asked, to let our means of carrying on war on the ocean rot in our docks, and not make use of them? These vessels would also be useful as a defence. Why then should they not be manned and put in readiness for service? It was said that we could not cope with the British navy. Mr. D. said this argument proved too much, if it proved any thing. If he did not feel perfectly comfortable in a cold day, should he therefore divest himself of all clothing? Why send out the sloop of war Hornet, alluded to by the gentleman last up—why rely upon it for redressing the insult at Savannah, if naval force was useless? It was no reason, because Great Britain had more vessels than we, that we should not use what we had. Indeed, those gentlemen who objected to naval force, appeared to be mostly from the interior, and of course could not properly estimate its value.
Mr. Sawyer was wholly opposed to the amendments from the Senate. The objection to this particular increase of naval force on the score of expense, was not to be disregarded. He called the attention of gentlemen to the state of the Treasury. The expense of this system would be three millions; and when this sum was added to other sums which would be requisite if measures now pending were adopted, it would render it necessary for Congress now to borrow money on the credit of posterity. The expedient of direct taxation would not be resorted to. It had already been the death-blow to the political existence of one Administration. This Government, he said, was founded on public opinion, and whenever the approbation of the people was withdrawn, from whatever cause, the whole superstructure must fall.
Mr. S. dwelt at some length on the disadvantage of loans. He said, if this nation was destined to raise a navy for the protection of commerce, it should have begun earlier, in the year 1793, when such outrageous violations had been committed on our commerce. The expense of such an establishment would have far exceeded the amount in value of captures made since that period. He concluded, from a number of observations which he made on this subject, that, on the score of the protection of trade, it would not be proper to fit out a navy. This proposition, he said, was the mere entering-wedge. The system was either unnecessary, or would be wholly futile in practice. Our seamen would cost us at least double of what is the expense of her seamen to Great Britain; and it required her utmost exertions to pay the interest of the enormous debt with which her unwieldy navy had saddled her. He therefore certainly thought that an attempt to justify it on the score of profit would not succeed. He deprecated the extension of Executive patronage, which would result from an increase of the Naval Establishment. Need he go back, he asked, to the time when the black cockade was necessary, in some parts of the country, to secure a man from insult from the officers of the navy? He wished to limit the Executive patronage; to adhere closely to the maxims of our forefathers. By sending out a navy, too, he said, we should volunteer to support the ascendency of the British navy, become the mere jackals of the British lion. Mr. S. went at some length into an examination of the former Administration in relation to a navy. There was nothing, he observed, in the nature of our Government, or of our foreign relations, to require a navy. If we could not carry on foreign commerce without a navy, he wished to have less of it and more of internal commerce, of that commerce which the natural advantages of the country would support between different parts of it. If we were to build a navy for the protection of foreign commerce, we should throw away our natural advantages for the sake of artificial ones. He was in favor of the embargo at present. There was more virtue in our barrels of flour as to coercion than in all the guns of our navy; and we had lately given our adversaries a supplementary broadside, which he hoped would tell well. Mr. S. stated the origin and progress of navies at some length, commencing with the Republic of Genoa. Our chief reliance as to defence must be on our militia. So little did Great Britain now rely on her navy for defence of her soil, that she had called upon every man in the country to be at his post, if danger came. Other nations might be justified in supporting a naval force, because they had colonies separated from them by the sea, with whom they were obliged to have means of intercourse, but we had not that apology for a navy. Mr. S. concluded his observations, after speaking near an hour, not, he said, that he had gone through the subject; but, as it was late in the day, he yielded the floor to some other gentleman.
Mr. J. G. Jackson said, that gentlemen should not be influenced, in discussing the present question, by a belief that they were now discussing the propriety of raising a naval force for offensive purposes. This was not the question. It was only whether, at this crisis, the House would employ a little force for the purpose of resisting attacks made on our territory at home. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Williams) had said that an attack on the soil touched the life-blood of every man in it. Yes, Mr. J. said, it did; whether the invasion was on our jurisdiction, on land or water, it touched equally the life-blood of the nation. He would as soon resist an attack on our territorial jurisdiction on sea as on land. It made no difference with him whether a foreign frigate came up to the piles of Potomac bridge and fired over into the town, or whether its crew came on shore and assaulted us with the bayonet. The territory, he said, was equally invaded in either case. Were we not to resist Great Britain because of her 1,130 sail of armed vessels? This would amount to a declaration that we must succumb to her, because she could at any time send a squadron sufficient to destroy our naval force at a single blow. This was the tendency of the argument. Mr. J. said it would be more honorable to fight, while a single gun could be fired, notwithstanding her overwhelming force. This mode of reasoning had a tendency to destroy the spirit of the people. He would never consent to crouch before we were conquered; this was not the course of our Revolutionary patriots, and he trusted it was one which we should not follow. He would rather, like the heroic band of Leonidas, perish in the combat, although the force of the enemy was irresistible, than acknowledge that we would submit. This naval force was not, however, intended to cope with the navy of Great Britain, but to chastise the petty pirates who trespassed on our jurisdiction; pirates, he called them, because the British Government had not sanctioned their acts. It had not justified the murder of Pierce, or asserted the right of jurisdiction claimed by an officer within the length of his buoys, &c., because, if she had, it would have then been war. For this reason he wished our little pigmy force to be sent on the ocean, notwithstanding the giant navy of Great Britain. Some gentlemen had opposed this on the score of expense. Our most valuable treasure, Mr. J. said, was honor; and the House had almost unanimously declared that it could not submit without a sacrifice of that honor.
Extra Session.
On motion of Mr. Smilie the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to alter the time of the next meeting of Congress.
Mr. J. G. Jackson moved to strike out the "fourth" Monday in May, and insert the "last," stating as a reason, that as the Virginia elections took place in April, the Representatives could not arrive here in time.
Mr. Macon wished a division of the question so as first to strike out, with a view to insert "September," instead of May. The motion to strike out was negatived—62 to 35. It was supposed that this question tried the principle of the bill.
The committee rose and reported the bill.
Mr. D. Williams moved to strike out May for the purpose of inserting "September."
Mr. Milnor hoped the motion would not be agreed to. If the new Congress could commence its session on the 4th day of March next, he said he should think it extremely proper that it should do so. And, if he could think that the majority would fix an earlier day than the fourth Monday of May for the meeting, he should vote for the present motion. He agreed with gentlemen that this was a momentous crisis; that the country was in a situation of extreme difficulty and danger. It appeared to him, therefore, that Congress, who were the guardians of the public welfare; to whom were confided the destinies of the nation, so far as the nation could control them, should be constantly in session, till a more favorable state of affairs took place. It was possible, but was it probable that any event would occur to alter our situation for the better? There was no hope that the belligerents would recede from their injurious restrictions on our commerce. It was not probable that any thing would occur which would do away the necessity of an extra session. The present Congress having determined to persevere in the embargo and the present system of measures a while longer, the peace and welfare of the country required that a different system should be adopted. The present had been sufficiently tested, and would never produce those effects anticipated from it. It was proper that an early opportunity should be given to the next Congress to approve the present system, or give it up and adopt some other in its stead.
Mr. D. R. Williams said he was opposed to Congress coming here at the time proposed. Why should they come here then? He wished some one to answer, and let him understand why they were coming. In his opinion there was every possible objection to such a procedure. On the fourth day of March, a new President comes into power. Is it not presumable that the President would choose to have some communication with our Ministers abroad before the meeting of Congress? Could any man say that it was not proper that he should have it? Mr. W. said he hoped that the President would send special messengers, unfashionable as that policy was. If you are willing to wait for a declaration of war till the fourth Monday in May, will there be any necessity of declaring it before the first Monday in June or July? You have suffered the public mind to assuage in its resentment, and I very much doubt, that before a full experiment be made of the embargo, it will be wholly allayed. It has been said through the nation, and indeed avowed on this floor, that the Administration does not wish for peace. Having failed to take hold of the affair of the Chesapeake for a declaration of war, you have nothing now to give the people that interest which I hope they always will have in a declaration of war. Suppose you were to send special Ministers, and they were to be treated as our Ministers to France were under a former Administration, would not this treatment make every man in the nation rally around you? Would it not prove beyond doubt that the Administration was sincere in its wishes for peace? Undoubtedly it would. Why are your Ministers now loitering in foreign Courts? With a hope of accommodation, sir, I would send other Ministers there, and if they failed of immediate accommodation, would order them all home. If they are compelled to return, you will have the whole nation with you, which you must have when you go to war.
Mr. J. G. Jackson replied to Mr. Williams. The gentleman had asked emphatically why Congress should convene here in May. Occurrences of every day, said Mr. J., are presenting themselves in such a way as to render it highly important and necessary that some other ground should be taken. Are we to adhere to the embargo forever, sir? I have said, and again say, that a total abandonment of the ocean would be submission. I think, by passing this bill, we give the nation a pledge that it shall be the ne plus ultra, which shall give to foreign nations time to revise their conduct towards us, and will give them time to consider whether or not they will have war with us. The gentleman wants a special mission. Sir, are we to continue in this state any longer? Shall negotiation be spun out further? No man can doubt the capacity of our Ministers abroad, and their disposition to represent their Government correctly. The doors are shut in the face of our Minister at the Court of St. James, and worse than shut at the Court of St. Cloud—for, from the latter, contemptuous silence is all the answer we have received, if indeed silence can convey an answer. Are we to renew negotiation, then, when every circumstance manifests that it would be useless? Need I refer to what took place the other day—I allude to the publication of a letter by Mr. Canning, in a highly exceptionable manner, through Federal presses, or presses more devoted to the interests of that country than any other? One universal burst of indignation accompanied the publication of that letter in this House. And are we, under such circumstances, to renew negotiation by extra missions? I conceive that the cup of negotiation and conciliation is exhausted to the dregs, and that we should but further degrade ourselves by sending further extra missions. It has been stated to me that a proposition had actually been reduced to writing by a member of this House the other day for sending away foreign Ministers and calling our Ministers home, and I am sorry that the proposition was not offered to the House, for, under present circumstances, it might not have been improper to have adopted it.
Mr. Smilie said, if there were no other reason, the present suspension of commerce, and discontents at home, were sufficient reasons for calling Congress earlier than the first Monday in December. When the new Administration should come into office, it was proper that they should have an opportunity of meeting Congress as early as possible. It was his opinion that, at the next session, a change of measures would take place. What would be the substitute for the present measure he could not say; but, at this time, he must say that he could see no way of avoiding war. With regard to extra missions, he really had no idea of a measure of that kind. If there should be any other means to secure the interest and honor of the nation but war, he hoped in God that it would be adopted, but he did not now see any such prospect.
Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee, said it was of no importance in the consideration of the present question what the next Administration should think or do. He wished that there could be an understanding with foreign nations for our good, but he much doubted such a result. He would not undertake to say whether war, or what other measure, ought to be adopted at the extra session; but, it was his opinion, that Congress ought to meet, and he should vote against every proposition going to defeat the object of the bill. Although this nation had not immediately retaliated the attack on the Chesapeake, would any man rise on this floor and say that the act of dishonor was done away because the House refused immediately to avenge it? He believed not; and, as long as it remained unatoned, it was cause for this nation to act. The only question for the House now to determine was this: Are there reasons to induce gentlemen to believe that a meeting of Congress is necessary on the fourth Monday of May next? As it appeared to him that such reasons did exist, he said he was bound on his responsibility to vote for the bill.
Mr. Durell asked if gentlemen meant to continue the embargo forever. He believed somewhat in the doctrine that an explosion might take place under it in a certain portion of the country. Gentlemen said an extra session was, therefore, necessary to save the nation. Mr. D. asked if the nation was to be saved by long speeches? He had seen almost two whole sessions of Congress pass away, the one of six months, the other of three, and the nation in the same situation still, and still told, in long stories, from day to day, that it was in a critical situation. He had no idea that the nation was to be saved by much speaking. He did firmly believe, that more than forty-eight hours would not be necessary to pass all laws to meet the impending crisis. If a declaration of war was thought proper, this would be sufficient time for it; if an extraordinary mission, as suggested by the gentleman from South Carolina, forty-eight hours would be time enough for the House to decide on recommending it. The present was a state of suspense, from which the nation ought to be removed, and he was unwilling to prolong this state by the passage of the bill.
Mr. Burwell said he was one of those who would vote for an earlier meeting of Congress than usual. In Great Britain, in whose government there were some features approximating to ours, there was always an uneasiness, lest the Parliament should not meet often enough. Whence could be the objection to Congress meeting at an earlier day? If the public sentiment was not then prepared for war, it would not be adopted. It appeared to him that an early session, instead of producing mischief, would essentially contribute to tranquillize the minds of the people. If peace was attainable, we must have peace; but if not, we have no choice but war. The gentleman from South Carolina suggests the propriety of sending a special mission, said Mr. B. Let me ask him, if Administration should not take this course, whether it would not be perfectly proper that Congress should be in session? Certainly it would. With respect to a special mission, Mr. B. said he was perfectly at a loss to conceive what could be the nature of any proposition which could be made to Great Britain. A proposition had already been made to her, in effect, to go to war with her against France, and insultingly refused; for no other interpretation could be made of the offer to suspend the embargo, if she would rescind her Orders in Council, except Mr. Canning chose to misunderstand everything that could be said. Unless gentlemen would point out some new proposition, which could be made to Great Britain or France, he could not see the propriety of the course recommended. As to the continuance of the embargo, Mr. B. said it seemed to be perfectly well understood by every man, that when the Government determined on that course, it did not determine to persevere in it eternally. If it could be made manifest to him that any particular favorable consequence would be produced by postponing the session beyond the fourth Monday in May, he might be induced to accede to it. As to the disposition of the Administration to preserve peace, could the gentleman conceive it possible to remove the impressions of those who were determined not to be convinced? This nation had sued for peace, but in vain; they had offered to give up almost every thing in contest, if Great Britain would yield a thing which neither Mr. Canning nor any other member of the British Government ever said they had a right to do, and which was only justified on the ground of necessity. There was therefore no plausibility in the assertion that peace had not been earnestly sought for.
Mr. G. W. Campbell said that if nothing occurred between this time and the time proposed by the bill for the next meeting of Congress, which would particularly render a change necessary, he was yet of opinion that it would be then necessary to change our situation; for this reason: that at that period, time sufficient would have elapsed to give us information as to what ground Great Britain would take, after she had heard of the position which Congress had maintained. After that ground was taken, Congress would know how to act. I never voted for the embargo as a permanent measure, said Mr. C., nor did I ever use an expression which would authorize such a supposition; nor do I suppose that any other gentleman entertained such an idea. As to a special mission, I should as soon think of sending a special messenger to the moon as to Great Britain or to France, for the cup of humiliation is exhausted already, and I will never put it in their power to offer us another cup.
Mr. Macon said he had not intended to have said any thing, but that the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Burwell) had broached a doctrine which he did not approve—that this Government was like that of Great Britain.
Mr. Burwell explained that he had said that the Governments were, in some of their features, alike.
Mr. Macon said that the reason of the fear in Great Britain that the Parliament would not meet often enough, was extremely obvious. The only voice which the people had was in the House of Commons, and they wanted them to be always in session, to keep the King and nobility off from them. In Great Britain the King dissolved Parliament at his pleasure. Here, he said, there was no power to dissolve Congress. Indeed, there was no similarity in the two Governments. He said he had no fear of any mischief being done by Congress meeting earlier; but he was opposed to their meeting earlier, because they would do more good by staying away. Could any man say what would take place between this day and the third of March? And yet the House were now called on to determine on an extra session. He was for giving such time, after the deliberations of the present session closed, as that Great Britain might see what we had done, and consider whether she would retract or go to war, for if she did not retract, war must be the consequence. Mr. M. said he would give every opportunity for peace; he would not be for hurrying the matter. He had no opinion that Congress being in session would have any effect on the people. The cry of an intention to destroy commerce was not to make him do a single thing which he would not otherwise do. No man can believe that we who raise produce should wish it to lie on our hands, as is now our situation. It is maritime rights for which we contend. For these we planters are making sacrifices, and we know it. As to the grower it is immaterial in point of interest into what ship or wagon his produce goes; but he is contending for the interests of his mercantile brethren. A great deal has been said about repealing the embargo to put an end to discontents. Let gentlemen beware of it, lest in trying to please everybody, they please nobody. Let us do what is right, that is the only ground for us to take. Whenever we begin to temporize, that principle is abandoned. I disagree with the gentleman from Tennessee as to the expediency of continuing the embargo; I do not believe that it would be inexpedient to try it beyond May. I believe we ought to try it beyond September. This is my opinion. What effect do gentlemen expect that the embargo will have had in May? Not more than at this moment. While every day from that time till September, it will be more and more effectual. I never voted for it as a permanent measure; but my opinion was, as I stated it, that it might be necessary to hold on to it for one, two, or three years. I might be wrong, but this was my opinion then, and I have not changed it. As to an extra session, I have never thought of it; but I am willing to leave it to the Executive. It has been so suddenly suggested, however, that I would not undertake to decide positively on the subject. I should rather incline to let them send to us now; we have sent to them long enough. As to the people being tired of the embargo, whenever they want war in preference to it, they will send their petitions here to that effect. When gentlemen from the Eastern States say, that the people there are tired of it, perhaps they speak correctly. As to all the talk of insurrections and divisions, it has no effect on me. When the sedition law was passed under the former Administration, it was said that the people would not bear it. I thought then as now, that the elections would show their disapprobation, and that they would manifest it in that way alone. When the people are tired of the embargo, as a means of preserving peace, they will tell you so, and say, "Give us war!" But none have said so; and yet, sir, I know well that myself and some others are blamed for our adherence to this measure. I can only say, that it is an honest adherence. I do believe that the continuance of that measure, with the addition of a bill now on your table, (non-intercourse bill,) is the best thing you can do; and if I thought that Congress would declare war in May, I should be much more averse to meeting then than I am now; but I do not believe it will.
The question was now taken on the motion of Mr. D. R. Williams to strike out the words "fourth Monday in May," and lost.
No other amendment being offered to the bill, it was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading. The bill being brought in engrossed, a motion was made that the same be read the third time to-morrow: and the question being put thereupon, it passed in the negative.
A motion was then made by Mr. Smilie, that the bill be now read the third time; and the question being taken thereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative.
The said bill was, accordingly, read the third time: Whereupon, Mr. Speaker stated the question from the chair, that the same do pass? And, the question being taken, it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 80, nays 26.
Presidential Election.
Several petitions having been presented, in addition to those heretofore stated, against the mode in which the late election in the State of Massachusetts was conducted—
Mr. Bacon offered the following resolution: