Now, sir, did this decree exist at the time of its date? No, sir, the date is false. If the decree existed in April, 1811, why was it not communicated to this nation, the only one interested in the subject? Why was it not communicated to Mr. Russell, who so strongly urged upon the French Government the necessity of furnishing some evidence of the repeal of the decrees. For the purpose of communicating some satisfactory information on that subject to this country, he detained the John Adams in France, in July, 1811. You will remember Napoleon's decree is dated in April. Permit me here to read a passage of Mr. Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe, dated the 15th of July, 1811.

After Mr. Russell had left Paris, he wrote from England to Mr. Barlow, who succeeded him, "for additional proofs of the removal of the decrees." Mr. Barlow seems to be very anxious "to get the treaty through, carrying an unequivocal stipulation, that shall lay that question to rest."

But it was all in vain; no authentic evidence of the repeal was furnished. This decree did not exist; and why was it not issued? Why was the evidence of the repeal of the decrees withheld? The answer is obvious. The United States were not yet committed to go to war with Great Britain. Napoleon knew very well that when proper evidence of the repeal of his decrees was furnished, the English Orders in Council would be repealed, and the United States would not go to war with Great Britain. For, sir, he knew very well, and we know very well, that for the subject of impressments alone, this country would not go to war. It cannot be denied, that for this cause we should not have declared war. This Government has never been disposed to go to war on that ground alone. The present President of the United States made an arrangement with Mr. Erskine, which gladdened the heart of every man in the nation, without any provision on that subject, without any mention of it; and there was not a murmur in the country, on account of its omission. Mr. Pinkney, too, as stated by the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Troup,) yesterday, again and again, offered to accommodate with England, on the rescinding of the Orders in council, without any reference to impressments.

Sir, this decree itself is an insult to this Government. It is issued expressly, because we had taken our stand against England; it is declared to be issued in consequence of our act of March, 1811, when, in fact, the President's proclamation and the act of March were founded on the repeal of the decrees. To show the correctness of my remarks on this part of the subject; to show that Napoleon has triumphed over our honor and character, I beg leave to call the attention of the committee to Mr. Russell's letter to Mr. Monroe, dated the 9th of June, 1811. His language does credit to his understanding and feelings:

It would have been base to have employed the President's proclamation, that the Berlin and Milan decrees had been revoked as the means of obtaining their revocation. But what, sir, is the price we have at length paid for the repeal? The President's proclamation was not enough; the act of March added to it was not enough; we could not procure the revocation till we went to war. For, sir, the Emperor would not issue this decree till he knew that we were pledged and committed to go to war with Great Britain. How he knew this, sir, it is not for me to say. We all know, however, that he had all the acts of this Government to satisfy him of the course we were pursuing—the step we were about to take. He had the President's Message, the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the war speeches of the members of this House, the laws for raising armies, and the embargo. In the month of May, then, when the policy of this country in relation to Great Britain was settled, he issued his decree, just in such time, too, sir, that it could not reach this country till we had plunged into the war. And well, in such a state, might he repeal his decrees, which, by the war itself, would be superseded—would become a nullity.

Thus, sir, believing the French decrees to be repealed, we departed from our neutral stand by enforcing the non-intercourse law against Great Britain. We have in vain waited for such evidence of their repeal as would have induced Great Britain to rescind her Orders in Council—the great cause of the war. Their revocation depended upon the repeal of the French decrees; and had they been revoked, there would have been no war between the United States and Great Britain. The decree, declaring the edicts of France to be revoked, is at length issued, when the Emperor knows it is too late to prevent the war. The decree is communicated to the English Government, the Orders in Council are revoked on the ground of the repeal of the French decrees, but the United States have declared war. How, sir, can I make this matter plainer? Our whole course against Great Britain has proceeded from the belief of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees; but that evidence of their repeal, which would have stopped our course, by means of which the Orders in Council would have been revoked, and the war would have been avoided, is withheld till the Emperor knows that war is inevitable. Thus, sir, have we been duped, deceived, and inveigled.

I repeat it, sir, had we, on the 17th June, understood our foreign relations as we now understand them, we should not have declared war. And would it not have been just and magnanimous in this Government, when all doubt was removed on the subject of the French decrees, to have acknowledged its error? Did not the honor, the character, the independence of the country require of us to go back to our original neutral ground? I rose principally for the purpose of presenting this view of the arts and deceit of the French Emperor to the committee. I regret that I have not done it more fully and clearly; and I hope that some gentleman more competent to a proper examination of the subject will yet take it up before we get through this discussion.

Mr. Tallmadge said he felt a peculiar embarrassment in rising to offer to the consideration of the committee some of his own reflections on the important subject now under debate, from a twofold consideration. In the first place, the magnitude of the question might claim the aid of more exalted talents than he pretended to possess, and, therefore, to do it justice, he feared, would not be in his power. For, said Mr. T., in the extensive range of debate which has been permitted by the Chair, the whole field of our foreign relations has been open to examination, and the policy of our own Government in relation to Great Britain has been deemed fairly within the range of discussion.

In the second place, the gentlemen who had preceded have occupied the ground so ably, and discussed the subject so extensively, that it was somewhat difficult to present arguments entirely novel to arrest the attention of the committee. Having a belief, however, that there were some important considerations, in relation to the bill now under debate, which had not yet been brought into view, he begged the attention of the committee while he endeavored to lay before them the views which he had taken of the subject, and which constrained him most decidedly to oppose the passage of the bill.

Before I enter upon the merits of the subject, said Mr. T., I take occasion to express my hearty assent to declarations made by honorable gentlemen that this is no time to indulge the bickerings of party; and that it is greatly to be desired that all distinctions of this sort were entirely laid aside and forgotten. Sir, I should consider it the most auspicious event of my life if I could see every gentleman on this floor determined to take and maintain the true old American ground occupied by the patriots of '76. Although it may be painful to the feelings of an honorable mind to be assailed with odious appellations, and charged with duplicity and falsehood, yet the mind which has virtue for its basis, a conscious integrity for its support, and firmness sufficient to enable the man to do his duty, may hope to pass unhurt by such malicious darts.

Standing, as I do, in the highly-responsible situation of one of the legislators of this extensive country, I hope to have stability and integrity sufficient to enable me to discharge my duty to my constituents. If, after having passed through the Revolutionary war, and having never changed my political creed to the present day, an odious epithet could induce me to alter my course, I should be unworthy the confidence of my country. But whence, Mr. Chairman, proceeds this system of slander and abuse? From the foul presses of our country. To whom are some of the fairest characters which have ever adorned this or any other country indebted for the odious epithets of monarchists, foreign agents, tories, and the like? To your imported patriots, who, weary of the dull pursuits of industry on their native soil, or escaping from the justice of the laws of their own country, have fled to this happy land to instruct its inhabitants in the true principles of liberty and equality.

To this set of newly-fledged politicians, and men of a similar stamp, is this once happy country indebted for one-half the miseries and much of the disgrace which it suffers.

I have been led into this digression in consequence of remarks which have fallen from the other side of the House, but will now return to my subject.

A gentleman from New York, (Mr. Stow,) who addressed you early in this debate, told us that he reprobated the war, and had no confidence in the Administration to conduct it to a successful issue, but should vote for the bill to enable them to carry it on. This is strange political logic to my understanding. While I subscribe fully to his premises, the reasonings of my mind bring me to a very different result. Because I deprecate this war as pregnant with great evils, if not ruin to my country, I will, therefore, take all constitutional measures to bring it to a speedy and honorable close; and because I have no confidence in the Executive department of our Government, nor in the subordinate agents who have been appointed to vote for this bill, which, if adopted, will enlist still greater evils on this devoted country.

In presenting the subject to this honorable committee, in its most appropriate form, it may be proper to examine into the prominent causes of our dispute, which has terminated in open war with Great Britain. These I take to be three, viz:

1. The Orders in Council.

2. Impressment of our seamen.

3. The attack upon the Chesapeake.

That we may narrow the point in controversy as much as possible, I remark that ample and satisfactory atonement having been made for the violation of our rights by the attack on the Chesapeake, one cause of disquietude and a prominent one too, has been finally removed. It has indeed been frequently remarked on this floor, that the satisfaction offered for the unauthorized attack on the frigate Chesapeake was long delayed, and very reluctantly offered. However painful it may be to censure the conduct of our own Government, yet a sense of justice obliges me to say, that to every overture made by Great Britain to accommodate this unpleasant affair, our Administration attached some exceptionable condition which closed the door to an amicable adjustment. The committee cannot have forgotten the early disavowal of this wanton aggression on the honor of our flag by the British Government, and the tender of satisfaction which was made, but failed because our Minister was instructed to couple with this complaint the subject of impressment; nor can they have forgotten how indignant the Ministry and nation were when the President assumed the right of judging what would best comport with the honor of their King. Few, I believe, who read the offensive remark, expect a different result from that which ensued. And while I am upon this subject I take occasion to remark, that in all our attempts to negotiate with the British Government there seems to have been some untoward circumstance, some unfortunate condition, either accidentally or intentionally, attached to the question at issue, which has defeated the negotiation.

It would be within the scope of my present plan to take a particular review of the British Orders in Council, as well as the subject of impressments. But inasmuch as the documents relating to these two subjects have been laid on every gentleman's table; and more especially when I reflect that both topics have been very ably discussed by some gentlemen who have preceded me, and especially by the gentleman who has just sat down, (Mr. Bleecker,) I shall content myself with taking but a brief review of these prominent, and I may add, the only remaining causes for the present war. As to the Orders in Council, it ought not to be forgotten, that during several lengthy discussions to obtain their repeal, as well by our Ministers in London, as at this place, they have been considered as the prominent point in dispute. So, again, as to the origin of our restrictive system; it cannot be forgotten that the friends and abettors of those measures uniformly professed that they were adopted as retaliatory for the Orders in Council. From the first partial non-importation act, which passed on the eighteenth of April, 1806, down to the law of the second of March, 1811, the object has been, on the very face of the law, to procure a repeal of the Orders in Council, and of the Berlin and Milan decrees. If any doubt should remain on the mind of any member of this committee as to this fact, I beg him to turn his eye to the restrictive code, and I presume he will find the evidence to be abundant and complete. In this system of anti-commercial regulations, I find the origin and progress of our present political calamities. And here, Mr. Chairman, I shall readily admit, that we had grievances and complaints, great and heavy, against both of the belligerents; nor have I the least inclination to palliate or excuse them. My object is to show, what I have uniformly expressed on this floor, that our system of non-importation, non-intercourse, and embargo, have been directed against the Orders in Council, as to Great Britain, and nothing else; and finally, have brought this country into a ruinous war. Is there a man within these walls, who does not now believe (as was fully predicted when the law passed) that the conditions held out to the two great belligerents, to induce them to repeal their obnoxious edicts, violating the neutral commerce of the United States, placed the execution of our law in the hands of a foreign Government? Is there a man of ordinary capacity in the United States, having the means of information, who now believes that the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, according to the proclamation of the President of the United States, solemnly announcing that fact; and that they thenceforward ceased to violate our neutral commerce? Does not candor constrain all to confess that, long after the pretended repeal of the aforesaid decrees, our commerce was harassed in every sea where French cruisers could reach it? Need I point you to the piratical seizures and burning of American property in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic seas, by the privateers and fleets of the French Empire; subsequent to this pretended repeal, and sanctioned expressly by its authority? If all other evidence should be deemed insufficient, I inquire whether the French Emperor himself has not sufficiently humbled this country (if indeed our cup of humiliation had not been full before) by his own formal antedated repeal of his Berlin and Milan decrees, long subsequent to the time imposed on the President by the Duke of Cadore?

It cannot have escaped the attention of the committee, or of the nation, that Napoleon's decree, respecting the Berlin and Milan decrees, bears date the 28th of April, 1811, and is explicitly bottomed on the law of Congress passed March 2, 1811; the sole object of which law was to confirm the proclamation of the President which had then been issued more than four months, and the legality of which had become very questionable. This decree may be found among the documents accompanying the President's Message of November 4th, 1812, and on the forty-sixth page of those printed papers.

If further evidence should be needed to prove the abominable fraud of this transaction, it may be found in the correspondence of our Minister at Paris, in the summer of 1811, wherein he remarks, that he had repeatedly demanded evidence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, but none could be obtained. And yet, forsooth, we are now furnished with a decree dated in April preceding, but not issued until we are so entangled in French toils, that war with Great Britain was inevitable. If this fact alone had been understood, I put it to the candor of this honorable committee to say, whether they would have consented to the declaration of war against Great Britain at the time and for the reasons which were given? I say, without fear of contradiction, that they would not. If my premises are true, and the inference undisputed, since the Government has been grossly deceived and drawn into this war, for reasons and causes which did not then exist, most assuredly it becomes our duty as well as interest to relieve the country from its pressure as soon as possible.

In addition to all this, it is a singular fact in the history and progress of this war, that in five days after its declaration, (viz. on the 23d of June, 1812,) and as soon as the aforesaid decree of the French Emperor was made known to the British Ministry by Mr. Russell, an Order in Council was issued, repealing the former obnoxious orders, which had been ostensively the most prominent cause of the war; and yet the President has never issued his proclamation announcing that fact, as by the terms of the law of March 2d, 1811, he was expressly bound to do. On this failure of the President to do what the law enjoined on him to perform, as well as having issued his proclamation of November, 1810, without possessing the facts required by the law to support him, I make no comment. The account is still unsettled between him and this injured country.

The Orders in Council having thus been revoked, the continuance of the war seems to rest upon the impressment of our seamen alone. Give me leave then to inquire into the grounds of this practice, as claimed by Great Britain. Is it not bottomed on the ancient doctrine of perpetual allegiance—or in other words, that the native-born subject can never so expatriate, as that the mother country may not claim his service in time of war? Is this a novel doctrine, either as to time, or the nation who now attempts to enforce it? I venture to say that Great Britain has practised upon this principle ever since she has been a nation; and it is farther manifest that France, and all the maritime powers of Europe, have maintained the same doctrine. Nay, sir, we maintain the same doctrine in our own country; in proof of which, witness the President's proclamation at the commencement of this war; and notice also the recent case of Clark the spy, who was condemned to suffer death by a court martial, and was pardoned by the President on the ground of his owing allegiance to the United States, although residing in an enemy's territory, and having been naturalized or sworn allegiance to the King of Great Britain. Hence it would seem, that the principle set up was not novel nor singular. But what is the principle in contest between the two Governments? Great Britain claims the right to visit neutral merchant ships on the high seas; and if she finds any of her natural born subjects, to take them into her service. The Government of the United States denies to her this right, and asserts, that a foreigner naturalized in this country, is absolved from all allegiance to the parent State. The practice of Great Britain under her principle, has undoubtedly subjected some of our native citizens to capture and involuntary service, from causes which I need not here repeat. In all such cases, I take it to be admitted on all hands, that she sets up no claim, and therefore every abuse of this sort is capable of remedy. But on this head I have no hesitation in expressing my unqualified belief, founded on documents which have been laid on our tables, that the list of such impressed seamen is greatly exaggerated. Out of the number six thousand two hundred and fifty-seven of American citizens said to have been impressed, and forming a standing head piece to the list of our grievances, I very much question if five hundred native Americans can be found among them all. The documents lately furnished by the Secretary of State, if carefully examined, will serve very much to substantiate this fact. Many names are there returned who have only forwarded their claims to our Consul at London, and who, very probably, never set foot on American ground. Others again are continued on the list who have been discharged years ago, and others who have voluntarily engaged in her service.

The question then at issue, I take to be this—Shall the war with Great Britain be continued to oblige her to relinquish the practice of taking from our merchantmen her native British sailors? If we could obtain the principle by continuing the war, I think it can be demonstrated, that it would be injurious to the American seamen to have it so established, inasmuch as it would, by increasing the number of our seamen, necessarily diminish their wages. But, circumstanced as Great Britain is, contending for her existence against the most formidable power on earth, and resting her last hopes upon her navy, I presume she will never relinquish the principle.

The inquiry has been made, with some solicitude, what will you do with naturalized foreigners? I answer, treat them hospitably, and extend the arm of protection and all the blessings of government to them while they continue within your territorial jurisdiction; but if they leave your territory, and choose to go upon the great highway of nations, the risk and the choice are their own, as will be the peril. Put the case fairly to the yeomanry of our country, and let them understand the subject, that this war is to be carried on for the purpose of protecting foreigners while sailing on the high seas, and I very much incline to the opinion, that they would, dismiss the authors of this war from further service, or oblige them soon to bring it to a close. Sir, I will not consent to waste one drop of pure American blood, nor to expend a single dollar, to protect, on the high seas, all the vagabonds of Europe. Valuable as may have been the acquisition in obtaining many great and good men as emigrants from Europe, still I must maintain the opinion, that all the blessings of liberty and domestic government, which are secured to them in common with our native citizens, ought to be an ample compensation. I know it is no easy matter to draw the precise line where protection shall cease; but in a question of such moment as peace or war, the prosperity and happiness, perhaps the misery and ruin of our country, I cannot hesitate as to the course proper to be pursued.

With respect to protections, they have become so much a matter of bargain and sale, that having been counterfeited and sold in almost every port in Great Britain, as well as in America, they have long since ceased to answer any valuable purpose. It has been a fact long since well established, that a foreigner, who could scarcely speak our language, could procure a protection in Great Britain purporting to be evidence of his American citizenship. This then may account for the light and contemptuous treatment given to this species of evidence by the officers of the British navy.

Friday, January 8.

Mounted Rangers.

Mr. Jennings said that it must be recollected by the House, that the act which was passed at the last session of Congress, for the raising certain companies of rangers for the protection of the frontiers, had expired. Those rangers were raised under the apprehension of attacks from the savages; and these apprehensions have unfortunately been realized far beyond the general anticipation. When those companies were raised, Mr. Speaker, we expected long since to have taken possession of the British Province of Upper Canada, thereby to have intercepted the connection and communication between the British and the northwestern Indians. It will therefore readily be perceived, that in consequence of our disappointed expectations in that quarter, the northwestern frontier will be more exposed to the savage knife and tomahawk, at the opening of the approaching spring, than they have been heretofore. This description of force, if again organized, and stationed at suitable points without the frontier settlements, will render it more efficient, and in a better situation to range the woods and prevent the unapprised attack of the savage upon the helpless women and children. If we had to expect invasion from a civilized foe, our situation would not excite so much terror, but the savage character draws no distinction between the helpless infant and the prisoner of war. Under such circumstances, no calculation of expenditure ought to have any weight against a measure calculated to afford a necessary and proper protection to such an important and extensive frontier of the United States. The secrecy and facility with which the savages can assail that frontier, renders it improper that we should depend entirely for protection upon the volunteers and militia of an adjoining State. They carry with them their prejudices, and too often forget the sacred rights of private property. This fact has unfortunately been verified by a petition which I presented yesterday from the territory which I represent. But I cannot believe that such is the character of the citizens of Kentucky, although I do believe that the cause of that plundering, so far as it did take place in the western part of the territory of Indiana, by a portion of the Kentucky volunteers, may be found in the unhallowed exertions of local political purposes, to impress on the minds of at least some of those volunteers, that they were to defend British agents, British partisans, and persons having connection with the savages.

I shall now (said Mr. J.) present to the House the following resolutions which I have prepared, as well for the purpose of offering a bounty in lands to those who would volunteer their services as rangers for the protection of the northwestern frontier, as for the purpose of inquiring into the expediency of paying the militia and volunteers who have already rendered important services in shielding the helpless from savage cruelty:—

The resolutions were ordered to lie on the table.

Additional Military Force.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate authorizing the raising of twenty thousand men, for one year, if in the opinion of the President of the United States the public service shall require it.

Mr. Wheaton said: Mr. Speaker, every intelligent man, whose age has given him an opportunity of combining experience with observation, must know that there are times when, on certain questions relating to the great interests of the nation, the sober remonstrances of truth and reason are of little or no avail against the misguided impetuosity of public prejudice. To such a crisis, if we have not already arrived, it is greatly to be feared that we are fast approaching. To float along the current of popular opinion requires very little exertion; but the man that is placed in a situation where the public safety demands that he should stem the torrent and buffet the storm, cannot but reflect, with peculiar sensibility, on the very unequal task he has to perform. The bill, now under consideration, has opened a field of discussion on the general policy of the war, in which its advocates and opponents seem to have given full range to their imaginations; and the arguments, on both sides, have apparently been attended with various success. There can, however, be little doubt on which side the victory will finally be declared. It is well known that the majority are determined, and the bill will pass. I had therefore resolved to take no part in the dispute, but to content myself with giving a simple vote. But, reflecting that I am called upon to act on a subject by me deemed important, not only for myself, but for the good of the people whom I have the honor to represent, who will be equally interested in the result, I have felt myself impelled, both by duty and inclination, to state some of the reasons on which that vote will be grounded.

The bill proposes giving authority to the President of the United States to raise twenty thousand regular troops, in addition to the thirty-five thousand already authorized by law. This may be right or wrong, proper or improper, according to times and circumstances, and the objects which the measure is contemplated to effect. Were the country invaded by a foreign foe, and a foe so powerful as to make this additional number of troops necessary for its defence, I should say it were right and proper to raise them, whatever expense it might be to the nation. But if, as the advocates of the bill profess, these men are to be enlisted, and, together with those heretofore authorized, are to form a powerful army for the purpose of foreign conquest, I have no hesitation in giving it, as my opinion, that it is improper and wrong, or, at least, as the President has told us respecting the French decree repealing those of Berlin and Milan, that "the proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections." Objections, it is apprehended, may arise from want of powers given to Congress by the constitution, either expressed or implied, to do this thing, with its professed object in view—that is, foreign conquest. And if these are unavailing, common reason and common sense furnish objections, sufficiently strong, to the expediency of our undertaking such enterprises. Objections, for want of sufficient powers given by the constitution, may be considered as novel; but, if sound, they should nevertheless prevail. The war itself is novel, this being the first of the kind that ever we have undertaken since that instrument was formed, or since we became an independent nation. If the constitution gives Congress any power to carry on foreign wars, those powers must be collected from expressions it contains, or from some clear and necessary implication from something that is therein expressed. It will be very readily admitted, that our national Government is a Government of a very simple construction, and that it possesses very limited powers; being established by compact, not by conquest, it has not all the powers incident to the sovereignties of other countries; not produced by conquest, it was not made for conquest. "The enumeration of certain rights in the constitution shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people; and the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." The framers of this constitution took particular care, not only to define the powers they intended to give, but the objects to which that power should be applied, and therefore, but for those defined objects, Congress have no powers at all. The objects are first pointed out clearly and plainly, and then the powers necessary to their attainment. The people of this country, after having effected the Revolution and established their independence, considering their great transmarine distance from the nations of the Old World, and all their jarring and rival interests, flattered themselves with the expectation of long peace. Unapprehensive of being attacked at home, they had no idea of making war for the purpose of conquest abroad. "Peace and friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none," was their motto, and the same sentiment has been sanctioned by a man, whom the advocates of this war have never ceased to admire. An aversion to standing armies was among the causes that induced the Declaration of Independence; without standing armies, it was then believed, and we now know full well, foreign wars cannot be carried on. Foreign wars did not, therefore, come within the scope of that policy that dictated the constitution. I am not insensible, that, by the constitution, a power is given to Congress to declare war, (not to make it,) but their power is not to be exercised but in the spirit of that instrument, and for the attainment of some or all of the objects for which it was framed. And what are those objects? Why, and for what was the constitution made? Its authors have told us. It was for "the forming of a more perfect union, establishing justice, insuring domestic tranquillity, providing for the common defence, promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," and all these benefits for the people that then did, or who thereafter should, belong to, or reside in the territory then embraced by the United States, and none other. The constitution was not made for any other, nor can it give jurisdiction over any other. If all or any of these objects are endangered, and it can be made to appear that raising the additional army proposed by this bill be necessary to the preservation and security of them, and can afford a rational prospect of producing such an effect, then my objections to the measure, so far as they arise from the apprehension of the want of constitutional authority, will be obviated. But here, permit me to ask, whether adding twenty thousand new troops to our present regular army, will be likely to have the effect of forming a more perfect union among the people of these States, or whether the little progress already made in the war has not produced fearful apprehensions of a sad reverse? If justice be not already established in our country, can there be any probability that a more formidable army will effect an object so desirable? No; for it is a well-known maxim, as true now as in those ancient times when it was written, that "Inter arma leges silent." So romantic an idea, as being able to establish justice through the world, could not have entered the heads of those that framed the constitution. Much has been said respecting the laws of nations; but they are now nowhere to be found, but in those books that treat on that subject; they were formed by the nations of the civilized world, and evidenced by the treaties, compacts, and agreements, entered into by them; but the Governments of Europe, in their struggle for power and dominion, seem to have disregarded or broken them down; and they being the majority in number, and superior in strength, it is not at present in our power to build up and enforce them. The unavoidable state of the world must be submitted to, until human nature shall, by its Great Author, be corrected. Nor can we, from what we have experienced, promise ourselves, from foreign war, an increase of tranquillity at home. But we are authorized, and are bound to provide for our common defence, and to raise armies, as well of regulars as militia, for that purpose, whenever the unfortunate situation of our country may render such a measure necessary; and our raising of a regular army could never have been contemplated by the framers of the constitution for any other purpose, and therefore give no authority so to do, and, as if conscious that this were the case, the committee that penned the act passed by Congress in June last, declaring war, made use of a form altogether unusual in other countries on similar occasions. The act declares that "war exists between the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, and the United States;" going upon the idea, that hostilities had then been actually commenced against us by that Government, and our country invaded by a British armed force. Such a doctrine would have been very proper, and it might have been proper to raise armies in pursuance of it, had it been true. But such was not the fact. No hostile invasion of the country, by the British Government, had then been made, attempted or threatened. But some may say, and do say, that, if it were not a point then, it is now, and that, therefore, if we had no right to raise regular armies then, it being a time of peace, we may feel ourselves fully authorized now, since war has been declared, to raise new ones, or make additions to the old. This, indeed, would be contrary to a principle universally received and adopted, that no one should be permitted to take the advantage of his own wrong.

I know it is a doctrine, that the ruling party in this country, both in and out of this House, are every day zealously endeavoring to inculcate, that even admitting the war to have been wrong, at its commencement, it has now become the constitutional duty of its original opponents to afford every aid and encouragement to its prosecution. But this is a doctrine that I think no one can yield his assent to, till he is made to believe that two lines, constantly diverging, may finally meet in the same point. If our country has been in any degree invaded, and such invasion be in consequence of our having first invaded the territories of the invaders, it is proper for us, by withdrawing the cause, to put an end to the effect. The last, and not the least object of the powers given by the constitution, is "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Many arguments cannot be necessary to show the tendency of foreign wars to destroy liberty. I believe history does not furnish an instance of any people long free, after engaging in the mad projects of foreign conquest. While Rome was content with her ancient boundaries, her inhabitants were blessed with freedom; but, afterwards, jealousies, tumults, insurrections, and seditions, and those two great plagues and scourges of mankind—anarchy and tyranny—following in the train, destroyed every vestige of liberty among that people. Is there any liberty left among the people of France, or of those countries that France has conquered? Fortunate for them, if they are less enlightened than we are; for, in such case, though slaves, they may not be quite so miserable ones. "The very age and body of our constitution, its form and pressure," indicative of the genius and temper of the people that adopted it, are all opposed to the prosecution of wars for conquest. Such enterprises must not be undertaken, or the constitution must be destroyed. Gentlemen seem already inclined to attribute the disgrace and defeats that have hitherto marked our progress in this war, rather to the form and constitution of our Government, than to the weakness and folly of its Administration. The French Emperor has been extolled, and his mode of conducting wars has been more than intimated as being worth our imitation. If, in making foreign conquests, we would have his success, we must make use of his means, and then we may bid adieu to our former happy institutions, our laws, and our liberty. On this ground, therefore, I am opposed to the progress of this war. But if I had not a scruple left, as to the authority given to Congress by the constitution to make this war for conquest, (and perhaps I ought not to have,) my sense of its inexpediency, while I shall have any regard for the welfare and prosperity of my country, will forever forbid my giving it the smallest aid.

Mr. H. Clay (Speaker) said he was gratified yesterday by the recommitment of this bill to a Committee of the whole House, from two considerations: one, since it afforded to him a slight relaxation from a most fatiguing situation; and the other, because it furnished him with an opportunity of presenting to the committee his sentiments upon the important topics which had been mingled in the debate. He regretted, however, the necessity under which the Chairman had been placed of putting the question,[32] precluded him from an opportunity he had wished to have enjoyed of rendering more acceptable to the committee any thing he might have to offer on the interesting points it was his duty to touch. Unprepared, however, as he was to speak on this day, of which he was more sensible from the ill state of his health, he would solicit the attention of the committee for a few moments.

I was a little astonished, I confess, said Mr. C., when I found this bill permitted to pass silently through the Committee of the Whole, and that, not until the moment when the question was about to be put for its third reading, was it selected as that subject on which gentlemen in the opposition chose to lay before the House their views of the interesting attitude in which the nation stands. It did appear to me that the loan bill, which will soon come before us, would have afforded a much more proper occasion, it being more essential, as providing the ways and means for the prosecution of the war. But the gentlemen had the right of selection, and having exercised it, no matter how improperly, I am gratified, whatever I may think of the character of some part of the debate, at the latitude in which for once they have indulged. I claim only, in return, of gentlemen on the other side of the House, and of the committee, a like indulgence in expressing, with the same unrestrained freedom, my sentiments. Perhaps in the course of the remarks which I may feel myself called upon to make, said he, gentlemen may apprehend that they assume too harsh an aspect; I have only now to say that I shall speak of parties, measures, and things, as they strike my moral sense, protesting against the imputation of any intention on my part to wound the feelings of any gentleman.

Considering the situation in which this country is now placed, in a state of actual war with one of the most powerful nations on the earth, it may not be useless to take a view of the past, of various parties which have at different times appeared in this country, and to attend to the manner by which we have been driven from a peaceful posture. Such an inquiry may assist in guiding us to that result—an honorable peace—which must be the sincere desire of every friend to America. The course of that opposition, by which the administration of the Government had been unremittingly impeded for the last twelve years, was singular, and, I believe, unexampled in the history of any country. It has been alike the duty and the interest of the Administration to preserve peace. Their duty, because it is necessary to the growth of an infant people, their genius and their habits. Their interest, because a change of the condition of the nation brings along with it a danger of the loss of the affections of the people. The Administration has not been forgetful of these solemn obligations. No art has been left unessayed; no experiment, promising a favorable result, left untried to maintain the peaceful relations of the country. When, some six or seven years ago, the affairs of the nation assumed a threatening aspect, a partial non-importation was adopted. As they grew more alarming, an embargo was imposed. It would have attained its purpose, but it was sacrificed upon the altar of conciliation. Vain and fruitless attempt to propitiate! Then came a law of non-intercourse, and a general non-importation followed in the train. In the mean time, any indications of a return to the public law and the path of justice, on the part of either belligerent, are seized with avidity by the Administration—the arrangement with Mr. Erskine is concluded. It is first applauded, and then censured by the opposition. No matter with what sincerity the Administration cultivates peace, the opposition will insist that it alone is culpable for any breach between the two countries. Because the President thought proper, in accepting the proffered reparation for the attack on a national vessel, to intimate that it would have better comported with the justice of the King (and who does not think so?) to punish the offending officer, the opposition, entering into the royal feelings, sees in that imaginary insult abundant cause for rejecting Mr. Erskine's arrangement. On another occasion, you cannot have forgotten the hypercritical ingenuity which they displayed to divest Mr. Jackson's correspondence of a premeditated insult to this country. If gentlemen would only reserve for their own Government half the sensibility which is indulged for that of Great Britain, they would find much less to condemn. Restriction after restriction has been tried; negotiation has been resorted to, until longer to have negotiated would have been disgraceful. Whilst these peaceful experiments are undergoing a trial, what is the conduct of the opposition? They are the champions of war; the proud, the spirited, the sole repository of the nation's honor; the exclusive men of vigor and energy. The Administration, on the contrary, is weak, feeble, and pusillanimous—"incapable of being kicked into a war." The maxim, "not a cent for tribute, millions for defence," is loudly proclaimed. Is the Administration for negotiation? The opposition is tired, sick, disgusted with negotiation. They want to draw the sword and avenge the nation's wrongs. When, at length, foreign nations, perhaps, emboldened by the very opposition here made, refused to listen to the amicable appeals made, and repeated and reiterated by the Administration, to their justice and to their interests; when, in fact, war with one of them became identified with our independence and our sovereignty, and it was no longer possible to abstain from it, behold the opposition become the friends of peace and of commerce. They tell you of the calamities of war; its tragical events; the squandering away of your resources; the waste of the public treasure, and the spilling of innocent blood. They tell you that honor is an illusion! Now we see them exhibiting the terrific forms of the roaring king of the forest. Now the meekness and humility of the lamb! They are for war, and no restrictions, when the Administration is for peace; they are for peace and restrictions, when the Administration is for war. You find them, sir, tacking with every gale, displaying the colors of every party, and of all nations, steady only in one unalterable purpose: to steer, if possible, into the haven of power.

During all this time the parasites of opposition do not fail by cunning sarcasm or sly inuendo to throw out the idea of French influence, which is known to be false; which ought to be met in one manner only, and that is, by the lie direct. The Administration of this country devoted to foreign influence! The Administration of this country subservient to France! Great God! how is it so influenced? By what ligament, on what basis, on what possible foundation, does it rest? Is it on similarity of language? No! we speak different tongues; we speak the English language. On the resemblance of our laws! No! the sources of our jurisprudence spring from another and a different country. On commercial intercourse? No! we have comparatively none with France. Is it from the correspondence in the genius of the two governments? No! here alone is the liberty of man secure from the inexorable despotism which everywhere else tramples it under foot. Where, then, is the ground of such an influence? But, sir, I am insulting you by arguing on such a subject. Yet, preposterous and ridiculous as the insinuation is, it is propagated with so much industry, that there are persons found foolish and credulous enough to believe it. You will, no doubt, think it incredible (but I have nevertheless been told the fact) that an honorable member of this House, now in my eye, recently lost his election by the circulation of a story in his district, that he was the first cousin of the Emperor Napoleon. The proof of the charge was rested on a statement of facts which was undoubtedly true. The gentleman in question it was alleged had married a connection of the lady of the President of the United States, who was the intimate friend of Thomas Jefferson, late President of the United States, who some years ago was in the habit of wearing red French breeches. Now, taking these premises as established, you, Mr. Chairman, are too good a logician not to see that the conclusion necessarily followed!

Throughout the period he had been speaking of, the opposition had been distinguished, amidst all its veerings and changes, by another inflexible feature—the application of every vile epithet, which our rich language affords, to Bonaparte. He has been compared to every hideous monster and beast, from that of the Revelations to the most insignificant quadruped. He has been called the scourge of mankind, the destroyer of Europe, the great robber, the infidel, and—Heaven knows by what other names. Really, gentlemen remind me of an obscure lady in a city, not very far off, who also took it into her head, in conversation with an accomplished French gentleman, to talk of the affairs of Europe. She, too, spoke of the destruction of the balance of power, stormed and raged about the insatiable ambition of the Emperor; called him the curse of mankind—the destroyer of Europe. The Frenchman listened to her with perfect patience, and when she had ceased, said to her, with ineffable politeness: "Madam, it would give my master, the Emperor, infinite pain, if he knew how hardly you thought of him."

Sir, gentlemen appear to me to forget that they stand on American soil; that they are not in the British House of Commons, but in the Chamber of the House of Representatives of the United States; that we have nothing to do with the affairs of Europe—the partition of territory and sovereignty there—except in so far as these things affect the interests of our own country. Gentlemen transform themselves into the Burkes, Chathams, and Pitts, of another country, and forgetting, from honest zeal, the interests of America, engage, with European sensibility, in the discussion of European interests. If gentlemen ask me, if I do not view with regret and sorrow the concentration of such vast power in the hands of Bonaparte, I reply that I do. I regret to see the Emperor of China holding such immense sway over the fortunes of millions of our species. I regret to see Great Britain possessing so uncontrolled a command over all the waters of our globe. And if I had the ability to distribute among the nations of Europe their several portions of power and of sovereignty, I would say that Holland should be resuscitated, and given the weight she enjoyed in the days of her De Witts. I would confine France within her natural boundaries—the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine—and make her a secondary naval power only. I would abridge the British maritime power, raise Prussia and Austria to first-rate powers, and preserve the integrity of the Empire of Russia. But these are speculations. I look at the political transactions of Europe, with the single exception of their possible bearing upon us, as I do at the history of other countries or other times. I do not survey them with half the interest that I do the movements in South America. Our political relation is much less important than it is supposed to be. I have no fears of French or English subjugation. If we are united, we are too powerful for the mightiest nation in Europe, or all Europe combined. If we are separated, and torn asunder, we shall become an easy prey to the weakest of them. In the latter dreadful contingency, our country will not be worth preserving.

In one respect there is a remarkable difference between Administration and the Opposition—it is in a sacred regard for personal liberty. When out of power, my political friends condemned the surrender of Jonathan Robbins; they opposed the violation of the freedom of the press, in the sedition law; they opposed the more insidious attack upon the freedom of the person, under the imposing garb of an alien law. The party now in opposition, then in power, advocated the sacrifice of the unhappy Robbins, and passed those two laws. True to our principles, we are now struggling for the liberty of our seamen against foreign oppression. True to theirs, they oppose the war for this object. They have indeed lately affected tender solicitude for the liberties of the people, and talk of the danger of standing armies, and the burden of taxes. But it is evident to you, Mr. Chairman, that they speak in a foreign idiom. Their brogue betrays that it is not their vernacular tongue. What! the opposition, who in 1798 and 1799, could raise an useless army to fight an enemy three thousand miles distant from us, alarmed at the existence of one raised for a known specified object—the attack of the adjoining provinces of the enemy? The gentleman from Massachusetts, who assisted by his vote to raise the army of twenty-five thousand, alarmed at the danger of our liberties from this very army!

I mean to speak of another subject, which I never think of but with the most awful considerations. The gentleman from Massachusetts, in imitation of his predecessors of 1799, has entertained us with Cabinet plots, Presidential plots, which are conjured up in the gentleman's own perturbed imagination. I wish, sir, that another plot of a much more serious kind—a plot that aims at the dismemberment of our Union—had only the same imaginary existence. But no man, who had paid any attention to the tone of certain prints, and to transactions in a particular quarter of the Union for several years past, can doubt the existence of such a plot. It was far, very far from my intention to charge the opposition with such a design. No, he believed them generally incapable of it. He could not say as much for some who were unworthily associated with them in that quarter of the Union to which he referred. The gentleman cannot have forgotten his own sentiment, uttered even on the floor of this House, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must;" in and about the same time Henry's mission to Boston was undertaken. The flagitiousness of that embassy had been attempted to be concealed by directing the public attention to the price which the gentleman says was given for the disclosure. As if any price could change the atrociousness of the attempt on the part of Great Britain, or could extenuate in the slightest degree the offence of those citizens who entertained and deliberated upon the infamous proposition! There was a most remarkable coincidence between some of the things which that man states, and certain events in the quarter alluded to. In the contingency of war with Great Britain, it will be recollected that the neutrality and eventual separation of that section of the Union was to be brought about. How, sir, has it happened, since the declaration of war, that British officers in Canada have asserted to American officers that this very neutrality would take place? That they have so asserted can be established beyond controversy. The project is not brought forward openly, with a direct avowal of the intention. No, the stock of good sense and patriotism in that portion of the country is too great to be undisguisedly encountered. It is assailed from the masked batteries of friendship to peace and commerce on the one side, and by the groundless imputation of opposite propensities on the other. The affections of the people are to be gradually undermined. The project is suggested or withdrawn; the diabolical parties, in this criminal tragedy, make their appearance or exit, as the audience to whom they address themselves are silent, applaud or hiss. I was astonished, sir, to have lately read a letter, or pretended letter, published in a prominent print in that quarter, written not in the fervor of party zeal, but coolly and deliberately, in which the writer affects to reason about a separation, and attempts to demonstrate its advantages to different sections of the Union, deploring the existence now of what he terms prejudices against it, but hoping for the arrival of the period when they shall be eradicated.

The war was declared because Great Britain arrogated to herself the pretension of regulating foreign trade, under the delusive name of retaliatory Orders in Council—a pretension by which she undertook to proclaim to American enterprise, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." Orders which she refused to revoke after the alleged cause of their enactment had ceased; because she persisted in the act of impressing American seamen; because she had instigated the Indians to commit hostilities against us; and because she refused indemnity for her past injuries upon our commerce. I throw out of the question other wrongs. The war in fact was announced, on our part, to meet the war which she was waging on her part. So undeniable were the causes of the war; so powerfully did they address themselves to the feelings of the whole American people, that when the bill was pending before this House, gentlemen in the opposition, although provoked to debate, would not, or could not, utter one syllable against it. It is true they wrapped themselves up in sullen silence, pretending that they did not choose to debate such a question in secret session. Whilst speaking of the proceedings on that occasion, I beg to be permitted to advert to another fact that transpired—an important fact material for the nation to know, and which I have often regretted had not been spread upon our journals. My honorable colleague (Mr. McKee) moved, in Committee of the Whole, to comprehend France in the war; and when the question was taken upon the proposition, there appeared but ten votes in support of it, of whom seven belonged to this side of the House, and three only to the other.

It is said that we were inveigled into the war by the perfidy of France; and that had she furnished the document in time, which was first published in England, in May last, it would have been prevented. I will concede to gentlemen every thing they ask about the injustice of France towards this country. I wish to God that our ability was equal to our disposition to make her feel the sense of that injustice. The manner of the publication of the paper in question, was undoubtedly extremely exceptionable. But I maintain that, had it made its appearance earlier, it would not have had the effect supposed; and the proof lies in the unequivocal declarations of the British Government. I will trouble you, sir, with going no further back than to the letters of the British Minister, addressed to the Secretary of State, just before the expiration of his diplomatic functions. It will be recollected by the committee that he exhibited to this Government a despatch from Lord Castlereagh, in which the principle was distinctly avowed, that to produce the effect of the repeal of the Orders in Council, the French decrees must be absolutely and entirely revoked as to all the world, and not as to America alone. A copy of that despatch was demanded of him, and he very awkwardly evaded it. But, on the 10th of June, after the bill declaring war had actually passed this House, and was pending before the Senate, (and which, I have no doubt, was known to him,) in a letter to Mr. Monroe, he says: "I have no hesitation, sir, in stating that Great Britain, as the case has hitherto stood, never did, nor ever could engage, without the greatest injustice to herself and her allies, as well as to other neutral nations, to repeal her orders as affecting America alone, leaving them in force against other States, upon condition that France would except singly and specially America from the operation of her decrees." On the 14th of the same month, the bill still pending before the Senate, he repeats: "I will now say, that I feel entirely authorized to assure you, that if you can at any time produce a full and unconditional repeal of the French decrees, as you have a right to demand it in your character of a neutral nation, and that it be disengaged from any question concerning our maritime rights, we shall be ready to meet you with a revocation of the Orders in Council. Previously to your producing such an instrument, which I am sorry to see you regard as unnecessary, you cannot expect of us to give up our Orders in Council." Thus, sir, you see that the British Government would not be content with a repeal of the French decrees as to us only. But the French paper in question was such a repeal. It could not, therefore, satisfy the British Government. It could not, therefore, have induced that Government, had it been earlier promulgated, to repeal the Orders in Council. It could not, therefore, have averted the war. The withholding of it did not occasion the war, and the promulgation of it would not have prevented the war. But gentlemen have contended that, in point of fact, it did produce a repeal of the Orders in Council. This I deny. After it made its appearance in England, it was declared by one of the British Ministry, in Parliament, not to be satisfactory. And all the world knows, that the repeal of the Orders in Council resulted from the inquiry, reluctantly acceded to by the Ministry, into the effect upon their manufacturing establishments, of our non-importation law, or to the warlike attitude assumed by this Government, or to both. But it is said that the Orders in Council are done away, no matter from what cause; and that having been the sole motive for declaring the war, the relations of peace ought to be restored. This brings me into an examination of the grounds for continuing the war.

I am far from acknowledging that had the Orders in Council been repealed, as they have been, before the war was declared, the declaration would have been prevented. In a body so numerous as this, from which the declaration emanated, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty what would have been the effect of such a repeal. Each member must answer for himself. I have no hesitation then, in saying, that I have always considered the impressment of American seamen as much the most serious aggression. But, sir, how have those orders at last been repealed? Great Britain, it is true, has intimated a willingness to suspend their practical operation, but she still arrogates to herself the right to revive them upon certain contingencies, of which she constitutes herself the sole judge. She waives the temporary use of the rod, but she suspends it in terrorem over our heads. Supposing it was conceded to gentlemen that such a repeal of the Orders in Council, as took place on the 23d of June last, exceptionable as it is, being known before the war, would have prevented the war, does it follow that it ought to induce us to lay down our arms without the redress of any other injury? Does it follow, in all cases, that that which would have prevented the war in the first instance should terminate the war? By no means. It requires a great struggle for a nation prone to peace as this is, to burst through its habits and encounter the difficulties of war. Such a nation ought but seldom to go to war. When it does, it should be for clear and essential rights alone, and it should firmly resolve to extort, at all hazards, their recognition. The war of the Revolution is an example of a war began for one object and prosecuted for another. It was waged in its commencement against the right asserted by the parent country to tax the colonies. Then no one thought of absolute independence. The idea of independence was repelled. But the British Government would have relinquished the principle of taxation. The founders of our liberties saw, however, that there was no security short of independence, and they achieved our independence. When nations are engaged in war, those rights in controversy, which are acknowledged by the Treaty of Peace, are abandoned. And who is prepared to say that American seamen shall be surrendered the victims to the British principle of impressment? And, sir, what is this principle? She contends that she has a right to the services of her own subjects: that, in the exercise of this right, she may lawfully impress them, even although she finds them in our vessels, upon the high seas, without her jurisdiction. Now, I deny that she has any right, without her jurisdiction, to come on board our vessels on the high seas, for any other purpose but in pursuit of enemies, or their goods, or goods contraband of war. But she further contends that her subjects cannot renounce their allegiance to her and contract a new obligation to other Sovereigns. I do not mean to go into the general question of the right of expatriation. If, as is contended, all nations deny it, all nations at the same time admit and practice the right of naturalization. Great Britain, in the very case of foreign seamen, imposes perhaps fewer restraints upon naturalization than any other nation. Then, if subjects cannot break their original allegiance, they may, according to universal usage, contract a new allegiance. What is the effect of this double obligation? Undoubtedly, that the Sovereign having possession of the subject would have a right to the services of the subject. If he return within the jurisdiction of his primitive Sovereign, he may resume his right to his services, of which the subject by his own act could not divest himself. But his primitive Sovereign can have no right to go in quest of him, out of his own jurisdiction into the jurisdiction of another Sovereign, or upon the high seas, where there exists either no jurisdiction, or it belongs to the nation owning the ship navigating them. But, sir, this discussion is altogether useless. It is not to the British principle, objectionable as it is, that we are alone to look; it is to her practice—no matter what guise she puts on. It is in vain to assert the inviolability of the obligation of allegiance. It is in vain to set up the plea of necessity, and to allege that she cannot exist without the impressment of her seamen. The truth is, she comes, by her press gangs, on board of our vessels, seizes our native seamen, as well as naturalized, and drags them into her service. It is the case, then, of the assertion of an erroneous principle, and a practice not conformable to the principle—a principle which, if it were theoretically right, must be forever practically wrong. We are told by gentlemen in the opposition that Government has not done all that was incumbent on it to do to avoid just cause of complaint on the part of Great Britain; that, in particular, the certificates of protection, authorized by the act of 1796, are fraudulently used. Sir, Government has done too much in granting those paper protections. I can never think of them without being shocked. They resemble the passes which the master grants to his negro slave: "Let the bearer, Mungo, pass and repass without molestation." What do they imply? That Great Britain has a right to take all who are not provided with them. From their very nature they must be liable to abuse on both sides. If Great Britain desires a mark by which she can know her own subjects, let her give them an ear mark. The colors that float from the mast head should be the credentials of our seamen. There is no safety to us, and the gentlemen have shown it, but in the rule that all who sail under the flag (not being enemies) are protected by the flag. It is impossible that this country should ever abandon the gallant tars who have won for us such splendid trophies. Let me suppose that the Genius of Columbia should visit one of them in his oppressor's prison and attempt to reconcile him to his wretched condition. She would say to him, in the. language of the gentlemen on the other side, "Great Britain intends you no harm; she did not mean to impress you, but one of her own subjects; having taken you by mistake, I will remonstrate, and try to prevail upon her by peaceable means to release you, but I cannot, my son, fight for you." If he did not consider this mockery, he would address her judgment, and say, "You owe me, my country, protection; I owe you in return obedience. I am no British subject, I am a native of old Massachusetts, where live my aged father, my wife and my children. I have faithfully discharged my duty. Will you refuse to do yours?" Appealing to her passions, he would continue, "I lost this eye in fighting under Truxton with the Insurgent; I got this scar before Tripoli; I broke this leg on board the Constitution when the Guerriere struck." If she remained still unmoved, he would break out, in the accents of mingled distress and despair,