Can such men pretend that peace is their object? Whatever may result, the perfect conviction of my mind is, that they have no such intention, and that if it comes it is contrary both to their hope and expectation.

I would not judge these men severely. But it is my duty to endeavor to judge them truly; and to express fearlessly the result of that judgment, whatever it may be. My opinion results from the application of the well-known principle of judging concerning men's purposes and motives: to consider rather what men do, than what they say; and to examine their deeds in connection with predominating passions and interests; and on this basis decide. In making an estimate of the intentions of these or any other politicians, I make little or no account of pacific pretensions. There is a general reluctance at war, and desire of peace, which pervades the great mass of every people; and artful rulers could never keep any nation at war any length of time, beyond their true interests, without some sacrifice to that general love of peace which exists in civilized men. Bonaparte himself will tell you that he is the most pacific creature in the world. He has already declared, by his proclamation to Frenchmen, that he has gone to Moscow for no other end than to cultivate peace, and counteract the Emperor of Russia's desire of war. In this country, where the popular sentiment has so strong an impulse on its affairs, the same obtrusive pretension must inevitably be preserved. No man or set of men ever can or will get this country at war, or continue it long in war, without keeping on hand a stout, round stock of gulling matter. Fair propositions will always be made to go hand in hand with offensive acts. And when something is offered so reasonable that no man can doubt but it will be accepted, at the same moment something will be done of a nature to embarrass the project, and if not to defeat at least to render its acceptance dubious. How this has been in past time, I have shown. I will now illustrate what is doing and intended at present.

As from the uniform tenor of the conduct of the American Cabinet, in relation to the British Government, I have no belief that their intention has been to make a solid arrangement with that nation; so, from the evidence of their disposition and intention, existing abroad and on the table, I have no belief that such is at present their purpose. I cannot possibly think otherwise, than that such is not their intention. Let us take the case into common life. I have demands, Mr. Speaker, against you, very just in their nature, but different. Some of recent, others of very old date. The former depending upon principles very clearly in my favor. The latter critical, difficult, and dubious, both in principle and settlement. In this state of things, and during your absence, I watch my opportunity, declare enmity; throw myself upon your children and servants and property, which happen to be in my neighborhood, and do them all the injury I can. While I am doing this, I receive a messenger from you, stating that the grounds of the recent injury are settled; that you comply fully with my terms. Your servants and children, whom I am plundering and killing, invite me to stay my hand until you return, or until some accommodation can take place between us. But, deaf to any such suggestions, I prosecute my intention of injury to the utmost. When there is reason to expect your return, I multiply my means of injury and offence. And no sooner do I hear of your arrival, than I thrust my fist into your face, and say to you—"Well, sir, here are fair propositions of settlement; come to my terms, which are very just; settle the old demand in my way, and we will be as good friends as ever." Mr. Speaker, what would be your conduct on such an occasion? Would you be apt to look as much at the nature of the propositions, as at the temper of the assailant? If you did not at once return blow for blow, and injury for injury, would you not at least take a little time to consider? Would you not tell such an assailant, that you were not to be bullied nor beaten into any concession? If you settled at all, might you not consider it your duty in some way to make him feel the consequences of his strange intemperance of passion? For myself, I have no question how a man of spirit ought to act under such circumstances. I have as little, how a great nation, like Great Britain, will act. Now, I have no doubt, sir, that the American Cabinet view this subject in the same light. They understand well, that by the declaration of war, the invasion of Canada, the refusal of an armistice, and perseverance in hostilities, after the principal ground of war had been removed, they have wrought the minds of the British Cabinet and people to a very high state of irritation. Now is the very moment to get up some grand scheme of pacification; such as may persuade the American people of the inveterate love of our Cabinet for peace, and make them acquiescent in their perseverance in hostilities. Accordingly, before the end of the session, a great tub will be thrown out to the whale. Probably, a little while before the Spring elections, terms of very fair import will be proffered to Great Britain. Such as, perhaps, six months ago our Cabinet would not have granted, had she solicited them on her knees. Such as probably, in the opinion of the people of this country, Great Britain ought to accept; such perhaps as in any other state of things, she would have accepted. But such as, I fear, under the irritation produced by the strange course pursued by the American Cabinet, that nation will not accept. Sir, I do not believe that our Cabinet expect that they will be accepted. They think the present state of induced passion is sufficient to prevent arrangement. But to make assurance doubly sure, to take a bond of fate, that arrangement shall not happen, they prepare this bill. A bill, which proposes an augmentation of the army for the express purpose of conquering the Canadas. A bill which, connected with the recent disposition evinced by our Cabinet, in relation to those provinces, and with the avowed intent of making their subjugation the means of peace, through the fear to be inspired into Great Britain, is as offensive to the pride of that nation as can well be imagined; and is, in my apprehension, as sure a guarantee of continued war as could be given. On these grounds, my mind cannot force itself to any other conclusion than this, that the avowed object of this bill is the true one; that the Canadas are to be invaded the next season; that the war is to be protracted: and that this is the real policy of the American Cabinet.

I will now reply to those invitations to "union," which have been so obtrusively urged upon us. If by this call to union is meant a union in a project for the invasion of Canada, or for the invasion of East Florida, or for the conquest of any foreign country whatever, either as a means of carrying on this war or for any other purpose, I answer, distinctly, I will unite with no man nor any body of men for any such purposes. I think such projects criminal in the highest degree, and ruinous to the prosperity of these States. But, if by this invitation is meant union in preparation for defence, strictly so called; union in fortifying our seaboard; union in putting our cities into a state of safety; union in raising such a military force as shall be sufficient with the local militia in the hands of the constitutional leaders, the Executives of the States, to give a rational degree of security against any invasion; sufficient to defend our frontiers, sufficient to awe into silence the Indian tribes within our Territories; union in creating such a maritime force as shall command the seas on the American coasts, and keep open the intercourse, at least between the States: if this is meant, I have no hesitation; union on such principles you shall have from me cordially and faithfully. And this, too, sir, without any reference to the state of my opinion, in relation to the justice or necessity of this war. Because I will understand such to be the condition of man, in a social compact, that he must partake of the fate of the society to which he belongs, and must submit to the privations and sacrifices its defence requires, notwithstanding these may be the result of the vices or crimes of its immediate rulers. But there is a great difference between supporting such rulers in plans of necessary self-defence, on which the safety of our altars and firesides especially depend, and supporting them in projects of foreign invasion, and encouraging them in schemes of conquest and ambition, which are not only unjust in themselves, but dreadful in their consequences; inasmuch as, let the particular project result as it may, the general effect must be, according to human view, destructive to our own domestic liberties and constitution. I speak as an individual. Sir, for my single self, did I support such projects as are avowed to be the objects of this bill, I should deem myself a traitor to my country. Were I even to aid them by loan, or in any other way, I should consider myself a partaker in the guilt of the purpose. But when these projects of an invasion shall be abandoned; when men yield up schemes which not only openly contemplate the raising of a great military force, but also the concentrating them at one point, and placing them in one hand; schemes obviously ruinous to the fates of a free Republic—as they comprehend the means by which such have ever heretofore been destroyed; when, I say, such schemes shall be abandoned, and the wishes of the Cabinet limited to mere defence and frontier and maritime protection, there will be no need of calls to union. For such objects there is not, there cannot be, but one heart and soul in this people.

Mr. Archer said, so great was the respect which he felt for the House, so deep was the consciousness which he entertained of his inability to do justice to a cause, especially one of so much magnitude and importance, of which he might be the advocate, that he would be doing injustice to his feelings were he not to express the weight of the embarrassments which oppressed him. But the wide range which the present discussion had taken, involving considerations of great national interest, and calling forth the cruel asperities of political intolerance, seemed to leave him no alternative in the discharge of his duty, but to repel the unfounded insinuations which had flown in so copious a stream from the other side of the House. Were gentlemen to confine themselves to a temperate investigation of the propriety of adopting measures either recommended by the Executive, or proposed by the majority, who is there that would not listen with pleasure and satisfaction? But when the liberty of debate was prostituted in disseminating the most unfounded charges, in the indiscriminate abuse of the constituted authorities of the nation, he confessed he could not "always be a hearer, and never reply." The few observations he had to make would be without either system or arrangement, having bestowed no previous consideration on the subject, and should be confined not so much to the bill for raising an additional army, as the remarks and arguments of those gentlemen who had preceded him on the other side of the House.

And here, he said, he hoped to be permitted first to notice the charge which had been confidently made by a gentleman from New York (Mr. Gold) against the majority of the House. He had asserted (and he seemed to dwell upon the assertion with peculiar satisfaction) that war had been declared by Congress prematurely and without due preparation; that to embark in a war with a powerful nation, without a large standing army, was impolitic in the extreme. This principle, said Mr. A., in the general might be true, but it had certainly no application to this country. Our Government was founded on the broad basis of popular opinion, liable to fluctuation upon the first appearance of any system which might be calculated to destroy the liberties of the people. A laudable jealousy of their rulers throbbed in the heart of every man in the country, who would seize the first opportunity to change an Administration that would raise a standing army in time of peace, whatever might be the professed objects of such an Administration. From this jealousy the natural result would be, that the men who raised the army would never declare the war which it was intended to wage. He would refer to the Administration of Mr. Adams. An army had been then raised, or attempted to be raised, to defend the country against an anticipated French invasion. The professed object was disbelieved, and the people, apprehending an invasion of their rights, removed from power the men who had voted for the army. All our institutions were repugnant to a standing army in time of peace. Anticipated invasion would seldom justify it, because it might be made a pretext for the purpose at all times, and with the most dangerous views. What had been said by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Quincy) seemed to confirm this position, for he had expressed his fears of the army, even in a state of declared war, when that army was to be employed out of the limits of the country; and if jealousy existed at such time, the conclusion would naturally follow that it would exist to a greater degree in a time of peace. The argument then of the gentleman, if it proved any thing, proved too much, because its effect would always be to frustrate the views of the Government, and prevent it from going to war to avenge even the grossest insult, or to assert even its most indisputable rights. But an appeal had been made with much confidence to the history of all Europe, to bear him out in the charge he had made, and it had been said that no instance of a nation's engaging in a war without having a well-regulated and disciplined army could be adduced. This, said Mr. A., will be admitted, but he presumed it was incumbent upon the gentleman to show that some analogy existed between the Governments of Europe and that of the United States, before his argument could have any application to the subject. There the people had no voice in the selection of their rulers. There the arbitrary will of the monarch was the law of the land, and his decrees, however oppressive or obnoxious, were enforced by the hand of power, without a murmur or complaint. There each Government is surrounded by kingdoms powerful and strong, the ambition of whose rulers prompts them to seize upon every occasion to enlarge the boundaries of their dominions. For one of these powers, even in the most peaceful condition of the world, to be destitute of a powerful and permanent military force, would evince an inattention to its own security and independence, which would demonstrate the incapacity of its monarch to govern his subjects, or to preserve the integrity of his possessions. But the dissimilarity of the Government and situation of the United States would show the inapplicability of the gentleman's maxim to this country. Here we have no powerful neighbor whose incursions we dread. Here we are happily removed, by a wide-extended ocean, from those nations who, upon a declaration of war by us, could overrun the country with a military force, or endanger its civil institutions. Here we have a people proudly jealous of their liberties, who will put down constitutionally every attempt in a state of peace to raise a Military Establishment. To have delayed, then, the declaration of war against England, until the ranks of the army authorized to be raised had been completely filled, would have been a most certain course to have defeated the object which Congress had in view. The jealousies and fears which would have been the necessary consequence of such delay, would have brought into power men of far different views; men who, if the natural conclusion to be drawn from the arguments of some of them could be admitted, would sooner submit to all the indignities we had received from Great Britain, than resist her. The war was therefore not declared prematurely, but was delayed to as late a period as the nature of our institutions would permit. And, if what he had said would not be sufficient to satisfy the gentleman from New York of his error, the army that was so shamefully surrendered at Detroit, if it had been commanded by a man of spirit and fidelity, would long before this, by the possession which it would have given us of an important province of the enemy, have convinced him that war was not declared without preparation. But, for having said so much upon this point, some apology seemed to be necessary upon his part, and he could only say that he had been induced to do so, because, having been one of the majority who voted for war against England, the charge seemed to be an imputation against his character, which the duty every man owed to himself bound him to repel.

It had been said by a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Pitkin) that the nature of the war had been changed; the principal cause had been removed by the British Order in Council of June 23d, 1812, by which her previous orders were repealed; that it was a well-ascertained fact that war would not have taken place if this intelligence had reached the United States before its declaration; and that the Executive ought to have acceded to the terms proposed through Admiral Warren, and have terminated the contest. These were grounds which demanded some consideration, and he trusted that he would be able to show, from authentic documents, that his premises were erroneous, and that of course his conclusions did not follow. But he would now admit, for the sake of argument, (what he should hereafter prove incorrect,) that the Orders in Council were the principal cause of the war; he could not, for himself, see how, even then, the war ought in justice to have terminated. Did it follow that minor considerations should be placed out of view or yielded up entirely? Would it have been proper for the Government to have entered into no stipulations for the security of American seamen? Would it have been proper in them to have claimed on behalf of our citizens no indemnity for the vast amount of spoliations which have been made on the property of American merchants? Unquestionably not. Until these considerations, admitting them to be of minor importance, should have been satisfactorily adjusted, to have made a peace, in his opinion, would have been the height of impolicy. Sir, said he, it is not sufficient that the injury should cease, but that ample compensation should be made for the commission of the wrong. This was the case every day between individuals in civil society, and why ought not the rule to apply with equal force to States, in their relation to each other? Justice was its foundation, and that would operate upon the one as well as the other. These considerations alone, perhaps, ought to be deemed sufficient to show that the course the gentlemen would have taken would have been unwise. But, supposing them to have no weight, he thought it might be satisfactorily shown that, to have acceded to the terms proposed by the British Government, would have been an actual abandonment of the principal cause which had induced hostilities. To have negotiated without entering into an arrangement in relation to the important interest of impressment, would unquestionably have been a relinquishment of the right which we claimed, to be exempted from its exercise. But it was said that was a secondary consideration. From whence was this conclusion drawn? Were we more regardful of the property than the personal liberty of the citizen? Was it taken from an impression which had gone abroad in the country? or from the unofficial conversation of the members of the House? These opinions (if the expression were allowed) he would call extra judicial, and entitled to no consideration. But to show that impressment was the principal cause, he would resort to the best evidence of which the case was susceptible. He would appeal to the archives and records of the country, which, in his opinion, would be conclusive, to show what the opinions of Congress were upon that subject. And, in the first place, would call the attention of the House to the report of the committee to whom our foreign affairs were intrusted, which was made on the 29th of November, 1811. After commenting on the operation of the Orders in Council, they say:

Again, the same committee, in the report which they made to the House, detailing the causes which should induce the House to declare war, say, (after speaking of the evils flowing from the Orders in Council:)

These reports, by the adoption of the measures they recommended, were sanctioned by the Congress of the United States, and may be considered as furnishing strong, if not full and complete evidence, that the Legislative department of the Government considered the impressment of our seamen as the principal cause which impelled them to have recourse to the last resort of injured nations. The opinion of the Executive had been manifested in clear and explicit terms upon the subject, in the Message of the Chief Magistrate of the 1st of June, 1812. Thus we have these concurrent proofs against the assertions of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Pitkin.) If, then, as it appears clearly to have been, from the documents before alluded to, that impressment was the principal cause of the war, that it was an injury which no independent nation could submit to without surrendering a portion of its sovereignty, would it not be admitted, even on the ground which had been taken, that, to have terminated the war by acceding to the propositions alluded to, would have been degrading to the nation, and have manifested the incompetency of the Executive to have conducted with firmness the helm of State which had been submitted to his guidance and direction? And no doubt could be entertained had such an event taken place, but we should have heard denunciations against the Administration proceeding from the very quarter whence they now flow. Then they would have been made with infinitely more justice, because they would have been supported by reason and by truth. We should have then found the opposition appealing to the sympathies of the people, and proclaiming that their most inestimable rights had been surrendered by Government in the pacification; that although they were originally opposed to a war, when it had once been declared they would have prosecuted it until the claim had been abandoned by the British Government. For, it cannot be concealed that unless, in the present contest, Great Britain can be compelled to relinquish her claim to the right of impressment, unless it be made the sine qua non by the American Government, to any arrangement of the existing differences between the two nations, our claim to exemption from the practice must be forever given up, and Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to continue to exercise it with ten-fold rigor and severity.

Mr. A. declared that, notwithstanding the clamor of French influence and French alliance, he felt no apprehensions upon that subject, as he was well convinced it was not the intention or wish of our Government to engulf us in the unfathomable vortex of European warfare. One word to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gold) and he had done. It had been considered by him as a most unfortunate circumstance that we should be engaged in a war with Great Britain when Russia was struggling for her independence. The most amicable relations existed, it was true, between Russia and the United States; but would the gentleman have us on that account to submit to every species of indignity from the ally of that power? He beheld with as much detestation and abhorrence the conduct of the French Emperor as any man could possibly do. His ambitious progress was everywhere marked with blood. The vengeance of Heaven, he trusted, would arrest him in his career to universal conquest and dominion. The present condition of Russia, although her people groaned under a despotism of the most unrelenting nature, must excite the sympathy of every man in this country, because she was contending for her independence, and he would wish her complete success in the war in which she was now engaged, but that her triumph would protract the restoration of peace to his own country.

Mr. Grundy.—Mr. Speaker, had this debate been confined to the bill before you, I should certainly not have troubled the House with any remarks of mine; but as the gentlemen opposed to the war in which we are engaged have selected this as a fit occasion to bring before this House and the nation a full view of all the relations which exist between this and other countries, an apology at least is furnished for a member of that committee, to whose examination these subjects have been confided, to give his ideas upon the various points suggested. This I shall endeavor to do with temper and moderation.

I will now proceed to state, as accurately and as concisely as I am able, the manner in which the points in difference between the two nations ought to be considered.

Upon some of the subjects in controversy, for instance, that of impressment, negotiation had been tried unsuccessfully for twenty years, as I will show before I sit down, from the public records of the country; on others it had been tried for a shorter period. At the last session of Congress, when every hope of obtaining justice in any other way was lost, the United States declared war, not to procure a repeal of the Orders in Council only, but to obtain redress for the unjust spoliations which had been committed on the property of American citizens, and to cause Great Britain to cease the practice of impressment. Other causes of irritation existed, but these were the prominent causes of the war. It may be taken as granted, in this discussion, that those orders are revoked, notwithstanding the objectionable manner of the revocation. You are now asked to lay down the sword before you have obtained any of the objects of the war, except the abolition of these obnoxious orders. I request gentlemen to reflect, whether this is not, in point of fact, an abandonment of the other points in dispute? Do you not, by ceasing to prosecute the war which is already commenced, declare, in the strongest possible terms, that you will not make war for the injuries which remain unredressed? Can any man persuade himself that you will obtain that by negotiation for which you have determined you will not fight! and that, too, from a nation at all times disposed to depress this growing country? That politician must have a very imperfect knowledge of the considerations which influence all Cabinets, who does not know that the strongest inducement which can be brought to operate in favor of an injured nation, is the apprehension of retaliation, or fear of war, entertained by the other party. I cannot, perhaps, establish this more clearly in any other way than by recurring to the history of a transaction which took place between the United States and Great Britain. Immediately after the attack on the Chesapeake, this Government demanded reparation. The terms proposed were reasonable, and such as a nation, inclined to act justly, would promptly have acceded to. For five years, or more, did the British Government refuse, or rather fail, to make that arrangement, which, at the last session, produced a satisfactory adjustment on that subject. Why, sir, was justice so long delayed, and why was it at last obtained? The British Minister discovered a determination in Congress to submit no longer. He saw that, unless something was done, friendly relations between the two countries must immediately cease. He saw that public sentiment called so loudly for an opportunity of obtaining that justice by force which had been refused to fair argument, that he granted us that reasonable satisfaction which had been so long withheld. Sir, had he not seen the approaching storm, no atonement for that wanton outrage on our national sovereignty had yet been made. If you now say that you will not prosecute the war, the enemy must view it as a decision pronounced by this Government, that war shall not be waged by the American nation for the impressment of her citizens, or for depredations committed on commerce. It might as well be said, in plain, intelligible language, that the ocean is to be abandoned by the people of the United States, except so far as depends on the will of Great Britain. If both the property and liberty of American citizens on the ocean are subject to her disposal, you cease to possess the rights of a sovereign and independent nation. For my own part, if we have the right to claim security for the liberty and property of our citizens against that nation, of which no man dare express a doubt, I am for asserting it until the object is attained, or the ability of this nation fails; of the latter I have no fear.

It is pretended that this Government is not desirous of peace, and that this is a war of conquest and ambition. I beg gentlemen to refrain from making statements which they themselves do not believe. After the declaration of war, what has been the conduct of the Executive? Through Mr. Russell, our Chargé des Affaires at London, they have offered to conclude an armistice on terms which would remove every pretext for complaint on the part of Great Britain. He proposed that this country should exclude from her service British seamen. It is true that Lord Castlereagh urged Mr. Russell's want of powers, and stated that the American Congress alone could make the necessary provisions on that subject. If, however, sincerity had existed with the British Ministry, a temporary arrangement could have been made, by which hostilities would have been suspended until the legitimate authorities of this country could have expressed an opinion. If Mr. R. had not adequate powers to conclude an armistice, the proposition made by Mr. Monroe to Admiral Warren was not liable to the same objection. In substance, both propositions were the same; to the latter, no offer of compliance has been tendered. If I have any objections to the late overtures made by the Executive, it is that too great an anxiety for peace is manifested; but when the nature of our institutions is consulted, a strong propensity for domestic quiet is discovered; and, therefore, the Administration should be indulged in any measure calculated to restore harmony between the two countries, provided the honor and interests of the nation are not compromitted.

I ask gentlemen in opposition to lay aside party feelings, and reflect whether, if we now recede, points are not conceded to the enemy, which they would not yield if in power. They affect to be the followers of Washington. I will show them what his opinions were on the subject of impressment. From them the pretended Washingtonians of the present day will discover their degeneracy. Yes, sir, the Father of his Country too well understood the value of liberty ever to consent that the most obscure individual of his country should be deprived of it by a foreign despot. So early as the year 1792, the British nation commenced the practice of impressment, as now exercised by it. On the 11th day of June, in that year, the then Secretary of State addressed a letter to Mr. Pinkney, the American Minister at London, in which the practice of impressment is strongly reprobated; and let it be remembered, that although this letter was written by the Secretary, it contained the sentiments of the President of the United States. In order that the House may more fully comprehend what were the sentiments of that man, whose memory we all venerate, I will read so much of the letter referred to, as relates to this subject:

If, at so early a period, the right of search for men was objected to by this Government, how much more forcible is the objection now? We were then a young nation; we have since increased in resources by which our rights can be maintained; whilst the violation of those rights have been augmented in a greater degree. On the 6th of November, 1792, the Secretary of State wrote to the American Minister at London a letter, in which, when speaking on the subject of impressment, the following language is used: "It is unnecessary to develop to you the inconveniences of this conduct, and the impossibility of letting it go on. I hope you will be able to make the British Ministry sensible of the necessity of punishing the past and preventing the future." I know, Mr. Speaker, that there is danger of fatiguing the House by recurring to documents of this sort, but my apology is a good one: those to which I refer have never been printed for the information of the members of this House, nor have the public had an opportunity of inspecting them. I hope, therefore, to be indulged in pursuing the sentiments of former Administrations further on a subject of so much interest. On the 20th of February, 1800, Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, addressed the President of the United States on the subject of a proposed treaty between the two countries, upon which occasion he makes the following remark: "That he transmits Mr. Liston's note of the 4th of February, together with his project of a treaty for the reciprocal delivery of deserters; which appears to the Secretary utterly inadmissible, unless it would put an end to impressment; which Mr. Liston seemed to imagine, while the seventh paragraph of his project expressly recognizes the right of impressing British subjects, and consequently American citizens as at present." Mr. Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury, when giving his opinion to the President, says—"That the project of a treaty proposed by His Britannic Majesty for the reciprocal delivery of deserters from the land and naval service, does not sufficiently provide against the impressment of American seamen, and is therefore deemed inadmissible."

Mr. Stoddert, who acted as Secretary of the Navy, at that period, when advising the President on the same subject, says—"That the Secretary is clearly of opinion that it is better to have no article, and meet all consequences, than not to enumerate merchant vessels, on the high seas, among the things not to be forcibly entered in search of deserters."

The letter of the present Chief Justice of the United States to Mr. King, Minister at London, dated on the 20th of September, 1800, places this subject in a strong light; he says—

In another part of the same letter, Mr. Marshall observes, "the United States require positively that their seamen who are not British subjects, whether born in America or elsewhere, shall be exempt from impressment."

From these documents we clearly collect what was the view which the first and second Presidents of the United States had on this subject, and that of the principal officers of the Government. It appears that this exemption from impressment is no new claim set up by men now in power. It is as old as the Government itself, and there never has been, nor can there be, an Administration in this country who dare surrender this point to any foreign power. Once relinquished, we had as well abandon the ocean altogether. If the liberty of American citizens is to be subject to the will, not of the English Government, but what is infinitely worse, of every petty officer that navigates a British ship, it is in vain that we boast of freedom; we do not possess it; and only let the British Government understand you distinctly on this point, and you need talk no more of American commerce.

It has been said, by a gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Pearson,) that, if we exclude British seamen from our service by law, one of two things must happen—either a peace would be the result, or the people of this country all unite in a vigorous prosecution of the war. If I have mistaken the meaning of the gentleman, I wish him to correct me at this time, and answer the question directly, if, in that event, he will support the war? [Mr. Pearson explained.] Mr. Grundy proceeded: Sir, from the explanation given, it will, I fear, be as difficult to come to an understanding with that gentleman, as it is to accommodate the points in dispute with the British Ministry; for, although the gentleman says he will not surrender an essential right of the country, a question might be made by him as to what were essential rights. I will, nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, make one more effort to elicit the opinion of the gentleman on this subject. I ask him whether he considers the impressment of American seamen "a violation of an essential right of this country?" [Mr. Pearson said he so considered it.] Then, said Mr. Grundy, from the gentleman's own declaration he is bound to support us in the war, if the principle of impressment is not relinquished by Great Britain. I have no hesitation in saying that, in a time of peace, I am willing British seamen, not naturalized in this country, should be excluded from our service. I believe that such a regulation would inflict no injury or inconvenience on the country. Whenever, therefore, a proposition to this effect is made, so as to take effect at the conclusion of the war, I shall vote for it. I consider it a direct encouragement to our own seamen, calculated to foster and cherish the enterprise and industry of that important class of our citizens.

Thursday, January 7.

Mr. Bleecker.—Mr. Chairman: I have a very few, very desultory, and I fear very unimportant observations to make on the subject now before the committee. They will be few, not because the subject does not abound with various fruitful and interesting topics, but because an indisposition of some days has unfitted me for any considerable effort of memory.

I was opposed to the war when it was declared, because I was confidently persuaded that the evils of which we complained were of a nature not to be remedied by war. I thought, too, sir, that by entering into war, we were plunging ourselves into evils a million fold greater than those from which we sought to be relieved. I was opposed to the war, because I thought that, notwithstanding all the decrees and orders of the belligerents affecting our neutral rights, we might enjoy a commerce more extensive and profitable than we could have in a time of European peace. The war in Europe was, in fact, a blessing to this country. I was opposed to the war, because I knew that the whole of one of the great political parties in the Northern and Eastern, the most commercial section of the country, which was most interested in the avowed objects of the war, openly condemned it; and I believed that a great portion of the other party was secretly opposed to it. This objection was to my mind perfectly conclusive. If there had been no other reason against the war, this was enough. What, sir, go to war when that part of the country which has most of its wealth, strength, and resources, is decidedly opposed to it! go to war for commercial and maritime rights, when the people of that part of the country which is principally interested in its commerce and navigation, openly execrate war!

It seemed to me that it became legislators who were disposed to exercise a paternal regard over the interests of the nation, to give up their own opinions, their prejudices and partialities, rather than go to war with a people thus divided. And permit me to say, sir, without any disparagement to the members of this House, that thousands and tens of thousands of the inhabitants of that part of the country of which I have been speaking, are as competent to understand the true interest and honor of the nation, as gentlemen who happen to be members of Congress.

I was opposed to the war, because I thought it might expose our happy form of Government—our excellent political institutions—to a dangerous trial. I was afraid, sir, that the war might produce a pressure upon the Government which it would not be able to sustain. I was opposed to the war, and this was the bitter draught, because it brought us into concert and co-operation with the great destroyer, the grand enemy of freedom and humanity throughout the world. I was opposed to the war, because I believed the state of things in Europe, out of which our difficulties arose—a state of things which the United States had no power to control—was in its nature transient. Rather than plunge ourselves into the vortex of European politics; rather than encounter the evils and dangers of war, I thought it would be wise and prudent to wait until "the troubled waters should subside, and the ancient landmarks of the world reappear above the flood;" with a living statesman, I thought I saw in the very cloud which blackened all our horizon, the bow which was set for a token, that the tempest would not be forever.

But, sir, war was declared, and the doctrine has since been promulgated, that it is now the duty of every man to support it; that all inquiry must be hushed, and all examination of its expediency and propriety cease. So far as this doctrine inculcates obedience to the laws, it has my cordial approbation; but inasmuch as it denies the right of the citizen to examine into the causes of the war, to express and publish his opinions respecting its policy, it is an insult to the understanding of an intelligent people, and inconsistent with the character and spirit of the constitution. War is declared by law. How shall the law be repealed? How can we get rid of the war, if we may not say that it is inexpedient, impolitic, and ruinous? How abominable the doctrine is, that the declaration of war shuts the door against all inquiry, is manifest from the consideration, that it would enable a wicked Administration to perpetuate its power by declaring war. Again, sir, I would ask the advocates of the doctrine I am reprobating, when will it be proper to show the folly and ruinous consequences of the war? Suppose the war to have continued five or ten years, and the country to be impoverished, its commerce annihilated, its resources exhausted, its best blood expended in wild and fruitless projects of conquest, the people oppressed by debts and taxes, will it then be deemed improper to expose the absurdity and mischief of continuing the war? Surely, sir, it will be patriotic and laudable to alarm the people, to entreat them to put an end to that which is the cause of their calamities. And if such conduct will then be proper, it must be laudable and patriotic now to show them their evils and dangers, and to point them to the means of escape.

But, sir, what has been the state of the country since the declaration of war? I speak again in reference to public opinion. The people of the North and East have poured out their feelings and opinions, their complaints and groans, in addresses, petitions, resolutions, and remonstrances against the war. Look, sir, at the Presidential election, and you see all the Northern and Eastern States; with the exception of Vermont, arrayed against the Administration. You see the people disregarding the old line of party division and distinction. Yes, sir, in spite of such division and distinction, "burying their mutual animosities," their ancient prejudices, "in their common detestation" of the policy of the Government, rising up in their might and strength to manifest their hostility to the course of measures it has pursued. This, Mr. Chairman, is a state of things which ought to arrest the attention, and engage the reflection of the National Legislature, for without that section of country our strength is weakness. I know how ungracious and invidious topics of this kind are to some gentlemen. But, sir, we cannot help it that the country is made up of sections. We are legislating for such a country, and it is our business and duty to regard the circumstances, the interests, and feelings of the people of different parts of the Union. We declared war for commerce; the people most interested in commerce were opposed to it. We continue the war for sailors' rights, and three-fourths of our native American seamen belong to New York and the Eastern States, the people of which are sighing for peace. It ought to be remembered, too, sir, that the war itself must have the effect of driving a vast portion of our sailors out of the country into foreign service.

But, Mr. Chairman, whatever may have been the reasons for declaring war, the question is not now what it was when war was declared. Our relations with the belligerents have materially and essentially changed. So much have they changed, that I declare, without fear of contradiction, that had they been on the 17th of June last what they now are, we should not have gone to war. I hope no gentleman of this committee will deny this. But if any gentleman should deny it, the nation will not believe him. Sir, we have received new, important, and interesting evidence of the true state of our foreign relations since the declaration of war. Facts which were then unknown, and which have shed a flood of light upon the situation and policy of the United States, have since been published to the world. The repeal of the Orders in Council itself, by removing the principal cause of the war, has produced a most material change; for had they been repealed before the war was declared, there would have been no war; and let it be remembered, that they were repealed before the war was known in England. But this is not all to which I refer. I mean to speak of the evidence we have received respecting our relations with France; and I hope gentlemen will not be startled or offended by what I am about to say. I declare confidently and boldly that Napoleon has inveigled us into the war. He has cajoled and deceived us. But for his arts, intrigues, and duplicity, the United States would not now have been at war with Great Britain. Yes, sir, he has led us on step by step, until he brought us to the edge of the precipice, and plunged us into the abyss. We have been humbled and mortified. He has triumphed over our character, our honor, our rights, our independence. I do not say these things hastily, carelessly, or lightly. And I will add, that after the discovery of the deceit and duplicity which the Emperor of France has practised upon us, it became the duty of this Government to go back to the ground it occupied before the President's proclamation of November, 1810, or to declare immediate war against France. A proper regard to the honor, the character, and independence of the country, demanded this of its Government.

Sir, the proof of what I have said is plain; and it is time that it be stated here, and spread before the nation. I beg the attention of the committee to the facts on which it rests. I need not go back farther than to the law of May, 1810, which provided that the non-intercourse act should cease, as to that belligerent which should first repeal its decrees violating our neutral rights, and that it should operate on the other, which should fail so to do, within three months after the President's proclamation of the fact of such repeal. This law, and the conduct of the President under it, are the immediate cause of the war, and the present unhappy state of the country. On the 5th of August, 1810, the Duke de Cadore wrote his famous letter to General Armstrong, the American Minister in Paris, stating that the Berlin and Milan decrees would, upon certain conditions, cease on the first of November then next. On the authority of this letter, the President of the United States issued his proclamation, declaring the fact, that the French decrees were repealed. But the British Government, not considering the letter of the Duke de Cadore sufficient evidence of their repeal, did not revoke their Orders in Council, and, in consequence, our non-intercourse act went into operation against Great Britain the February following. Notwithstanding the proclamation of the President, great doubts existed in this country, whether the French decrees were in fact repealed. To remove these doubts, to confirm the proclamation, to prevent inquiry and investigation in the judicial tribunals of the country, the act of March, 1811, was passed. Yet, sir, it has ever since been denied that the decrees of Berlin and Milan were repealed. The public prints have teemed, and the tables of this House have been loaded with the proofs of their existence and execution. You remember, sir, an impressive argument, in many respects original, an unanswered and unanswerable argument of the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) on this subject in this House, towards the close of the last session. But, sir, notwithstanding all this, this Government persisted in declaring that the French decrees were repealed. I do not mean to discuss that stale matter. The statement I make is necessary to my present purpose. The question of their repeal was the subject of a very voluminous and long-continued correspondence between Mr. Foster, the British Minister, and our Secretary of State. The discussion, I believe, was protracted to the last moment of peace. War was declared on the 18th of June. Some weeks afterwards, appeared in this country a decree of Napoleon, issued in May last, and bearing date the 28th of April, 1811. This is an extraordinary paper, and deserves some attention. I will read it: