Be it enacted, &c., That, in addition to the present Military Establishment of the United States, there be raised twenty regiments of infantry, to be enlisted for the term of one year, unless sooner discharged.
[The remainder of the bill is mere detail; the bounty on enlistment sixteen dollars.]
Mr. Gold said this was a bill involving questions of great importance, as well in principle as in its details. There was one feature especially of the bill which required mature consideration; he alluded to the limited period of service of the proposed additional force. There was no pressing emergency to hurry the bill; and he, therefore, moved to postpone the further consideration of it to Monday, which was negatived.
Death of Mr. Smilie.
So soon as this decision was declared—
Mr. Findlay rose.—It is my melancholy duty, said he, to announce to this House that my venerable colleague and old friend and associate, John Smilie, is no more. He departed this life at two o'clock this afternoon.
A committee was then appointed to superintend the funeral of the deceased, consisting of Messrs. Findlay, Lyle, Brown, Roberts, Davis, Lacock, and Hyneman.
A resolution was unanimously adopted, requesting each member of the House, in testimony of their respect to the memory of John Smilie, to wear crape on the left arm for one month.
And, on motion of Mr. Fitch, the House then adjourned.
On motion of Mr. Findlay,
Resolved, unanimously, That the members of this House will attend the funeral of the late John Smilie, this day, at two o'clock.
Resolved, That a message be sent to the Senate to notify them of the death of John Smilie, late a member of this House, and that his funeral will take place at two o'clock, this day.
And then the House adjourned.
Additional Military Force.
The House resumed the consideration of the report of the Committee of the Whole on the bill in addition to the act for raising an additional military force.
The amendments made by the House having been agreed to, the question was stated, Shall the bill be engrossed, and read a third time?
Mr. Mosely said that, in stating concisely some of the reasons which would induce him to vote against the present bill, he should not attempt to enter into a consideration of the justice or expediency of the war, nor the policy of continuing it. War is declared, and it appears to be the determination of those who have the control of our public concerns to prosecute it with the utmost vigor; yes, sir, with a vigor that, within twelve months from the enlistment of the twenty thousand men to be raised by this bill, we are told must bring it to a successful termination. Really, Mr. Speaker, when I listened to the confident assurance of the honorable Chairman of the Military Committee, that with these twenty thousand men, in addition to the troops already raised, and voted to be raised, we should in a single campaign be able to conquer Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and that the object of all these conquests was to procure an honorable peace, I almost felt myself persuaded as a peace man to join the honorable gentleman in his project of fighting for peace one year, with such a certainty of obtaining it at the expiration of that period; but unfortunately I could not but recollect the fate of similar assurances made on former occasions. When we were about declaring war, I very well remember that we were told with equal confidence by gentlemen anxious to engage in it (and who would listen to no arguments, even for delay, against the measure) that we had only to declare war, and Canada would, in the course of a few months, at most, be ours; that the militia alone, with the aid of a very few regulars, would be competent to the conquest of the whole country, except the fortress of Quebec; and that that must very soon fall of course. An honorable gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Fisk) informed us that the people of those Provinces would almost conquer themselves; that they were at least pre-disposed to be conquered—to use his own expression, that they were "panting" to participate in our liberty.
Experience has now proved the fallacy of these predictions. Gentlemen must now be convinced that Canada is not to be conquered quite so easily as they had imagined—that it is not to be subdued with a few thousand militia, regulars, or volunteers, though aided by proclamations. I mention proclamations, because they seem to be considered as an indispensable auxiliary on all great emergencies. What can be done by proclamation, I will readily concede we are competent to do. No nation, I believe, ever arrived at greater perfection in the art of proclamation-making than we have done; and if history is faithful to record them, we shall in this particular at least bear the palm from all the world.
Sir, it can afford pleasure to no man, who feels as he ought for the honor and interest of his country, to dwell unnecessarily upon the disasters and disgrace which have everywhere attended our military operations from the commencement of the war to the present time. I mean upon land; for to our little Navy too much praise cannot be given. Our gallant seamen have not only afforded to their countrymen examples of valor worthy of imitation, but they have also taught us a lesson of wisdom, by which I am happy to find we have manifested a disposition to profit. But, sir, while gentlemen must feel mortified at the miserable termination of all our boasted military exploits thus far, and might wish to draw a veil over the disgraceful scenes which have taken place, it cannot be done; it would be unwise to attempt it. We ought rather to look at the causes which have produced our misfortunes, and pursue a course in future which may not expose us to similar evils.
Mr. Gold said the annals of this Government, the last six months, commencing with the declaration of war, would be found the most interesting, the most deplorable.
In that period, we have seen a war declared, precipitately and prematurely; for, notwithstanding all the arguments urged on that occasion, with so much zeal and eloquence, time has dissipated all; the illusion has vanished; your army, so confidently expected, did not, under the magic of that declaration, spring into existence; the condition of your enlistments would not, I apprehend, at this hour, justify the declaration of war. We have seen, sir, that war conducted in a manner well to comport with the spirit in which it was declared; disaster upon disaster in rapid succession have followed; the tone and heart of the country broken; universal disgust at the past, and deep concern and anxiety for the future, prevail everywhere.
And what, Mr. Speaker, is now proposed for the future—what is to retrieve our affairs—on what are our hopes to rest? An army of twelve-months' men! A broken reed! An army and term of service, which well nigh lost the country in the Revolutionary war; an army which in every step and stage of that war received the uniform and reiterated censure and condemnation of Washington, and every intelligent officer of that period; an army that stands recorded by every historian of that war with deep reproach and reprobation. Such is the foundation of our future hopes; shutting our eyes upon the lessons of experience, we live but to repeat former errors and renew our sufferings. Shall we never learn, that a soldier is not the creature of an hour; that he must be seasoned to the hardships of war; that to remove your recruit from his fireside, from his plentiful board, and all the comforts with which he is surrounded, to the theatre of service, there to sleep on the ground in tents, with two or three articles of subsistence only, is to give him up a victim to disease, to consign him to the grave? This precise result is presented to the mind by the melancholy review of the last campaign; disease and death have walked abroad in our armies on the frontier; they have been swept to the grave as by the besom of destruction. It has not stopped with your army; the frontier inhabitants, infected by the diseases of the camp, fly from the deadly theatre as from a destroying angel! Shall we never learn the difference between our situation, and that of nations who have a competent military establishment, sufficient at all times for both offensive and defensive operations?
The slender Military Establishment of the United States, whilst it consults economy, and favors the genius of the Government, forbids a hasty resort to war, especially extra-territorial and offensive war; time for preparation, after the measure is resolved on, is indispensable; and a disregard of our situation in this respect cannot fail to induce defeat and disaster—to produce such a campaign as has just now closed.
But, Mr. Speaker, wherefore change the term of enlistment, from five years, or during the war, to one year? The sole avowed object of the war by land was the conquest of the Canadas. Are you at this hour nearer your object than on the day you declared war, or has that object, with a steady and sure pace, constantly receded from you as you have advanced in the war? Is Canada so far conquered that you can now reduce the term of enlistment? It is impossible to shut our eyes on the past; while all is disgust and despondency with our own citizens—sick of the past, and concerned for the future; while every post brings to the Cabinet fearful and alarming changes in the sentiments of the people under this ill-fated war; your enemy, the Canadians, take courage, their wavering sentiments have become resolved, and union in defence of their firesides, the land that gives them bread, is spreading and cementing all in the patriotic vow.
There was a time, sir, when you had friends in the Upper Province; there were many who wished well to your arms, and would have greeted your approach, but that ill-fated policy which precipitated every thing, which in zeal for the end overlooked the means, has blasted all our hopes from that quarter. The Canadian, while he knows your power, distrusts your wisdom and your capacity to conduct the war; he dares not commit himself, his all, to such auspices. Hence, sir, difficulties thicken on every side, and at least three times the force is now necessary to effect the conquest, which would have been required at the commencement of the war. Have we made an impression on the Prince Regent and his Ministry? are they now more disposed to succumb and accept your terms than before the war? How stand the people of the British Empire? Instead of their coercing the Government into our terms, which we fondly anticipated, the late election to Parliament shows them disposed to go hand in hand with the Government in resisting our claims and inflicting on us all the evils of war. "Maritime Rights" are echoed and re-echoed with applause throughout the Empire. Such, sir, are the bitter fruits of your policy, and to what farther point the same hand shall conduct the destinies of the country, remains to be seen.
I seek not to aggravate the misconduct of the war, nor to commend our enemies, but only wish, sir, that we may see things as they are, our actual situation, and thus look danger in the face. Do you persevere in the conquest of Canada? Pass not the barrier with an army of less than forty-five or fifty thousand men: if you do, in my apprehension, the defeats and disasters of the past campaign will be visited upon you; another army will be made to pass under the yoke, and at the end of the year, you will find yourself still further removed from your object. The tug of war is now placed fairly before us, we cannot advance without meeting it. Such, Mr. Speaker, are the grounds on which I object to this twelve-months' army; it is not adapted to the professed object of the war, the conquest of Canada. Is there, sir, any other object in contemplation of the Government; any other land of leeks and onions, which Heaven has given us, or to which our destinies lead? Is the South of easier access than the North, and is the circle of hostility to be extended to that quarter? We profess a pacific policy; moderation and justice are our boast; let us beware how we commit to the hazard this high and enviable character; how we yield, on specious grounds, to the mad and destructive policy which we reprobate in others; a policy which has in all periods overwhelmed nations with calamity, and swelled the tide of human misery.
I fear there are points in our neutral course, in our relative conduct towards Great Britain and France which will not bear examination. You proclaimed the Berlin and Milan decrees revoked, and put upon Great Britain the threatened alternative of non-intercourse. Was the fact so? You took a promise for the fact; you proclaimed the fact, while France herself, the author of the deed and party to be benefited, denies and disowns it as done at the time. Here was a fatal error, a departure from the straight line of justice; and when our error in this was palpable to all the world, we gave no explanation, no excuse, but persevered in a measure which led to war. It is this course, sir, this departure from even-handed neutrality between Great Britain and France, that has lost you the support of your own citizens to a great and alarming extent, and at this moment sustains the British Ministry in the hearts of Englishmen. It is this belief of our Government's leaning to France, that has carried that Ministry so triumphantly through the late elections to Parliament.
If any thing could add to the gloom and sicken the mind under the prospect before us, it is the inauspicious conjunction of events. America and France both making war at the same time on Great Britain; we making the enemy of France our enemy, and this at the ill-fated moment when the all-grasping Emperor of that country is rolling a baleful cloud, charged with destruction, north upon the Russian Empire; upon a power always just to America; upon our truest and best friend in the European theatre. Against such a friend, at such a period, we have beheld the march of the Corsican through rivers of blood; his footsteps are traced over the ashes of the proudest cities, and he sits himself down, at length, at Moscow, like Marius over the ruins of Carthage.
The question was then taken on Mr. Clay's motion, and negatived.
Mr. Macon moved to strike out one, and insert five years as the term of enlistment. He regretted as much as any one the disasters which had befallen the country; and there was but one way to obviate their effects, and that was by rising superior to them, as a part of the nation had already done—he meant the Western country, where a patriotism had been exhibited equal to that which might have distinguished Rome in its best days. Their zeal was equal to their bravery—and the only drawback on their enterprise was the difficulty of finding something to eat in the wilderness. We must rise after reverses. What, sir, said Mr. M., would have become of Rome, had she desponded when Hannibal defeated her armies? She rose upon it and became the mistress of the world. What would have been the situation of our cause in the Revolution, if, after the British successes in Jersey, we had desponded? But the men of Pennsylvania and New Jersey rose on it, and victory and triumph followed. Our object now ought to be to recover the ground we have lost, and meet the enemy with troops that will insure success. We are told, sir, this war has united England to a man. Sir, I never expected aid from our enemies. Let us follow so good an example, and unite to a man; let us remember the old Continental maxim—"United we stand, divided we fall." If we were as united in defence of our rights, as England is in her usurpations, this war would not last a single campaign—and I hope in this respect we shall, at least, learn wisdom from an enemy. The calculations about one or two campaigns, however, in present circumstances, are visionary. We have engaged an enemy not in the habit of yielding very soon. But, if we were to unite, the question would soon be settled. The cause and object of this war has been more concisely stated by one of those actively engaged in it, than by any other person—I mean Captain Porter's motto—"Free trade and sailors' rights;" no man could have given a better definition of it. It appears to me that one part of this continent ought to be zealous for the rights of seamen—another part for a free export trade; and, if we were, as we ought to be, united, the war would be carried on with energy and with success. I agree with the gentleman from New Jersey, that this thing is not to be done by paper men. My opinion is, that the best thing we can do, is to raise men for five years. Let the Legislature of the country do its duty. If the thirty-five thousand men, now authorized, be not enough, let us get as many as will be adequate to the end we propose. Gentlemen have thought proper to review former transactions. I would be willing to pass them over. I believe almost every measure adopted by the General Government would have had its destined effect if adhered to. You have always got the better of the argument; you have better proclamations; but what avails all this? Britain has impressed your seamen, and given you blows for good words. You have been heretofore told your paper measures were worth nothing: now that it is proposed to give blow for blow, what is said? That you are departing from the pacific system, which the same persons before reprobated, and to which they have become friendly only after every attempt at pacification has failed. Sir, we are now engaged in war, and we must succeed or we must yield the rights of sailors and free trade. Does any man doubt that the war is justly undertaken? Is there a man in the nation—I care not of what political sect, many as there are—who believes that the war is not undertaken on just grounds—that we had not borne with their indignities till we could have borne them no longer? After plundering your property and impressing your seamen on the ocean, their agents have been sent into this nation to sow divisions among us, who ought to be but one family. What crime has been left undone? what injury have we not suffered? Could one be added to the catalogue? It seems to me not. No man loves peace more than I do, and if it had not been for Great Britain sending her agents to our firesides, I do not know but I should have voted against the war. It seemed to me like an attempt on a man's daughter. Not content with vexing and harassing you whenever you went from home, they came here to put strife into your family. You have been told that the Prince Regent and his Ministers are firm. Sir, we never calculated on their receding, but on the energies and force of the nation to obtain redress, and if we had been united, we should have equalled our most sanguine expectations. Let us follow their example, and determine to maintain our national rights, as they do to maintain their usurpations on them.
Mr. M. Clay seconded the motion of Mr. Macon to strike out "one year" and insert "five," as the term of enlistment. He said an army ought to be seasoned before it was carried into the field. We have heard much said, observed he, about sickness in your army; much of the sickness, some time ago, at New Orleans, and much lately of the sickness at Plattsburg. Have you ever heard of an army on earth that was carried into the field before it had been seasoned in the camp? It must, to be good for any thing, be first disciplined in camp, and become inured to the mode of living and the fare of soldiers. It will take some time to season men to the change in their mode of living which must take place on going into camp. It will take a year to prepare them for the field. Without discipline they will be useless. Your seamen are brave and successful because they know what they go to sea for. Take a landsman on board a ship, and what sort of a sailor will he make? Such as the French have on board their vessels. We take no man into the Navy but who understands his business and the purpose for which he goes there, and we see the effects of it. I do not wish it understood, sir, if I vote against the bill, that I am opposed to the war. No, sir. It is a righteous war, into which I go with hand and heart. We may differ about the mode, but that is all. I speak from experience more than from any thing else. Let us raise a sufficient army to serve during the war, be it long or short. It is absurd to suppose that we shall not succeed in our enterprise against the enemy's provinces. We have the Canadas as much under our command as she has the ocean; and the way to conquer her on the ocean is to drive her from the land. I am not for stopping at Quebec or anywhere else; but I would take the whole continent from them, and ask them no favors. Her fleets cannot then rendezvous at Halifax as now, and having no place of resort in the North, cannot infest our coast as they have lately done. It is as easy to conquer them on the land as their whole navy could conquer ours on the ocean. As to coping with them at sea, we cannot do it. We can annoy them, but not meet them on the open sea. I would meet them and hurt them, however, where we can. We must take the continent from them. I wish never to see a peace till we do. God has given us the power and the means; we are to blame if we do not use them. If we get the continent, she must allow us the freedom of the sea. I hope, sir, the amendment of my friend from North Carolina, going to make this army more efficient, may be adopted.
Mr. Pleasants said, before the question was taken, he wished to submit a few of the reasons why he was opposed to the amendment. The question before the House, if he correctly understood it, was not, what were the best materials of which to make an army; whether men for the war, for five years, or for twelve months; but the question was, what is the kind of force, and for what length of time can you raise an army to take the field at the earliest period? I hesitate not a moment, Mr. P. said, to declare, that if it were within the compass of our ability to raise an army for five years by voting it, I would authorize it. Not a moment should I doubt on the subject. The history of the world is strongly in favor of such an army. But we perfectly know, from the progress of the recruiting service, that we have already authorized as many men of that description as we shall probably be able to raise. This force is wanted to render the next campaign efficient. I consider the bill merely as a substitute for the volunteer system heretofore pursued. Of what materials will this army be composed? Of young men ready to volunteer their services for one year in the form of regulars; and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, men will enlist in this corps who would not enlist for five years, or for the war. I am sanguine in the opinion, that this measure, if now adopted, will do away the defects of the present volunteer system, and I am fully of opinion, that under it, a force may be drawn into the field ready to act efficiently in the next campaign. I am not one of those, sir, notwithstanding the accounts we have heard of our disasters, who despair of the Republic. If we turn to history we shall find that we have never engaged in any war in which we have come out better in the first campaign than we have in this. Look at the war undertaken under the auspices of Gen. Washington against the Indians. What was the history of it? We all recollect the campaign under Harmar, and its bloody scenes. The campaign under St. Clair cannot be forgotten. We then suffered defeat upon defeat, disaster upon disaster, in the course of the war, which was not terminated till the treaty of Greenville, in 1795, though it may be said to have virtually terminated by the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, which occurred previous to the treaty. If this country be willing to go into the contest heart and hand, we shall in a very short time demonstrate to the enemy all we want to convince her of, that it is in reality her interest to be at peace with this country. I hope, sir, the motion to amend the bill will not prevail. I am perfectly convinced that the bill as it is will enable us to call a valuable force into service, and I am sanguine in the hope, that, with its aid, together with the other force we shall have, we may clear the continent of the enemy's dominion in one campaign, though I do not undertake to predict that we shall.
The question was then taken on Mr. Macon's proposed amendment, and lost.
The question recurred on the passage of the bill to a third reading.
Mr. Pearson said, not unfrequently it happens, Mr. Speaker, both in private and political life, that men of the clearest perceptions and most correct motives, experience much difficulty and embarrassment in determining on the course best to be pursued, or the application of means best calculated to produce a given object. The object most devoutly wished for by myself, and, no doubt, equally desired by every honest and honorable man in this community, is, that my country should once more be restored to the enjoyment of peace. Under the pressure of existing circumstances, involved in a war with a powerful nation—a war now prosecuted for a doubtful, or, at least, strongly controverted question of national right—a war, the prosecution of which, so far as relates to our military operations, has everywhere, and on all occasions, been attended with disgrace, defeat, or disaster; under such circumstances, I confess, sir, I am not free from embarrassment in determining on the course demanded by genuine patriotism, or best calculated to restore the blessings of peace to the country. I rejoiced to hear the honorable Chairman of the Military Committee (Mr. D. R. Williams) declare, the other day, that his object was also peace. It must be a source of gratification to the country to learn that some of the strongest advocates for the declaration of war begin now to think and talk of peace.
The honorable gentleman, however, urges the passage of the bill under consideration, (which authorizes the enlistment of twenty thousand additional regular troops for one year; and provides for the appointment of proportionally an unusual number of officers, with all the accompanying paraphernalia of an army,) as the means best calculated to produce the end in view. Did I believe, sir, that the passage of this bill, or (what is more difficult and less likely to happen) the actual enlistment of the proposed additional force would secure to us our object, I would not only consent to give this force, but ten times the number, if it were by force alone to be obtained; but when I reflect on the special and sole cause for which it is avowed the war is now prosecuted; when I consider the relative strength, situation, and disposable force, by sea and land, of the two nations, and especially when my recollection is assailed (for we cannot, nor ought we to close our senses against such damning facts) with the heretofore scanty enlistments; the confusion and insubordination which has pervaded many parts of your army; the extraordinary expense already incurred, and the uniform disasters which have marked all your military operations, I cannot bring my mind to the belief that the force now proposed can produce any desirable effect.
Mr. Speaker: As much as I was opposed to the declaration of war, and as much as subsequent events have convinced me of the correctness of the vote I gave on that momentous question, it is not my purpose on this occasion to question the policy of that unfortunate act. My mind is bent on peace; to that object my efforts are directed. The impression is strongly fixed on my understanding, that this war can be terminated with honor and advantage to this nation, without the further effusion of human blood. If so, surely no Christian will deny but justice, humanity, and sound policy demand that nothing should remain undone, on our part, to stop this career of carnage and bloodshed. I have said, sir, that it is my impression that this war can be terminated with honor and advantage to this nation, without a further appeal to arms. In stating this opinion, I do not mean to be understood as identifying the honor of the nation with the honor of those by whom the war was declared; or, in other words, I do not admit that the national honor rests solely in the hands of those who may happen to be in the Administration, or who may happen to constitute a majority in Congress. No, sir, this is an elective Government—the power and ultimate responsibility rest with the people; they cannot be dishonored unless they pertinaciously approve of unwise or wicked measures, and continue to support the authors of such measures. It is, therefore, not with me a primary consideration, in the suggestions I am about to make, how far the honor or reputation, for political wisdom, of any individuals may be affected by the adoption of the plan for peace which has occurred to my mind. I do not know that any honorable gentleman will be affected by it, should it be adopted. I hope he will not; to me it is perfectly indifferent who are in power, so that the affairs of the nation are well conducted.
Mr. Speaker: Whatever may have been the original causes for the declaration of this war, we are now taught to believe that the question in contest is reduced to a single point. The British Orders in Council were repealed on the 21st of June, three days after our declaration of war; and, of course, without a knowledge of that event, the blockade of May, 1806, had long ceased to exist. The sole avowed cause, therefore, remaining, and for which the war is now carried on, is the practice of impressment from on board our merchant vessels. This subject has for many years engaged the attention of both nations; it has been a fruitful theme of execration and declamation for almost every editor and orator of the age. Great as our cause of complaint may have been, (and I am not disposed to palliate it,) it must be admitted by all who understand the nature and true bearing of the question, that it had been subjected to much exaggeration. Permit me, sir, to remark, that notwithstanding the importance, the difficulty, and delicacy which have been justly attributed to this subject, and the unwillingness at all times manifested on the part of the British Government to abandon or derogate from the abstract right of impressing her own seamen from on board neutral merchant vessels, it is very far from being certain that she has not been willing to enter into such arrangement with this Government, as would place the question of impressment on a basis both safe and honorable to this nation. By a reference to the correspondence of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney with the British Commissioners, which preceded the treaty concluded by those gentlemen in the year 1806, but which was unfortunately rejected by the then President, it is evident that the interest of impressment was, in the opinion of those gentlemen, placed on a footing well calculated to secure our own seamen from the abuse against which we had complained, and against which it was our duty to protect them. This opinion was not only expressed in forcible and decisive language at the time of entering into the arrangement, but repeated by Mr. Monroe more than a year after, in a formal letter to the Secretary of State. The language of that gentleman, now your Secretary of State, is peculiarly emphatic, and must be within the recollection of every gentleman in this House. Without troubling the House with the reading of the documents referred to, it is sufficient for me to state, that your present Secretary of State did, in a letter addressed to Mr. Madison, dated February 28, 1808, declare "that he always believed, and did still believe, that the ground on which the interest of impressment was placed by the paper of the British Commissioners of the 8th of November, 1806, and the explanations which accompanied it, was both honorable and advantageous to the United States."
Thus, sir, as we have conclusive evidence of a disposition on the part of the British Government, at one period at least, to advance considerable length towards an adjustment of this long-contested question; and as we have no evidence that different principles and claims are now asserted from those then advanced; I think it fair to conclude, that it is still in our power to put an end to this controversy with safety to our seamen, and advantage to the nation. Instead, then, of passing this bill, and spending the blood and treasure of our countrymen in the prosecution of this war, I conceive it our duty to make an effort for the sanction of our just rights, and the restoration of peace, without a further appeal to force. It is my decided opinion that such an effort, if fairly and liberally made by this House, and the Executive branch of the Government, would not fail in producing the desired effect.
The peculiar nature of the question, which now constitutes the sole object for continuing the war; the intimation given by the Executive in the correspondence with the British Government, since the declaration of war, together with the opinions stated by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, in their letter to the Secretary of State of January 3, 1807, all tend to confirm me in the belief, that it is the duty of Congress to pass a law which would not only check desertions from the British service, by excluding persons of that description from employ in our service, but also deprive the British Government of the apology alleged for impressing American seamen, by excluding British subjects from the commercial and public service of the United States. Having alluded to the letter of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney of the 3d of January, 1807, I will take the liberty of reading from it a short extract. After stating the opinion they had formerly expressed, that although the British Government did not feel itself at liberty to relinquish formally, by treaty, its claim to search our merchant vessels for British seamen, its practice would nevertheless be essentially, if not completely, abandoned, they observe: "That opinion has since been confirmed by frequent conferences on the subject with the British Commissioners, who have repeatedly assured us that, in their judgment, we were made as secure against the exercise of their pretension by the policy which their Government had adopted, in regard to that very delicate and important question, as we could have been made by treaty. It is proper to observe, however, that the good effect of this disposition, and its continuance, may depend, in a great measure, on the means which may be taken hereafter by the Congress to check desertions from the British service. If the treaty is ratified, and a perfect good understanding is produced by it between the two countries, it will be easy for their Governments, by friendly communications, to state to each other what they respectively desire, and in that mode to arrange the business as satisfactorily as it could be done by treaty."
Thus, sir, had the treaty of 1806 been ratified and a good understanding been produced between the two countries, Congress were warned, even in that event, that it was their duty to lend their aid in rendering effectual and perpetual any arrangement which might be made on this subject of impressment. As to the late communications from the Executive department, made to the British Government, since the declaration of war, it is not my intention at this time to enter into a particular examination of their merit or demerit. I will barely remark, that to me they present a novelty in the history of war and diplomacy. Propositions, alleged to be of a pacific nature, made in six days after the declaration of war! Such a procedure (much as I desire peace and much as I was opposed to the war) is to my mind, to say the least, extremely extraordinary, and its policy incomprehensible. It is the more so from the circumstance of a British Minister being on the spot at the moment of declaring the war and keeping up a continued correspondence with the Secretary of State to the last moment of the existence of peace. Under such circumstances I should conceive each nation ought to have known the ultimatum of the other and not waited for the form of a declaration of war, to resume the negotiation and give a new shape to their proposition. I confess that I am not surprised at the result of this war negotiation—every thing was demanded to be yielded by our enemy, for which the war was declared, even as a preliminary in the first instance to an armistice, and in the second instance as preliminary to a negotiation. The equivalent offered on our part was of a nature which it was not within the province of the Executive to confirm, and, of course, depended on what Congress might or might not do on the subject. In addition to this, our agent in London, through whom those propositions were made, did not possess regular and competent powers, and was considered by the British Government as incompetent to act with them on such a subject on equal terms of obligation and responsibility. Whatever, therefore, may be my opinion in relation to those late propositions, and however illy calculated they may have been to produce any desirable result, I am far from considering them unworthy the particular attention of this House. I allude particularly to the equivalent proposed as an inducement for the discontinuance of the practice of impressment. Here, for the first time in the whole history of the long-protracted discussion on this subject, it is intimated that something effectual will be done on our part to prevent the cause of the abuse of which we complain—a promise is given, in the event of obtaining the concessions demanded, that a law would be passed by Congress to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the United States. This, then, is what I ask you now to do—pass a law effectually to exclude all British subjects from the public and private maritime service of the United States; let the law be well guarded against the possibility of violation or evasion; and let us be determined rigidly to enforce it; place this law in the hands of your Executive; let him immediately appoint one or more honest, able, independent commissioners; men who neither have nor expect an office; men in whom the nation, without regard to party, would be willing to confide; give them ample powers to form a treaty or arrange the sole question which is now the pivot on which this war depends. Do all this; do it faithfully, and I venture to predict you will obtain a peace, and secure your just rights more speedily, more effectually, and more satisfactorily to the people of this country, than by all the military operations in the compass of your power.
Edward Hempstead, returned to serve as the Delegate in this House from the Territory of Missouri, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.
Additional Military Force.
The House resumed the consideration of the bill for raising for one year an additional military force of twenty thousand men.
The question was stated on the engrossment of the bill for a third reading.
Mr. Brigham.—Mr. Speaker, the bill under consideration, if passed into a law, will deeply affect my constituents and the public in general. It provides for prosecuting this war on a more extensive scale—it is a kind of second declaration of war. The objects of conquest are multiplied; the field of operation is enlarged; the Army must be increased with the addition of 20,000 regular troops; and enlistments encouraged by additional bounty and wages. Sir, this is the system of arrangement to prosecute the scheme of foreign invasion. One error frequently prepares the way for another; we are now unhappily involved in the calamities of war, and the question is, how we shall prosecute and support it.
Mr. B. said he had been uniformly, and in principle, opposed to this war, and of course opposed to all the measures connected with it; that, in his opinion, this war was both politically and morally wrong; that it was declared without suitable preparation, without necessity, without an army, without adequate resources, and without unanimity; it has been prosecuted without success; we have also gained nothing but loss, defeat, and disgrace; the people are alarmed at the loss of their peace, distressed with the fruits of the war, and have serious apprehensions of what may be the future measures of Congress on this subject.
Sir, continued Mr. B., this war is of an offensive character; it is a war of conquest, totally inconsistent with the spirit and genius of our constitution, and, if prosecuted in the present divided state of the country, I fear it may be fatal to our most valuable institutions. Republics, sir, ought never to be engaged in a foreign, offensive war; they are calculated only for defensive war.
Sir, there is something unaccountable, that the disposition to prosecute this war should increase, as the causes of the war decrease, and the means and ability to carry it on lessen. The war which we now have on hand is predicated principally on the Orders in Council. The impressment of seamen, during the last session of Congress, was considered of minor importance and as a proper subject of negotiation between the two nations, and was so considered in the days of General Washington, in those of Mr. Jefferson, and why not now by Mr. Madison?
Sir, the Orders in Council which interfered with our neutral rights are revoked. The President, in his Message at the commencement of this session, declared the fact, and the war now rests solely on the subject of impressment. I do not believe that the prosecuting of this war will have a tendency to bring about an amicable and satisfactory adjustment on this subject, and at the end of the war, if it ever ceases, this question of impressment must be settled by treaty.
Sir, at this time, and under these circumstances, we are called on to augment our standing army to the number of 55,000 regular troops, to prosecute the war with vigor, and, as some say, for glory.
Sir, if this system of warfare is carried into effect, we shall unavoidably create an annual expense of forty millions of dollars; and where is your money to defray this expense? Why, you must take it from the pockets of our constituents, and from those who are opposed to this war; and if you fail of obtaining the necessary loans, you must stop payment; the nation will become bankrupt, and future generations will be loaded with an enormous debt.
Sir, can this be for the honor and interest of the American people; can it be for the satisfaction of our constituents; are they in love with this war? Are they prepared to barter away their property and their peace for the hazards and fatigue of a foreign war, which promises nothing but poverty and distress? It is impossible. Sir, it is said that we are now about to make one sublime military effort, which shall do honor to this nation; that with these troops we are to take, not only the Canadas, but Halifax and Nova Scotia, and, for aught I know, East Florida, follow up the Tippecanoe expedition, and exterminate the Indians. Mr. B. said that he never had known the incipient cause nor by what authority General Harrison made his incursion into the wilderness, beyond where the United States had extinguished the Indian titles, and destroyed the Prophet's town, but said that he hoped the time would come when he should know the merits of that enterprise.
Mr. B. said if the friends of this bill and of the war could accomplish their darling object, subdue and take possession of the Canadas, and all the other British provinces in North America, in his opinion it would be a great public misfortune—fatal to the civil liberties of the country, and change the character of our Government.
Sir, said Mr. B., with these impressions I deprecate the taking of the Canadas, or the other British provinces, as I do the loss of liberty and the ruin of this country. This war cannot be perpetuated and prosecuted without violating the laws of humanity and justice, the laws of religion and morality—and these laws are to be respected as well by nations as by individuals; and we have not only reason to believe, but do believe, that the God of Armies, who superintends the concerns of men, will give success to our arms, or blast our enterprise, according to its moral character. If the Canadas are subdued and conquered, it must be done by force of arms; and what have the inhabitants of those provinces been guilty of, which warrant this Government in putting them to the sword?
Sir, they are now inoffensive, and quietly pursuing their own business; they are content under their own Administration; they are protected by their own Government, and are not panting for the liberties of this country, as was vainly supposed the last season, nor do they ask us to relieve them from the oppression of their own Government, which General Hull, in his tender mercy, promised them in his pompous proclamation, on the condition that they would revolt from their rightful Sovereign, and put themselves under his gracious protection; nor were they terrified by the threat of extermination, if found fighting in their own defence by the side of an Indian; nor were they to be seduced from their allegiance by promises which could not be performed. No, sir, nor do they ask any favor but that you cease from troubling. Sir, they will not submit, and they have told you, by their actual resistance, that they will defend themselves, their councils, their firesides, their wives, and their children, their rights and their property; and they are not to be subdued but at the price of blood. And where is your authority, where is your right to go home, invade, and break into a foreign territory, and there establish a slaughter-house for the brave sons of America; there spill your blood, and expend your treasure, destroy cities, and demolish houses, plunder the inhabitants, and waste the substance of the industrious and the innocent? Sir, there is no right but a Napoleon right, and that right is power, and not that which reason approves.
Mr. B. said that the war was becoming more and more unpopular in the Eastern States, especially in the State which he had the honor to represent; and they had, in their late elections, come forth and declared it in a voice and language which cannot be misunderstood. And whether there will be a majority in the next Congress in favor of this war was uncertain—he hoped not.
Mr. Ridgely said he claimed the patience of the House while he assigned the reasons that would influence him to vote against the bill now under consideration. He considered the force contemplated to be raised by the bill as unnecessary. The present Military Establishment of the United States consisted of various descriptions of troops; they were the regular army, the rangers, the volunteers, and the militia. The regular army was made up of the Peace Establishment, authorized by the acts of the 16th of March, 1802, and the 12th of April, 1808, containing about 10,000 men, including officers, and of the "additional military force," which was directed to be raised by the act of the 11th January, 1812; these different establishments were incorporated by an act passed on the 26th of June last; and the present regular army of the United States, as authorized by law, consisted of twenty-five regiments of infantry, three regiments of artillery, two of light dragoons, one of riflemen, and one of light artillery, containing in all about thirty-six thousand men, including company officers and privates; of these the President might have not exceeding fifteen thousand enlisted for eighteen months, and the residue enlisted for five years, unless sooner discharged. Of the rangers, there were seven companies by the acts of 27th January, and 1st July, 1812, and about four or five hundred men. By the act of the 6th February last, the President was authorized to accept of any company or companies of volunteers, either of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, who might offer their services to the number of fifty thousand men; their commissioned officers were to be appointed in the manner prescribed by law in the several States and Territories to which they might respectively belong, and they could only, according to the fair construction of this act, be considered as militia, liable to be called on to do military duty at any time within two years after they were accepted by the President, and bound to continue in service one year after arriving at the place of rendezvous. By the law of the 6th of July last, the President was empowered to appoint and commission the officers of the volunteers who had or should offer their services, and to form them into battalions, squadrons, &c., and they were thus converted from militia into a species of regular force. By the act of the 10th of April last, the President was authorized to call on the several States and Territories for their respective proportions of a detachment of one hundred thousand militia; and the call has been made, I believe, on every State and Territory. The present military force, then, of the United States, as authorized by existing laws, consists of upward of one hundred and eighty-six thousand men, all of whom, when in service, are subject to the rules and articles of war. Of these, the militia can only be used in the prosecution of this war for defensive purposes; the regulars and the volunteers may be ordered to act offensively against the enemy. They may amount, as we have seen, to eighty-six thousand men; and if Canada be as weak and badly defended as gentlemen seem to suppose, and the Administration should persist in their determination to conquer it, they should, I think, be satisfied with such a force to obtain an object so easily attainable. But, sir, said Mr. R., our present Military Establishment is certainly sufficient for all purposes of defence; and I wish to see no land forces raised for any other purpose. I have no hesitation in declaring that I should lament to see Canada or any of the British provinces on this continent in our possession, or forming a part of the American Republic. They will never be worth, to this nation, in any point of view, the blood and treasure that their acquisition will cost us. It has been said by the honorable chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, that there are now in Canada twelve thousand regular troops, and that the militia amount to six thousand. To any thing that gentleman should say, as matter of fact within his own knowledge, I should give the most implicit credit. But his estimate of the militia of Canada must be too low. His sources of information on this point must have been incorrect. The population of Canada (and when I speak of Canada, I mean both Upper and Lower Canada) has been variously stated, from three to five hundred thousand souls; according to no account, I believe, can it be less than three hundred thousand; and, I presume, no gentleman on this floor will say that estimate is too high. Take, then, the population of Canada to be 300,000 souls; what number of militia should this population furnish? We will take the State of New Jersey as a guide for our calculation; according to the census of 1810, the population of that State is 245,255, and its militia, by the return for the same year, 33,740, and the militia bears about the same proportion to the population in the States, generally, as it does in this State. If, then, the militia of Jersey, with its population, amounts to near thirty-four thousand, we may, I think, without danger of contradiction, estimate the militia of Canada (with a larger population) at between thirty and forty thousand; to these add the twelve thousand regular troops, and, in all probability, before we can act offensively against them in the Spring, the number of these troops will be greatly increased, and they may have an efficient force of about fifty thousand men to oppose an invading army. It ought to be recollected, also, that a generous people, contending in their own defence, are actuated by far different and more worthy motives than an army of soldiers can be who attempt their subjugation. The Canadians will contend for their homes, their wives, their children; for every thing that can or that ought to be dear to the human heart. They will be excited in such a cause to the boldest deeds. Instead of traitors, we shall find them true to their country and themselves, and able and ready to exert all their energies in their own defence. If we conquer them, it must be by great exertions, and with immense loss. To subdue a people acting under the impulse of such considerations as will operate on them, will require a force at least double to that which they can oppose to us. But can any man imagine that, if we invade the British colonies, the war will be there? Will the pride of Britain, powerful as she is at sea, and ready at any moment to meet every emergency, permit her tamely to look on and see her provinces wrested from her, without exerting herself with all her energies for their security? Will she make no diversions in their favor? Will she suffer us to carry the war into her territories, and not retort upon us? Does an unprotected seacoast of two thousand miles afford her no opportunities of attacking us? Do our rich and flourishing cities, exposed without defence on the seaboard, to the cannon of her ships of war, furnish her with no objects worthy her attention? Will the city of New York, laid in ashes, atone for the invasion of Canada; or, will the acquisition of Canada compensate to us for the loss of New York? Sir, said Mr. R., ten Canadas, ten times told, would not be worth to this nation that single city.
But of what value would these provinces be to us, if they could be easily acquired? Shall we, by their conquest, obtain the objects for which this war is waged? Shall we thereby secure our commercial rights? Not at all, sir. On the other hand, if the British Government would offer them to us, it would be our true policy to refuse to accept them. It is known to everybody that the population of several of the Eastern States is now full, and that great numbers of their citizens are constantly emigrating. The direction this emigration takes, it is also well known, is South and West. This surplus of population of the Eastern States settles on the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi, and carries with it its Eastern habits, and, if you please, its Eastern prejudices. They become connected and united with the people of the South and West. This union and intercourse will tend to render as the brothers of one family the citizens of this extended Empire. The prejudices of the South against the North, and the North against the South, are weakened daily and will be destroyed. The course this emigration takes is just as it should be. The currents flow from the extremities into the centre of the country. The operation is most beneficial to the nation, and tends constantly to strengthen and cement the union of the States. But if the British provinces should be conquered and become incorporated into the Republic, the direction of the emigration from the Northern and Eastern States will be at once changed. It will take a North instead of a South course. It will go just where it ought not to go. The strength of the nation, already too much scattered, will be still more weakened by a further expansion of its territory and population. The Northern and Eastern States, at present possessing more than their proper proportion of wealth, population, and strength, and having different habits, pursuits, and interests, from the Middle and Southern States, will, by the addition of these provinces, and the settlement of their surplus of population in them, acquire a weight and influence that this Union cannot control. It will exist only at their pleasure, and, in a few years, the destruction of this Government and a separation of the States will be the inevitable consequence.
Mr. Pitkin rose and said:—Before, Mr. Speaker, we give our sanction to this bill; before we agree to add so large a force to our present army, making the whole number fifty-five thousand men, is it not a duty we owe to ourselves and to our constituents, seriously to inquire into the policy, into the necessity of the measure, as well as into the present state of our relations with that nation against which we have declared war? Almost at the very instant when Congress declared war against Great Britain, the Orders in Council, and the blockade of May, 1806, the most prominent causes of the war, were removed. I have always, sir, considered the Orders in Council as the greatest obstacle to the restoration of harmony and free intercourse between the two countries. Had this obstacle been removed before the declaration of war, no one can believe that the Executive would have recommended, or that a majority in either House of Congress would have adopted a measure always fraught with evils in all governments, and which, in a Government like ours, ought never to be resorted to but in the last extremity. I cannot believe that the President, in that case, would have recommended it, when, on the 26th of July, 1811, through the Secretary of State, he informed the British Minister that, on the revocation of the Orders in Council, the non-importation law would be removed, and, of consequence, commercial intercourse would be restored between the two nations. It would be strange, indeed, if the President should, in one moment, restore a free intercourse between the two countries, and, in the next, recommend to Congress a declaration of war, solely on account of another topic remaining in dispute. And, in case such recommendation had been made, if any confidence is to be placed in the declared opinions of gentlemen, many who voted for the war would not, under such circumstances, have given it their support. Unfortunately for the country, the President did not embrace the opportunity, presented by the repeal of the Orders in Council, to remove the non-importation law, and thereby smooth the way for a complete restoration of harmony between Great Britain and the United States. Sir, this would have been done, and the remaining subject of dispute been left in the same situation as before the declaration of war, to be adjusted by amicable arrangements. But, sir, as this was not done, it remains for us, it remains for the people of the United States, to determine whether they will encounter all the evils, all the calamities of war; whether they will sacrifice the fairest prospects, and the best interests of this rising country, on the point now in dispute with Great Britain.
In the few remarks I shall submit to you, sir, and to the House, it is not my intention to go into the consideration of all the original avowed causes of the war; but to confine myself to the new aspect of affairs, presented to us since the declaration of war by the removal of the Orders in Council and blockades.
On the subject of impressments, for which alone the war is now to be continued, what, let me ask, is the principle for which our Government contends? It is this, sir: that the flag of the merchant vessel shall cover all who sail under it; or, in other words, that our flag shall protect all the foreigners our merchants may think proper to employ in their service, whether naturalized or not. Before we raise immense armies, before we sacrifice any more of the lives of American citizens, let us inquire—
1st. Whether the principle, if yielded to us to-morrow, would benefit our native seamen, or would promote the real permanent interests of their country.
2d. Whether there is a probability of obtaining a recognition of this principle by a continuance of the war.
The foreigners employed in our service are those who have not been naturalized, and those who have taken the benefit of our naturalization laws. The former constitute nearly the whole: the latter class is very inconsiderable. The foreigners of the first description, of course, were in competition with our native seamen, and either exclude them from employment, or lessen the rate of their wages. In this way, then, the employment of foreign seamen is an injury to our native seamen; and, in a national point of view, it may well be questioned, whether their employment subserves the permanent and solid interest of the country.
Is it not, sir, of the first importance to us, as a commercial and maritime nation, especially when it may be engaged in a war with a great naval power, to be able to have a sufficient number of native seamen employed in our service? Seamen, who shall be attached by every tie to this country, and on whom we can depend for its defence in time of danger?
This, sir, it is presumed, cannot be denied. If so, is it not the dictate of wisdom and of sound policy for us to give encouragement to our native seamen in preference to those of any foreign country?
The situation in which we now are proves the correctness, as well as the importance, of the position. We are now at war with Great Britain. And, at the very time when this war was declared, thousands of British seamen who had not been naturalized in this country, were, and they still continue in our employment. These seamen (I am speaking, sir, of those not naturalized) are now claimed as British subjects, and, indeed, by our own laws, are now considered as alien enemies. Will gentlemen suffer me to turn their attention to this last fact?
By a law passed the 6th of July, 1798, it is enacted, that "whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or Government, &c., all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects, of the hostile nation or Government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed, as alien enemies." Ought we, sir, to depend upon these men to man our fleets, or to defend our ports and harbors? So far as foreigners of this description are concerned, I do not hesitate to say that it is not for the interest of this country that our flag should protect them, and that I will never consent to continue this war for the maintenance of this principle on their account. It is well known, sir, that not only Great Britain, but that France, and all the nations of Europe, claim a right to the services of all their subjects in time of war. In the exercise of this right, the history of Europe shows that, at the commencement of almost all wars, proclamations have been issued by the belligerent powers, recalling their subjects to aid in the defence of their respective countries. During the present war in Europe, this has been done by Great Britain, by France, and the other belligerent powers. With respect to this claim of allegiance, it is not my intention to enter into the discussion whether, in the abstract, it is well or ill founded. This would lead me too far, and would tend to no practical good. I will, however, observe, that it is a right, a claim, which has been long exercised in Europe, and has been sanctioned and acknowledged by the most able and distinguished European writers on public law.
With respect to foreigners, who have been naturalized under our laws, the question is of a more distinct nature, and presents greater difficulties. We ought, undoubtedly, to fulfill all our obligations towards them. What these obligations are, and how far they extend, are questions about which a diversity of sentiment may prevail.—While they remain within our territories, and within our exclusive jurisdiction, they are shielded by the general principle, that all within our dominion and exclusive jurisdiction, are, of course, protected against all claims whatever, and never to be molested in any way without our consent. But, sir, when they go without our territories, and beyond our exclusive jurisdiction, and come within the sphere of the claim of their former Government, the opinion of the best writers on public law seems to be, that the obligation of the country, under whose laws they have been naturalized, does not extend to guaranty them against such claims, unless their allegiance was changed with the consent of their former Government. But, sir, whatever speculative opinions may be entertained on this subject, the number of naturalized seamen is so small, that few, if any, can be of opinion that we ought to have declared war, or that we ought to continue it on their account alone. The whole number of seamen naturalized from 1796 to 1810, as appears by the returns made to the Department of State, is 1,332. This includes those of all nations. What proportion of these were British, or how many of them are now in our service, it is impossible to determine. I presume, however, the number of naturalized British seamen now in our employ does not exceed two or three hundred. Shall we, sir, continue the war for these men?
I am aware, sir, that with respect to impressment from our merchant vessels, abuses have happened, that although the right of taking American citizens is not claimed, the British commanders have not been scrupulous whether they took British subjects or American citizens. Sir, these abuses I never can, and I never will justify. I am satisfied, however, that they have been exaggerated.
But, sir, let me ask, if we have not really intended to protect foreign seamen under our flag, if we have not been guilty of gross negligence, to say the least of it, towards our native seamen? whether, by our laws, and the practice under them, we have afforded them all that protection and security to which they are entitled?
In 1796, Congress passed an act for the relief and protection of American seamen. By this act, the collectors of the several ports were directed, on application, to enter the names of seamen, being citizens of the United States, to grant them certificates, in a form given in the act. In this certificate, the collector is to describe the person of the applicant: also, to declare that, on proof produced to him agreeable to the act, the seaman is a citizen of the United States of America.
It is not a little singular that, although the proof of citizenship to be produced to the collector must be agreeable to the directions of the act, the act itself nowhere directs what that proof must be. Every collector, therefore, has, under this act, used his own discretion, or has pursued such directions as he may have received from the Government as to the kind of proof. What, sir, has been the practice under this law? Have those certificates, or protections, as they are commonly called, been confined to bona fide American citizens? No, sir; we cannot, we ought not, to shut our eyes against facts too notorious to be concealed or denied. Under this act, made expressly for the protection of American seamen, every foreign seaman, almost, at the moment of setting his feet on our shores, has obtained a certificate from some collector, that he is a citizen of the United States; and, with this certificate in his pocket, although perhaps a deserter from his own Government, he enters a public or private vessel, as an American seaman. The mode of obtaining proof of citizenship is well understood. Among other modes, some of which are too disgraceful to be mentioned in this place, those foreign seamen will go before a magistrate, and, although hardly able to speak the English language intelligibly, will swear, for each other, that they were born within the United States, and are American citizens. On such proof, a proof of this sort, the collector issues his certificate.
It will be recollected, sir, that this subject was brought before this House during the last session, in a case from Philadelphia, when a certificate of this kind was obtained by the most flagrant and avowed act of perjury on the part of a foreigner who had just arrived in this country. It was found, on inquiry, that there was no law, either of Pennsylvania or of the United States, to punish the man for this act of false swearing. Not only have these protections been thus obtained by fraud and perjury, but they have also, long since, been an object of barter; they have been bought and sold, and transferred from one to another, not only in this country, but in foreign countries.
To show the extent of this traffic in seamen's protections, permit me to state some facts, of which I have no doubt, knowing the source from whence I have derived them. An American captain having a ship in Bristol, in England, without a crew, he applied to a man who kept a boarding-house for sailors, to procure a crew of American sailors in port; he showed him a great number of American protections, which he agreed to sell him for two guineas each, and with the aid of these to procure him a crew. By high wages, and by suiting these protections to the description of British sailors, he procured this captain his ship's crew; not only so, but when the ship was about to sail, and it was doubtful whether those who had engaged for the voyage would actually go on board, this man actually procured some of a press gang to take them as American sailors, who had deserted from their ships, and put them on board. When we ourselves place no confidence in these certificates, when we know that they are thus obtained by fraud and perjury, can we expect that foreign nations will give credit to them? Instead of being a shield and protection to the real American sailor, they have become a dangerous weapon of offence.
If, sir, it is not for the permanent interest of the United States to employ so many transient foreign seamen, we ought long since, not only to have refused these false protections, but to have passed laws for the encouragement of our native seamen, similar to those which have been adopted in commercial countries, and are commonly called navigation acts. This would, in some measure, have relieved us from the evils which we now experience, in consequence of the employment of so many foreign seamen.
Additional Military Force.
The House resumed the order of the day on the bill for raising an additional military force of 20,000 men for one year, the question being on the passage of the bill to a third reading.
Mr. Boyd.—Mr. Speaker: It is with great diffidence that I address the Chair. When the bill now before the House was under discussion on Saturday last; that is, the then proposed amendment to insert eighteen months, instead of one year, I was offering my reasons why I thought that that amendment ought to prevail; when, unfortunately for me, I was considered as taking too great a latitude, and prevented from connecting my remarks. As there is little difference, in point of principle, as the bill then was and now is, I embrace this opportunity to make up that deficiency, and will now take care to stick as close as possible to the text.
Sir, I am opposed to passing the bill to a third reading, because I believe it to be altogether inadequate to the purpose intended to be accomplished by it. Sir, when I last addressed the Chair, I then took a retrospective view of our past expectations, plans, and propositions, from which we expected to derive great advantages. Such were the expectations of that time, that I did not accord with them. Those expectations have not been realized; but, instead thereof, we have met with disappointments and misfortunes. I thought that viewing the errors of the past was the most certain way to avoid the future; and I am not at this time sensible of that being erroneous.
Mr. Speaker, I am an old man, and not in the habit of public speaking; and if I have not the faculty of composing my arguments in so connected a form as a lawyer's special pleadings, I hope the House will excuse me, and grant me their indulgence to do it in such form as my capacity will admit of.
[The Speaker observed that it was unpleasant to the Chair that the gentleman should indulge in such remarks; he had certainly no wish not to give full latitude to debate. Mr. B. said he stood corrected, and was allowed to proceed.]
Then, Mr. Speaker, I object, because, in my opinion, it is not calculated to produce the desired effect, or that which is intended by it: that is, to raise a force competent to the conquest of the Canadas in the given time. I will ask how many regiments you have in your present establishment? Say thirty-five, and you add twenty, making together fifty-five: what use is there in multiplying regiments without men? The Chairman did state that from prudential motives, he had thought it inexpedient to give the number now actually in service, or enlisted by the present establishment. Sir, it is not my wish to go into a strict inquiry; the regard I have for the honor of my country forbids me; but I will suppose seventeen thousand, and, I believe, that is large; then there is left officers for eighteen thousand men. Are these not sufficient for the recruiting service? to engage every man who is willing to serve his country? to place a recruiting officer in almost every town and village in the United States? They are; and, therefore, you ought not to create an unnecessary addition. If the present establishment is not full, what is the reason? Either that the pay and bounty are not sufficient inducements, or there is a dislike to the service; your creating more regiments will not remove that difficulty. I am against the bill, because the term of service is too short to answer any valuable purpose. Suppose them intended to operate as a force against Canada. Let us see how that will answer the purpose: You send out your warrants to commence the enlistment of the proposed troops at this time; how long a time, is it contemplated, will be necessary for their enlistment? My opinion is, that you will not have them half full in four months; it is then time to take the field, and they are then raw troops. The honorable Chairman (Mr. D. R. Williams) states to you the number of troops necessary for defensive operations, according to his calculation, to be ten thousand; deducting that number from the present establishment, supposing it to be full. It is not for me to say how far the present establishment is short of the whole number, or will be at that time; but we know that it is far short; we do not know that it can be filled, and if it cannot, then those calculations are fictitious. He also states to you that the regular force in the Canadas is not to be estimated at less than twelve thousand, and three thousand in Halifax, besides their militia. According to this, and my views, you cannot enter Canada the next campaign with man for man; and surely that is not sufficient for conquest in an enemy's country. But I will suppose that you conquer a part of the country; that part must be garrisoned if you will keep it. In a year from the time of enlistment their term expires, and what becomes of your conquest, without force to keep it, supposing it to be made? Say that the officers will be called into service in four months, and there is some of the men enlisted six or eight months hence; the officers must serve until the expiration of the term of the last man engaged, or a derangement must take place—always a disagreeable occurrence in an army.