Sir: I here avail myself of the first opportunity of informing you of occurrences of our cruise, which terminated in the capture of the Wasp, on the 18th of October, by the Poictiers, of seventy-four guns, while a wreck from damages received in the engagement with the British sloop-of-war Frolic, of twenty-two guns, sixteen of them thirty-two-pound carronades, four twelve-pounders on the main deck, and two twelve-pound carronades on the top-gallant forecastle; making her superior in force to us by four twelve-pounders. The Frolic had struck to us, and was taken possession of two hours before our surrendering to the Poictiers.
We had left the Delaware on the 13th; the 16th had a heavy gale, in which we lost our jib-boom and two men; half-past eleven on the night of the 17th, in latitude 37 degrees north, and longitude 65 degrees west, we saw several sail, two of them appearing very large; we stood for them for some time, then shortened sail, and steered the remainder of the night the course we had perceived them on. At daylight, on Sunday the 18th, we saw them ahead; gave chase, and soon discovered them to be a convoy of six sail, under the protection of a sloop-of-war; four of them large ships, mounting from sixteen to eighteen guns. At thirty-two minutes past eleven A. M., we engaged the sloop-of-war, having first received her fire at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, which space we gradually lessened until we laid her on board, after a well-supported fire of forty-three minutes; and although so near, while loading our last broadside, that our rammers were shoved against the side of the enemy, our men exhibited the same alacrity which they had done during the whole of the action. They immediately surrendered upon our gaining their forecastle, so that no loss was sustained on their side after boarding.
Our maintop-mast was shot away between four and five minutes from the commencement of the firing, and falling, together with the maintopsail-yard, across the larboard fore and fore-topsail braces, rendered our head-yards unmanageable the remainder of the action. At eight minutes, the gaff and mizzen topgallant-mast came down, and at twenty minutes from the beginning of the action every brace and most of the rigging was shot away. A few minutes after separating from the Frolic both her masts fell upon deck; the main-mast going close by the deck, and the foremast going twelve or fifteen feet above it.
The courage and exertions of the officers and crew fully answered my expectations and wishes. Lieutenant Biddle's active conduct contributed much to our success, by the exact attention paid to every department during the engagement, and the animating example he afforded the crew by his intrepidity. Lieutenants Rogers, Booth, and Mr. Rapp, showed, by incessant fire from their divisions, that they were not to be surpassed in resolution or skill. Mr. Knight, and every other officer, acted with a courage and promptitude highly honorable, and I trust have given assurance that they may be relied on whenever their services may be required.
I could not ascertain the exact loss of the enemy, as many of the dead lay buried under the masts and spars that had fallen on deck, which two hours' exertion had not sufficiently removed. Mr. Biddle, who had charge of the Frolic, states that, from what he saw, and from information from the officers, the number killed must have been about thirty, and that of the wounded about forty or fifty; of the killed, is her first lieutenant and sailing-master; of the wounded, Captain Winyates, and the second lieutenant.
We had five killed and five wounded, as per list: the wounded are recovering. Lieutenant Claxton, who was confined by sickness, left his bed a little previous to the engagement, and though too weak to be at his division, remained on deck, and showed, by his composed manner of noting its incidents, that we had lost by his illness the services of a brave officer.
I am, respectfully, &c.
JACOB JONES.
Hon. Paul Hamilton.
The Message and documents having been read—
On motion of Mr. Randolph, they were referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, with instructions to report a suitable expression of the Legislative approbation of the services detailed.
Mr. R. said he did not wish by this motion to limit the committee to reporting a resolution; or to preclude them from expressing approbation in a more substantial manner.
Navy of the United States.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill from the Senate, which had been previously twice read in the House.
Mr. Sawyer made a motion to add the word "teen" to "four," so as to make it fourteen 74 gun ships.
Mr. S. thought it a proper occasion to try the question whether we were to have a navy or not. He took the occasion to congratulate the House upon the repeated victories of our little navy over the enemy; and of the grateful prospect of a speedy termination to the despotism of the seas. National piracy is about to be exterminated, and all nations permitted to traverse their great highway in safety. The thing can be done; and if we say so, with the will of God, will be done. The experiment upon which the proof hangs has been made. British arms cannot withstand American upon the sea. The bully has been disgraced by an infant; and fear shall no longer restrain an abject world from vindicating its long violated rights. Give us but a respectable fleet, and it is all we ask. But what can we do with four seventy-fours? They are a mere mockery. If we do mean to make a serious stand upon the ocean, such a force must be out of all character. If we mean merely to annoy her trade, (and he trusted we meant more,) frigates will do; but, to make any serious impression that way, we must have a respectable fleet; at least, in his opinion, fourteen sail-of-the-line. That would give us a preponderance on our own coast, and enable us to bring in our prizes with safety. Who can bear the idea of our being obliged to burn or sink all the ships we may take away from the enemy, for fear of their being recaptured? He thought we should save enough by the protection they would afford to our prizes to support the expense of them. We can easily support such a force. The expense, distributed over our widely-extended population, would be less than a dollar a head; and, where is the American who would grudge such a sum for such an object? The people, I am confident, will cheerfully pay it, because we are now at war, and a navy is found the most efficient weapon in our hands against the enemy. He therefore trusted that if it was the disposition of the House to have a navy, they would establish such a one as would answer some purpose.
Mr. Seybert said he did not anticipate that the bill from the Senate would have been called for to-day by the Chairman of the Naval Committee; notwithstanding he had bestowed some attention on the subject, he confessed his remarks would be made in a manner not entirely satisfactory to himself; he would, however, proceed with them.
Mr. Chairman, said he, I wish it was as easy to build, equip, and man the seventy-fours, as it will be to add the word "teen" to "four," as is proposed by the gentleman from North Carolina. So far from adding to the number of these ships, contemplated by the bill, he had intended to move that no seventy-four gun ships should be, at this time, authorized by the Legislature.
On a former occasion, Mr. S. continued, when a naval establishment was the subject under consideration, he stated at length his reasons for opposing the propositions before the House. The opinions which he then advanced concerning an extensively permanent naval establishment for the United States were still believed to be well grounded. He did not hesitate to declare his intention, at this time, and under the pressure of present circumstances, to yield much to general feelings, and the sentiments of the nation; nevertheless, he should guard against being carried too far by the current of popular opinion. It is equally my duty, said he, to keep in view what is conceived to be the permanent and vital national interest. He declared a uniform opposition to that establishment, which could not be brought within the means and resources of the nation to maintain it. We have made war, said he, to guarantee the honor and independence of the nation, as well as for the support of the just rights of our citizens; with these objects in view, he had consented to authorize a regular force of 25,000 men, and advocated one more numerous, though in principle he was opposed to standing armies. If, then, a great portion of my fellow-citizens deem an increase of the Naval Establishment essential to promote the great work, why should it be refused on my part? No opposition would be made by him to the principle or spirit of the bill before the House, though, he confessed, he did not approve the provisions as to the kind of force therein contemplated.
Mr. S. continued.—At this time our principal object should be, to authorize that species of force which can be furnished in the shortest period, and which promises to be the most efficient in the present contest. If the views of the Government were not now confined to the present war, he considered it inexpedient to build public ships. It was necessary that the revenue should be cautiously applied. If it be employed so as to carry on the war with vigor, he would not shrink from any appropriation which could tend to produce that effect; by protracting the contest for the want of means, expense will be accumulated, and we should achieve nothing.
Mr. S. would not assent to an increase of the navy, with a view to reconcile other measures to the opposition—to him that vote promised no such result. Our political opponents, continued he, will tell us, as regards the navy, you are doing right to add to it; thus far we will go with you; we always maintained this to be the proper course; as to your golden dreams in Canada, we will abandon them to yourselves exclusively. Such were his present impressions; it would gratify him to find himself to have been mistaken. He declared his intention to oppose the building of 74´s, or double-decked ships, and to advocate a greater number of the largest class frigates. If, however, his statements should not prove satisfactory to the House, he declared the failure would not induce him ultimately to vote against that species of force which a majority might deem expedient.
If, said Mr. S., the great reason for now laying the keels of the double-decked ships, be (as was lately acknowledged elsewhere by high authority) to test the intentions of the legislature as to a permanent naval establishment, he, for one, declared, he would not thus be tested, nor could he be thereby induced to vote in favor of the proposition; he would always be governed by circumstances.
The declaration of the committee, that it was proper to meet "like with like," or, in other words, because the British have seventy-four gun ships, the United States should have them of the same class, would have no effect on him. We might as well say, because there are ships in the British service, which carry one hundred and twenty guns, we should also have such. This reasoning is fallacious. No one has attempted to advocate the latter proposition. Admitting that you had four seventy-four gun ships on your navy list, he maintained, they would answer no good purpose. In the course of the following year, their number will be more than doubled and trebled on the part of the enemy. The consequence would be, that your most expensive ships must either combat under very unpromising circumstances, or they would be blockaded in your harbors, and then be worse than useless; they must be kept at a heavy expense, and their crews would deprive other ships of the men necessary for their equipment. He said, the opinions which he had just advanced were not the result of idle speculations at the fireside; they were supported by intelligent commanders, and rested upon the firm base of experience; they were confirmed by the conversations of some whose splendid achievements adorned the pages of our Revolutionary history, and by others, who rank as heroes of the present war. He asked, why need we resort to other authority, when that of the head of the Naval Department can be brought to bear testimony in favor of the propositions laid down? In the year 1798, the Secretary of the Navy informed the House that twelve seventy-fours, as many frigates, and twenty or thirty smaller vessels, "would probably be found sufficient to insure our future peace with the nations of Europe." In 1811, it was declared that, "twelve sail of seventy-fours and twenty well-constructed frigates, with our smaller vessels," were necessary to annoy the commerce of the enemy, and guard our coasts. To this he added that, in the year 1811, during a state of peace with the United States, the British had seven ships-of-the-line on the American stations, independent of fifties, frigates, and smaller vessels; at the same time, they had thirty-nine ships-of-the-line on the stocks! Tell me, said he, what is to keep a great proportion of them from your coast in 1813?
Mr. McKee said, he had not expected this subject would have been taken up to-day, or to say any thing on it when it should be taken up. But, said he, for what purpose, I feel impelled to ask, are you going to build these vessels? Are you to spend four or five millions of dollars, in addition to your present extraordinary expenditures, to protect commerce? Will this old argument, in favor of a navy, now be used, which we have so often heard heretofore? Sir, where is your commerce now to protect? Will you protect that clandestinely destined to Great Britain? No, surely. Will you protect that destined to the coast of France? Let us reflect what commerce you can carry on with France. None worth protection, or of any moment to the great body of the American people. Does France purchase your tobacco or cotton, which heretofore have found a market there? She has never been a purchaser of provisions or breadstuffs. What is the state of trade between us and France? Your cotton, in France, is taxed with enormous duties. No man who is not under the influence of the moon would, at this time, think of making a shipment there. Would you ship your commerce there merely to surrender so much property into the grasp of the Emperor? It would be the extreme of folly. Where, then, will you protect your commerce? To the Baltic, sir? You can carry on in that quarter no commerce at all interesting to the great body of the American people. In what does your export to that region consist? In articles of colonial produce; not in articles the produce of your soil. Will you tax the great agricultural community for the purpose of protecting this extraneous commerce? I ask if the people of the West, of the Atlantic, of the Middle States, or any other portion of the American people, will be content to be taxed to support a navy for the protection of a commerce in foreign produce, by which but few individuals in the nation can be benefited? There is no commerce to protect, unless it be that which exchanges specie for the production of the East Indies, and benefits no part of the community. Having no valuable commerce now to protect, the object of adding vessels to your navy, must be to fight your battles at sea.
If you would propose a navy as a means of carrying on war, bend your resources to that object. We have been told that the trident of Neptune is passing into our hands. But, sir, the sovereignty of the ocean is not to be acquired by four ships-of-the-line and five or six frigates. You can have no legitimate object in building such vessels as proposed, unless it be to carry on the war. If that be your object, make your means commensurate to the end you have in view.
Do you yet contend that the object is to protect commerce? Your commerce is not worth the cost. And who would pay it? The merchants? No, sir. They will pay only their proportion. I recollect, when a boy, to have seen a little book, in which I admired the pictures more than the reading, in which were the representations of a king, a priest, a soldier, and a farmer; a label issuing from the mouth of each contained these words: The king says, "I govern all;" the priest, "I pray for all;" the soldier, "I fight for all;" and the farmer, "I pay for all." This, sir, is perfectly true as regards the American farmers—they pay for all. And what advantage do they derive from it? What advantage are my constituents to derive from the expenditure of this money?
Increase of the Navy.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to increase the Navy of the United States.
Mr. Seybert moved to amend the first section of the bill by striking out "four seventy-fours and," so as to erase the provision for building vessels of that description.
Mr. Gold.—The provision in the bill to introduce ships-of-the-line into the Navy, I consider, Mr. Chairman, as fixing the great policy of a navy under this Government. Frigates we have had, but in common with petty nations; for the Barbary Powers have frigates; the provision now offered rises higher and promises something worthy of the constitution, something honorable to the Government. I rejoice, Mr. Chairman, at the favorable circumstances, and hail the auspices under which we now meet this question; we are no longer left to erring speculations, to uncertain reasoning, but have under our eyes the sure and infallible test of experience, of practice in war with a naval force. Within a few weeks our tars have thrice grappled with the enemy, and thrice have they triumphed in combat; the success has swelled the American bosom with joy from Orleans to Maine—all without exception of party, vie in demonstrations of joy and in the bestowment of honors upon the victors.
While such a scene is presented here, gloom and dissatisfaction prevail in the metropolis of Great Britain—those who have been so long accustomed to conquer, receive the capture of the Guerriere with as much astonishment as they would behold a suspension of the laws of nature. A strange event to Britons!
How often, sir, has it been echoed and re-echoed within these walls, that it would be in vain to attempt any thing with a navy against Great Britain, unless we could bring ship to ship and man to man—could equal our enemy on the ocean. How much mistaken have gentlemen been; how vain is human reason! The earliest stage of the first war under the Government has yielded a clear, full, and incontestable refutation of the argument. While the American arms have suffered disgrace upon disgrace on what was deemed the natural and proper theatre for the display of our power; while by land all is gloomy and comfortless, and the heart sickens under the past, our little Navy, a handful of men, has nobly sustained us upon the ocean, and banished that despondency which our disasters by land must have otherwise produced.
If, sir, under such auspices, such overwhelming evidence of the efficiency of a navy, this question is to be put by, I shall despair of a navy; we may rank with Algiers in a force of frigates, but shall do nothing worthy of a community of eight millions of souls, placed by Heaven in a situation most favorable to commerce and naval power.
The objections, sir, to a navy are not a little amusing. Do you move the question in peace, it is objected, that commerce flourishes and you want not protection; at another time it is said not to be worth the expense of a navy, and lastly a navy will draw America into the European vortex and involve us in a war. Now that we are in war, a new book of logic is opened, and it is objected, that you have not time to build a navy, the war will be over before ships can be finished. It is thus, sir, that the arguments against a navy are made to answer and refute themselves; nay, more, the argument in war is a satire and reproach to the objection in peace. "There is not now time to build a navy," reproaches us for not having passed the requisite laws at the last session.
I have always considered the great policy of a navy settled by the constitution; need I spend time to show, that no great specific power was delegated to the General Government unless it was deemed necessary; not necessary for a dormitory, but to be executed for the general protection and welfare. This was the polar star—the test and criterion that governed in the delegation of powers by the States—powers not necessary to be exercised for the general good were retained by the several States. What greatly strengthens the argument is, the power to provide a navy is not only given to the General Government, but taken away or denied to the several States. In adopting the constitution, this question was considered at rest, and a navy was deemed the necessary consequence of this power; in the Virginia Convention, where great talent and ingenuity was displayed in the debate, the point was so considered, and the objection rested on that ground; the consequence of adoption was supposed to be an unequal strengthening of the commercial parts of the Union. So deeply impressed was President Washington with the importance of a navy, and so true to his duty and just claims of commerce for protection, that he could not consent to quit his high station in the public councils without placing on record his sentiments for the good of his country—this he did in his speech to the fourth Congress (second session) in language that well attests his wisdom and paternal care and solicitude for his country. He recommended and urged the policy of a navy in the strongest terms, and I will not believe that the parting lesson of that great and good man will be lost to his country—there is certainly too much respect for his memory to disregard his solemn advice and counsel on any subject. In this policy Mr. Jefferson also concurred at a period most auspicious to fair inquiry and dispassionate judgment; it was before the tempest of party arose, to obscure the great luminary of truth and blacken the political horizon.
Mr. Widgery.—Mr. Chairman, it will be recollected that I was last session of Congress opposed to the building of seventy-fours, until we had got more frigates. I have been rather opposed to them in the Committee of Naval Affairs, not because I was opposed to an augmentation of the Navy, but because I thought it more to the advantage of the country to build frigates and sloops of war at present; and if, hereafter, when we have sailors plenty to man the large ships with, it should be thought best to have larger ships, it may be very well to build them; but, at present, our resources are inadequate to build the seventy-fours and the ten frigates, and say eight or ten sloops of war, which are absolutely necessary for the protection of our seacoast, in order to keep off the British gun-brigs or privateers. The ships-of-the-line will not answer this purpose, when they are at sea; they must keep deep water; they cannot, with safety, follow in under the land those small vessels which annoy our coasters, and capture them all along shore. Within a few days, I have accounts of a small privateer, of eight guns, having captured twenty or thirty sail of coasting vessels. Sir, it is a sight to see a public armed ship of the United States anywhere on our shore to the eastward of Boston—a seacoast of 200 miles—when the enemy can take every thing that passes out to sea, and a country in which there are the best of ship-harbors, where they might cruise with safety, always having a harbor handy to run into. I cannot feel willing to build seventy-fours, to the exclusion of the smaller ships, of which we are so much in want at this time. If you had the money in your chest, and all ready for the building four seventy-fours, and all the timber in the yard—which you have not—still I should have doubts on my mind as to the propriety of those heavy ships. Say, if you please, that you had those ships built, could you send them to sea? I presume not, if at war with England, because she would always blockade your harbors wherever they were; and if you sent them out, perhaps you would never have to man them again; not because our ships in single combat are not a match for hers, but, because they have more ships than they know what to do with; they would always outnumber you at sea, and they would be able to come up with and capture your four ships. But, for what purpose are you to send them out? Certainly, not to take merchantmen. They are not calculated for that purpose, unless you had more than four of them. In case you had a number sufficient to intercept their East India fleet, which, generally, are under strong convoys of heavy ships, then it might be an object to send them to sea. If you are to keep them in port, for the purpose of harbor defence, you must always keep them manned; it will be too late to man them after the enemy comes in sight. And there is, in my mind, another difficulty: In the manning these heavy ships, you will have to impress men to go on board of them, or raise the wages up to what is given in a merchant ship; because the sailors will not be willing to go on board large ships, when they have no chance for prize money. On the other hand, they will be very willing to enter on board cruising ships, such as frigates or sloops of war, in hopes of taking prizes; and you have not, at present, a sufficient number of sailors to man what smaller vessels we want. If you build frigates and sloops of war, they can be furnished without your advancing the money; the merchants will build them, and loan them to the Government. The frigates and smaller vessels can be put afloat in six months from the time they are agreed for; and your ships-of-the-line will not be finished in less than two years; and if they do not cost 30 per cent. more than they are calculated at, I will dare pay all I am worth towards them for nothing. I am willing to go for almost any number of frigates, because I know you can have them built without advancing a dollar until they are ready for service, and because I am convinced they are most for our interest. Popular opinion, I know, has great weight at times; let us not be carried off on the wings of enthusiasm; we are at present at very great expense, and we ought to act prudently with our finances, or they will soon become low. At the same time, I cannot agree with the gentleman from Kentucky, who says he is opposed to any augmentation of the Navy, and asks if you are willing to tax the planters for the building a Navy, and the protection of the merchant? Sir, will not the same reasoning apply against the maritime towns being taxed to support the army of 10,000 men in the West? Gentlemen say, stay on shore, and you will be safe. Sir, may we not, in return, say to the gentlemen who are settling the cheap lands of the interior, keep among us; go not into the Indian country; we cannot be taxed to defend you. This reasoning will apply with as much force against the interior as theirs does against the Atlantic towns. Sir, we are all one people, and, in order to remain so, we must be willing to defend at all points.
Mr. Bassett spoke several times in the course of the debate. The following is the substance of the whole of his remarks: He said, on rising, that it was with no feigned diffidence that he addressed the House. I shall, said he, have credit with every one in the assertion that I am most anxious that the proposition I have made should succeed. Must I not, then, deplore the feebleness of voice, the want of force, of manner, and promptness of mind and thought, which limit me? But I shall feel compensated if the House will, in heart, join me in regretting that a cause worthy of the first of advocates has fallen into such puny hands. For the cause, then, will they hear me, and for their country's good will they improve each hint I may let fall, by their better judgment. It is true, sir, we have little experience—I cannot boast of naval knowledge in our land—but, yet, we are not quite deficient. Let it be remembered, that it is on the first principles that we are to decide; that we are to mark the outlines only, which depend much on general reasoning, and, in doing which, we may resort to the experience of others. I will follow (though with unequal step) the course taken by my predecessor last year, and, on the question to fill this blank, bring the whole subject before the committee. It will be assumed, as then proved, that protection is due to every national right, which cannot be estimated by pecuniary calculation, but must be tested by national ability only to defend and protect them. To the mode of effecting so desirable an object, I shall confine myself. The report has assumed it as a principle almost of instinct to oppose like to like, and so says the history of man, whom we find ever availing himself of the improvements of his assailant for self-defence. Hence has the art of war become to all nations the most interesting science, and no citizen is more estimable than he who can direct the national force with most efficiency. The importance of a naval force is amply attested on record. I will first, sir, point you to the conflicts between the rival Republics of Rome and Carthage, and ask you to remember the agency that their vessels had in them. Had the Romans confined themselves to the land, never had Carthage been destroyed. The history of Europe, from Venice to Great Britain, is too familiar to all who hear me, to require reference to particulars. It is sufficient for me to call attention to the effect of naval power, as it passed from nation to nation. What was the power of Venice and Genoa when they led the van of naval power? How quickly did the sceptre of Portugal rise, as she assumed a station on the ocean! how sink as she lost her naval preponderance! How did a navy once support the United Provinces! and how is it now the salvation of Great Britain! It is then a fact, that a naval armament gives effect to the power of a nation, as do the musket and bayonet, the cannon and the mortar. And how, sir, is it attempted to rebut this fact? By showing a physical disability in the country to avail itself of this force? No. For then would they be rebutted by the extent of our coasts, by the materials for ship-building, (so ample,) and the known habits and genius of our countrymen, as each day is evincing. And here, sir, I wish I could follow up the beautiful figure of my friend, who, on a former occasion, showed you our continent, extending to either ocean, with the finger of Munificence pointing to the goodly heritage.
We have then these facts: that a navy is a powerful means of national operation; that our local situation is fitted for its use; and that we have the necessary materials. To which it is objected that your infant Navy must be opposed to one which has reached the full manhood of power on the ocean. I admit it. But shall we therefore abandon the ocean, yield our birthright, our goodly heritage, without a struggle? Or, shall we not rather, deducing argument from example, like the gallant Captain Hull, avoid their fleets and capture their single ships.
I am aware that habit impels some to be fearful on this subject, and the experience of the past will not convince them. With diffidence, therefore, do I refer to the efficiency of twelve ships-of-the-line and twenty frigates, as demonstrated last session. Let me ask of gentlemen who thus think, who thus feel, to examine the extent of their argument. Does it not go, not only to the abandonment of the ocean, but to the seacoast also? I shall trust to former statements for the magnitude of this sacrifice, with the observation, that abandoning the ocean involves the loss of one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping; and that in giving up the coasts, you lose a valuable portion of your soil, and some of your fairest cities. I will not dwell on the magnitude of this sacrifice, because I cannot believe that Americans will abandon any right which there is a prospect to maintain. I cannot, I admit, answer as conclusively the objection, that much time will be passed before this force can be procured; yet, I believe, that a mind which relied on that objection, might be satisfied that late preparation is better than none. Nor could a mind, so circumstanced, fail to see, that, while making preparation, you come every day nearer your object; in neglecting it, you are every day further from it, and you are, in neglecting it, blending ultimate loss with temporary sacrifice.
Mr. Chairman, is it for an infant nation, or a popular Government, to be deterred by the want of preparation? What is it that the youth has not to prepare, or when was it that a popular Government taxed itself with previous preparation? But why this argument of despair? What were your preparations for the Revolutionary war, and when made? After an army was in your country. Yet were they then made and effectually made. By the bravery of our fathers our soil was secured; on us it rests to secure our rights on the water, common to every independent nation, and as clearly ours as they are essential to our interests. What is this argument of infancy? Had not the Navy of Great Britain a beginning? Yes. There was a time when Britain had no ship. What then? She was invaded, and more, she was conquered. At this day, her wooden walls, as they are proverbially called, are her defence and protection. Is it admitted that the British fleet secures her from attack? If so, would not a fleet secure us from attack also? But we have it not. Is it not then our duty, as guardians of the public interest, to provide this powerful, this necessary means of defence? But some are alarmed at the cost. Permit me to recur to the calculation of the last year. And first, as to the information derived from British experience, whose example may be taken as precedent on maritime subjects; at least they make a powerful argument, where they are rejected as full proof. In recurring to British estimates, it certainly was unexpected to the American eye to see the same sum charged for a soldier as for a sailor, viz: —— dollars per month; and as unexpected, on investigating the British expenditures for a series of years, to find that the appropriations for the Navy are found less than those for the Army, as will be seen by reference to the Annual Register. In corroboration of this is our own history, as appears from the calculations made by my predecessor, of which I will avail myself.
Is it not then demonstrated by foreign and domestic experience, that a naval force is the cheapest the nation can resort to for defence and protection? Is it not also proved, that a force believed to be competent, might be obtained at a sum greatly within the means of the Government—say twelve millions of dollars—or a fourth less than the ordinary amount of revenue for a year in good times? Test this subject in another way. The cost of your Navy, twelve millions; give up the ocean, and you lose, for one item, one million four hundred thousand tons of shipping, which at fifty dollars the ton, would be worth five times the sum. Yet that would unquestionably be the least item in the account, because that would be but one loss, while that of your coasting, and other trade, would swell into a great annual amount, and be as great a sacrifice of convenience as profit. Nor is such a conclusion the less to be deprecated, because it is difficult to foresee all the evils which must result from the abandonment of one essential right of an independent nation. I know it may be said by those who view this subject differently from me, that they do not mean to abandon the ocean. It is, then, for them to show the difference between not abandoning a right, and not defending it; for I cannot believe that any gentleman will contend that the national defence shall be left to privateers. They have most justly been considered an aid to the national arm, but Heaven forbid that they should be relied on as principal. A private arm, with power to shield the nation, is what I could not contemplate without terror. I cannot believe it necessary to pursue this argument.
To return then: The force adequate to the defence of our seas would cost twelve millions. I will not say that this whole expense ought to be incurred in one year; indeed, it ought to be remarked, that of the twenty frigates, nearly eight are ready for service. Let the principle be yielded, and we can then enter on the calculation as to the portion which may be procured each year. The decision, too, would, in my judgment, be the strongest inducement to the enemy to make peace when they saw that you were progressing to a force which they could not meet. If, indeed, the force which has been named was not altogether adequate to the object of defending your own waters, you would find, having that force, that you could make any small addition that was requisite without difficulty. In reference to the opinions of others, in some measure, did the select committee determine on the number of ships, and their force, to be procured this year. Thus if the first blanks are filled with four seventy-six gun ships, they cost, per estimate, $333,000, and will require an appropriation of $1,332,000. If the other blank be filled with six thirty-eight gun ships, which, by estimate, cost $220,000, the requisite appropriation for them will be $1,320,000. For the sloops of war, the last blank I have calculated at $61,200, which would require an appropriation of $367,200; which, with the necessary appropriation for the four frigates ordered to be rebuilt last year, viz: the Philadelphia, New York, General Greene, and Boston, will amount to $3,500,000. This would give you four seventy-sixes and eighteen frigates, mostly of the best size. Compare the efficiency of that force with the interest of three millions and a half, the cost, and you cannot but be gratified with the result. I say, Mr. Chairman, the interest; because, though it was not in the province of the select committee to look out the ways and means, yet was it so interested as to their object, that they could but ask how was the money to be had; and they were satisfied that three millions and a half could, with facility, be loaned for navy purposes. I state this with no view to limit the ways and means, but only that until the subject is given them to provide for, the House might not be embarrassed with the difficulty of money.
With the humble hope that the views of the committee have been shown to be at least most reasonable, if not most correct, I beg leave to say a few words as to the different kinds of vessels proposed. I will not ask that the clerk should read that excellent letter from Captain Stewart, because I presume every gentleman who wishes information has read it more than once. From that and the other documents, the committee thought themselves warranted in recommending four seventy-six gun ships. In addition to the sufficient reasons offered there, that a large ship, with fewer men and a less cost, will be more efficient than small ones, by the table A it is most conclusively evinced, that a seventy-six, at one round, throws on the enemy four pounds fourteen ounces of ball for each man; whereas, the gunboat throws only ten ounces. I only give the extremes, that the argument may be the more readily taken. Here, too, we have the fact, that six hundred and fifty men are sufficient for a seventy-six, while four hundred and twenty are required for a frigate. The annual expense is, for the large ship, $202,110; for the frigate, $110,000. While in action, the larger ship is equal or superior to three frigates. To support this calculation by figures, we have the opinions of Captains Hull, Stewart, and Morris; and Mr. Hamilton says, that all the officers in service concur in the opinion; and I am told that such is the real history of naval conflicts. Mr. Hamilton mentions one, and Captain Stewart mentions another, of four French frigates attacking a British seventy-four, of which one was sunk, two taken, and the other run off.
It is cause of some exultation to me, that our naval men, where the opportunity is afforded them, give the example to prove our theory. As I am told, orders were sent from Washington in September to Captain Chauncey, then at New York, who made his preparation, took his workmen with him to the Lakes, and some days since we had the account that he had built and launched, before November was out, a frigate of twenty-six guns. The gallant Chauncey enables me to present an argument that would, could I do it justice, I am sure, have much weight. Will any gentleman regret that this twenty-six gun ship has been built, though the mastery of the Lakes has been acquired without it? Neither shall we regret the building of the seventy-sixes, though peace, which God send, should come before they are launched. There is yet one other objection too important to be passed over, though it was on a former occasion so ably canvassed. It is the difficulty of getting seamen. That difficulty exists, I do admit. Yet is not the difficulty insurmountable. Here again I avail myself of the illustrations of my friend from South Carolina.
The gentleman has again referred to the difficulty of manning your ships, and deems impressment indispensable. Sir, I admit the weakness of our nation, and lament it too. Yet I cannot believe that the hard hand of tyranny is essential to their well-being; and I regret that in an assembly of freemen, that this, the most if not the only detestable example England has set us as to a navy, should be so much relied on. Look to the fact, that in five years forty-two thousand seamen deserted from the British navy. Look to the fact, that their prisoners require to be committed to return to their own country. It is with no little pride that I call the attention of the gentleman and the committee to our gallery. Did a British gallery ever exhibit such a spectacle? No, a seaman there is a slave, and seldom puts his foot on shore but under the guard of an officer. Let us therefore be cautious in admitting that though Great Britain has been most successful, that she owes it to the hard, to the iron hand of impressment. It would not be difficult to find in her naval institutions other principles to which the mind would delight to attribute her superiority, rather than that from which we cannot but turn in disgust.
Mr. Stow said he should not consider the motion made by the honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Seybert) as going to defeat the main object of the bill, which was a liberal increase of the navy, because he understood his intention to be to move a larger number of frigates if the clause for seventy-fours should be stricken out. The question then he should consider as simply whether it was best at present to build any ships-of-the-line, or to confine our exertions to frigates only? He said his own opinions had leaned pretty strongly to the latter side till, as a member of the Navy Committee, he had been led to a more careful examination of the subject; and he confessed that that examination had fully convinced him of the utility, and he might say necessity, of building some line-of-battle ships. The propriety of building them, as well as a proportion of lighter ships, grew out of the different objects to which they were to be applied. There could be no doubt of the superior advantages of frigates and sloops of war when employed in cruising against our enemy's commerce, but whenever the object is to repel a powerful force, ships-of-the-line ought to be resorted to. They form batteries infinitely more effective in proportion to their expense than frigates. To illustrate this—the cost of a seventy-four is less than one-third more than that of a forty-four gun frigate, yet the force is as three to one, or according to the lowest estimate I have heard, as two to one. This is easily explained when we consider that to make a seventy-four is little more than adding another deck to a large frigate. It would then appear evident, that unless we resorted to this kind of force, we should fight our enemy on the most unequal terms. She could at any time lay a few heavy ships at the mouths of our harbors and in our narrow waters, and thus effectually destroy not only our foreign trade, but what was of infinitely more importance, she could destroy the whole of our coasting trade.
Further, said Mr. S., knowing that we have no powerful ships, she can easily protect by convoy all her valuable fleets; but if we had four ships-of-the-line she would be driven to the enormous expense of convoying every fleet of merchantmen sailing to any part of America by five or six seventy-fours, or they would be exposed to capture by our fleet.
But, said Mr. S., it is objected that they would be blockaded. This objection was equally against frigates; but he was perfectly willing to put it upon that ground, that Great Britain would attempt to blockade them. What then would be the case? She must employ six blockading ships, supported at an enormous expense, at such a distance; and as had been fully shown by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Cheves,) last year, six more ships at least must be occupied in preparing and sailing to replace the first six—thus employing twelve ships to four. And after all, the attempt to confine our ships would frequently be rendered abortive by storms. Again, it has been objected that we had no harbors south of Montauk Point, in which, if pursued, our ships could take shelter. If by this was meant barely that we had no harbor properly fortified, he admitted it was true; and it was also equally true as applied to our heavy frigates; but if it was meant that there was no harbor in which ships could enter that was capable of being properly defended, it was entirely erroneous. For many such there were, and where sufficient works could be erected in a few months.
Mr. S. said a strong reason for building seventy-fours, and to which he particularly requested the attention of the committee, grew out of the state of our preparation. We have timber for four seventy-fours, seasoned and ready for use, which could not be applied to frigates, without great loss. And this explained the fact, that we could build seventy-fours sooner than frigates, unless the timber thus provided should be cut up, which, after years of deliberate preparation for seventy-fours, would appear like children's play. He said in a case of this kind, he thought great respect was due to experience. That many years ago all the ships of war belonging to the nations of Europe were small, but that, without one exception, they had resorted to a certain proportion of heavy ships. From this circumstance, as well as from the uniform opinion of our own officers, he inferred that these were the most conclusive reasons in favor of them.
The question was then taken on the motion to strike out the seventy-fours, and negatived. The committee rose and had leave to sit again.
Increase of the Navy.
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to increase the Navy of the United States.
Mr. Cutts then moved to strike out the seventy-fours, with a view to increase the number of frigates to be built to ten, and to add a number of sloops of war.
Mr. C. spoke at considerable length in support of his motion, and in favor of frigates and sloops of war in preference to seventy-four gun ships.
The question was then taken on striking out the provision respecting seventy-fours, and was carried—for the amendment 56, against it 53.
Mr. Cutts moved an amendment authorizing the building of ten ships of war, of forty-four guns, and ten sloops of war.—Motion lost by a great majority.
On motion of Mr. Bassett, the petitions of J. A. Chevallie, attorney of Amelie Eugene de Beaumarchais, presented on the 24th of December, 1805, and 2d of April, 1806, together with all the documents concerning the said claim, were referred to the Committee of Claims.
Encouragement to Privateering by Public Armed and Private Armed Vessels.
Mr. Bassett, from the Committee on the Naval Establishment, presented a bill relating to captures; which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Wednesday next. The bill is as follows: