Gentlemen propose to protect commerce on this side the Gulf Stream, yet admit if our vessels are despoiled on the Indian Ocean, we must apply retaliation in the West Indies. The Gulf Stream limitation is at once given up; a new expedition to the Cyclades is in that case to take place. Begin your conquest in the West Indies, and you must increase your navy to acquire and defend them. It is at once an admission that naval power must be used more for ambition than the protection of commerce and our territorial waters. But, what is worse, as you acquire colonies and ships you must create armies. The hands of the Executive, restricted and elective as it is, in the United States, became thence armed with a sceptre formidable indeed, and the more so as it acquires this strength without producing the shock to public feeling which the seizure of power by a military leader will always excite. It has been said, (said Mr. R.,) that the existence of Great Britain hung upon her navy in the contest in which she is now engaged. If her fate hangs suspended by her naval power, she owes her peril to that source. Without her maritime strength, would she have aspired to balance the scales of power on the Continent? Would she have become a party to the infamous conspiracy of Pilnitz? Would she have wantonly plotted the dismemberment of France? Would she have broken the peace of Amiens whence her present dangers arise? Certainly not.
On the article of cost, said Mr. R., it is of little importance whether the army or navy of Great Britain is most burdensome on her finances, though it has been dwelt upon with particular emphasis, nor whether an army be more expensive in every case, than a navy. Armies are a necessary consequence of navies. Has not the British army increased with equal pace with her navy?
The humane mind, said Mr. R., cannot contemplate without pain, that from naval power have flown the most copious streams of human misery. The plunder of half the world, with immense advantages in addition, has not sustained the British navy. A debt has been accumulated that almost baffles the power of figures to estimate. But debt, and a prospect of Government insolvency at home, are of much less account than the wrongs this navy has wrought on the society of nations. And yet it is this Government that is held up to Republican America as a model for imitation.
Need I remind you, said Mr. R., of the millions of victims sacrificed to commercial cupidity on the plains of Hindostan, by means of this navy? A population, thrice as great as that of the British Isles, has been exterminated in this devoted region, within comparatively but a few years, by mercantile rapacity. Colonel Dowe informs us, that the wealth of one of the cities of this wretched country had whetted the avarice of Clive and his associates, and that an offer was made to the Government to pay the public debt for permission to sack it. It was too gross an act of infamy to assent to, and the adventurers obtained their end by other means. A famine and pestilence was substituted for the bayonet, and the spoils of the devoted city glutted the hands of rapine. In this exploit, a shoe-black divided his £200,000. Need I remind you, said Mr. R., that the population of Africa has been drained, to groan out a wretched existence in the West India colonies, to prop up this naval and commercial power, or that the remotest corners of every sea have been visited with the scourge of blood and desolation for the same purpose? On general principles, does not past experience afford sufficient warning to these States to avoid those shoals on which so many nations have been wrecked?
Mr. Chairman, under no view which I have been able to take of this subject, considering it either as the furtherance of a system of naval power, to be expanded with the growing strength of the Union to gigantic size, or that it is a proper time for providing a temporary increase of naval force, can I agree, said Mr. R., to the bill on your table.
When Mr. Roberts had concluded, the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.
Another member, to wit, William M. Richardson, from Massachusetts, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.
Naval Establishment.
The House again went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill concerning the Navy. The question on filling up the blank in the section which provides for repairing the vessels on hand, with four hundred and eighty thousand dollars, was carried by a large majority.
The next section provides for the building of ---- additional frigates.
Mr. Clay (the Speaker) rose to present his views on the bill before the committee. He said that as he did not precisely agree in opinion with any gentleman who had spoken, he should take the liberty of detaining the committee a few moments while he offered to their attention some observations. He was highly gratified with the temper and ability with which the discussion had been hitherto conducted. It was honorable to the House, and, he trusted, would continue to be manifested on many future occasions.
On this interesting topic a diversity of opinion has existed almost ever since the adoption of the present Government. On the one hand there appeared to him to have been attempts made to precipitate the nation into all the evils of naval extravagance, which had been productive of so much mischief in other countries; and, on the other, strongly feeling this mischief, there has existed an unreasonable prejudice against providing such a competent naval protection for our commercial and maritime rights as is demanded by their importance, and as the increased resources of the country amply justify.
The attention of Congress has been invited to this subject by the President in his Message delivered at the opening of the session. Indeed, had it been wholly neglected by the Chief Magistrate, from the critical situation of the country, and nature of the rights proposed to be vindicated, it must have pressed itself upon our attention. But, said Mr. C., the President, in his Message, observes: "Your attention will, of course, be drawn to such provisions on the subject of our naval force as may be required for the service to which it is best adapted. I submit to Congress the seasonableness also of an authority to augment the stock of such materials as are imperishable in their nature, or may not at once be attainable." The President, by this recommendation, clearly intimates an opinion that the naval force of this country is capable of producing some effect; and the propriety of laying up imperishable materials was no doubt suggested for the purpose of making additions to the navy, as convenience and exigencies might direct.
It appeared to Mr. C. a little extraordinary that so much, as it seemed to him, unreasonable jealousy should exist against the Naval Establishment. If, said he, we look back to the period of the formation of the constitution, it will be found that no such jealousy was then excited. In placing the physical force of the nation at the disposal of Congress, the Convention manifested much greater apprehension of abuse in the power given to raise armies than in that to provide a navy. In reference to the Navy, Congress is put under no restrictions; but with respect to the Army—that description of force which has been so often employed to subvert the liberties of mankind—they are subjected to limitations, designed to prevent the abuse of this dangerous power. But it was not his intention to detain the committee by a discussion on the comparative utility and safety of these two kinds of force. He would, however, be indulged in saying, that he thought gentlemen had wholly failed in maintaining the position they had assumed, that the fall of maritime powers was attributable to their navies. They have told you, indeed, that Carthage, Genoa, Venice, and other nations, had navies, and, notwithstanding, were finally destroyed. But have they shown, by a train of argument, that their overthrow was, in any degree, ascribable to their maritime greatness? Have they attempted even to show that there exists in the nature of this power a necessary tendency to destroy the nation using it? Assertion is substituted for argument; inferences not authorized by historical facts are arbitrarily drawn; things wholly unconnected with each other are associated together—a very logical mode of reasoning! In the same way he could demonstrate how idle and absurd our attachments are to freedom itself. He might say, for example, that Greece and Rome had forms of free government, and that they no longer exist; and deducing their fall from their devotion to liberty, the conclusion in favor of despotism would very satisfactorily follow! He demanded what there is in the nature and construction of maritime power to excite the fears that have been indulged? Do gentlemen really apprehend that a body of seamen will abandon their proper element, and, placing themselves under an aspiring chief, will erect a throne to his ambition? Will they deign to listen to the voice of history, and learn how chimerical are their apprehensions?
But the source of alarm is in ourselves. Gentlemen fear that if we provide a marine it will produce collisions with foreign nations—plunge us into war, and ultimately overturn the constitution of the country. Sir, if you wish to avoid foreign collision you had better abandon the ocean; surrender all your commerce; give up all your prosperity. It is the thing protected, not the instrument of protection, that involves you in war. Commerce engenders collision, collision war, and war, the argument supposes, leads to despotism. Would the counsels be deemed wise, of that statesman who should recommend that the nation should be unarmed—that the art of war, the martial spirit, and martial exercises, should be prohibited—and that the great body of the people should be taught that national happiness was to be found in perpetual peace alone? No, sir. And yet every argument in favor of a power of protection on land applies, in some degree, to a power of protection on the sea. Undoubtedly a commerce void of naval protection is more exposed to rapacity than a guarded commerce; and if we wish to invite the continuance of the old, or enaction of new unjust edicts, let us refrain from all exertion upon that element where they operate, and where, in the end, they must be resisted.
For his part, Mr. C. said, he did not allow himself to be alarmed by those apprehensions of maritime power which appeared to agitate other gentlemen. In the nature of our Government he beheld abundant security against abuse. He would be unwilling to tax the land to support the rights of the sea, and was for drawing from the sea itself the resources with which its violated freedom should at all times be vindicated. Whilst this principle is adhered to, there will be no danger of running into the folly and extravagance which so much alarms gentlemen; and whenever it is abandoned—whenever Congress shall lay burdensome taxes to augment the Navy beyond what may be authorized by the increased wealth, and demanded by the exigencies of the country, the people will interpose, and, removing their unworthy representatives, apply the appropriate corrective. Mr. C. could not, then, see any just ground of dread in the nature of naval power. It was, on the contrary, free from the evils attendant upon standing armies. And, the genius of our institutions—the great representative principle, in the practical enjoyment of which we are so eminently distinguished—afforded the best guarantee against the ambition and wasteful extravagance of Government.
What maritime strength is it expedient to provide for the United States? In considering this subject, three different degrees of naval power present themselves. In the first place, such a force as would be capable of contending with that which any other nation is able to bring on the ocean—a force that, boldly scouring every sea, would challenge to combat the fleets of other powers, however great. He admitted it was impossible at this time, perhaps it never would be desirable for this country to establish so extensive a Navy. Indeed, he should consider it as madness in the extreme in this Government to attempt to provide a Navy capable to cope with the fleets of Great Britain, wherever they might be met.
The next species of naval power to which he would advert, is that which, without adventuring into distant seas, and keeping generally in our own harbors, and on our coasts, would be competent to beat off any squadron which might be attempted to be permanently stationed in our waters. His friends from South Carolina (Messrs. Cheves and Lowndes) had satisfactorily shown that, to effect this object, a force equivalent only to one-third of that which the maintenance of such squadron must require would be sufficient. That if, for example, England should determine to station permanently upon our coast a squadron of twelve ships-of-the-line, it would require for this service thirty-six ships-of-the line, one-third in port repairing, one-third on the passage, and one-third on the station. But that is a force which it has been shown that even England, with her boasted Navy, could not spare for the American service whilst she is engaged in the present contest. Mr. C. said he was desirous of seeing such a force as he had described, that is, about twelve ships-of-the-line and fifteen or twenty frigates, provided for the United States; but, he admitted that it was unattainable in the present situation of the finances of the country. He contended, however, that it was such as Congress ought to set about providing, and he hoped, in less than ten years, to see it actually established. He was far from surveying the vast maritime power of Great Britain with the desponding eye with which other gentlemen beheld it. He could not allow himself to be discouraged at the prospect even of her thousand ships. This country only required resolution, and a proper exertion of its immense resources, to command respect, and to vindicate every essential right. When we consider our remoteness from Europe, the expense, difficulty, and perils, to which any squadron would be exposed, stationed off our coasts, he entertained no doubt that the force to which he referred would insure the command of our own seas. Such a force would avail itself of our extensive seaboard and numerous harbors, everywhere affording asylums to which it could retire for safety from a superior fleet, or from which it could issue for the purpose of annoyance. To the opinion of his colleague, (Mr. McKee,) who appeared to think that it was in vain for us to make any struggle on the ocean, he would oppose the sentiments of his distinguished connexion, the heroic Daviess, who fell in the battle of Tippecanoe.
[Here Mr. C. read certain parts of a work written by Colonel Daviess, in which the author attempts to show that, as the aggressions upon our commerce were not committed by fleets, but by single vessels, they could in the same manner be best retaliated; that a force of about twenty or thirty frigates would be capable of inflicting great injury on English commerce by picking up stragglers, cutting off convoys, and seizing upon every moment of supineness; and that such a force, with our seaports and harbors well fortified, and aided by privateers, would be really formidable, and would annoy the British navy and commerce, as the French army was assailed in Egypt, the Persian army in Scythia, and the Roman army in Parthia.][26]
The third description of force worthy of consideration is, that which would be able to prevent any single vessel, of whatever metal, from endangering our whole coasting trade, blocking up our harbors, or laying under contribution our cities; a force competent to punish the insolence of the commander of any single ship, and to preserve in our own jurisdiction the inviolability of our peace and our laws. A force of this kind is entirely within the compass of our means at this time. Is there a reflecting man in the nation who would not charge Congress with a culpable neglect of its duty, if, for the want of such a force, a single ship were to bombard one of our cities? Would not every honorable member of this committee inflict on himself the bitterest reproaches, if, by failing to make an inconsiderable addition to our gallant little Navy, a single British vessel should place New York under contribution? Yes, sir, when the city is in flames, its wretched inhabitants begin to repent of their neglect in not providing engines and water buckets. If, said Mr. C, we are not able to meet the wolves of the forest, shall we put up with the barking of every petty fox that trips across our way? Because we cannot guard against every possible danger, shall we provide against none? He hoped not. He had hardly expected that the instructing but humiliating lesson was so soon to be forgotten which was taught us in the murder of Pierce; the attack on the Chesapeake; and the insult offered in the harbor of Charleston, which the brave old fellow that commanded the fort in vain endeavored to chastise.
It was a rule with Mr. C., when acting either in a public or private character, to attempt nothing more than what there existed a prospect of accomplishing. He was, therefore, not in favor of entering into any mad projects on this subject; but for deliberately and resolutely pursuing what he believed to be within the power of Government. Gentlemen refer to the period of 1798, and we are reminded of the principles maintained by the opposition at that time. He had no doubt of the correctness of that opposition. The naval schemes of that day were premature, not warranted by the resources of the country, and were contemplated for an unnecessary war into which the nation was about to be plunged. He always admired and approved the zeal and ability with which that opposition was conducted by the distinguished gentleman now at the head of the Treasury. But the state of things is totally altered. What was folly in 1798 may be wisdom now. At that time, we had a revenue only of about six millions. Our revenue now, upon a supposition that commerce is restored, is about sixteen millions. The population of the country, too, is greatly increased—nearly doubled—and the wealth of the nation is, perhaps, tripled. While our ability to construct a navy is thus enhanced, the necessity for maritime protection is proportionately augmented. Independent of the extension of our commerce, since the year 1798, we have had an addition of more than five hundred miles to our coast, from the bay of Perdido to the mouth of the Sabine—a weak and defenceless accession, requiring, more than any other part of our maritime frontier, the protecting arm of Government.
Naval Establishment.
The blank in the section for providing a dock yard, was filled with one hundred thousand dollars.
Mr. Rhea moved so to amend the bill as to fix the dock yard in the navy-yard at Washington City; but this motion was negatived by a large majority.
On motion of Mr. Cheves, the words "central and," were struck out, so as to leave the site of the dock yard to be determined by the Executive.
The committee having gone through the bill, rose and reported it to the House with the amendments. The House took up the bill, and on the question of filling up the blank for repairing the vessels on hand with "four hundred and eighty thousand dollars," it was carried—yeas 90, nays 23.
The question was next put upon agreeing to the report of the committee to strike out the second section of the bill, which contemplated the building of new frigates; when
Mr. Williams rose and spoke at considerable length. He said the time was very inauspicious for commencing an undertaking of such magnitude as the building a navy, which could be of no use in the approaching contest. He doubted the policy of engaging in the business at all; for navies, he said, had deceived the hopes of every country which had relied upon them; that we could never expect to be able to meet Great Britain on the ocean; that we had fought through the Revolution without a navy; for in that contest, a single privateer had done more than the few ships of war which were in possession of the old Congress; that except we are able to build and equip a navy equal to meet the British at sea, we were better without one, as our ships would probably fall a prey to their superior force; that his greatest objection against a navy was, that it must be kept up in time of peace as well as in war; that when the gentlemen spoke of a navy as cheaper than an army, they could not mean to say that if we had a navy the army could be dispensed with—they could not, for instance, take possession of Canada by a navy; that the building of a navy would burden the people with oppressive taxes; that such an establishment would serve only to increase Executive patronage; that with respect to commerce, the people were willing to give it all the protection in their power, but they could not provide a navy for that purpose.
Naval Establishment.
Mr. Quincy.—Mr. Speaker, I rise to address you, on this occasion, with no affected diffidence, and with many doubts concerning the expediency of taking any part in this debate. On the one hand, the subject has been discussed with a zeal, industry, and talent, which leave but little scope for novelty, either in topic or illustration. On the other hand, arguments from this side of the House, in favor of this question, are received with so natural a jealousy, that I know not whether more may not be lost than gained by so unpropitious a support. Indeed, sir, if this subject had been discussed on narrow or temporary or party principles, I should have been silent. On such ground, I could not condescend to debate—I could not hope to influence. But, the scale of discussion has been enlarged and liberal—relative rather to the general system, than to the particular exigency. In almost every respect, it has been honorable to the House, and auspicious to the prospects of the nation. In such a state of feeling and sentiment, I could not refrain from indulging the hope that suggestions, even from so favorite a quarter, would be received with candor—perhaps with attention. And, when I consider the deep interest which the State from which I have the honor to be a Representative has, according to my apprehension, in the event, I cannot permit the opportunity entirely to pass, without bringing my small tribute of reflection to the general stock of the House.
The object I shall chiefly attempt to enforce, is, the necessity and duty of a systematic protection of our maritime rights, by maritime means. I would call the thoughtful and intelligent men of this House and nation to the contemplation of the essential connection between a naval force, proportionate to the circumstances of our seacoast, the extent of our commerce, and the inherent enterprise of our people; I say, sir, I would call them to the contemplation of the essential connection between such a naval force and the safety, prosperity, and existence, of our Union. In the course of my observations, and as a subsidiary argument, I shall also attempt to show the connection between the adoption of the principle of a systematic maintenance of our maritime rights, by maritime means, and relief from our present national embarrassments.
I confess to you, Mr. Speaker, I never can look—indeed, in my opinion, no American statesman ought ever to look—on any question touching the vital interests of this nation, or of any of its component parts, without keeping at all times in distinct view the nature of our political association, and the character of the independent sovereignties which compose it. Among States, the only sure and permanent bond of union is interest. And the vital interests of States, although they may be sometimes obscured, can never, for a very long time, be misapprehended. The natural protection which the essential interests of the great component parts of our political association require will be sooner or later understood by the States concerned in those interests. If a protection, upon system, be not provided, it is impossible that discontent should not result. And need I tell statesmen, that, when great local discontent is combined in those sections with great physical power, and with acknowledged portions of sovereignty, the inbred ties of nature will be too strong for the artificial ties of parchment compact. Hence it results that the essential interests of the great component parts of our association ought to be the polar lights of all our statesmen—by them they should guide their course. According to the bearings and variations of those lights, should the statesmen of such a country adjust their policy—always bearing in mind two assurances, as fundamental principles of action, which the nature of things teaches, that, although temporary circumstances—party spirit, local rivalries, personal jealousies, suggestions of subordinate interests—may weaken, or even destroy, for a time, the influence of the leading and permanent interests of any great section of the country, yet those interests must ultimately and necessarily predominate, and swallow up all these local, and temporary, and personal, and subordinate considerations; in other words, the minor interests will soon begin to realize the essential connection which exists between their prosperity and the prosperity of those great interests which, in such sections of the country, nature has made predominant; and that no political connection among free States can be lasting, or ought to be, which systematically oppresses, or systematically refuses to protect, the vital interests of any of the sovereignties which compose it.
I have recurred to these general considerations, to introduce and elucidate this principle, which is the basis of my argument, that, as it is the incumbent duty of every nation to protect its essential interests, so it is the most impressive and critical duty of a nation, composed of a voluntary association of vast, powerful, and independent States, to protect the essential interests of all its great component parts. And I add, that this protection must not be formal or fictitious, but that it must be proportionate to the greatness of those interests, and of a nature to give content to the States concerned in their protection.
In reference to this principle, the course of my reflections will be guided by two general inquiries—the nature of the interest to be protected, and the nature of the protection to be extended. In pursuing these inquiries, I shall touch very slightly, if at all, on the abstract duty of protection, which is the very end of all political associations, and, without the attainment of which, they are burdens and no blessings. But I shall keep it mainly in my purpose to establish the connection between a naval force and commercial prosperity; and to show the nature of the necessity, and the degree of our capacity, to give to our maritime rights a maritime protection.
In contemplating the nature of the interest to be protected, three prominent features strike the eye, and direct the course of reflection, viz: its locality, its greatness, and its permanency.
The locality of any great interest, in an association of States such as compose this Union, will be a circumstance of primary importance, in the estimation of every wise statesman. When a great interest is equally diffused over the whole mass, it may be neglected or oppressed or even abandoned, with less hazard of internal dissension. The equality of the pressure lightens the burden. The common nature of the interest removes the causes of jealousy. A concern equally affecting the happiness of every part of the nation, it is natural to suppose, is equally dear to all, and equally understood by all. Hence results acquiescence in any artificial or political embarrassment of it. Sectional fears and suspicions, in such case, have no food for support, and no stimulant for activity. But it is far otherwise when a great interest is, from its nature, either wholly, or in a very great proportion, local. In relation to such a local interest, it is impossible that jealousies and suspicions should not arise, whenever it is obstructed by any artificial or political embarrassment; and it is also impossible that they should not be, in a greater or less degree, just. It is true, of the wisest and the best and the most thoughtful of our species, that they are so constituted as not deeply to realize the importance of interests which affect them not at all, or very remotely. Every local circle of States, as well as of individuals, has a set of interests, in the prosperity of which, the happiness of the section to which they belong is identified; in relation to which interests, the hopes and the fears, the reasonings and the schemes, of the inhabitants of such sections are necessarily fashioned and conducted. It is morally impossible that those concerned in such sectional interests, should not look with some degree of jealousy on schemes adopted in relation to those interests, and prosecuted by men, a majority of whom have a very remote or very small stake in them. And this jealousy must rise to an extreme height, when the course of measures adopted, whether they have relation to the management or the protection of such interests, wholly contravene the opinions and the practical experience of the persons immediately concerned in them. This course of reflection has a tendency to illustrate this idea—that, as in every political association it is of primary importance that the great interests of each local section should be skilfully and honestly managed and protected, so, in selecting the mode and means of management and protection, an especial regard should be had to the content and rational satisfaction of those most deeply concerned in such sectional interests. Theories and speculations of the closet, however abundant in a show of wisdom, are never to be admitted to take the place of those principles of conduct in which experience has shown the prosperity and safety of such interests to consist. Practical knowledge, and that sagacity which results from long attention to great interests, never fail to inspire a just self-confidence in relation to those interests—a confidence not to be browbeaten by authority, nor circumvented by any general reasoning. And, in a national point of view, it is scarcely of more importance that the course adopted should be wise, than that content and rational satisfaction should be given.
On this topic of locality, I shall confine myself to one or two very plain statements. It seems sufficient to observe, that commerce is, from the nature of things, the leading interest of more than one-half, and that it is the predominant interest of more than one-third, of the people of the United States. The States north of the Potomac contain nearly four millions of souls; and surely it needs no proof to convince the most casual observer, that the proportion which the commercial interest bears to the other interests of that great section of the Union, is such as entitles it to the denomination of leading interest. The States north of the Hudson contain nearly two and a half millions of souls; and surely there is as little need of proof to show that the proportion the commercial interest bears to the other interests of that Northern section of the Union, is such as entitles it there to the denomination of predominating interest. In all the country between the Potomac and the Hudson the interest of commerce is so great, in proportion to the other interests, that its embarrassment clogs and weakens the energy of every other description of industry. Yet, the agricultural and manufacturing interests of this section are of a nature and a magnitude, both in respect of the staples of the one and the objects of the other, as to render them, in a very considerable degree, independent of the commercial. And, although they feel the effect of the obstruction of commerce, the feeling may be borne for a long time, without much individual suffering, or any general distress. But, in the country north of the Hudson, the proportion and connection of these great interests are different. Both agriculture and manufactures have there grown up in more intimate relation to commerce. The industry of that section has its shape and energy from commercial prosperity. To the construction, the supply, and the support of navigation, its manufactures have a direct or indirect reference; and it is not very different with its agriculture. A country divided into small farms, among a population great compared with its extent, requires quick circulation and easy processes in the exchange of its commodities. This can only be obtained by an active and prosperous commerce.
But, perhaps, the greatness of this interest, and our pecuniary ability to protect it, may be made more strikingly apparent by a comparison of our commerce with that of Britain, in the single particular of export. I state, then, as a fact, of which any man may satisfy himself by a reference to McPherson's Annals of Commerce, where the tables of British export may be found, that, taking the nine years prior to the war of our Revolution—from 1766 to 1774 inclusive—the total average export of Great Britain was £16,000,000 sterling; equal to $71,000,000—an amount less, by $10,000,000, than the present total average export of the United States. And again, taking the nine years beginning with 1789, and ending with 1797, inclusive, the total annual average export of Great Britain was £24,000,000 sterling—equal to $106,000,000—which is less, by $2,000,000, than the total export of the United States in 1807. It is true, that this is the official value of the British export, and that the real value is somewhat higher—perhaps thirty per cent. This circumstance, although it in a degree diminishes the approximation of the American to the British commerce, in point of amount does not materially affect the argument. Upon the basis of her commerce, Great Britain maintains a maritime force of 800 or 1,000 vessels of war. And will it be seriously contended, that, upon the basis of a commerce like ours, thus treading upon the heels of British greatness, we are absolutely without the ability of maintaining the security of our seaboard, the safety of our cities, and the unobstructed course of our coasting trade?
By recurring to the permanency of this interest, the folly and madness of this negligence and misplaced meanness—for it does not deserve the name of economy—will be still more distinctly exhibited. If this commerce were the mushroom growth of a night—if it had its vigor from the temporary excitement and the accumulated nutriment which warring elements in Europe had swept from the places of their natural deposit—then, indeed, there might be some excuse for a temporizing policy touching so transitory an interest. But commerce in the Eastern States is of no foreign growth, and of no adventitious seed; its root is of a fibre which almost two centuries have nourished; and the perpetuity of its destiny is written in legible characters, as well in the nature of the country, as in the disposition of its inhabitants. Indeed, sir, look along your whole coast, from Passamaquoddy to Capes Henry and Charles, and behold the deep and far-winding creeks and inlets, the noble basins, the projecting headlands, the majestic rivers; and those sounds and bays, which are more like inland seas, than any thing called by those names in other quarters of the globe! Can any man do this, and not realize that the destiny of the people inhabiting such a country is essentially maritime? Can any man do this, without being impressed by the conviction, that, although the poor projects of politicians may embarrass, for a time, the dispositions growing out of the condition of such a country, yet that nature will be too strong for cobweb regulations, and will vindicate her rights with certain effect—perhaps with awful perils? No nation ever did or ever ought to resist such allurements and invitations to a particular mode of industry. The purposes of Providence relative to the destination of men are to be gathered from the circumstances in which his beneficence has placed them; and to refuse to make use of the means of prosperity which his goodness has put into our hands, what is it but spurning at his bounty, and rejecting the blessings which his infinite wisdom has designated for us, by the very nature of his allotments? The employments of industry, connected with navigation and commercial enterprise, are precious to the people of that quarter of the country, by ancient prejudice, not less than recent profit. The occupation is rendered dear and venerable, by all the cherished associations of our infancy, and all the sage and prudential maxims of our ancestors. And, as to the lessons of encouragement derived from recent experience, what nation, within a similar period, ever received so many that were sweet and salutary? What nation, in so short a time, ever before ascended to such a height of commercial greatness?
Having concluded what I intended to suggest, in relation to the nature of the interest to be protected, I proceed to consider the nature of the protection which it is our duty to extend. And here, Mr. Speaker, I am necessitated to make an observation which is so simple and so obvious, that were it not for the arguments urged against the principle of maritime protection, I should have deemed the mere mention of it to require an apology. The remark is this: that rights, in their nature local, can only be maintained where they exist, and not where they do not exist. If you had a field to defend in Georgia, it would be very strange to put up a fence in Massachusetts. And yet, how does this differ from invading Canada, for the purpose of defending our maritime rights? I beg not to be understood, Mr. Speaker, by this remark, as intending to chill the ardor for the Canada expedition. It is very true, that, to possess ourselves of the Canadas, and Nova Scotia, and their dependencies, it would cost these United States, at the least estimate, $50,000,000; and that Great Britain's national pride, and her pledge of protection to the people of that country, being put out of the question, she would sell you the whole territory for half the money. I make no objection, however, on this account. On the contrary, for the purposes of the present argument, I may admit that pecuniary calculation ought to be put out of the field, when spirit is to be shown, or honor vindicated. I only design to inquire how our maritime rights are protected by such invasion. Suppose that in every land-project you are successful—suppose both the Canadas, Quebec, Halifax, every thing to the North pole, yours by fair conquest—are your rights on the ocean, therefore, secure? Does your flag float afterwards in honor? Are your seamen safe from impressment? Is your course along the highway of nations unobstructed? No one pretends it. No one has or can show, by any logical deduction, or any detail of facts, that the loss of those countries would so compress Great Britain as to induce her to abandon for one hour any of her maritime pretensions. What then results? Why, sir—what is palpable as the day—that maritime rights are only to be maintained by maritime means. This species of protection must be given, or all clamor about maritime rights will be understood, by the people interested in them, to be hollow or false; or (what is worse) an intention to co-operate with the enemies of our commerce in a still further embarrassment of it.
In considering this subject of maritime protection, I shall recur to the nature and degree of it, and to our capacity to extend it. And there we are always met, at the very threshold, with this objection: "A naval force requires much time to get it into readiness, and the exigency will be past before the preparation can be completed." This want of foresight in times past, is made an apology for want of foresight in the time present. We were unwise in the beginning, and unwise we resolve to continue until the end of the chapter. We refuse to do any thing until the moment of exigency, and then it is too late. Thus our improvidence is made sponsor for our disinclination. But what is the law of nature and the dictate of wisdom, on this subject? The casualties of life, the accidents to which man is exposed, are the modes established by Providence for his instruction. This is the law of our nature. Hence it is that adversity is said to keep a school for certain people who will learn in no other. Hence, too, the poet likens it to "a toad, ugly and venomous, which bears a precious jewel in his head." And, in another place, but with the same general relation, "out of this thorn danger, we pluck the flower safety." This law is just as relative to nations, as it is to individuals. For, notwithstanding all the vaunting of statesmen, their whole business is to apply an enlarged common sense to the affairs intrusted to their management.
Touching the nature and degree of that maritime protection, which it may be wise in this nation to extend to its maritime interests, it seems to me that our exertions should rather be excited than graduated, by the present exigency; that our duty is to inquire, upon a general scale, what our commercial citizens have, in this respect, a right to claim; and what is the unquestionable obligation of a commercial nation, to so great a class of its interests. For this purpose, my observations will have reference rather to the principles of the system, than to the provisions of the bill now under debate. Undoubtedly, an appropriation for the building of ten, or any other additional number of frigates, would be so distinct a manifestation of the intention of the National Legislature to extend to commerce its natural protection, as in itself to outweigh any theoretic preference for a maritime force of higher character. I cannot, therefore, but cordially support an appropriation for a species of protection so important and desirable. Yet in an argument, having relation to the system, rather than to the occasion, I trust I shall have the indulgence of the House, if my course of reflections should take a wider range than the propositions on the table, and embrace, within the scope of remark, the general principles by which the nature and degree of systematical naval protection should in my judgment be regulated.
Touching that branch of interest which is most precious to commercial men, it is impossible that there can be any mistake. For however dear the interests of property or of life, exposed upon the ocean, may be to their owners or their friends; yet the safety of our altars and of our firesides, of our cities and of our seaboard, must, from the nature of things, be entwined into the affections by ties incomparably more strong and tender. And it happens that both national pride and honor are peculiarly identified with the support of these primary objects of commercial interest.
With respect to the nature and extent of this naval force, some difference of opinion may arise, according to the view taken of the primary objects of protection. For myself, I consider that those objects are first to be protected, in the safety of which the national character and happiness are most deeply interested. And these are chiefly concerned, beyond all question, in the preservation of our maritime settlements from pillage and our coast from violence. For this purpose it is requisite that there should be a ship of war for the harbor of every great city of the United States, equal, in point of force, to the usual grade of ships-of-the-line of the maritime belligerents. These ships might be so instructed as to act singly or together, as circumstances might require. My reason for the selection of this species of force is, that it puts every city and great harbor of the United States in a state of security from the insults, and the inhabitants of your seacoast from the depredation, of any single ship of war of any nation. To these should be added a number of frigates and smaller vessels of war. By such means our coasting trade might be protected, the mouths of our harbors secured (in particular that of the Mississippi) from the buccaneers of the West Indies, and, hereafter perhaps, from those of South America. A system of protection, graduated upon a scale so conformable to the nature of the country, and to the greatness of the commercial interest, would tend to quiet that spirit of jealousy which so naturally and so justly begins to spring up among the States. Those interested in commerce would care little what local influences predominated, or how the ball of power vibrated among our factions, provided an efficient protection of their essential interests, upon systematic principles, was not only secured by the letter of the constitution, but assured by a spirit pervading every description of their rulers. But it is said that "we have not capacity to maintain such a naval force." Is it want of pecuniary or want of physical capacity? In relation to our pecuniary capacity, I will not condescend to add any proof to that plain statement already exhibited, showing that we have an annual commercial exposure, equal to six hundred millions of dollars, and that two-thirds of one per cent. upon this amount of value, or four millions of dollars, is more than is necessary, if annually and systematically appropriated, for this great object; so anxiously and rightfully desired by your seaboard, and so essential to the honor and obligations of the nation. I will only make a single other statement, by way of illustrating the smallness of the annual appropriations necessary for the attainment of this important purpose. The annual appropriation of one-sixth of one per cent. on the amount of the value of the whole annual commercial exposure, (one million of dollars,) is sufficient to build, in two years, six seventy-four gun ships; and taking the average expense in peace and war, the annual appropriation of the same sum is sufficient to maintain them afterwards, in a condition for efficient service. This objection of pecuniary inability may be believed in the interior country, where the greatness of the commercial property and all the tender obligations connected with its preservation, are not realized. But, in the cities and in the commercial States, the extent of the national resources is more truly estimated. They know the magnitude of the interests at stake and their essential claim to protection. Why, sir, were we seriously to urge this objection of pecuniary incapacity to the commercial men of Massachusetts, they would laugh us to scorn. Let me state a single fact. In the year 1745, the State, then the colony of Massachusetts Bay, included a population of 220,000 souls, and yet, in that infant state of the country, it owned a fleet consisting of three ships, one of which carried twenty guns, three snows, one brig, and three sloops; being an aggregate of ten vessels of war. These partook of the dangers, and shared in the glory, of that expedition which terminated with the surrender of Louisburg. Comparing the population, the extent of territory, the capital, and all the other resources of this great nation, with the narrow means of the colony of Massachusetts at that period of its history, it is not extravagant to assert that the fleet it then possessed, in proportion to its pecuniary resources, was greater than would be, in proportion to the resources of the United States, a fleet of fifty sail-of-the-line and one hundred frigates.
The general effect of the policy I advocate, is to produce confidence at home and respect abroad. These are twin shoots from the same stock, and never fail to flourish or fade together. Confidence is a plant of no mushroom growth and of no artificial texture. It springs only from sage counsels and generous endeavors. The protection you extend must be efficient and suited to the nature of the object you profess to maintain. If it be neither adequate nor appropriate, your wisdom may be doubted, your motives may be distrusted, but in vain you expect confidence. The inhabitants of the seaboard will inquire of their own senses and not of your logic, concerning the reality of their protection.
As to respect abroad, what course can be more certain to insure it? What object more honorable, what more dignified than to behold a great nation pursuing wise ends by appropriate means; rising to adopt a series of systematic exertions, suited to her power, and adequate to her purposes? What object more consolatory to the friends—what more paralyzing to the enemies of our Union—than to behold the natural jealousies and rivalries, which are the acknowledged dangers of our political condition, subsiding or sacrificing? What sight more exhilarating than to see this great nation once more walking forth among the nations of the earth, under the protection of no foreign shield? Peaceful because powerful—powerful because united in interests, and amalgamated by concentration of those interests in the national affections.
But, let the opposite policy prevail; let the essential interests of the great component parts of this Union find no protection under the national arm—instead of safety let them realize oppression, and the seeds of discord and dissolution are inevitably sown in a soil the best fitted for their root, and affording the richest nourishment for their expansion. It may be a long time before they ripen. But, sooner or later, they will assuredly burst forth in all their destructive energies. In the intermediate period, what aspect does a Union, thus destitute of cement, present? Is it that of a nation keen to discern, and strong to resist, violations of its sovereignty? It has rather the appearance of a casual collection of semi-barbarous clans, with the forms of civilization, and with the rude and rending passions of the savage state. In truth, powerful—yet, as to any foreign effect, imbecile—rich, in the goods of fortune, yet wanting that inherent spirit without which a nation is poor indeed; their strength exhausted by struggles for local power; their moral sense debased by low intrigues for personal popularity, or temporary pre-eminence; all their thoughts turned not to the safety of the State, but to the elevation of a chieftain. A people presenting such an aspect, what have they to expect abroad? What but pillage, insult, and scorn?
The choice is before us. Persist in refusing efficient maritime protection; persist in the system of commercial restrictions; what now is, perhaps, anticipation, will hereafter be history.
Mr. Fisk said that, when this subject was first presented to the House, he felt inclined to vote for a small increase of the Naval Establishment; but it now appears that, what is asked for is considered only as laying a foundation for a great system—a system which, he feared, if carried into execution, might change the Government.
Mr. F. contended that the Navy never had, and never could protect our commerce. Like standing armies, he considered navies as dangerous to liberty. As to the constitutional provision, with respect to a navy, it is nothing more than a mere grant of power, which Congress is at liberty to use or not, as they may deem it necessary or expedient.
Though he had listened with candor to all the arguments which had been used in favor of an increase of this Establishment at the present time, he was far from being convinced that such an increase, at present, is either necessary or expedient. It appeared to him that every nation which has embarked, to any extent, in Navy Establishments, has been eventually crushed by them. Whether you go back to ancient, or look upon modern Europe, you will find navies have not afforded that protection which gentlemen are desirous of persuading the House they are capable of affording. Has the navy of Russia protected her commerce? There are in the Russian dominions from twenty-five to thirty millions of people; but, by every account we have of them, their situation is not very enviable; nor have they any great degree of commerce to protect. Where are the navies of Sweden and Denmark? The latter, it is well known, were swept away and destroyed by the British fleet; and the fleet of Sweden serves only to keep the country in poverty to maintain it. A navy looks pretty well in theory; but look into the experience of nations, and it will be found to have been the bane of every country which has had any thing to do with it. We should want wisdom, therefore, to pursue a system which has proved so ruinous to others.
With respect to Great Britain herself, it had been said that her navy had been the basis of her wealth and prosperity. Mr. F. said he did not envy the situation of that country. The glory and honor which such nations are in the habit of acquiring, prove a curse to them in the end by enslaving them with expense.
As to the protection and encouragement of commerce, he believed commerce would always flourish best when left to itself unshackled by regulations. It will then be carried to every part of the globe. In the course of the debate, it had been said that the exports of Great Britain, in 1797, were not greater than ours before our commerce was restricted, though that nation had possessed a navy which had triumphed on the ocean for half a century. How did this happen? It was owing, said Mr. F., to the freedom of our commerce.
The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Quincy) had spoken of the naval force formerly possessed by Massachusetts. But, what security did those ships afford? They were of no use, as he believed; they were nothing but a heavy expense to the State; and he believed the merchants had found their commerce in a much better state since, than it was when they were in being.
Gentlemen speak of the embarrassments of our commerce, as if they were owing to our not having a navy; but, if they will look around, they will find that those countries which have navies have not escaped; our embarrassments have arisen from the wrongs committed against us by other nations, which we had no power of preventing.
It had been shown that the Navy Establishment proposed could not be supported but by an expense which would prove ruinous to this country. Rather than incur this expense, he was willing to dispense with the honor supposed to be attached to such an Establishment. Mr. F. was opposed to this system, too, because it could not be supported without having recourse to a force similar to impressment to obtain a number of seamen sufficient to man such a fleet. He was anxious to protect every part of the Union; but he could not consent to support any scheme so pregnant with mischief to the country, as he considered this large Navy Establishment to be.
The question on agreeing to strike out the section for building the frigates was carried—yeas 62, nays 59.
The next question was, on agreeing with the Committee of the Whole to fill the blank for providing ship timber and other imperishable materials, with the words two hundred thousand dollars, which was carried—yeas 82, nays 37.
Another question was on agreeing with the Committee of the Whole to make the above appropriation for three years, viz: for the years 1812, 1813, and 1814. This motion was carried—yeas 67, nays 52.
The next question was on agreeing with the Committee of the Whole to appropriate one hundred thousand dollars for providing a dock yard.
Mr. Rhea moved to strike out the section; but this motion being decided to be out of order, Mr. D. R. Williams spoke against the propriety of appropriating money, without estimate, for an object not wanted until we went about building seventy-fours. The House adjourned, on motion of Mr. Smilie, without taking the question.
Naval Establishment.
The order of the day, viz: the bill concerning the Naval Establishment, was then taken up, and the question on agreeing to the report of the Committee of the Whole, to fill up the blank in the section providing a dock yard, with one hundred thousand dollars, being under consideration, Mr. Cheves stated the grounds upon which the committee had recommended this provision of the bill, and replied to some remarks of his colleague (Mr. Williams) made yesterday.
Mr. Rhea then moved to strike out the whole section in relation to the dock yard; which, after some little debate, was carried—yeas 56, nays 52.
Mr. Blackledge moved a new section to the bill, providing for the building of four seventy-four gunships. As an inducement to the House to adopt this new section, he stated there were sufficient timber and guns on hand; that the whole expense would not exceed $1,300,000, and the guns and timber being already provided, an appropriation of $824,000 only, would be necessary to complete them.
The question was negatived—yeas 33, nays 76.
The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for a third reading to-morrow.
Divorces in the District.
Mr. Lewis, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, made the following report: