Mr. Gold said the amendment now offered to the rules of the House, secures to every member the right of speaking at least once on every question before the House. The liberty of speech, and freedom of debate, are sacred by the constitution; and to refuse all debate, to deny us the privilege of speaking at all, on the most important questions of peace and war, is a subversion of the first principles of the constitution. And what is to justify this measure of imposing silence? It is said, the right of debate has been abused. Let gentlemen beware how, for an occasional abuse of a right, they take away—destroy the right itself. What right, in the whole charter of our rights, has not at some time been abused? Man is frail, and why should not, at times of public agitation and concussion of parties, abuses arise? debate become angry and be prolonged? And for this, is the principle to be adopted, that the right shall be forever suppressed and destroyed?—the principle that absolute silence shall be imposed on a minority? Sir, Philip, the tyrant of Macedon, disliked the freedom of speech and debate in Athens: it annoyed him; for this cause, Demosthenes was pursued to the altar, where he expired. The principle contended for by the majority (supposed abuse) will be found to justify the most odious usurpations recorded in history; liberty is abused, and chains are forged to restrain it.

Gentlemen of the majority insist, that the rule will not be abused; that the majority will not execute the rule arbitrarily. The amendment, now offered to the rules, stipulates only for liberty to each member to speak once. Now, sir, if this be denied, and the rule is ever executed, the abuse is inevitable, it is necessarily involved in the very execution of the rule.

Neither the journals of our State Legislatures nor the laws of the Parliament of Great Britain afford examples for thus arbitrarily proceeding. Debate is admitted in the British Parliament on the previous question; our rules exclude it on both the previous and main question. Beside, sir, I need only refer gentlemen to the manual of parliamentary law, from the hand of the third President of the United States, to show that the previous question was confined to subjects of delicacy, which a due regard to the interests of the State or its Government forbade to be agitated. How much, sir, has this question been perverted from its proper province, to silence all debate and force the question, the passage of the law! Such measures are dangerous to freedom, and afford, in evil times, the most fatal examples.

Mr. Smilie said he was a friend to freedom of debate, but that there was a difference between this, and that abuse of it when you cannot get a decision without an exertion of physical strength. This has been our case several times. The rule now proposed to be altered is the old rule, and is only restored. We very well know, that a debate has been often prolonged merely to prevent a decision. We have been kept till ten and twelve o'clock at night, and sometimes till daylight. It is an inconvenience which he at his time of life had seriously felt. There can be no evil from the rule as now established. The responsibility of the majority is such to the people, that, if they should abuse it, as the minority have their privilege, the people will correct it, when the minority shall fairly state it to them. He said the majority were also responsible to the people to transact the public business.

Mr. Stanford, in reply to Mr. Smilie, said he did not think it proper to give this dispensing power to the majority, if they by the constitution did not possess it, as he contended they did not. He said we have heard of a sedition law, and the reign of terror. The bill, when first introduced for that law, went to prevent freedom of speech. This rule, in his opinion, much more deserved the character of a "Gag-law," than the Sedition law did.

Mr. Wright mentioned the great abuses of this privilege of the minority the last winter. He said, if we don't establish a written, decent rule, we must have a common law rule, such as they have in the British House of Commons, to shuffle and put down, when the abuse of this privilege becomes enormous.

Mr. Quincy.—Mr. Speaker, I do not regard this question in the light in which some of its advocates, as well as its opponents, have considered it; as a mere contest for power between the majority and the minority. It is of a higher character. It affects the essential principles of civil liberty, and saps its hopes at its very foundation. I rejoice that the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Nelson) has limited his proposition, so as to preclude any mistake concerning the object of it. We are not now advocating an unrestrained privilege of debate. The inquiry is, shall a main question ever be taken in this deliberative body, until every member, who has not already spoken, shall have had an opportunity, if he wishes to avail himself of it, to speak at least once upon the question? The ground taken by those who oppose the proposition, is that of necessity and convenience. These are the very points, which, in a free country, ought most vigilantly to be guarded. For it is here that the spirit of despotism always lies in ambush. Under the cover of necessity, or convenience, it steals upon the liberties of a people, and never fails, sooner or later, to make them its prey.

It is not to be denied, that the subject is in some respects difficult to manage, with any hope of convincing. There is a state of feeling, both within this House and out of it, very unpropitious to an impartial debate. In this House it is argued as a question concerning who shall have the power, a majority, or a minority. And as it is agreed, on all hands, that, in the exercise of the power, abuse may happen, the present majority, like all other majorities, have a prevailing inclination to reserve, in their own hands, the exclusive privilege of abuse. And without doors, the subject is of less difficulty. For, of late years, the popular ear has been so vexed with speech upon speech, wind upon wind, the public patience has been so exhausted, in hunting up the solitary grain of sense, hidden in the bushels of chaff, that it is ready to submit to any limitation of a privilege, which subjects it to so irksome a labor. The people are almost ready to exclaim, "do what you will with the liberty of speech, provided you will save us from that fresh of words, with which we are periodically inundated."

Now, this is the very state of the public mind in which the corruption of essential principles commences. Through apparent necessity, or temporary convenience, or disgust at abuse, the popular sentiment is made to acquiesce in the introduction of doctrines vitally inconsistent with the perpetuity of liberty.

I ask the House to consider what is that principle of civil liberty, which is amalgamated and identified with the very existence of a legislative body. In what does it consist? And what is its character? It consists in the right of deliberation. And its character is, that it belongs not to the body, but the individual members constituting the body. The body has the power to control and to regulate its exercise. But it has not the power to take away that right altogether, by the operation of any general principle. An individual member may render himself unworthy of the privilege. He may be set down; he may be denied the right, because he has abused it. But whenever a legislative body assumes to itself the power of stopping, at its will, all debate, at any stage of deliberation, it assumes a power wholly inconsistent with the essential right of deliberation, and totally destructive of that principle of civil liberty which exists, and is identified with the exercise of that right.

The right of every individual member is, in fact, the right of his constituents. He is but their Representative. It is in their majesty, that he appears. It is their right that he reflects. The right of being heard by their Representative is the inherent and absolute right of the people. Now, it is in the essential character of such a right, that it exists, independent, and in despite of any man, or body of men, whatsoever. It is absurd to say, that any right is independent, which depends upon the will of another. It is absurd to say, that any right is absolute, which is wholly relative to the inclination of another; which lasts only as long as he chooses, and terminates at his nod. Now, whether this power be exercised by one, or many, it matters not. The principle of civil liberty is gone, when the inherent and absolute nature of the right is gone.

Apply this reasoning to the case before us. It is impossible to conceal the fact, that as our rules and orders stand, independent of the proposition now offered as an amendment, it is in the power of a majority to preclude all debate, upon any question, and force every member of the House to vote, upon any proposition, without giving him the opportunity of explaining his own reasons, or stating the interests of his constituents. This is undeniable. Is it not, then, plain and conclusive, that, as our rules and orders now stand, according to recent construction, every member of this House holds his right of speaking, not on the principle of his constituents, whose Representative he is, but upon the will of the majority of this House? For that which another may at any time take away from me, I hold not by my own right, but at his will. Can any thing be more obviously at variance with the spirit of the constitution and the first principles of civil liberty?

Let not any man say this power will not be abused. In the nature of things it must be abused. This is the favorite argument of every despotism, and, of course, will not fail to be urged when it is about to plant itself in the very temple of liberty.

I have chosen to consider this subject in relation to the right of the whole body, and of one of its individual members, rather than to that of a majority and minority. The right to speak is an individual right. Limit it as you please, consistent with a single exercise of that right. But when this is taken away, or, which is precisely the same thing so far as it respects the principle of civil liberty, when it is in the power of one or many, at its sovereign will and pleasure, to take it away, there is no longer any right. We have our tenure of speech as the slave has his—at the will of a master.

But it is said that the Legislature must sometimes "act," and that individuals, by an abuse of this liberty of speech, prevent the whole body from "acting." All I say is, limit the exercise of the right as you please, only do not assume to yourselves the power of taking away the whole right, at your pleasure.

It is in this doctrine, of "the necessity of acting," that lies the whole mystery of that error which we are now combating. Strictly speaking, a Legislative body never "acts." Its province is to deliberate and decide. "Action" is, alone, correctly attributable to the Executive. And it will be found, that all the cases in which this necessity of "action" has been urged, have been cases in which the Legislative body has departed from its appropriate duties of deliberation and decision, and descended to be an instrument, or engine, of the Executive. I hesitate not to say, that this position may be proved by almost every instance in which this necessity of action has been urged. It was an Executive haste to its own purposes, which prevailed upon the Legislative body to deny, to its own members, their privileges.

It has been asserted, that "if this amendment passes, this will be the only deliberative body in the world which cannot stop debate." On the other hand I assert, that if this amendment does not pass, this will be the only deliberative body in the world, pretending to be free, in which it is in the power of a majority to force a decision, without any deliberation. It is not true that, in the British Parliament, the previous question stops debate and forces decision on the main question without deliberation. The previous question there, if decided in the negative, suppresses debate, by postponing the main question. And until 1807, the practice and rules of this House permitted debate of the main question, after an affirmative decision of a previous question. Whoever undertakes to examine the subject will find it as I have stated.

It is not true, that this power ever was, or ever can be necessary, in a Legislative body. In every case in which the previous question, according to recent construction, has been pressed upon the House, it will be found that there was no National or State necessity for an immediate decision. That is to say, in every instance it will be found, that it was of no sort of public importance whether the main question were taken on this day, on the next, or on a third day. Always the question might have been taken in a reasonable time; and every individual member, who chose to speak, might have had the privilege, if he pleased, of speaking, at least once. As far as I observed, all these pretences of necessity have been easily resolvable into party cunning. The subject was one difficult to maintain. It had popular bearings, which it suited not the pleasure of the majority to have investigated. They pressed the minority to instant decision, by refusing adjournment. And as it happens in all such cases, reaction is equal to action. The minority were put upon their mettle, and they put to trial the mettle of the majority.

It is undoubtedly true, that this power may be sometimes convenient. And this is the whole strength of the argument of those who oppose this proposition. The weak and aged members of the majority have been kept all night from their slumbers, by a hale and sturdy minority; which slumbers they might, by the way, at any moment have enjoyed, if that very majority had yielded the point of adjournment. And is this reason of convenience sufficient, in the estimation of this House, to justify it, in depriving this people, in the person of their Representatives, of the essential right of speaking upon this floor? Is this a justification for such an atrocious and exorbitant grasp at power? Our patriotism, nowadays, can submit to no sacrifices. We are not content with sleeping, if we please, every day in our seats, unless we can sleep also every night of the session in our feather beds. And these feather-bed patriots, as I understand, are all agog for a march into Canada; and, if we believe them, are desirous of nothing so much as showing how those can meet privation and watchfulness in the field, who think of nothing but comfort and sleep upon this floor.

I know there is another argument urged in favor of the assumption of this power by the majority, and that is, the haste and clatter which always attend the end of a session. Let our session be long or short, the event is, in this respect, always nearly the same. What with speeches and postponements, and laying down one piece of business half finished, and taking up another, the latter end of a session is a political chaos. The work of this and the other House, and that of the Palace into the bargain, is in fact sometimes to be washed up, in a night—and the members of all branches are knee-deep and shoulder-deep in the suds. Now, this shows the necessity, not of this unlimited power of the previous question, but of conducting public business with more prospective intelligence. The House is just like all other spendthrifts. It first wastes what is its own, and then seeks how it may make up its deficiency out of the property of other people. We pillage the public liberty, in order to compensate for legislative negligence.

I have often been puzzled to imagine a necessity, which could even apologize for such an assumption of power as the majority, by this new construction of the previous question, are attempting; and, until lately, I did not believe that it could possibly exist. The only case, in which there seemed to me to be an apology for resorting to it, was, the other day, when the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Troup) threatened to call the previous question upon the majority themselves. I admired both his manner and the occasion on which he introduced that idea. And really there was something like a necessity. If I understood the view of that honorable gentleman, it was, that he thought there was not fighting matter to spare in the stomachs of the majority; and he threatened them with the previous question, lest, peradventure, the whole war spirit should ooze away through the mouth. In this there was both discretion and patriotism.

Mr. Brigham said, that although he was forward in life, he was but of yesterday of this House, and that the rules and orders were not familiar with him. But he exceedingly regretted that this House, in their wisdom, ever found it expedient or proper to adopt a rule to deprive a minority, or an individual member of this House, of the freedom of debate, the freedom of speech, a privilege so much boasted of in this land of liberty. He observed that he had his rights in common with the other members of the House, and that he had his duties to perform. He was not ambitious to become a public speaker, nor would he say that he supposed he could speak to the edification or satisfaction of the House. But should he, on great questions, be denied the privilege of speaking? Suppose the question of peace or war should assume the aspect of solemnity, and it should become necessary and important that this House be made acquainted with the circumstances and disposition of the citizens of the several sections of the country—and suppose a member who is not much accustomed to speaking, silently sits until those gentlemen who are in the habit, and are fond of speaking, shall have exhausted themselves in debate—shall he, in that case, be denied the right of speaking—shall he be deprived of his constitutional privileges and his constituents of the right of representation on the floor of this House?

He said that he was bound by the oath of God to support the constitution, and to promote the welfare of his country; but, if his mouth is stopped, how can he execute his trust or perform his vows? For this House by a rule to interdict the freedom of speech, is an assumption of power, and a violation of right. He hoped, that the rule under consideration would be modified, and that the proposed amendment would be adopted. He wished that each individual member might be permitted to exercise his right of speaking to any question before the House, at least once, if he chooses.

Mr. Nelson spoke in favor of the amendment. He said he had no hesitation in declaring, that whenever right and expediency shall come in competition, that he should prefer right. He remarked, that the constitution secured the freedom of speech to the citizen. And are we, he asked, to be deprived of it when we come to this House—when we enter this temple of liberty? The attempt is not to suspend merely, but to destroy this right, and because we have experienced some inconvenience from this exercise. He agreed with the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Quincy,) that if the House would do their duty, and get the business along in the early part of the session, we should never be in the dilemma the House were in, the last session of Congress; and that an inconvenience was a very poor reason for destroying this right of offering our sentiments. He would rather recommend the turning out of doors a member who should become troublesome in speaking too long, than to suffer him to stay in the House and prevent his uttering his sentiments. Even expulsion would not be a greater infringement of his right. The right of the people is the right of their Representatives to speak, deliberate, and decide. As to the plea of necessity, he protested against it as the plea of tyrants.

Mr. Alston, of North Carolina, expressed his astonishment, that the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Nelson) had assumed the ground he had. He said, there were two parties in this House; and asked, is it ever known how a question will be decided, until it is taken?

Mr. Bassett said, if a stranger was present, and should hear this debate, he would suppose that the question was now for the first time brought forward for the establishment of the rule, against which so much had been said, when it is well known that it has always been the practice.

Mr. Pitkin said, the amendment now under consideration was proposed in consequence of a decision of the House, at the close of the last session, that when the previous question was decided in the affirmative, there could be no debate on the main question; the amendment, if adopted, allows a member, who has not previously spoken, to speak at least once on the main question, before he is called upon to give his vote upon it.

The principle adopted by the majority, during the last days of the last session, and now supported in the House, is this, that a majority, who may happen to be present, at any time, have it in their power, by means of a previous question, as it is called, to prevent all debate on every question before the House, however important it may be; to seal up the lips of every member, and compel him to vote upon the question without an opportunity of expressing his sentiments upon it, or explaining the reasons of his vote. This, Mr. Speaker, is a principle to which I never have, and to which I never will give my assent. What, sir, let me ask, and where is the rule under which the majority claim to exercise this enormous power—the power of imposing silence upon any member, on this floor?

The rule, under which this power is claimed, is in the following words: "The previous question shall be in this form: Shall the main question be now put?" It shall only be admitted when demanded by five members; and, until it is decided, shall preclude all amendment and further debate of the main question, and that "on a previous question there shall be no debate." By a new construction, which a majority of the House thought proper to give to this rule, at the close of the last session, all debate may be prohibited on any question; for five members alone can demand the previous question, and then, of course, all debate must cease, until a decision be had on that question, and if the previous question be decided in the affirmative, by this new construction of the rule, there can be no debate or amendment of the main question. Thus, sir, unless the amendment now proposed be adopted, if a proposition for a declaration of war against Great Britain, or any other nation, should be laid upon your table to-morrow, it will be in the power of a majority of the House, and that majority may consist of less than forty members, to impose silence upon every member of this House; and we must be compelled to vote on a proposition so interesting to the prosperity, happiness, and perhaps the final destiny of this country, without the poor privilege (if we might choose so to do) of raising our voices against it. But, sir, the opponents of the amendment say, that the construction given to the rule the last session, was in conformity with the universal practice of the House, from the establishment of the Government, except in two or three instances.

I deny, sir, that this has been the practice, and I believe I may venture to assert, without fear of contradiction, that no such power has ever been exercised over the members of this House, since its organization, until the last session. I have, sir, examined the journals, with some attention, and have not been able to find a solitary instance of the kind. On the contrary, many cases are to be found when the previous question has been decided in the affirmative, and that, immediately after the main question has not only been amended but has been debated. And here, sir, permit me to observe, that the rule itself, with respect to the previous question, was adopted the first session of the First Congress, and has ever since remained precisely in the same form; and no construction was ever given to it, so as to prevent debate on the main question, until the last session.

Permit me to refer the House to the Journal of the first session of the Third Congress, for the proof of what I have stated. During this session, the difficulties then subsisting between this country and Great Britain, became the subject of discussion, and a proposition for prohibiting all intercourse with Great Britain, in case justice was not done us, was then submitted to the House, and the previous question was called upon it, and decided in the affirmative, after which the subject was not only postponed, but, as appears by the Journal, was both amended and debated. It appears also from the Journal in 1795, that a proposition was amended after an affirmative decision of the previous question. In the year 1798, when a resolution was before the House for publishing the instructions to, and the despatches from our Ministers to the French Republic, the previous question was moved and determined in the affirmative; and it appears by the Journal that immediately after such decision, on the same day, debate was had on the main question.

But, sir, to come to our own times: on the 15th of December, 1807, a construction was given to the rule, after mature deliberation, by a large majority of the House, that the main question might be debated, after an affirmative decision of the previous question. This was done on an appeal from the decision of the Speaker, "that after the previous question is called for and determined in the affirmative, it precludes all debate on the main question." The House reversed the decision of the Chair by 103 to 14. A similar decision took place on the 2d of December, 1803, in the House—101 to 18. And, sir, I have been unable to find a single decision of the House to the contrary, from the first organization of the Government until the close of the last session. Indeed, sir, the words of the rule itself, show that the construction, which had so long prevailed, was the only true construction which could be given to it. The words are, and until it (viz: the previous question) is decided, "shall preclude all amendment and further debate on the main question." By which it is evident, that amendment and debate of the main question is only precluded, until the previous question is decided, but that after such decision, it was not precluded.

The gentleman from New York, (Mr. Gold,) and the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Nelson,) have truly stated that the previous question was taken from the rules of the British Parliament, and they have likewise stated the reason of its introduction into that body. It was, sir, to prevent debate in the House of Commons upon questions of a delicate nature with respect to high personages, &c. Yes, sir, it was introduced there to enable the Ministry to prevent the Commons from opening their lips on subjects relating to the Royal Family and the great men of the realm. But, sir, we have gone further than the Ministry and their majorities, despotic and tyrannical as they have been, have ever dared to go in Parliament. For even there members are now, and always have been, permitted to debate on the previous question; but which members on this floor are not now permitted to do. Mr. Speaker, the nature of our Government forbids that the majority should have the power to prohibit all debate on questions which may come before this House. We have not, as yet, I trust, any high personages in this country about whom it would be indelicate or improper for the members on this floor to speak; and let me ask what subject of national importance can be proposed for adoption, on which a member should be deprived of the privilege of speaking at least once before he gives his vote? Nay, sir, let me ask gentlemen whether this House has a right to compel me, or any other member, to vote on any question, without giving me an opportunity of explaining my reason for that vote. I deny, sir, that they have this right; as a member of this body, I claim the privilege of delivering my sentiments, or what I may consider the sentiments of my constituents, on any subject, before I give my vote upon it. I claim it not, sir, for myself personally, but I claim it in the capacity of a Representative of a free people, sent here, not like a member of the French Council of Five Hundred, for the purpose of voting merely, but for the purpose of deliberating on subjects of high concern to their peace, their prosperity, their happiness. For what, sir, are we assembled here under a constitution the purest in the world? Is it not for the purpose of promoting "the general welfare" of the nation which we represent? And how is this to be done, except by a free communication of our sentiments to each other, on the various plans which may be proposed for that object? The peace, the honor, and interest of this country is confided to our care, and while we are here deliberating on the best means of preserving the one or securing and promoting the other, the constitution has very wisely thrown around us a shield of complete indemnity—"for any speech or debate in this House," we are "not to be questioned in any other place." Will then the majority claim the right of depriving a member of this privilege of speech, a privilege not only thus secured to him by the constitution itself, but for the due exercise of which he is not to be questioned elsewhere? But, sir, those who oppose the amendment say that the construction is founded in necessity; that individual members have abused the privilege of speech; that they have heretofore, and probably will again, make long speeches merely for the purpose of delay, and of embarrassing the proceedings of the House; and that therefore the majority must have it in their power to stop debate, whenever they think proper, and that this power will always be exercised with a sound discretion.

I deny, sir, that any such necessity exists; it is a plea easily made, but generally difficult and in this case impossible to be supported. Why has it so happened that this necessity has never existed until the last session of Congress? Was it then for the first time, that a division of sentiment appeared on this floor? were parties never before heard of in this country? Were not parties arrayed against each other in 1796 on the subject of the British Treaty, and in 1798-'9, on the question of a war with France? Were not the disputes in this House, in those times, as long and as bitter as they have ever been since? Those were times, which have been so often quoted in this House as hard, and unconstitutional; times when the reign of terror prevailed, when corrupt majorities, as has been often said on this floor, passed alien and sedition laws. And, yet, sir, with all the political sins which have been heaped upon those majorities, the sin of having taken away the privilege of speech on this floor never has been, and as I have proved from the journals, never can be laid to their charge. This House, by the constitution, has the power to "determine the rules of its proceedings;" and in making those rules, it has the right of regulating, but not of entirely preventing debate.

It would indeed be a strange anomaly in politics, as well as in law, that under a general power of making rules of proceeding, we should make a rule to prevent all proceedings whatever. Gentlemen may as well assume the power of preventing a member from voting, as they now do that of preventing him from speaking. I am willing to agree, sir, that the privilege of debate, on this floor, may have been and will again be abused; that on particular subjects individual members have spoken much longer than was necessary, and I may add, also, with much less sense than a majority might have wished; and in some instances they may have prolonged their speeches, merely for the purposes of delay. But, sir, will you deprive a member of the right of speaking at all, because he is unable to convey his ideas in few words, or because he may have very few or no ideas to convey? Or because some may have spoken merely to delay the proceedings of the House, will you make a general rule, by which a member may be wholly deprived of the right of speaking? If indeed, sir, evils do arise in consequence of the liberty of speech in this house, if the business of the nation does not progress with as much rapidity as in countries under the control of an individual; they are evils which flow from the very nature of our Government, from that freedom which we so highly prize, and from that very constitution which we have sworn to support. So long as we are men we shall be imperfect, we shall bring with us on this floor different views, different ideas on political as well as on other subjects; and it would be strange indeed if, on the various topics of national importance brought before us for discussion, we should not at times come into strong collision with each other.

The question on the amendment was determined in the negative—yeas 36, nays 76.

Mr. Stanford moved to amend the rules by adding to the end of the paragraph relating to priority of business, the words "but no question of consideration shall be required upon an original motion;" which was also determined in the negative—yeas 30, nays 68.

On motion of Mr. Williams the said rules were amended by striking out the word "five," in the paragraph prescribing the manner in which the previous question shall be taken, and inserting the words "one-fifth of the."

The question was then taken to concur in the said rules as amended, and determined in the affirmative.[21]

Friday, December 27.

Mr. Nelson presented a petition of sundry inhabitants of the Territory of Louisiana, praying that the second grade of Territorial government may be extended to the inhabitants of said Territory.

Monday, December 30.

Burning of the Richmond Theatre.

Soon after the Journal was read,

Mr. Dawson rose and addressed the chair. The lowness of his voice, owing to recent indisposition prevented his being heard distinctly; but his observations were nearly as follows:

Mr. Speaker—Virginia, my parent State, has long to mourn the loss of some of her most valuable sons and estimable daughters, who on the night of the 26th of the present month, met their untimely end.[22]

Among those who perished in the flames, in the metropolis of that State, on that sad night, were the Chief Magistrate of the State, and a gentleman[23] well known to many of us, and who, for years, held an honorable station in this House. Some of the most valuable and prominent characters in their professions, and others who promised ere long to be ornaments to their country. With these, sir, was the rising offspring[24] of one of our present most valuable members, and many other amiable and virtuous women who adorned and improved society.

These, sir, with many others, have fallen victims to that unrelenting element, notwithstanding the bold and generous efforts which were made to save them.

Their ashes are now mingled with the dust, and their spirits have ascended to Heaven.

It is to us a great national calamity.

I well know, that on such occasions grief, although keen, is unavailing—that the decrees of fate are irrevocable and ought to be submitted to with humility. In order, however, to testify the respect and sorrow which this nation feels for the deceased, and to prove that we sympathize with the afflicted, without further comment on this painful subject, I beg leave to offer the following resolution:

This resolution was unanimously adopted.

Tuesday, January 7, 1812.

Statute of Limitations.

On motion of Mr. Gholson, the House resolved itself into a committee, on a report of the Committee of Claims on the subject of excepting certain claims from the act of limitations. The report of the committee being read, which concluded with a resolve that it is inexpedient to open the act of limitations for the claims in question:

Mr. Gholson hoped the committee would not agree to this report. Information had been received from the Treasury Department, stating in a distinct and unequivocal manner, that all this description of claims (which were all liquidated claims, such as indents of interest, certificates, &c.,) might be allowed by the Government, without danger of fraud or imposition; and, said Mr. G., if justice can be extended to this description of claimants, without danger, why should it be deferred? Only one solitary reason had been offered—that the persons really entitled to these claims upon Government might not get the money. He hoped this would not be sufficient to prevent Congress from doing what was just on the occasion.

Mr. Clay (the Speaker) hoped the committee would disagree to this resolution. It appears that the officers of the Treasury are of opinion that provision may be made for this description of claims without that danger of fraud, which might possibly arise from a total repeal of the statute of limitations; that their whole amount does not exceed $300,000, and the probability is, that one-fifth will never be applied for, should they be authorized to be paid. What, said Mr. C, is this statute of limitations, which, whenever mentioned in this House, seems to make everybody tremble? It is a general rule prescribed by the Government for the direction of its accounting officers in order to exclude unjust claims. What are statutes of limitation as applicable to individual cases? A rule under which individuals claim protection whenever they choose to do so, and when, from the lapse of time, or loss of evidence, they would be injured, were they not to take this advantage. But in these statutes of limitation there are always exceptions in favor of cases of disability, infancy, coverture, insanity, absence beyond sea, &c. But what is the course which an individual would take who found himself protected by a statute of limitation? He would examine the justice of the claim brought against him; if the claim were just, if he had been deprived of no evidence by the delay, if as able to pay it as if it had been presented at an earlier day, he will not hesitate to discharge the claim, and scorn to take advantage of the statute. And, said Mr. O., shall the Government be less willing to discharge its just debts than an honest individual? Shall we turn a deaf ear to the claims of individuals upon Government because of this statute? He trusted not. The Committee of Claims ought to examine the merit of every claim which comes before it, and if it be just, decide in its favor. But what, said Mr. C, has been the history of claims for four or five years past? When a solitary claim was presented the House would say, we cannot legislate upon individual cases. They occupy too much of our time. The claim is put aside. The same individual some time after, appears in company with others. We then say there are too many of these claims—their amount is too large, and the Treasury too poor—that there are a great many other claims equally well founded—that justice cannot be done to them all. Sometimes there is a division between the two Houses. This House passes a bill in favor of some particular claim—the other tells you they will not legislate for particular cases; that if they act, they wish to take up the subject generally. Mr. C. said it was his wish, both in his public and private character, as far as possible, to do justice; he therefore hoped the course proposed by the Chairman of the Committee of Claims would be agreed to.

The resolution recommended by the report was negatived, 54 to 31: and a resolution offered by Mr. Gold, recommending a provision by law for these claims, after some objections from Mr. Alston, was agreed to, 39 to 36.

Wednesday, January 8.

Battle of Tippecanoe.

Mr. McKee, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, to whom was referred the Message of the President, transmitting two letters from Governor Harrison, reporting the particulars and issue of the expedition under his command against the hostile Indians on the Wabash River, and the memorials of the Legislature of the Indiana Territory, and the officers and soldiers who served in the said expedition, presented the twenty-fourth ultimo, made a report thereon; which was read and committed to a Committee of the Whole to-morrow. The report is as follows:

Thursday, January 9.

Ursuline Nuns at New Orleans.

The petition which the Speaker laid before the House yesterday, from the Ursuline nuns at New Orleans, was enclosed to him and recommended by Governor Claiborne. It prayed for an exchange of the military hospital for some lots which they hold in that city better calculated for a hospital. After the petition was read,

Mr. Dawson observed that he had received a letter from Governor Claiborne relative to that petition, and in confirmation of the facts therein stated. This community of nuns is a most respectable and useful member of society, the whole of their temporal cares being directed to the education of female youth. They are that community which some years ago presented a most elegant address to the then President of the United States, and received from him an equally elegant answer.

I am well assured that the lots which they wish to exchange are more valuable, and better suited for the erection of a hospital than those on which the hospital now stands. I therefore move that the petition and accompanying papers be referred to a select committee, who will no doubt converse with the Secretary of War on the subject.

This was agreed to, and Mr. Dawson, Mr. Lowndes, and Mr. Macon, were appointed the committee.

Friday, January 17.

Quartermaster's Department.

The bill from the Senate "for the establishment of a Quartermaster's Department" came up on its third reading.

Mr. Alston said, if the House would pay attention to the duty of the Purveyor of Public Supplies, and examine the powers given to the Quartermaster General in this bill, it would appear evident that there was no necessity for both offices, and it certainly was not the wish of the House to erect two great departments to perform the same duties. He could perceive no way in which one officer was to be a check upon the other. He liked the bill as it came from the Senate better than as amended, as he saw no necessity for retaining the office of Purveyor.

Mr. Tallmadge observed, that the great object of this bill, and the only one which made it necessary, was to provide for a Quartermaster General's Department, instead of military agents, as employed at present. There never was such an officer in the staff department in the Revolutionary war. The late Secretary of War, as well as the present, were in favor of this change. The military agents, without much responsibility, had nearly controlled the whole War Department. An attempt was made two years ago to effect this change, but it then failed. The office of Purveyor of Public Supplies was instituted long before that of Military Agent. The duties of the Quartermaster General and Purveyor are very different. The former is a highly respectable and confidential officer; he is next in consequence to the Commander-in-chief, with whom he has frequent communication. Every movement of the Army is first communicated to him. He ought to be a military character. It is his duty to receive and deliver out the necessary supplies for the Army, and to attend to its movements. The duties of the Purveyor is to purchase, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, arms, clothing, hospital stores, and every other article necessary for the Army. So that there is not the least similarity between the two officers; one being the purchasing, the other the distributing officer. If the office of Purveyor were to be done away, the Quartermaster General would have to employ a deputy or agent to make these purchases, which would be putting too much in the power of a subordinate officer, and would do away that check which will exist if the Purveyor be continued, as the purchaser and distributor of the supplies would be in the same person. The Purveyor is also the purchaser of goods for the Indian department.

Mr. Williams rose to prevent any person from falling into the mistake which the gentleman from North Carolina appeared to have done, by making remarks applicable to the printed bill (a part of which had been struck out and other parts amended) instead of the bill read from the Chair. He deemed it unnecessary to add any thing in reply to what had been so well said by the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. Alston said he had attended to the bill as read, and not to the printed bill; and insisted that, from the provisions of the bill, the Secretary of War might direct the Purveyor and Quartermaster to purchase the same articles. If the bill was what the gentleman from Connecticut had stated it to be, he should not have objected to it; but it was not.

Mr. Quincy had doubts whether both these officers were necessary. There was no such officer as Purveyor of Public Supplies during the Revolutionary war. If it were found hereafter that another besides the Quartermaster General was necessary, he could be appointed. There ought certainly to be a responsibility attached to the purchase of supplies, and this might be placed in the Head of the War Department or Quartermaster General. He had not sufficient light on the subject, to say that both these officers are necessary. He was in favor of the bill as it came from the Senate.

Mr. Blount said, that though there was not a Purveyor of Public Supplies during the Revolutionary war, there was a Clothier, who did much the same business. If we are going to war, said Mr. B., he did not see how we could do without a Quartermaster General; and it would be improper for him to become the purchaser of supplies, which it is the duty of the Purveyor to purchase, because, as had already been stated, there would be no check in the business. There must be propriety in keeping the offices distinct.

Mr. Macon observed, it was impossible to go to war without a Quartermaster General; for there is no man has so much to do about an army as this officer. There was always more difficulty in settling the Quartermaster General's accounts than any other. The only instance in which a Quartermaster General has to purchase supplies, is when, by some miscarriage or accident, the supplies from the Commissary or Purveyor do not arrive in season. It is necessary that such a power should be vested in this officer, to be used on such extraordinary occasions. As had been stated by his colleague, though there was no Purveyor during the Revolution, there were clothiers or agents employed in different situations, which answered the purpose. The qualifications necessary for the Quartermaster General and Purveyor are very different; the one ought to be a soldier, the other a merchant.

The bill passed by a large majority.

Naval Establishment.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill concerning the Naval Establishment.

Mr. Cheves, the Chairman of the Navy Committee, moved to fill the blank in the first section of the bill with "four hundred and eighty thousand dollars," and said he believed it to be his duty at this time, to disclose to the Committee of the Whole the views and motives of the select committee in reporting the bill. Mr. C. said, I consider this subject as one of the most important that can be brought before this House; as a great question, involving, to a considerable extent, the fate of a species of national defence the most essential and necessary to the interests of this country. I know, said Mr. C., how many and how strong are the prejudices, how numerous and how deeply laid are the errors which I have to encounter in the discussion of this question; errors and prejudices the more formidable, as they come recommended by the virtues, and shielded by the estimable motives of those who indulged them. I have been told that this subject is unpopular, and it has been not indistinctly hinted, that those who become the zealous advocates of the bill will not advance by their exertions the personal estimation in which they may be held by their political associates. I will not do my political friends the injustice to believe that these exertions will diminish their confidence; but, could I think otherwise, I hope I shall never be diverted from a faithful discharge of my duty by considerations of this kind. I wish to lead no man, and I am determined not to be blindly led by any man. In acting with a party, I do so, because I adopt their leading principles and politics as the best, and because I believe, from the nature of free Government, it is necessary so to act to give efficiency to the exertions of any individual; but I do not feel myself, therefore, bound to renounce my deliberate opinions on all the great interests of the nation, or to take no independent part in the exertions of the party to which I belong. I sincerely believe that, if this infant Naval Establishment be either abandoned or put down, the party who now form the majority in this House, and in the country, may run great risk of becoming the minority, not only within these walls, but in the nation.

It has been said, by a strong and lively figure of rhetoric, that this country is a great land animal, which should not venture into the water. But if you look at its broad high back, the Alleghanies, and its great sides swelling to the east and to the west, where do you find its immense limbs terminate? Not on some great plain which has been formed for their reception, but in two great oceans, the Pacific on the one side, and the Atlantic on the other. The figure explains the true interests of the country, in the inseparable union and necessary dependence of agriculture and commerce. The God of Nature did not give to the United States a coast of two thousand miles in extent, not to be used. No; it was intended by this bounty to make us a great commercial people; and shall we ungratefully reject the enjoyment of his unexampled beneficence? No, it has not and will not be neglected. A great portion of our people exist but upon the ocean and its fruits. It has been eloquently, and not less truly than eloquently, said, that "the ocean is their farm," and it must and will be protected. But how is this protection to be afforded? I will endeavor to prove that it can be done, and done most cheaply and effectually by a naval force; and if I succeed in this, I shall hope for the concurrence of the committee. No proposition appears to me more true or more obvious, than that it is only by a naval force that our commerce and our neutral rights on the ocean can be protected. We are now going to war for the protection of these rights; but in what way, and under what circumstances? The mode is altogether accidental, and not founded on the permanent relations or means of the country. It is not my intention to condemn the course which has been taken. It has had my hearty concurrence, and my zealous, though feeble, support. I hope it may be altogether effectual; and I believe it will inflict a wound which will be felt with poignancy. But it is, notwithstanding, partial and accidental; for, if Great Britain had not the Canadas on our borders, how could we attack or resist her, armed as we are? If we possess ourselves of the Canadas, and this we shall certainly do in the event of war, how and where shall we then continue the war without a naval force? We shall suffer the evils of war, without inflicting any of them on the enemy. We cannot send our regulars or our volunteers on the ocean. Does it not then result, inevitably, as the dictate of common prudence, that we should, as soon as possible, commence our naval preparations? The Naval Establishment of the United States has been heretofore so much neglected, that it is at present in a state of lamentable depression; and the question now is, whether we will suffer it to go down entirely, or attempt to raise it up to some degree of respectability. Some gentlemen say, "if you had asked for no more than the reparation of the frigates in ordinary, we might have granted your request." But, for myself, I would not thank any gentleman for this concession. The select committee conceived it to be their duty to bring the question fully before the House in the shape in which they have exposed it. Not to ask merely what it would do to assist by naval co-operation, in the first efforts of the contemplated struggle, but principally what it would do towards establishing and perpetuating a respectable naval force for the protection of those important rights of the people, which are, and must continue, exposed upon the ocean. Their determination was plainly, candidly, and boldly to speak to the House, and through it to the nation, on this great question, and leave its fate to the wisdom of the one and the good sense of the other.

That a respectable Naval Establishment affords the only effectual means of causing our commercial rights to be respected, will, as a general proposition, be denied by few persons, if any. But its adoption by us is deemed improper by those who oppose it, on the grounds of the enormous expense which, it is said, the establishment will necessitate, and the inability of the nation, by any force which it can provide, to resist, with effect, the immense naval power of Great Britain. Is it not surprising that so much prejudice should exist against this establishment on account of its expensiveness, when it is ascertained that, during the whole eighteen years of its existence, from 1794 to 1811, inclusive, it has cost the Government only $27,175,695? I am afraid I shall be tedious, because the only way in which I hope to bring conviction home to the minds of the House, is by entering, with minuteness and precision, into a dry detail of figures and statements; but the necessity of the case must be my apology for the course which I shall take. If the House shall have full confidence in my statements, much will be gained to the argument; for it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the hearer to follow me through an examination of these details, as the argument proceeds. For this confidence, therefore, I will venture to hope. I believe the statements on which I rely to be accurate, as far as accuracy is material to the discussion. I will state them with candor, and, when I have concluded, I will put them into the hands of gentlemen who may wish to examine them for their own satisfaction, or to refute them. The average annual expense of this establishment, so much censured for its wasteful and improvident management, has but little exceeded $1,500,000, which is not much more than twice the amount of the usual annual appropriation for our economical Civil List. It has been generally supposed that it has been much more expensive than the Military Establishment, but I will show that this is not really the case. The expense of the Military Establishment, from 1791 to 1811, inclusive, has been $37,541,669, giving an annual average of $1,700,000, or $200,000 per annum more than that of the Navy. It thus appears that, in the gross amount, as well as in the annual expenditure, the Army has been more expensive than the Navy. Compare, too, the services of the Army with those of the Navy, and it will be found that those of the latter have been most useful and most honorable to the nation. I know of no service of this character which the Army has performed, except the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, and the late gallant affair on the Wabash. The Navy, in the contest with France in 1798, were victorious wherever it encountered an enemy, and probably laid the foundation of the subsequent accommodation with that nation. In the Mediterranean, its exploits gave a name to the country throughout Europe; humbled, in an unexampled manner, the piratical and barbarous foe, and crowned itself with a reputation for intrepidity and heroism, which had not been exceeded by the exploits of any nation, and which must go down to a distant posterity. I mean not, by this comparison, to say any thing injurious to the Army, but only to declare that preference to which I think the naval services of the country are entitled. Admitting, if it be desired, that the Navy has heretofore occasioned an expense not warranted by its force or its services; and I cannot deny but that, from a variety of causes, the expense may have been unnecessarily great; an argument cannot thence be fairly drawn against its future use—the contrary is the fair conclusion. Past errors lay the foundation of future improvement. It was thus the greatest orator, and one of the greatest statesmen of antiquity, reasoned. The great Athenian orator, when rousing his countrymen, by his impetuous eloquence, to resist the ambition of Philip, declared that it was on their past misconduct that he built his highest hopes; for, said he, "were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the honor of our State demanded, there were then no hope of recovery." So may we reason in this case; for had these extraordinary expenses been the result of good economy, then, indeed, would their diminution be hopeless; but, as they have proceeded from a wasteful or unskilful expenditure, the remedy will be found in a reform of the abuse; to effect this reform, is the duty of Congress. But it has not only been less expensive than the Army, but it may be proved, as the committee have declared in their report, that "a naval force within due limits and under proper regulations, will constitute the cheapest defence of the nation." This will be partly proved by a comparison between the expense of the permanent fortifications of our maritime frontier and that of an adequate naval defence. The experience of modern naval warfare has proved that no fortifications can prevent the passage of ships of war. The present fortifications of our maritime frontier, though they are more numerous and better than they have been at any other period in our history, cannot prevent an inconsiderable naval force from laying many of our towns in ashes. Indeed, it is believed that no fortifications which can be erected will afford a complete protection against such attacks, while their expense would be oppressive to the nation. The city of New York alone, if completely fortified, would require a further expenditure of three millions of dollars, and a garrison of ten thousand men, and then might be laid in ashes by four or five seventy-fours. But we have a coast of two thousand miles to protect, the expense of which could not be borne by the nation. A better defence would be furnished by such a naval force as would give you a mastery in the American seas, and at home much less expense.

The superior cheapness of naval defence seems to me to be satisfactorily established, and I am next to prove that the force proposed—I mean twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates—are sufficient to protect us in our own seas, and defend our ports and harbors against the naval power of Great Britain. The first evidence that is offered in support of this proposition, is the opinion of naval men; and if the representations of any man may be relied upon with confidence, so far, at least, as that they are not founded in deception, I believe those of a sailor may be. By naval men, I have been assured that this force is adequate to the object proposed. It is impossible for me to state with accuracy, or in a manner calculated to give a due impression of them, all the reasons which they offer in support of their opinion, but among them are those detailed in the report of the select committee. Indeed, they advance the opinion, and support it with reasons, the error of which, if they be erroneous, I am unable to discover, that it will require the enemy to employ a triple force to put himself on a footing of equality with that of the United States. Their reasons are, as nearly as I can state them, these: there must be stationed on our coast, at any given time, an equal force; this force cannot be fitted out, unless with great disadvantage to the service in point of expense, and in respect to the health of the crew, for much more than three months' service. An equal force must be put in requisition and kept in readiness to relieve that on the station. But, as all the equipments of the enemy must be made in Europe, the force destined to relieve the first must be despatched by the time the first may be supposed to have arrived on our coast, because it will be necessary, at a period as early as the arrival of the second, for the first to return; but the first could not proceed to Europe, be equipped, and return to relieve the second in time; and therefore a third equivalent force is necessary, and thus three times the force of the United States must be employed by the enemy to place himself on a footing of equality with it. History may be resorted to, with confidence, to prove that neither Great Britain, nor any other nation, has ever been able to station, for any length of time, in distant seas, a force equal to that which, in the opinion of naval men, is sufficient to accomplish the objects proposed by the committee—the dominion of the American seas, and the defence of our ports and harbors. There is one fact which, above all others, shows the inability of Great Britain to keep a large fleet on our coast. From the frozen regions of the North to the Isthmus of Darien, she has not a port fit for naval equipment or repair, except Halifax; and if, as the opponents of the Navy seem to think certain, and I hope their opinions may be realized, we shall, in the event of war, deprive her of that, she will be without the means of repairing a disabled vessel in our seas. Under such circumstances, any thing but temporary service would be utterly impracticable.

But, said Mr. C., on the subject of the British naval force, there is great misconception. The high-sounding number of a thousand ships appals the mind, and an examination of its actual force, and the numerous requisitions which are made upon it, is usually rejected as an idle labor. Let this examination be made, and at least some part of the terror which it excites will vanish. Of the eight hundred and thirty-three ships which Great Britain had in commission in 1801, and she never had more, it is believed there were only three hundred and eighty-three that exceeded the size and capacity of the large privateers that will probably be fitted out by the citizens of the United States, in the event of war. Of this last number, there were one hundred and forty-two of sixty-four guns, and above; twenty-two between fifty and sixty guns; one hundred and fifty-six between thirty-two and forty-four; and sixty-three between twenty and thirty guns. The remainder of the vessels in commission consisted of one hundred and seventy-four sloops, one hundred and forty-one gun-vessels, and one hundred and thirty hired vessels. These hired vessels are small vessels, of from four to ten guns, which, it is believed, are only employed for revenue purposes. This review and enumeration, I have no doubt, proves the actual force of the navy of Great Britain, however great it really is, to be much inferior to the impression almost universally received, from the high-sounding boast of her thousand ships. Nor has the actual force of the British navy been more misconceived than the application of it. The common impression is, that the Government can direct to any given point almost an unlimited number of ships. But if this delusive impression be removed, it will be found that, notwithstanding the greatness of the force, the points to which it must be destined are so numerous and dispersed as to put it all in requisition. This I will prove by reference to the distribution of her fleets in 1801. [Here Mr. C. read a statement of the force and distribution of the British fleet at that time.] From which of these stations, said Mr. C., could she have spared, with safety and prudence, a portion of the force employed? Could she, from all, have stationed and continued in our seas a force which would have been equal, under the disadvantages which have been pointed out, to twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates? How much less would she have been able to have furnished a force which would be superior to a naval armament whose expense should equal that of the military preparations of the present year? But it may be said, that the ships which Great Britain has in ordinary would be more than equal to any increase which any circumstances would require. This might be true, were her seamen unlimited in numbers, and her pecuniary resources inexhaustible; but both are limited, and so must be her naval armament. To fit out vessels which she has in ordinary, would require, within a few thousand, all the seamen in her merchant service, and such an addition to her annual expenditure, as the nation neither would nor could bear. The true object of inquiry to ascertain her efficient power is, what number of vessels is she practically able to keep in commission, and the answer may be received in a shape the most unfavorable to my argument, yet confirmatory of it, in the example of 1801, the year which I have selected for illustration, when it is confidently believed her equipment was greater, combining force and numbers, than at any other period of her history.

But, while it is contended by some that it will not be in the power of the nation to establish an effective naval force, there are others who are opposed to it, lest we become too great a naval power. They fear that our fleets will cover the ocean, and seeking victory on all the opposite shores of the Atlantic, involve the nation in oppressive expenses, and in wanton and habitual wars. Such objects are certainly not contemplated by the report of the committee; nor can such events possibly happen, as long as we remain a free people. The committee have recommended such a navy as will give to the United States an ascendency in the American seas, and protect their ports and harbors. The people will never bear the establishment of a greater force than these objects require. The reasons which forbid Great Britain, or any other European power, to station large fleets on our seas, will equally forbid us to cross the Atlantic, or go into distant seas, for the purpose of frequent or habitual wars.

But a navy is said to be anti-republican, because it was opposed by the Republicans in 1798. I apprehend, however, that it was then objected to, not because it was anti-republican in itself, but because the Republicans of that time believed it was to be employed for improper objects; because, while it was unnecessary at the time, it was of such a nature as only fitted it for the time, because it was part of a system which embraced unnecessary armies and unnecessary taxes and loans, to continue a war beyond the just objects of war—a war which, to use the language of the day, was to be waged by every man, woman, and child, in the nation, to which we are opposed.

We are told, also, that navies have ruined every nation that has employed them; and England, and Holland, and Venice, and other nations, have been mentioned as examples. The vast debt of Great Britain is declared to be among the pernicious fruits of her Naval Establishment. This I deny. Her debt has grown out of her profuse subsidies, and her absurd wars on the land. Though the ruin, which is supposed to threaten England, is attributed to her navy, it is obvious that her navy alone has saved and still saves her from ruin. Without it she must, long since, have yielded to the power of France her independence and her liberties. We are told that the same wealth which she has expended in supporting her navies would have been employed more profitably for the nation in the improvement of its agriculture and manufactures, and in the establishment of canals and roads, and other internal improvements. But experience is better than theory. Let us compare England with nations which have no navies, or comparatively inconsiderable navies. The nations of the Continent of Europe are without such overgrown and ruinous Naval Establishments, but do you there find the highest improvements in agriculture, the most flourishing manufactures, or the best roads and canals? No, it is in this nation, that has been ruined by her navy, that you find all these improvements most perfect and most extended. I mean not either to be the panegyrist of England; but these truths may be declared for our instruction, without suppressing the feelings excited by the wrongs she has done us. England has not, then, I conclude, been destroyed or impoverished, but preserved and enriched, by her navy. Was Holland ruined by her navy? No; surrounded by the great powers of the continent, with a population not exceeding 2,000,000 of souls, she protected and secured her independence for more than a century, against her powerful neighbors, by means of her commercial riches, which were cherished and defended by her naval power. Did Venice owe her decline, or fall, to her navy? While the neighboring Italian States were subdued, year after year changing their masters and their tyrants, she long continued to ride triumphantly amidst the storm, independent, and, in a great degree, free. It was her naval and commercial power which made her rich and great, and secured her existence as a State so long. Look even at the little Republic of Genoa, whose inhabitants, but for its commerce and its navy, would scarcely ever have possessed "a local habitation," or "a name!" But I must have exhausted the patience of the House, I will therefore conclude the observations which I proposed to make on the general merits of the question.