It is, "we, the people of the United States, for ourselves and our posterity;" not for the people of Louisiana; nor for the people of New Orleans, or of Canada. None of these enter into the scope of the instrument; it embraces only "the United States of America." Who those are, it may seem strange, in this place, to inquire. But truly, sir, our imaginations have, of late, been so accustomed to wander after new settlements to the very end of the earth, that it will not be time ill-spent to inquire what this phrase means, and what it includes. These are not terms adopted at hazard; they have reference to a state of things existing anterior to the constitution. When the people of the present United States began to contemplate a severance from their parent State, it was a long time before they fixed definitely the name by which they would be designated. In 1774, they called themselves "the Colonies and Provinces of North America." In 1775, "the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America." In the Declaration of Independence, "the Representatives of the United States of America." And finally, in the Articles of Confederation, the style of the confederacy is declared to be "the United States of America." It was with reference to the old articles of confederation, and to preserve the identity and established individuality of their character, that the preamble to this constitution, not content, simply, with declaring that it is "we, the people of the United States," who enter into this compact, adds that it is for "the United States of America." Concerning the territory contemplated by the people of the United States, in these general terms, there can be no dispute; it is settled by the treaty of peace, and included within the Atlantic Ocean, and St. Croix, the lakes, and more precisely, so far as relates to the frontier, having relation to the present argument, within "a line to be drawn through the middle of the river Mississippi, until it intersect the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of north latitude to the river Apalachicola, thence along the middle of this river to its junction with the Flint River, thence straight to the head of the St. Mary's River, and thence down the St. Mary's to the Atlantic Ocean."

I have been thus particular to draw the minds of gentlemen, distinctly, to the meaning of the terms used in the preamble; to the extent which "the United States" then included; and to the fact that neither New Orleans nor Louisiana were within the comprehension of the terms of this instrument. It is sufficient for the present branch of my argument to say, that there is nothing in the general nature of this compact from which the power contemplated to be exercised in this bill results. On the contrary, as the introduction of a new associate in political power implies, necessarily, a new division of power, and consequent diminution of the relative proportion of the former proprietors of it; there can, certainly, be nothing more obvious, than that from the general nature of the instrument no power can result to diminish and give away to strangers any proportion of the rights of the original partners. If such a power exists, it must be found, then, in the particular provisions in the constitution. The question now arising is, in which of these provisions is given the power to admit new States, to be created in territories, beyond the limits of the old United States. If it exists anywhere, it is either in the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, or in the treaty-making power. If it result from neither of these, it is not pretended to be found anywhere else.

That part of the third section of the fourth article, on which the advocates of this bill rely, is the following: "New States may be admitted, by the Congress, into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress." I know, Mr. Speaker, that the first clause of this paragraph has been read, with all the superciliousness of a grammarian's triumph. "New States may be admitted, by the Congress, into this Union." Accompanied with this most consequential inquiry: "Is not this a new State to be admitted? And is not here an express authority?" I have no doubt this is a full and satisfactory argument to every one, who is content with the mere colors and superficies of things. And if we were now at the bar of some stall-fed justice, the inquiry would insure victory to the maker of it, to the manifest delight of the constables and suitors of his court. But, sir, we are now before the tribunal of the whole American people; reasoning concerning their liberties, their rights, their constitution. These are not to be made the victims of the inevitable obscurity of general terms; nor the sport of verbal criticism. The question is concerning the intent of the American people, the proprietors of the old United States, when they agreed to this article. Dictionaries and spelling-books are, here, of no authority. Neither Johnson, nor Walker, nor Webster nor Dilworth, has any voice in this matter. Sir, the question concerns the proportion of power, reserved by this constitution, to every State in the Union. Have the three branches of this Government a right, at will, to weaken and outweigh the influence, respectively secured to each State, in this compact, by introducing, at pleasure, new partners, situate beyond the old limits of the United States? The question has not relation merely to New Orleans. The great objection is to the principle of the bill. If this bill be admitted, the whole space of Louisiana, greater, it is said, than the entire extent of the old United States, will be a mighty theatre, in which this Government assumes the right of exercising this unparalleled power. And it will be; there is no concealment, it is intended to be exercised. Nor will it stop, until the very name and nature of the old partners be overwhelmed by new comers into the Confederacy. Sir, the question goes to the very root of the power and influence of the present members of this Union. The real intent of this article is, therefore, an inquiry of most serious import; and is to be settled only by a recurrence to the known history and known relations of this people and their constitution. These, I maintain, support this position: that the terms "new States," in this article, do intend new political sovereignties, to be formed within the original limits of the United States; and do not intend new political sovereignties with territorial annexations, to be erected without the original limits of the United States. I undertake to support both branches of this position to the satisfaction of the people of these United States. As to any expectation of conviction on this floor, I know the nature of the ground and how hopeless any arguments are, which thwart a concerted course of measures.

I recur, in the first place, to the evidence of history. This furnishes the following leading fact: that before, and at the time of the adoption of this constitution, the creation of new political sovereignties within the limits of the old United States was contemplated. Among the records of the old Congress will be found a resolution, passed as long ago as the 10th day of October, 1780, contemplating the cession of unappropriated lands to the United States, accompanied by a provision that "they shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct Republican States, which shall become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other States." Afterward, on the 7th of July, 1786, the subject of "laying out and forming into States" the country lying northwest of the river Ohio, came under the consideration of the same body; and another resolution was passed recommending to the Legislature of Virginia to revise their act of cession, so as to permit a more eligible division of that portion of territory derived from her; "which States," it proceeds to declare, "shall hereafter become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the original States, in conformity with the resolution of Congress of the 10th of October, 1780." All the Territories to which these resolutions had reference, were undeniably within the ancient limits of the United States.

Here, then, is a leading fact, that the article in the constitution had a condition of things, notorious at the time when it was adopted, upon which it was to act, and to meet the exigency resulting from which, such an article was requisite. That is to say: new States, within the limits of the United States, were contemplated at the time when the foundations of the constitution were laid. But we have another authority upon this point, which is, in truth, a cotemporaneous exposition of this article of the constitution. I allude to the resolution, passed on the 3d of July, 1788, in the words following:

[Here the resolution was read.]

In this resolution of the old Congress, it is expressly declared, that the Constitution of the United States having been adopted by nine States, an act of the old Congress could have no effect to make Kentucky a separate member of the Union, and that, although they thought it expedient that it should be so admitted, yet that this could only be done under the provisions made in the new constitution. It is impossible to have a more direct contemporaneous evidence that the case contemplated in this article was that of the Territories within the limits of the United States; yet the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon,) for whose integrity and independence I have very great respect, told us the other day, that "if this article had not territories within the limits of the old United States to act upon, it would be wholly without meaning. Because the ordinance of the old Congress had secured the right to the States within the old United States, and a provision for that object, in the new constitution, was wholly unnecessary." Now, I will appeal to the gentleman's own candor, if the very reverse of the conclusion he draws is not the true one, after he has considered the following fact: That, by this ordinance of the old Congress, it was declared, that the boundaries of the contemplated States, and the terms of their admission, should be, in certain particulars, specified in the ordinance, subject to the control of Congress. Now, as by the new constitution the old Congress was about to be annihilated, it was absolutely necessary for the very fulfilment of this ordinance, that the new constitution should have this power for the admission of new States within the ancient limits, so that the ordinance of the old Congress, far from showing the inutility of such a provision for the Territories within the ancient limits, expressly proves the reverse, and is an evidence of its necessity to effect the object of the ordinance itself.

I think there can be no more satisfactory evidence adduced or required of the first part of the position, that the terms "new States" did intend new political sovereignties within the limits of the old United States. For it is here shown, that the creation of such States, within the territorial limits fixed by the treaty of 1783, had been contemplated; that the old Congress itself expressly asserts that the new constitution gave the power for that object; that the nature of the old ordinance required such a power, for the purpose of carrying its provisions into effect, and that it has been from the time of the adoption of the federal constitution, unto this hour, applied exclusively to the admission of States, within the limits of the old United States, and was never attempted to be extended to any other object.

Now, having shown a purpose, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, sufficient to occupy the whole scope of the terms of the article, ought not the evidence be very strong to satisfy the mind, that the terms really intended something else, besides this obvious purpose; that it may be fairly extended to the entire circle of the globe, wherever title can be obtained by purchase, or conquest, and the new partners in the political power may be admitted at the mere discretion of this Legislature, any where that it wills. A principle thus monstrous is asserted in this bill.

But I think it may be made satisfactorily to appear not only that the terms "new States" in this article did mean political sovereignties to be formed within the original limits of the United States, as has just been shown, but, also, negatively, that it did not intend new political sovereignties, with territorial annexations, to be created without those original limits. This appears first from the very tenor of the article. All its limitations have respect to the creation of States within the original limits. Two States shall not be joined; no new State shall be erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of Congress. Now, had foreign territories been contemplated, had the new habits, customs, manners, and language of other nations been in the idea of the framers of this constitution, would not some limitation have been devised, to guard against the abuse of a power, in its nature so enormous, and so obviously, when it occurred, calculated to excite just jealousy among the States, whose relative weight would be so essentially affected, by such an infusion at once of a mass of foreigners into their Councils, and into all the rights of the country? The want of all limitation of such power would be a strong evidence, were others wanting, that the powers, now about to be exercised, never entered into the imagination of those thoughtful and prescient men, who constructed the fabric. But there is another most powerful argument against the extension of this article to embrace the right to create States without the original limits of the United States, deducible from the utter silence of all debates at the period of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, touching the power here proposed to be usurped. If ever there was a time in which the ingenuity of the greatest men of an age was taxed to find arguments in favor of and against any political measure, it was at the time of the adoption of this constitution. All the faculties of the human mind were, on the one side and the other, put upon their utmost stretch, to find the real and imaginary blessings or evils, likely to result from the proposed measure. Now I call upon the advocates of this bill to point out, in all the debates of that period in any one publication, in any one newspaper of those times, a single intimation, by friend or foe to the constitution, approving or censuring it for containing the power here proposed to be usurped, or a single suggestion that it might be extended to such an object as is now proposed. I do not say that no such suggestion was ever made. But this I will say that I do not believe there is such a one any where to be found. Certain I am, I have never been able to meet the shadow of such a suggestion, and I have made no inconsiderable research upon the point. Such may exist—but until it be produced, we have a right to reason as though it had no existence. No, sir. The people of this country at that day had no idea of the territorial avidity of their successors. It was, on the contrary, an argument, urged against the success of the project, that the territory was too extensive for a republican form of government. But, now there is no limits to our ambitious hopes. We are about to cross the Mississippi. The Missouri and Red River are but roads, on which our imagination travels to new lands and new States to be raised and admitted (under the power, now first usurped) into this Union, among undiscovered lands in the west. But it has been suggested that the Convention had Canada in view, in this article, and the gentleman from North Carolina told this House, that a member of the Convention, as I understood him, either now, or lately a member of the Senate, informed him that the article had that reference. Sir, I have no doubt the gentleman from North Carolina has had a communication such as he intimates. But, for myself, I have no sort of faith in these convenient recollections, suited to serve a turn, to furnish an apology for a party, or give color to a project. I do not deny, on the contrary I believe it very probable, that among the coursings of some discursive and craving fancy, such thoughts might be started; but that is not the question. Was this an avowed object in the Convention when it formed this article? Did it enter into the conception of the people when its principles were discussed? Sir, it did not, it could not. The very intention would have been a disgrace both to this people and the Convention. What, sir! Shall it be intimated; shall it for a moment be admitted, that the noblest and purest band of patriots this or any other country ever could boast, were engaged in machinating means for the dismemberment of the territories of a power to which they had pledged friendship, and the observance of all the obligations which grow out of a strict and perfect amity? The honor of our country forbids and disdains such a suggestion.

But there is an argument stronger, even, than all those which have been produced, to be drawn from the nature of the power here proposed to be exercised. Is it possible that such a power, if it had been intended to be given by the people, should be left dependent upon the effect of general expressions; and such too, as were obviously applicable to another subject; to a particular exigency contemplated at the time? Sir, what is this power we propose now to usurp? Nothing less than a power, changing all the proportion of the weight and influence possessed by the potent sovereignties composing this Union. A stranger is to be introduced to an equal share, without their consent. Upon a principle, pretended to be deduced from the constitution—this Government, after this bill passes, may and will multiply foreign partners in power, at its own mere motion; at its irresponsible pleasure; in other words, as local interests, party passions, or ambitious views may suggest. It is a power that, from its nature, never could be delegated; never was delegated; and as it breaks down all the proportions of power guarantied by the constitution to the States, upon which their essential security depends, utterly annihilates the moral force of this political contract. Would this people, so wisely vigilant concerning their rights, have transferred to Congress a power to balance, at its will, the political weight of any one State, much more of all the States, by authorizing it to create new States at its pleasure, in foreign countries, not pretended to be within the scope of the constitution or the conception of the people, at the time of passing it?

This is not so much a question concerning the exercise of sovereignty, as it is who shall be sovereign. Whether the proprietors of the good old United States shall manage their own affairs in their own way; or whether they, and their constitution, and their political rights, shall be trampled under foot by foreigners introduced through a breach of the constitution. The proportion of the political weight of each sovereign State, constituting this Union, depends upon the number of the States which have a voice under the compact. This number the constitution permits us to multiply at pleasure, within the limits of the original United States; observing only the expressed limitations in the constitution. But when in order to increase your power of augmenting this number you pass the old limits, you are guilty of a violation of the constitution in a fundamental point; and in one, also, which is totally inconsistent with the intent of the contract, and the safety of the States which established the association. What is the practical difference to the old partners, whether they hold their liberties at the will of a master, or whether, by admitting exterior States on an equal footing with the original States, arbiters are constituted, who by availing themselves of the contrariety of interests and views which in such a confederacy necessarily will arise, hold the balance among the parties which exist and govern us, by throwing themselves into the scale most conformable to their purposes? In both cases there is an effective despotism. But the last is the more galling, as we carry the chain in the name and gait of freemen.

I have thus shown, and whether fairly, I am willing to be judged by the sound discretion of the American people, that the power, proposed to be usurped, in this bill, results neither from the general nature, nor the particular provisions, of the Federal Constitution; and that it is a palpable violation of it in a fundamental point; whence flow all the consequences I have intimated.

The present President of the United States, when a member of the Virginia Convention for adopting the constitution, expressly declares that the treaty-making power has limitations; and he states this as one, "that it cannot alienate any essential right." Now, is not here an essential right to be alienated? The right to that proportion of political power which the constitution has secured to every State, modified only by such internal increase of States as the existing limits of the Territories at the time of the adoption of the constitution permitted. The debates of that period chiefly turned upon the competency of this power to bargain away any of the old States. It was agreed, at that time, that by this power old States within the ancient limits could not be sold from us. And I maintain that, by it, new States without the ancient limits cannot be saddled upon us. It was agreed, at that time, that the treaty-making power "could not cut off a limb." And I maintain, that neither has it the competency to clap a hump upon our shoulders. The fair proportions devised by the constitution are in both cases marred, and the fate and felicity of the political being, in material particulars, related to the essence of his constitution, affected. It was never pretended, by the most enthusiastic advocates for the extent of the treaty-making power, that it exceeded that of the King of Great Britain. Yet, I ask, suppose that monarch should make a treaty, stipulating that Hanover or Hindostan should have a right of representation on the floor of Parliament, would such a treaty be binding? No, sir; not, as I believe, if a House of Commons and of Lords could be found venal enough to agree to it. But although in that country the three branches of its legislature are called omnipotent, and the people might not deem themselves justified in resistance, yet here there is no apology of this kind; the limits of our power are distinctly marked; and when the three branches of this Government usurp upon this constitution in particulars vital to the liberties of this people, the deed is at their peril.

I have done with the constitutional argument. Whether I have been able to convince any member of this House, I am ignorant—I had almost said indifferent. But this I will not say, because I am, indeed, deeply anxious to prevent the passage of this bill. Of this I am certain, however, that when the dissension of this day is passed away, when party spirit shall no longer prevent the people of the United States from looking at the principle assumed in it, independent of gross and deceptive attachments and antipathies, that the ground here defended will be acknowledged as a high constitutional bulwark, and that the principles here advanced will be appreciated.

I will add one word, touching the situation of New Orleans. The provision of the treaty of 1803, which stipulates that it shall be "admitted as soon as possible," does not therefore imply a violation of the constitution. There are ways in which this may constitutionally be effected—by an amendment of the constitution, or by reference to conventions of the people in the States. And I do suppose, that, in relation to the objects of the present bill, (with the people of New Orleans,) no great difficulty would arise. Considered as an important accommodation to the Western States, there would be no violent objection to the measure. But this would not answer all the projects to which the principle of this bill, when once admitted, leads, and is intended to be applied. The whole extent of Louisiana is to be cut up into independent States, to counterbalance and to paralyze whatever there is of influence in other quarters of the Union. Such a power, I am well aware that the people of the States would never grant you. And therefore, if you get it, the only way is by the mode adopted in this bill—by usurpation.

The objection here urged is not a new one. I refer with great delicacy to the course pursued by any member of the other branch of the Legislature; yet I have it from such authority that I have an entire belief of the fact, that our present Minister in Russia, then a member of that body, when the Louisiana treaty was under the consideration of the Senate, although he was in favor of the treaty, yet expressed great doubts on the ground of constitutionality, in relation to our control over the destinies of that people, and the manner and the principles on which they could be admitted into the Union. And it does appear that he made two several motions in that body, having for their object, as avowed, and as gathered from their nature, an alteration in the constitution, to enable us to comply with the stipulations of that convention.

I will add only a few words in relation to the moral and political consequences of usurping this power. I have said, that it would be a virtual dissolution of the Union; and gentlemen express great sensibility at the expression. But the true source of terror is not the declaration I have made, but the deed you propose. Is there a moral principle of public law better settled, or more conformable to the plainest suggestions of reason, than that the violation of a contract by one of the parties may be considered as exempting the other from its obligations? Suppose, in private life, thirteen form a partnership, and ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without the concurrence of the other three, would it not be at their option to abandon the partnership, after so palpable an infringement of their rights? How much more, in the political partnership, where the admission of new associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant with obvious dangers and evils! Again: it is settled as a principle of morality, among writers on public law, that no person can be obliged, beyond his intent at the time of the contract. Now, who believes, who dare assert, that it was the intention of the people, when they adopted this constitution, to assign, eventually, to New Orleans and Louisiana, a portion of their political power, and to invest all the people those extensive regions might hereafter contain with an authority over themselves and their descendants? When you throw the weight of Louisiana into the scale, you destroy the political equipoise contemplated at the time of forming the contract. Can any man venture to affirm that the people did intend such a comprehension as you now, by construction, give it; or can it be concealed that, beyond its fair and acknowledged intent, such a compact has no moral force? If gentlemen are so alarmed at the bare mention of the consequences, let them abandon a measure which sooner or later will produce them. How long before the seeds of discontent will ripen, no man can foretell; but it is the part of wisdom not to multiply or scatter them. Do you suppose the people of the Northern and Atlantic States will, or ought to, look on with patience and see Representatives and Senators from the Red river and Missouri pouring themselves upon this and the other floor, managing the concerns of a seaboard fifteen hundred miles at least from their residence, and having a preponderancy in councils, into which, constitutionally, they could never have been admitted? I have no hesitation upon this point. They neither will see it, nor ought to see it, with content. It is the part of a wise man to foresee danger, and to hide himself. This great usurpation, which creeps into this House under the plausible appearance of giving content to that important point, New Orleans, starts up a gigantic power to control the nation. Upon the actual condition of things, there is, there can be, no need of concealment. It is apparent to the blindest vision. By the course of nature, and conformable to the acknowledged principles of the constitution, the sceptre of power in this country is passing towards the Northwest. Sir, there is to this no objection. The right belongs to that quarter of the country; enjoy it; it is yours. Use the powers granted as you please; but take care, in your haste after effectual dominion, not to overload the scales by heaping it with these new acquisitions. Grasp not too eagerly at your purpose. In your speed after uncontrolled sway, trample not down this constitution. Already the old States sink in the estimation of members, when brought into comparison with these new countries. We have been told that "New Orleans was the most important point in the Union." A place out of the Union the most important place within it! We have been asked, "What are some of the small States when compared with the Mississippi Territory?" The gentleman from that Territory (Mr. Poindexter) spoke the other day of the Mississippi as "of a high road between" ——. Good heavens, between what, Mr. Speaker? Why, "the Eastern and Western States." So that all the Northwestern Territories, all the countries once the extreme western boundary of our Union, are hereafter to be denominated Eastern States.

[Mr. Poindexter explained. He said that he had not said that the Mississippi was to be the boundary between the Eastern and Western States. He had merely thrown out a hint, that, in erecting new States, it might be a good high-road between the States on its waters. His idea had not extended beyond the new States, on the waters of the Mississippi.]

I make no great point of this matter. The gentleman will find, in the National Intelligencer, the terms to which I refer. There will be seen, I presume, what he has said, and what he has not said. The argument is not affected by the explanation. New States are intended to be formed beyond the Mississippi. There is no limit to men's imaginations, on this subject, short of California and Columbia river. When I said that the bill would justify a revolution, and would produce it, I spoke of its principle and its practical consequences. To this principle and those consequences, I would call the attention of this House and nation. If it be about to introduce a condition of things absolutely insupportable, it becomes wise and honest men to anticipate the evil, and to warn and prepare the people against the event. I have no hesitation on the subject. The extension of this principle to the States, contemplated beyond the Mississippi, cannot, will not, and ought not to be borne. And the sooner the people contemplate the unavoidable result, the better; the more likely that convulsions may be prevented; the more hope that the evils may be palliated or removed.

Mr. Speaker: What is this liberty of which so much is said? Is it to walk about this earth, to breathe this air, and to partake the common blessings of God's providence? The beasts of the field and the birds of the air unite with us in such privileges as these. But man boasts a purer and more ethereal temperature. His mind grasps in its view the past and the future, as well as the present. We live not for ourselves alone. That which we call liberty, is that principle on which the essential security of our political condition depends. It results from the limitations of our political system, prescribed in the constitution. These limitations, so long as they are faithfully observed, maintain order, peace, and safety. When they are violated in essential particulars, all the concurrent spheres of authority rush against each other, and disorder, derangement, and convulsion are, sooner or later, the necessary consequences.

With respect to this love of our Union, concerning which so much sensibility is expressed, I have no fear about analyzing its nature. There is in it nothing of mystery. It depends upon the qualities of that Union, and it results from its effects upon our and our country's happiness. It is valued for "that sober certainty of waking bliss" which it enables us to realize. It grows out of the affections, and has not, and cannot be made to have, any thing universal in its nature. Sir, I confess it, the first public love of my heart is the commonwealth of Massachusetts. There is my fireside; there are the tombs of my ancestors—

The love of this Union grows out of this attachment to my native soil, and is rooted in it. I cherish it, because it affords the best external hope of her peace, her prosperity, her independence. I oppose this bill from no animosity to the people of New Orleans, but from the deep conviction that it contains a principle incompatible with the liberties and safety of my country. I have no concealment of my opinion. The bill, if it passes, is a death-blow to the constitution. It may, afterwards, linger; but lingering, its fate will, at no very distant period, be consummated.

Tuesday, January 15.

Orleans Territory.

The House resumed the consideration of the bill authorizing the people of Orleans Territory to elect a convention to form a constitution preparatory to its admission into the Union as a free and independent State—Mr. Quincy's motion for indefinite postponement still under consideration.

Mr. Wright.—Sir, this bill is not, in my judgment, a violation of the constitution, nor have I a fear that it is fraught with those direful consequences with which the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Quincy) threatens us. It will neither justify a dissolution of the Union, nor lead any citizen attached to it, even amicably, much less forcibly, to the contemplation of it, notwithstanding the predictions of that gentleman. That we are authorized to erect new States, I will prove both by theory and practice, and for that purpose I will first invite your attention to the articles of Confederation. By one section it is expressly declared that Canada may be permitted to enjoy all the benefits of the Confederation on the same terms with the other States of the Union. The thirteen States under this Confederation conducted themselves safely through the war; but finding, in 1787, that their requisitions had not been duly respected, and that New York had rejected some necessary commercial regulations, whereby their fiscal affairs were deranged, Congress, by a resolution, resolved that a convention of States should be held for the express purpose of amending the articles of Confederation. Under this resolution the Convention met, and proceeded to form the present constitution. Thus it will appear that they were to form the new constitution not ex pari materia, but out of the very materials of the Confederation.

As a conclusive evidence, you will find a number of the articles in each instrument literally or substantially the same, and thereby be justified in giving a construction of the letter of the constitution, so as to respect the spirit of the Confederation. By the third section of 4th article of the constitution, "New States may be admitted by Congress into the Union;" and by the next member of the same section, "the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States"—hence I can have no doubt that Congress have the power to admit new States into the Union, that power being expressly given. It is however contended, that that power is limited to the admission only of those States that may be established within the limits of the United States, as demarcated by the Treaty of Peace. And the preamble to the constitution is relied on to establish that doctrine. "We, the people of the United States, &c., do establish this constitution for the United States of America." If this preamble is so imperious as to limit the positive provisions of the constitution, it will certainly limit itself to the States that formed the constitution—the negative of which has been determined. To prove which, here let me call your attention to the fact, that Vermont was not a member of the Confederation, nor was she a member of the convention that formed the constitution; she therefore was not one of the United States—was foreign as to them, and as distinctly governed as any other foreign power; she in 1791 was admitted into the Union, and the laws of the United States extended to her. She was not one of the old States, and was correctly admitted under the power to admit new States. Vermont was so repulsive to a confederacy with the United States, as not to be mentioned in the articles of Confederation. Can it be for a moment doubted that Canada, expressly mentioned, might be now received as a new State, by becoming independent, or by purchase, when Vermont has been admitted, who was not mentioned in the Confederation? Can there be an opinion that the framers of the constitution intended Canada should be excluded from the benefits of the constitution, when before invited into it? When, by the express letter of the instrument, "new States may be admitted," and when Vermont, not mentioned in the Confederation, has been admitted? Such a conclusion can never be the rational result of such premises. But it is objected, that, as this Territory was obtained by treaty, and after the formation of the constitution, it cannot be admitted into the Union as a State.

I have shown that new States may be admitted, that Vermont has been admitted, and that Canada was expressly entitled under the Confederation, and by the terms of the constitution may be admitted as a new State. "Congress may admit new States into the Union, and make all needful rules and regulations with respect to the territory or other property of the United States." This is certainly a territory, the property of the United States, and Congress as certainly may, if needful, that is, expedient, admit it into the Union. We are told, I presume to retard this measure, that the limits are in dispute, and that, if made a State, they cannot afterwards be settled by the United States. That this is not the case, I will prove by theory and by practice. By the treaty-making power vested in the President and the Senate, they may treat on all subjects within the treaty-making power, with foreign nations; and where the limits of any foreign power adjoining the territory of the United States are not ascertained to their mutual satisfaction, they certainly may settle them by a treaty of limits. This is the practice and usage of all nations, and the United States by a treaty of limits with Great Britain, did settle the beginning of their northeastern limits, at the river St. Croix, whereby they gave up seven miles to Great Britain, which was taken from a State—hence I presume no difficulty can arise on the subject.

The question was then taken on the motion for indefinite postponement, and lost: yeas 28, nays 78.

The main question was then taken that the said bill do pass, and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 77, nays 36.

Wednesday, January 16.

Bank of the United States.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States.

Mr. Burwell moved to strike out the first section.

I have made this motion, sir, said Mr. B., because it allows the greatest latitude of discussion upon the important points which are preliminary to the examination of the details. It tries the principle of the bill, and may save much tedious and useless labor. Should a majority decide in favor of the Bank of the United States, as an honest man I will aid in forming a system best adapted to the state of the country, and most subservient to the purposes of such an institution. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Mosely) has done justice to my conduct, and the fairness with which the subject has been treated. I have been anxious to present the question fairly, not from any doubt or indecision as to the course I should pursue, but from its magnitude, and the sensibility it has excited. It will be recollected by the committee, when the gentleman from Pennsylvania presented the memorial upon which the Secretary of the Treasury founded his report, on that, as on all subsequent occasions, my opposition was manifested; and I will add that the particular attention which my duty has compelled me to bestow on the bank, has confirmed more strongly former impressions.

The remarks I shall make are intended to show that Congress possesses no power to incorporate a bank; to show its effect on the government, and to satisfy the committee that the exercise of the power, even if possessed, is inexpedient. While, sir, I feel the most ardent desire to consult the convenience of the government and promote the prosperity of the community in general, I have not lost sight of the limits within which I am restrained by the Constitution of the United States and considerations of sound policy. It is my most deliberate conviction that the constitution of the country gives no authority to Congress to incorporate a bank and endow the stockholders with chartered immunities; and even if its dissolution should produce ruin to the merchants, and, what is of equal importance, embarrassment to the government, they would not be paramount to the sacred obligation of supporting the constitution; though I am persuaded the dreadful evils which have been predicted from the annihilation of the bank will soon vanish, and that no material shock will be produced by that cause. The construction which the constitution has received by the various persons who have at different times administered it, has been rigid or liberal according to the confidence in the General or State Governments. The unqualified extent given to its general powers, and the inclusion of incidental powers, as flowing from and belonging to particular enumerated grants, have constituted the essential points of difference among those who have divided upon the principles of the constitution. This has been the case not only in the exercise of authority where the right was questionable, but in cases where the right was undeniable, tending by its operation to increase the weight of the General Government. In giving to the constitution that construction which sound policy requires, and a just regard to the harmony of the States and the perpetuation of their Union dictates, I cannot find any part of it authorizing the exercise of a power which, from its nature, is obnoxious, its tendency alarming, and its influence in the hands of those who manage its concerns irresistible. The power to establish a bank cannot be deduced from the general phrases "to provide for the common defence and general welfare," because they merely announce the object for which the General Government was instituted. The only means by which this object is to be attained are specifically enumerated in the constitution, and if they are not ample, it is a defect which Congress are not competent to supply. I think this inference the stronger, inasmuch as those means were granted to us by those who had acted under the confederation and experienced its defects, and knew precisely to what extent power was requisite to provide for the common defence and general welfare. In relation to this particular subject, the proceedings of the convention itself furnish the plainest evidence, by rejecting the proposition to vest in Congress the right to grant incorporations. I readily admit the motive of deliberative bodies cannot always be known. Various considerations might have operated. They might have supposed the power already vested. But, it is incumbent on those who can place faith in an interpretation so repugnant to the cautious and guarded phraseology of the instrument, to demonstrate it. If the right to incorporate exists, it is a general grant of power, equally applicable to all the objects of incorporation, and cannot be assumed as a means to carry into effect any particular grant of authority. To my mind, it is much more natural to suppose a power to create monopolies had been surrendered, to quiet the fears of those who saw in the constitution the germ which would sooner or later palsy the vitals of the State authority. If the general phrases are not explained in the manner just mentioned, and powers so extensive and important are derived from them, it would be ridiculous to consider the jurisdiction of Congress restricted; they would confer equal authority to establish monopolies in all the various branches of individual industry and commercial enterprise. Sir, I will conclude this part of the subject by reminding you how essential it is, when we are giving an interpretation to the constitution, to which the States are parties, to assume only what clearly belongs to us. Moderation will inspire confidence, selfishness will excite disgust and suspicion.

The parts of the constitution which bear any analogy to this subject, are

1st. Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare, &c.

2d. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.

3d. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with Indian tribes. And

4th. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the constitution in the General Government, into effect.

It will not be denied that, if the establishment of a bank comes within the meaning of the power to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts of the United States, and to regulate commerce, or is necessary and proper to carry the foregoing powers into effect, it would be a fair subject for legislation by Congress. But can any one pretend that a bank would be a mode contemplated by the constitution to lay and collect taxes on the people for the purpose of raising revenue? Would it comport with that wise principle of uniformity, and those guarded restrictions against unequal burdens on the people, which constitute the most valuable safeguard to the citizen? To understand these terms we must give them a meaning which has been affixed by their usual import. When we speak of the power to lay taxes, we understand by it a demand of money from the community, regulated by fixed and equitable principles, indiscriminate as to persons, and the species of property taxed. To suppose that every law which imposed burdens or brought money into the Treasury was constitutional, would destroy our equal system of government, and substitute a capricious despotism. It would revive the exploded doctrine of free gifts, benevolences, and that shameful train of extortions practised by the old governments of Europe. Does it fall within the power to pay the debts of the United States? This clause relates entirely to the application of the funds after they have been accumulated; it is in conformity with that article which pledges the public faith for debts which had been contracted, as well as those which might be created in pursuance of the authority to borrow money upon the faith of the United States. If the power to incorporate a bank grew out of the obligation to pay the debts of the United States, its charter should be so worded as to cease whenever they were extinguished; and it would be no longer for Congress to fix a definite period for its expiration. If the right of incorporation was ever meant to be given, it would most naturally follow from the regulation of commerce; yet, no one has contended Congress could create insurance companies within the States. Those who contend the bank is constitutional, consider it as necessary and proper in collecting the revenue. That it may be an useful instrument, I do not deny. It forms depositories convenient to the government; but, you should recollect, depositories equally safe and convenient can be procured without being purchased at the expense of exorbitant and invidious privileges to a particular class in the community. I apprehend the constitution means something extremely different when it empowers the General Government to collect taxes; it relates exclusively to the authority thus given to Congress of employing compulsory process in coercing the payment of taxes; it enables Congress to create, within the jurisdiction of the States, officers of the revenue, and, through them, to exercise over the property of the citizens a concurrent jurisdiction, from which they otherwise would be precluded, and from which they had been precluded before the adoption of the constitution; it enables them to impose penalties and forfeitures, and to inflict punishment for resistance to their authority. But, sir, admit for a moment the bank may be formed to collect the revenue, ought it not to be exclusively used for that object? Whence the power to make it an instrument of commerce? Why invest it with a capital immense in amount, and sovereign in its control over the external and internal commerce of the country? Sir, I must again call your attention to the limited nature of our Government; we must administer it as we find it, and not as we think it ought to be. Under this view of the subject, so long as I understand the right to "lay taxes" to consist in drawing supplies from the people for public purposes, and not to tax one portion of the community for the benefit of another, and "to collect them," the right to enforce payment, I cannot construe them to authorize the establishment of a bank. Sir, a bank has been improperly considered a means of executing some power exclusively given to Congress. The nature of incorporations is so clearly a distinct class of political power, that, before they can be converted into means incidental to an object without the jurisdiction of the General Government, they must be shown to be absolutely necessary. Permit me to ask, how has it been ascertained that a bank is necessary to the operations of the Government? Has the experiment been tried? Upon a question involving a breach of the constitution, it would be safer to be guided by experience than conjecture.

Sir, I am well aware that I can add nothing new upon the constitutional points. The subject was more thoroughly examined in 1791, and more ably elucidated than any other since the adoption of the Government. The celebrated speech of Mr. Madison, to which I ascribe my conviction, has been recently presented to us in the newspapers, and gentlemen must be familiar with it. I cannot give additional weight to the arguments, but I thought it proper to call the attention of the committee to that part of the subject by the remarks I have made.

I said, sir, it must be shown that the bank is necessary to the operations of the Government—without its aid our fiscal concerns cannot be managed. So far from subscribing to the necessity of the bank, I believe the revenue would be equally safe in the State banks, and could be distributed with inconsiderable difficulty. The revenue received in most of the States is nearly equal to the expenditure within them, and when a deficiency occurred in any one, it could be supplied by arrangements with the different banks, by transportation, or inland bills of exchange, in the manner that the public engagements are fulfilled abroad. I will venture to assert the Secretary of the Treasury will find no difficulty in contracting with individuals and corporate institutions, upon the most ample security, to transfer the public revenue upon terms equally advantageous to the United States. Among the several States commercial intercourse is great, and daily increasing; the constant traffic which the different portions of the country maintain with one another, will give facility to the operations of the Government, and obviate the obstacles which are anticipated; the very commerce which enables the Treasury to remit with ease immense sums to every part of Europe is the result of this interchange among the States, and insures equal facility at home. Where, then, is the necessity for this bank? The accommodation of the bank to the Government in times of emergency, and the use of its resources to support public credit, have been urged as motives for its establishment; how far such considerations weaken constitutional objections, it is needless to state. If, sir, the bank becomes a source of supply to the Government to an adequate extent, it ceases to be one to the merchants. It therefore cannot answer in both capacities. The same necessity which throws the Government upon the charity of the banks renders it incapable of discharging the obligation, and while the funds of the institution are locked up in the Government, its commercial functions must cease. The relief which sudden and temporary embarrassments require, can, at all times, be administered by the State banks, and, therefore, supersedes the necessity of aid from this bank. Whenever, by disasters, the ordinary sources of supply are exhausted, or the unavoidable objects of expenditure exceed the revenue, a more copious and permanent aliment will be found in the wealth and capital of the citizens than by loans from banks. Instead of diverting the active and productive capital from useful channels, the sluggish and inert mass will be drawn forth in its aid, to support public credit and cherish private enterprise. But, sir, is it prudent to rely upon an institution that may refuse you assistance? What will be the influence of such an institution on the Government, and the country at large? It cannot escape your recollection that the establishment of the Bank of the United States was the origin of a system which assumed as its basis the enlargement of the national jurisdiction. Whether the principles of expediency to which it owes its birth be regarded, or the overweening influence it established over the moneyed institutions and merchants of the States, the charge, to say the least, is plausible. The close and intimate connection between the Government and bank—the dependence of the former for loans, and the latter for public deposits, have given the Executive branch its full share of influence and odium—shows incontestably it was created to augment the power of the General Government, and the Executive in particular. Yes, sir, it was the commencement of those political animosities which have poisoned the sources of social intercourse; it was the origin of that doctrine of constructive power which abrogates the constitution and nullifies the restrictions imposed upon Congress. So long as it exists, the body politic will experience the agitations and convulsive throes of well-grounded jealousy in the States.

Sir, in the administration of this Government two things alone are necessary to insure its durability. You must first avoid every measure which will produce uneasiness among the States, or, second, that will extend the jurisdiction of the United States Government to subjects purely local. I do not mean that the rightful authority of Congress is to be abandoned for fear of giving offence, but, whenever called on to take a step which will produce uneasiness, you should be perfectly satisfied the letter and spirit of the constitution bear you out. Do not gentlemen perceive the tendency of this measure to involve us with the States upon delicate points? Has not the United States' Bank produced serious alarm? Will not the alarm be increased by its continuance at this time? Yes, sir, some of the States have already taxed this institution, others have waited under the expectation we shall render a collision unnecessary. Suppose the charter renewed, and the stockholders should be taxed in such a manner as to destroy, virtually, the privileges you have guarantied to them. Are you to leave them unprotected, or will you draw the sword in their behalf? While you have time, avoid a situation not less perilous than the most serious foreign war. Since the establishment of the bank, the States have created banks—their people have accumulated capital, and they will not tamely witness the perpetuation of an institution whose strength can at any moment overthrow whatever State bank they may mark for destruction. However paradoxical it may appear, I consider the General Government strengthened by narrowing its jurisdiction; it will produce disunion whenever they interfere with local concerns. The habits, local interest, and passions of this country vary, and no one is a competent judge of what will suit the feelings of the State out of which he lives. But, sir, there are general principles in which our feelings and interests are identified; there are subjects upon which we may safely act, and trust to the co-operation of every man and State in the Union. Does the bank affect the people locally? The answer is obvious: it not only undertakes to fix the amount of capital, but interferes with the rights of property most essentially—it may change the fundamental principles of State law as to the liability of property for debts, and the mode of recovering them. Let me caution you against the renewal of the charter; it is pregnant with the most baneful consequences to the tranquillity of the country. Is it not better to sacrifice this golden calf upon the altar of concord, restore confidence and harmony among individuals as well as States, and to reunite the lovers of the constitution?

In the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, the convenience of obtaining loans from the bank is mentioned as an inducement to establish a National Bank. To me the abuse of this convenience is more dreaded than any other evil which will follow from the measure. Where have you seen a National Bank, connected with the Government, which has not ultimately ruined the circulating medium of the nation? It is a notorious fact that money has depreciated seriously, from the unlimited circulation of paper, and if the Government should be compelled, by necessity, to use the funds of the bank, they must permit the increased circulation of its paper, although its money capital remains stationary. In this situation the Government must tolerate an operation which will increase the evil of which we complain. The example of England is a salutary monition to us, and we ought to profit from it. In that country there was a time when the stability of the bank was a national phrase, "As good as the Bank of England." How is it now? The funds of the bank have been borrowed by the Government—its paper circulation increased, and Parliament has been compelled to make it a tender for the payment of all contracts. Who, sir, can estimate the complicated mischiefs of a depreciated paper currency, without specie for its redemption? Should we be involved in war, or our property seized abroad, nothing can present universal bankruptcy—one wide-spread ruin will pervade the continent. At this time the country is inundated with paper bottomed upon the whole floating and real property of the community: should an alarm exist, can these funds be converted into money to redeem its credit? Certainly not. Will it not be prudent to diminish the extent of this evil by putting down this bank which is the fountain from which the whole system flows? It is of little importance, as it regards the internal trade of a country, what constitutes the representation of property. Paper, iron, or any thing else, which passes current, will answer every purpose of barter and trade; but, in its commerce abroad, it is indispensable that the circulating medium should be equally valuable and readily acknowledged among all commercial nations; otherwise, all the operations of commerce, carried on with money, will be abandoned or prosecuted under disadvantages equal to the difference in the value of the currency at home and abroad. In countries actively engaged in business, this branch of trade is not only great in amount, but by far the most profitable. How unwise, therefore, not only to substitute for the precious metals paper currency, whose value is confined to the United States, but to augment the quantity until it depreciates even among ourselves.

Thursday, January 17.

Bank of the United States.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States—the motion for striking out the first section still under consideration.

Mr. Fisk.—Mr. Chairman: I regret that we are called upon to vote for or against striking out the first section of this bill, at this time. I could have wished that, upon a bill of so much interest and importance, we could have proceeded to have filled the blanks, and made such amendments as would have obviated many objections which may be urged against it in its present form. I am not prepared to give my vote in favor of a renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States, either upon the terms upon which it was originally granted, or in the manner contemplated by this bill; yet, upon conditions less objectionable, I should feel myself bound to vote in favor of a renewal. But the question presented upon this motion, is not upon what terms this charter shall be renewed, but whether it shall be renewed upon any terms, subject to any conditions Congress may impose.

In this view, I consider it the most important subject upon which this Congress will be required to act. It is determining a question which is connected with our finances, with the circulating medium of the country, and with our agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing interests; and, as such, it cannot but be interesting to every class of our citizens.

The interests and prosperity of the United States are not only intimately, but inseparably, connected with trade. The market of the farmer depends greatly upon the merchant and the shipper. And the price and demand of every article of produce are in a great degree regulated by the difficulties or facilities of payment. Let the difficulty of paying be increased, and the price of produce immediately falls; for the demand for exportation becomes very limited, the markets are overstocked, and prices reduced. Any sudden check to our commerce, whether produced by our own municipal regulations, or the outrages of foreign powers, checks the market and the price of produce; so that not only the merchants, but the farmers feel its effects. I scarcely need recur to the history of the times when trade was principally suspended in this country, to show how severely the suspension operated upon every class of our citizens, and in every part of the country. This period in our political annals will be long remembered. So great was the distress in some States, and agricultural States, too, that their Legislatures deemed it necessary, for the protection of the debtor from the power of his creditor, to stay the administration of justice, and prohibit by statute the issuing of an execution for the collection of any debt.

This proves the connection which subsists between the two great agricultural and commercial interests of this country. Agriculture, commerce, and manufactures constitute the source of our wealth, revenue, and prosperity. To foster and cherish the principles upon which rest our existing hopes and future prospects, can never be a question of doubtful policy with a wise and patriotic legislature.

We have seen that commerce is essential to our interests; but commerce will not flourish without credit. It never has prospered independent of credit. As credit is essential to trade, so is punctuality to support credit. Look at the business of any commercial people, and see how much of it is done upon credit; and see the integrity and fidelity with which punctuality is maintained in order to support their credit.

For several centuries past, banks have been the successful medium through which credit has not only been preserved, but great wealth acquired. This assertion is warranted by the history of these institutions, and of the countries where they have been patronized. The first bank established in Europe, was at Genoa, in 1407—four hundred and four years ago; this was soon followed by one at Venice.

The Bank of Amsterdam was established in 1609, and shortly after those of Hamburg and Rotterdam; and the Bank of England in 1694; the Royal Bank at Paris in 1718; the Bank of North America in 1784—a memorable period in our history—and the Bank of the United States in 1791.

All these different institutions show, that enlightened legislators have entertained but one opinion upon this subject both in Europe and America for the last four hundred years. They have seen and acknowledged their utility. Banks have long since been considered not only essentially useful in the transaction of commercial concerns, but as highly necessary to aid the fiscal operations of Government. And a more unanswerable argument cannot be urged in favor of their general utility than their uniform success; to this may be added the prosperity of the people and the countries where banks have been supported. Their immediate advantages are, a convenient circulating medium; the safe depository they afford for cash and funds. And they serve to keep the standard of money steady and correct; to insure punctuality; to preserve credit; to inspire confidence, and to promote a spirit of industry and enterprise. They are not, as many have supposed, in their nature hostile to Government and dangerous to liberty. They rather form a barrier to tyranny and oppression. Their principal business is to lend money at the common rate of interest, and thus prevent usury. The owners of banks are generally rich men, who have not only their personal liberty, but a large property to risk, by sedition, treason, and rebellion. It is their interest to resist oppression. We need scarcely point to the Continent of Europe for proof of the fact, when we assert, that trade and banks cannot flourish where despotism prevails. Despotic power generally ruins trade and banks, but no instance occurs in history where banks, not under the control of Government, have ruined a State. A bank owned by Government, and under its command, would be an engine dangerous to the people. But when owned by individuals, neither the people nor the Government have any thing to fear from it. It is then dependent on both for its business, prosperity, and usefulness.

With the evidence which both history and experience offer to our reflection, we cannot doubt the utility of banks, nor deny but that they have been beneficial to us. And we are justified in the conclusion, that, under proper regulations, they may subserve the best interests of the people of the United States. They are now in successful operation in almost every State in the Union, and that they have been useful, the present prosperous state of the country abundantly proves. We enjoy as perfect security for life, liberty, and property, as any people under any Government ever did. These are the great objects of a good Government. And we may triumphantly ask, where is the nation or people that enjoy these with more freedom and safety than the American people? A parallel for our liberty and prosperity, for the last twenty years, is not to be found in the history of man. Our wealth, population, and resources, have increased beyond what any one would have calculated or imagined, and beyond what strangers and foreigners now believe. Industry, wealth, and contentment, pervade every quarter of our country, and poverty and oppression are unknown to our citizens.

In 1791, the year this bank was incorporated, our exports amounted to about eighteen millions of dollars; and in 1804, they had increased to about seventy-six millions, gaining in thirteen years fifty-eight millions; and our tonnage in about the same proportion.

Much of this prosperity is to be attributed to the active capital which has excited industry, and a spirit of enterprise among us, and the activity of this capital has been in a great degree created and promoted by the Bank of the United States. Its operations have been extensive in all our trading towns. It has aided in loans and discounts, and assisted in the collection, safe-keeping, and transmission of our revenues. It has been the depository of our Treasury, and is now become incorporated with the administration of the fiscal department of our Government. The connection which it has formed with almost every branch of business in the country, is not slight and trifling, and so easily to be severed as some seem to believe. Its operations are deeply interwoven with the dealings and concerns of all the men of business in the United States.

With a capital of ten millions, it has furnished accommodations of fifteen millions a year. This has been employed principally in trade; in making prompt and cash payments to our farmers for their produce. This, again, has furnished to our citizens a ready and profitable market for every article of produce. These high profits of a good market have gone into the hands of the farmer, to cultivate, improve, and enrich the country. And travel through any State in the Union, and their effects may be readily seen, affording a prospect, consoling and elevating to the philanthropist and the patriot. The land is highly cultivated, good buildings, turnpike roads, bridges, and other expensive improvement, indicate the wealth of our citizens, and the prosperity of the country. Money has been freely circulated, trade has been active, produce high, and our country has been improved by these unexampled advantages to a degree far beyond what the most sanguine calculations, twenty years ago, could have anticipated. And yet, sir, we are gravely told that this bank has nearly ruined the country; that it is threatening our best interests with destruction. As well might gentlemen tell us that total darkness prevails at noon-day, or that the sun, in his meridian splendor, affords neither light nor heat to any part of this globe.

The principal portion of the trade and business of the United States has been conducted by a paper medium; metallic has scarcely been seen. The amount of this circulating medium is, say fifty millions. Now what is proposed by denying a renewal of the United States' Bank charter? That this bank shall close its concerns, and of course stop all its accommodations. This must necessarily check and change at least one-third of the circulating medium of the country. It will undeniably require $24,000,000 to be directed to one operation, and for a time to one point—for the capital is $10,000,000; this is to be collected to divide among the stockholders. There are $19,000,000 due to the bank; this must be collected. This will occasion a demand for this amount from other sources; it must be paid. And the $5,000,000 in the bank makes the sum of $24,000,000, which must be suddenly called in. The effect this will have upon the various interests in the country can neither be described nor conceived. It must inevitably give a general and heavy shock to all paper credit; this credit, so much and profitably in operation, must receive a severe, if not a mortal wound. And what substitute have we for this when it shall be destroyed? Silver and gold coin cannot be relied on. There is not from the best estimate an amount to exceed $10,000,000 specie in all our cities and trading towns, and this will be collected by this bank. The price of all stocks, and every kind of produce and species of property must suffer a great depression, for a scarcity of money enhances its value, and consequently depresses the value of every other species of property. That this sudden, if not total change in our system, must occasion great embarrassment, produce failures, disappointments, and distress, among our citizens, is certain.

Put down this bank, and how then are your revenues to be collected? Through the medium of the State banks? You do what no prudent man, in his individual concerns, would think of doing. You discard a faithful, honest, responsible agent, whose integrity and fidelity you have known for twenty years, and you place your estate in the hands and at the disposal of twenty or thirty entire strangers, of whose character and responsibility you know nothing, nor have the means of acquiring any knowledge, and over whose conduct you have no control. Should an individual act thus with his property, he would be deemed to have lost all regard for it, if not considered a madman. In resorting to the State banks, we are offering the amount of our revenue as a bounty for intrigues, cabals, and factions, through the country. In almost every State there are a number of banks, and each will endeavor to get the revenue collected in that State, to keep and trade with. It must be given to one, or divided among them all. If one is selected as the favorite, all the rest become jealous, dissatisfied, and exert their capital and influence against the favorite bank and its patron, the Government. This will awaken a spirit of faction in every State, yet unknown in this country. If all are to be gratified in their request for the deposits, the Government must open separate accounts with all the different banks in the country, to the amount of fifty or sixty; and new companies will be formed, and new applicants request to divide the business, and share the profits. Indeed, there will be no end to the scenes of speculation and intrigue, which will soon appear, if this course is adopted by the Government.

Mr. Seybert.—It may be said that this subject has been exhausted by the discussions of the ablest politicians of the country. I will premise, the remarks which I shall offer are intended solely to justify the vote which it is my intention to give on this momentous occasion.

The question pending the United States' Bank has excited a peculiar interest throughout this nation, more especially in our seaports. The dissolution of this institution, which from its limitation, will expire on the fourth of March next, has been portrayed in colors of the darkest shades, and the distresses which many maintain will be consequent to that event, call seriously for a fair and deliberate investigation. I hope, sir, I shall be pardoned for imposing on the patience of the House, when it is recollected that the community which I represent have employed four-tenths of the capital stock of the United States' Bank. If evil consequences are to attend the dissolution of this establishment, or if beneficial results proceed from its continuance, in either case I must feel myself essentially interested; it is therefore my wish to be distinctly understood upon the important principles which have connection with the great question now before us.

At the last session of Congress, I presented the memorial of the President, Directors, and Stockholders of the Bank of the United States; at that time I entertained no positive opinion on the subject; the discussions which took place in the committee to whom the memorial was referred, necessarily, as a duty on my part, excited that attention which the importance of the question imperiously demanded. Under circumstances of doubt, I voted in favor of reporting a resolution in support of the bank, for the purpose of giving to the establishment every chance which reason could urge; at the same time reserving to myself the right to pronounce a final decision, according as policy and expediency, but more especially as principle should dictate. I will admit, sir, that this is not the time or place to institute the general inquiry, whether banks are or are not beneficial to a nation? Because, whether the charter of the United States' Bank be renewed or not, the several States, who have the unquestioned authority to incorporate bank establishments, have already created many, which it is not in our power to control. I do not hesitate to declare, though many persons in the United States are decidedly opposed to a banking system, under every possible circumstance, I am not of this class. Experience has proved, in a manner very satisfactory to my mind, the advantages which are derived from the banks when they are impartially directed, and when the accommodation afforded by them is prudently employed; the great difficulty seems to be to confine the system within its proper limits. I understand the proposition as applicable to the agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial interests of the United States.