"To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings," &c.
Now, says my friend from Tennessee, this clause gives the right to erect dockyards; and as dockyards must be on the seacoast, therefore Congress has the right to erect light-houses, because they must also be on the seacoast. This argument is extremely logical, nay, syllogistical, in form, but it is extremely illogical in substance. The conclusion drawn from the premises, is as necessary, as though I were to say, that because two and two makes four, therefore five and five makes twelve. The conclusion in the latter case is as necessary as in the former. But my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. Giles) derives it from the authority given in this clause, to erect other needful buildings. But the question recurs, needful for what? Why, certainly, for the purposes before specified. What are they? Forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards. If this clause gives any authority to erect forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards, the other needful buildings spoken of must be needful for the specified purposes. I should suppose that no man, who spends only a few days in this city, can be at a loss to determine what is comprehended under the term "other needful buildings." Let him go to the dockyard, nicknamed a navy-yard in this city, and he will there find a little town of "other needful buildings" in the words of the constitution. But, sir, I deny that this clause of the constitution expressly gives any right, but that of exercising exclusive legislation in the places to be accepted or purchased for the purpose therein specified. The right to erect forts, magazines, and arsenals, is fairly incidental to the right of declaring war, and of raising armies; and the right to erect dockyards is fairly incidental to the right of providing and maintaining a navy. But if for the sake of argument I should admit that the right to erect forts, &c., is given in this clause, how can it be proved that the right to erect a light-house is also given? Forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards, are enumerated, and as the constitution says that all powers not expressly given are retained, if the right to erect forts, magazines, &c., is given in this clause, most clearly the right to erect light-houses is retained by the States, because it is not to be found in the enumeration contained in the clause. When I had the honor of addressing the Senate before I questioned the authority of the State governments to create banks; I then stated, and I again explicitly state, that it is with reluctance that I have felt it my duty to make any inquiry into the constitutional right of the State governments to incorporate banks. The State Legislatures ought to have recollected the Spanish proverb, which says that those who live in glass-houses ought not to throw stones. Before they undertook to question the constitutional authority of Congress, they ought to have thoroughly examined the foundation upon which their own right rested. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) says that the construction which I have given to that part of the constitution which prohibits the States from emitting bills of credit, would apply equally to promissory notes given by one individual to another under the laws of a State, as to a bank bill. Permit me to inquire of that gentleman whether he ever saw a law authorizing one man to give another his promissory note? He may search the pandects of Justinian; he may turn over the leaves of the musty volumes written upon the common law, from the days of Bracton and Fleta down to the present day, and his search will be in vain. For the right to make contracts, the right to give promissory notes, is antecedent to, and independent of all municipal law. The gentleman will find laws and decisions in abundance, regulating the effect of endorsements and other collateral circumstances, and prescribing the manner of enforcing the payment of promissory notes, but he will never find a law giving the right to execute the promissory note. But it is said that the bills of credit, which the States are prohibited from emitting, must be bills of credit emitted on the credit of the State. If this distinction should be well founded, many of the State banks are still subject to the charge of unconstitutionality, because in many of them the States are directly interested, and wherever that is the case, their bank bills are bills of credit emitted on the credit of the State. But the correctness of this distinction may well be denied, because the restriction is as general as it could possibly be made. But it is said that this restriction applies only to bills of credit which are made a legal tender in the payment of debts; that bills of credit, designated in the constitution, are ex vi termini a legal tender. For the correctness of this exposition, an appeal is made to the restriction which immediately follows it, which restrains the right of the States to make anything but gold and silver a legal tender in the payment of debts. It appears to me that the latter restriction excludes most emphatically the construction contended for. If the States are prohibited from emitting bills of credit, it would have been, to say the least of it, wholly nugatory to say they should not make them a legal tender. If the bills are not emitted, it is impossible that they can be made a legal tender. To suppose that the restriction upon the right of the States to make any thing but gold and silver legal tender has any connection with or influence upon the restriction to emit bills of credit, is as absurd as to suppose that the Decalogue, after having declared that "thou shalt do no murder," should have added, but, if you will murder, you shall not rob and strike the dead. The construction of the restraint upon the right to make any thing but gold or silver a tender, is that they shall not make specific articles, as tobacco or cotton, a tender, as was the case in some of the States.
But it is said that the history of the States will show that the bills of credit specified in the constitution were those only which were a legal tender in the payment of debts. Let us examine this point, according to the rule of construction applied to another clause in the constitution by a large majority of both Houses of Congress during the present session. Another clause in the constitution gives Congress the power to admit new States into the Union under two limitations: 1st. That no new State shall be formed within the limits of any State without the consent of the State; and, 2d. That no new State should be formed by the junction of two or more States without the consent of such States, and also of Congress. These limitations prove that the formation of new States, within the limits of the United States, was in view of the convention at the time that this clause was adopted; and the subsequent clause, which gives Congress the power to make rules for the government of its Territories, proves that these Territories were at that moment under consideration. In addition to these reasons for believing that the framers of the constitution had no idea of forming new States, beyond the limits of the United States, those who were opposed to the admission of Orleans as a State contended that the history of the United States proves that the power to erect new States and admit them into the Union was intended to be confined to new States within the limits of the United States at the formation of the constitution, and that a different construction would disparage the rights of the original States, and, of course, be a violation of the constitution. What reply did the majority of Congress give to this train of reasoning? They said that the right to admit new States cannot be subject to any other limitations or restrictions than those which are contained in the clause which gives the right, and as there is no restriction upon the right to erect new States without the then limits of the United States, Congress have an unlimited right to erect and admit them into the Union. Let us apply the same rule of construction to the restriction of the right of the States to emit bills of credit. The restriction is a general one; it has no exceptions; and every attempt to make exceptions ought to be repelled by the answer which was given to those who opposed the right of Congress to admit the Territory of Orleans into the Union as a State. The construction I have contended for gains additional weight when we consider the restriction which immediately precedes that under consideration. No State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, &c. Bills of credit are but the representatives of money. The constitution gives Congress the right to coin money, and to regulate its value. It takes from the States the right to coin money and to emit bills of credit. Why give to Congress the right to coin money and regulate its value? Because the interest of the nation requires that the current coin of the nation should be uniform both as to its species and value. If this is the true reason why the right of coining money and fixing its value was given to Congress, does not the right to issue that which is to be the representative of this coin; which, in fact, is to usurp its place; which is to be the real currency of the nation, necessarily belong to Congress? Does not the right to create a bank, which shall issue this representative of money, come within the same reason? I think it does.
To the fervid imagination of my friend from Kentucky, (Mr. Clay,) this power to create a bank appears to be more terrific than was the lever of Archimedes to the frightened imagination of the Romans, when they beheld their galleys suddenly lifted up and whirled about in the air, and in a moment plunged into the bosom of the ocean. Are these apprehensions founded in reason, or are they the chimeras of a fervid and perturbed imagination? What limitation does the constitution contain upon the power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, duties, and excises? None but that they shall be uniform; which is no limitation of the amount which they can lay and collect. What limitation does it contain upon the power to raise and support armies? None other than that appropriations shall not be made for a longer term than two years. What restriction is to be found in it upon the right to provide and maintain a navy? None. What upon the right to declare war and make peace? None, none. Thus the constitution gives to the Government of the United States unlimited power over your purses—unlimited power to raise armies and provide navies—unlimited power to make war and peace, and you are alarmed; you are terrified at the power to create a bank to aid it in the management of its fiscal operations. Sir, nothing short of my most profound respect for honorable gentlemen, who have frightened themselves with this bugbear, could induce me to treat the subject seriously. Gentlemen have said that they are alarmed at the exercise of this power, and I am bound to believe them. Sir, after giving Congress the right to make war and peace; the right to impose taxes, imposts, duties, and excises, ad libitum; the right to raise and support armies without restriction as to number or term of service; the right to provide and maintain a navy without a limitation, I cannot bring myself to tremble at the exercise of a power incidental to only one of these tremendous grants of power. The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) contends that we have attempted to give a degree of weight and force to what we are pleased to call precedents, to which they would not be entitled in those tribunals from which we derive all our ideas of precedents. I am happy to find that my friend from Virginia (Mr. Giles) agrees with me in opinion upon this subject. Indeed the principal difference between that gentleman and myself is confined to the question of expedience. He thinks that the construction which has been given to the constitution ought to be considered as conclusive; and that great inconvenience will be produced by unsettling what ought to be considered as finally settled and adjudged.
Sir, I have closed the observations which I thought it my duty to make in reply to the comments which have been made upon the remarks which I had previously submitted to the consideration of this honorable body. If, sir, I preferred my political standing in the State which I have the honor to represent (and, sir, I do not profess to have any out of it) to the public welfare, I should rejoice at the success of the motion which has been made by the honorable gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Anderson.) But, sir, as I believe the public welfare infinitely more important than any fleeting popularity which an individual like myself can expect to enjoy, I shall most sincerely regret the success of that motion. Sir, I have said but little about the degree of distress which will flow from the dissolution of the bank, because I have not that kind of evidence which would enable me to judge of it with any degree of accuracy. The convulsed state of the European nations; the immense losses which our commerce has sustained by the operation of the decrees and orders of the tyrants of the land and the ocean, imperiously admonish us to beware of making untried and dangerous experiments. By supporting this institution, the tottering credit of the commercial class of your citizens may be upheld, until the storm shall have passed over. By overturning this great moneyed institution at the present crisis, you may draw down to undistinguished ruin thousands of your unfortunate and unoffending fellow-citizens.
The question was then taken on striking out the first section of the bill, (equivalent to a rejection,) when it appeared that there were for the motion 17, against it 17, as follows:
Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Campbell, Clay, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, German, Giles, Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Mathewson, Reed, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Whiteside, and Worthington.
Nays.—Messrs. Bayard, Bradley, Brent, Champlin, Condit, Crawford, Dana, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Lloyd, Pickering, Pope, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, and Turner.
The Senate being equally divided, it became the duty of the Vice President to decide the question by his vote; previously to which he made the following observations:
Gentlemen: As the subject on which I am called upon to decide has excited great sensibility, I must solicit the indulgence of the Senate while I briefly state the reasons which influence my judgment.
Permit me to observe, that the question to be decided does not depend simply upon the right of Congress to establish under any modification a bank, but upon their power to establish a National Bank, as contemplated by this bill. In other words, can they create a body politic and corporate, not constituting a part of the Government, nor otherwise responsible to it but by forfeiture of charter, and bestow on its members privileges, immunities, and exemptions not recognized by the laws of the States, nor enjoyed by the citizens generally? It cannot be doubted but that Congress may pass all necessary and proper laws for carrying into execution the powers specifically granted to the Government, or to any department or officer thereof; but, in doing so, the means must be suited and subordinate to the end. The power to create corporations is not expressly granted; it is a high attribute of sovereignty, and in its nature not accessorial or derivative by implication, but primary and independent.
I cannot believe that this interpretation of the constitution will, in any degree, defeat the purposes for which it was formed. On the contrary, it does appear to me, that the opposite exposition has an inevitable tendency to consolidation, and affords just and serious cause of alarm.
In the course of a long life I have found that Government is not to be strengthened by an assumption of doubtful powers, but by a wise and energetic execution of those which are incontestible; the former never fails to produce suspicion and distrust, while the latter inspires respect and confidence.
If, however, after a fair experiment, the powers vested in the Government shall be found incompetent to the attainment of the objects for which it was instituted, the constitution happily furnishes the means for remedying the evil by amendment, and I have no doubt that in such event on an appeal to the patriotism and good sense of the community it will be wisely applied.
I will not trespass upon the patience of the Senate any longer than to say, from the best examination I have been able to give the subject, I am constrained by a sense of duty to decide in the affirmative—that is, that the first section of the bill be stricken out.
Bank of the United States.
Mr. Clay, from the committee to whom was referred, on the 25th February, the memorial of the stockholders of the Bank of the United States, praying that an act of Congress might be passed to continue the corporate powers of the bank for a further period, to enable it to settle such of its concerns as may be depending on the 3d of March, 1811, made the following report:
That your committee have duly weighed the contents of the memorial, and deliberately attended to such explanations of the views of the memorialists as they have thought proper to present through their agents. That, holding the opinion (as a majority of the committee do) that the constitution did not authorize Congress originally to grant the charter, it follows, as a necessary consequence of that opinion, that an extension of it, even under the restrictions contemplated by the stockholders, is equally repugnant to the constitution. But, if it were possible to surmount this fundamental objection, and if that rule which forbids, during the same session of the Senate, the re-agitation of a proposition once decided, were disregarded, your committee would still be at a loss to find any sufficient reasons for prolonging the political existence of the corporation for the purpose of winding up its affairs. For, as it respects the body itself, it is believed that the existing laws, through the instrumentality of a trust properly constituted, afford as ample means as a qualified continuance of the charter would, for the liquidation of its accounts, and the collection and final distribution of its funds. But should any inconvenience be experienced on this subject, the committee are persuaded it will be very partial, and such as the State authorities, upon proper application, would not fail to provide a competent remedy for. And, in relation to the community, if the corporation, stripped of its banking powers, were to fulfil bona fide the duty of closing its affairs, your committee cannot see that any material advantage would be derived. Whilst, on the contrary, if it should not so act, but should avail itself of the temporary prolongation, in order to effect a more durable extension of its charter, it might in its operations become a serious scourge.
Your committee are happy to say that they learn, from a satisfactory source, that the apprehensions which were indulged, as to the distress resulting from a non-renewal of the charter, are far from being realized in Philadelphia, to which their information has been confined. It was long since obvious that the vacuum, in the circulation of the country, which was to be produced by the withdrawal of the paper of the Bank of the United States, would be filled by paper issuing from other banks. This operation is now actually going on. The paper of the Bank of the United States is rapidly returning, and that of other banks is taking its place. The ability to enlarge their accommodations is proportionately enhanced; and when it shall be further increased by a removal into their vaults of those deposits which are in the possession of the Bank of the United States, the injurious effects of a dissolution of the corporation will be found to consist in an accelerated disclosure of the actual condition of those who have been supported by the credit of others, but whose insolvent or tottering situation, known to the bank, has been concealed from the public at large.
Your committee beg leave to present the following resolution:
Resolved, That the prayer of the memorialists ought not to be granted.
The report was ordered to lie on the table.
Claim of General Wilkinson.
Mr. Bradley, from the committee to whom was referred the memorial of General James Wilkinson, praying to be remunerated for moneys disbursed in the service of the United States, made the following report:
That the said Wilkinson has exhibited to them claims against the United States, to the amount of eleven thousand eight hundred dollars and ninety-six cents. It appears to your committee, from the documents and proofs produced by the petitioner to explain and support his claim against the public, that, of the above sum, $6,719.73 are claimed for his disbursements and expenses incurred pending Burr's conspiracy; $2,560 paid for a tract of land for the public service, now occupied by the troops on the Missouri river, near its mouth; $450, the amount of his passage from Baltimore to Charleston, when ordered on extra duty by the President; and $2,131.23, for losses of property sustained by his sudden transfer from St. Louis, where he was exercising the functions of a civil magistrate, to the Sabine, for the purpose of directing the arms of the nation against an invading force of the Spaniards.
Your committee have no hesitancy in saying that many of the charges appear to be legal and founded in justice, and may furnish a proper set off against the balance opposed to him by the War Department, and that the residue are entitled to equitable consideration; but, from the shortness of the time, and the pressure of business before the expiration of the session, your committee cannot find leisure to form that deliberate and clear judgment on the merits of the several items which justice to the petitioner and to the public require; they, therefore, beg leave to offer the following resolution:
Resolved, That the further consideration of the petition of General James Wilkinson, together with the accompanying documents, be postponed to the next meeting of Congress.
The report and accompanying documents were ordered to lie on the table.
The Senate adjourned to 6 o'clock this evening.
Adjournment.
Resolved, That Messrs. Turner and Condit be a committee on the part of the Senate, with such committee as the House of Representatives may join, to wait on the President of the United States and notify him, that, unless he may have any further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress, they are ready to adjourn.
Ordered, That the Secretary acquaint the House of Representatives therewith, and request the appointment of a committee on their part.
A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate, that the House concur in the resolution for the appointment of a joint committee to wait upon the President of the United States, and notify him of the intended recess, and have appointed a committee on their part.
Mr. Turner, from the joint committee, reported that they had waited upon the President of the United States, who informed them that he had no further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress.
Ordered, That the Secretary notify the House of Representatives that the Senate, having finished the business before them, are about to adjourn. Whereupon, the President adjourned the Senate without day.
The following confidential Message was received from the President of the United States, by Mr. Edward Coles, his Secretary:
To the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States:
I communicate to Congress, in confidence, a letter of the 2d of December, from Governor Folch, of West Florida, to the Secretary of State; and another, of the same date, from the same, to John McKee.
I communicate, in like manner, a letter from the British Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary of State, with the answer of the latter. Although the letter cannot have been written in consequence of any instruction from the British Government, founded on the late order for taking possession of the portion of West Florida well known to be claimed by the United States; although no communication has ever been made by that Government to this of any stipulation with Spain, contemplating an interposition which might so materially affect the United States; and although no call can have been made by Spain, in the present instance, for the fulfilment of any such subsisting engagement; yet the spirit and scope of the document, with the accredited source from which it proceeds, required that it should not be withheld from the consideration of Congress.
Taking into view the tenor of these several communications, the posture of things with which they are connected, the intimate relation of the country adjoining the United States, eastward of the river Perdido, to their security and tranquillity, and the peculiar interest they otherwise have in its destiny, I recommend to the consideration of Congress, the seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not see, without serious inquietude, any part of a neighboring territory, in which they have, in different respects, so deep and so just a concern, pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign power.
I recommend to their consideration, also, the expediency of authorizing the Executive to take temporary possession of any part or parts of the said territory, in pursuance of arrangements which may be desired by the Spanish authorities; and for making provision for the government of the same, during such possession.
The wisdom of Congress will, at the same time, determine how far it may be expedient to provide for the event of a subversion of the Spanish authorities within the territory in question, and an apprehended occupancy thereof by any other foreign power.
JAMES MADISON.
Washington, January 3, 1811.
The Message was read.
On motion by Mr. Clay,
Resolved, That the Message from the President of the United States, of this day, which has been just read, be referred to a committee, with leave to report by bill or otherwise.
Mr. Clay, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Smith of Maryland, and Mr. Anderson, were appointed the committee.
Mr. Clay, from the committee, appointed the 3d instant, on the confidential Message of the President of the United States, reported a declaration and bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the country lying east of the Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes; which were read, and passed to a second reading.
The bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the country lying east of the Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes, was read the second time; and, on motion by Mr. Clay, it was considered as in Committee of the Whole.
On motion, by Mr. Bayard, to amend the bill, by striking out of the first section thereof the words, "In the event of such arrangement for that purpose as shall have been made with the local authority which may then exist;" and, in lieu thereof, to insert the words, "In case an arrangement has been or shall be made with the local authority of the said territory for delivering up the possession of the same to the United States:"
On motion, by Mr. Gilman, a division of the question was called for: and the question being put on striking out, it was determined in the affirmative.
The question was then taken upon inserting the proposed amendment, and determined in the affirmative—yeas 20, nays 12, as follows:
Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Bayard, Brent, Campbell, Condit, Crawford, Franklin, German, Gregg, Lambert, Lloyd, Mathewson, Pickering, Pope, Reed, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, and Worthington.
Nays.—Messrs. Bradley, Champlin, Clay, Cutts, Dana, Gaillard, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Leib, Robinson, and Whiteside.
On motion, by Mr. Bayard, it was agreed to amend the fourth section of the bill, by inserting, after the word "enacted," the words, "That in case possession of the territory aforesaid shall be obtained by the United States, as aforesaid."
The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territory lying east of the Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes.
On motion, by Mr. Clay, it was agreed further to amend the bill, by adding to the first section the remainder of the original second section; and by adopting the original third and fourth sections, as the second and third sections of the bill; and having gone through the amendments, the President reported the bill to the House accordingly.
On the question, "Shall this bill be engrossed and read a third time, as amended?" it was determined in the affirmative.
Mr. Anderson submitted the following motion:
Resolved, That the subject-matter of the bill, entitled "An act to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the country lying east of the Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes," be kept inviolably secret by the members of the Senate, until the Senate shall, by their resolution, take off the injunction of secrecy.
Which was read; and on the question to agree thereto, it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 20, nays 6, as follows:
Yeas.—Messrs. Anderson, Bradley, Brent, Clay, Crawford, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, Gilman, Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Pope, Reed, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Tait, Taylor, Whiteside, and Worthington.
Nays.—Messrs. Bayard, Champlin, Dana, Goodrich, Lloyd, and Pickering.
Mr. Cutts, from the committee, reported the bill last mentioned, correctly engrossed.
A confidential message was received from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Montgomery and Mr. Cutts, two members of that body, with the following resolution, in which they ask the concurrence of the Senate:
Congress of the United States,
In House of Representatives, Jan. 8, 1811.
Taking into view the present state of the world, the peculiar situation of Spain and of the American provinces, and the intimate relation of the territory eastward of the river Perdido, adjoining the United States, to their security and tranquillity: Therefore,
Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States cannot see, with indifference, any part of the Spanish provinces, adjoining the said States, eastward of the river Perdido, pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign power.
The resolution was read, and passed to a second reading.
So it was Resolved, That this bill do pass, and that the title thereof be, "An act to enable the President of the United States, under certain contingencies, to take possession of the country lying east of the river Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes."
On motion, by Mr. Clay,
Resolved, That a committee of two be appointed to carry the said bill to the House of Representatives, and ask their concurrence therein.
Ordered, That Mr. Clay and Mr. Bayard be the committee.
Mr. Clay reported that the committee had performed the service assigned them.
Mr. Anderson, from the committee appointed on the subject, reported the confidential resolution from the House of Representatives, with the following amendment:
Strike out all the words after the word "the," first mentioned in the first line of the resolution, to the end thereof, and in lieu thereof, insert "peculiar situation of Spain and of her American provinces; and considering the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have upon their security, tranquillity, and commerce:" Therefore,
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States, under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory; they, at the same time, declare that the said territory shall, in their hands, remain subject to a future negotiation.
Which report was read, and considered as in Committee of the Whole; and, on motion to adopt the report, a division of the question was called for by Mr. Dana, and the question to strike out was agreed to, and the amendment was adopted; and the President reported the resolution to the House accordingly.
Ordered, That the resolution pass to the third reading, as amended.
This being the day appointed by the constitution for the meeting of Congress, the following members of the House of Representatives appeared and took their seats, to wit:
From New Hampshire—James Wilson.
From Massachusetts—Ezekiel Bacon, William Ely, and Joseph B. Varnum, Speaker.
From Vermont—Samuel Shaw.
From Connecticut—Epaphroditus Champion, John Davenport, jr., Jonathan O. Mosely, Timothy Pitkin, jr., and Benjamin Tallmadge.
From New York—James Emott, Jonathan Fisk, Robert Le Roy Livingston, Erastus Root, Thomas Sammons, John Thompson, Uri Tracy, and Killian K. Van Rensselaer.
From New Jersey—Adam Boyd, Jacob Hufty, and Henry Southard.
From, Pennsylvania—William Anderson, David Bard, Robert Brown, William Crawford, William Findlay, Daniel Heister, Aaron Lyle, William Milnor, John Rea, Matthias Richards, Adam Seybert, John Smilie, George Smith, Samuel Smith, and Robert Whitehill.
From Maryland—Charles Goldsborough, Alexander McKim, Philip B. Key, Archibald Van Horne, John Montgomery, and Nicholas R. Moore.
From Virginia—James Breckinridge, William A. Burwell, Matthew Clay, John Dawson, David S. Garland, Thomas Gholson, Peterson, Goodwyn, Joseph Lewis, jr., Thomas Newton, John Roane, and James Stephenson.
From North Carolina—Willis Alston, jr., James Cochran, James Holland, Thomas Kenan, Nathaniel Macon, Archibald McBryde, Joseph Pearson, Richard Stanford, and John Stanley.
From South Carolina—Lemuel J. Alston, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, Thomas Moore, John Taylor, and Robert Witherspoon,.
From Georgia—William W. Bibb, Howell Cobb, and George M. Troup.
From Kentucky—Joseph Desha, Richard M. Johnson, and Samuel McKee.
From Tennessee—Pleasant M. Miller, John Rhea, and Robert Weakley.
From Ohio—Jeremiah Morrow.
Several new members, to wit: from Connecticut, Ebenezer Huntington, returned to serve in the place of Samuel W. Dana, appointed a Senator of the United States; from New Jersey, John A. Scudder, in the place of James Cox, deceased; and from Maryland, Robert Wright, in the place of John Brown, resigned; appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats.
A quorum, consisting of a majority of the whole House, being present, the Clerk of the House was directed to acquaint the Senate therewith.
On motion of Mr. Dawson, a committee was appointed on the part of the House, jointly with the committee appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications he may be pleased to make to them.
The Clerk of the House was directed to procure newspapers from any number of offices that the members may elect, provided that the expense do not exceed the amount of three daily papers.
The House then adjourned until to-morrow morning eleven o'clock.
Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, Richard Cutts, Ebenezer Seaver, and Charles Turner, jr.; from Rhode Island, Elisha R. Potter; from New York, Thomas R. Gold; from Pennsylvania, Robert Jenkins; and from Virginia, Burwell Bassett and John W. Eppes, appeared, and took their seats in the House.
A new member, to wit, from New York, Samuel L. Mitchill, returned to serve in the place of William Denning, resigned, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat.
Jonathan Jennings, the Delegate from the Indiana Territory, and Julian Poydras, the Delegate from the Territory of Orleans, appeared, and took their seats.
A message from the Senate informed the House that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and ready to proceed to business. They have appointed a committee on their part, jointly with the committee appointed on the part of this House, to inform the President of the United States, that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications that he may be pleased to make to them.
Mr. Dawson, from the joint committee appointed to wait on the President of the United States, reported that the committee had performed the service assigned them, and that the President answered that he would make a communication to the two Houses of Congress to-morrow at twelve o'clock.
Several other members, to wit: from New Hampshire, Daniel Blaisdell and John C. Chamberlain; from Massachusetts, J. Quincy, Samuel Taggart, and Laban Wheaton; from Vermont, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, and Jonathan H. Hubbard; from Connecticut, Lewis B. Sturges; from New York, Vincent Matthews, Peter B. Porter, and Ebenezer Sage; and from Rhode Island, Richard Jackson, jr., appeared, and took their seats in the House.
A Message was received from the President of the United States, which was read at the Clerk's table.
[For this Message see Senate Proceedings of this date, ante page.]
The documents accompanying the Message having been read, in part, the House adjourned.
The Speaker laid before the House certificates of the election of Ebenezer Huntington, of Connecticut; John A. Scudder, of New Jersey; Robert Wright, of Maryland; and William McKinley, returned to supply the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of John G. Jackson, of Virginia; which were referred to the Committee of Elections.
Another member, to wit, from New Jersey, William Helms, appeared, and took his seat in the House; also, a new member, to wit, from Maryland, Samuel Ringgold, returned to serve in the place of Roger Nelson, resigned, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.
Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, Gideon Gardner; from New York, Gurdon S. Mumford; from Pennsylvania, John Porter; from Virginia, John Love and Daniel Sheffey; and from North Carolina, Lemuel Sawyer, appeared, and took their seats.
The Speaker laid before the House a certificate of the election of William T. Barry, elected to supply the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Benjamin Howard, of Kentucky; which was referred to the Committee of Elections.
Several other members, to wit: from New York, Herman Knickerbacker; from Virginia, Edwin Gray and Jacob Swoope; and from South Carolina, Richard Wynn, appeared, and took their seats.
Two other members, to wit: from North Carolina, Meshack Franklin and William Kennedy, appeared, and took their seats.
Another member, to wit, from Georgia, Dennis Smelt, appeared, and took his seat; also two other new members, to wit: Joseph Allen, from Massachusetts, in the place of Jabez Upham, resigned, and William T. Barry, from Kentucky, in the place of Benjamin Howard, resigned, appeared, were qualified, and took their seats.
Apportionment Bill.
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill to apportion the Representatives according to the third enumeration of the people of the United States.
The question recurring on filling the blank with the number of souls which should entitle to a Representative—
Mr. Macon said he was decidedly of opinion that the ratio ought to be fixed, before the result of the census was known. He had no objection to a moderate increase of the number of members; if they amounted to so many that one side of the House could not hear the other side speak, debate was at end, and the purposes of deliberative legislation defeated. He should have liked the bill better, he said, if it had declared that the House of Representatives should hereafter consist of a certain number of members, and had left the apportionment then to be made according to the population. On the subject of electioneering, he said it became him at least to say, that that portion of the people who sent him here, had not been concerned in it. Whatever might have been the practice elsewhere, so far as concerned his constituents, there had been no going about or haranguing. And, on the subject of electioneering, said he, wherever the people are free, there will be electioneering. It belongs to free government. Possibly different parts of the country may differ as to the mode. In some, men go themselves about electioneering; in others, their friends do it for them. In some, newspaper publications help an election; in others, they destroy it. In some places, I have heard, the sacred pulpit is not free from it; in others, a divine would be destroyed that would attempt it. There was not more electioneering South, Mr. M. believed, than elsewhere; certain he was that candidates could not there spend the sums of money which he had heard of being spent elsewhere in an election. He concluded by saying he was in favor of a moderate increase of representatives. He was not afraid that, from a multitude of counsellors, nothing would be done; it was quite as much to be feared from too few that they would act rashly.
Another member, to wit, from Massachusetts, Abijah Bigelow, elected to supply the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of William Stedman, appeared, was qualified, and took his seat.
Apportionment Bill.
Mr. Gold considered this bill as a very important one, as fixing the construction to be put on a provision of the constitution. While, on the one hand, it might be admitted that business would be in general better done by a small number of Representatives, yet, on the other hand, there were important considerations in favor of a large number, as gentlemen would find by referring to the discussions at the period of the adoption of the constitution. It was then feared by some that the representation of so great a people would be too small. If gentlemen would refer to a number of papers, drawn up by an association of gentlemen, at that time, and published under the title of "The Federalist," they would find various arguments used to induce the Legislature to make the representation full; so that, at that period, no apprehensions had existed of the Representatives becoming too numerous. On the contrary, it was supposed that the public confidence would be impaired by having a small delegation. In adverting to the relaxed state of the Union, and how much it was exposed to be shook by attempts to weaken it, it was supposed that public confidence would be inspired, and general satisfaction given, by the selection of a large number. It was true, Mr. G. said, that representation might swell so much as to operate to the exclusion of legislation; but the House of Representatives would not, even if the present ratio were retained, be so numerous as many other legislative bodies in the Union. He had no objection to increasing the numbers of the House of Representatives to such an amount as would permit public business to be done with facility. Gentlemen might differ as to the precise ratio; but, while they argued in favor of a small number, from the inconvenience of a large delegation, he hoped they would conceive with him that well-grounded apprehensions might be entertained of the evils which would result from its being too small.
Mr. Mitchill said he was in favor of the largest number proposed; and, not having been able to obtain that, he should vote for the largest on which a majority could agree. In the district represented by his colleague (Mr. Mumford) and himself, there was probably one hundred and twenty thousand souls, and yet he had not heard any murmuring that they were not adequately represented.
Congress, Mr. M. said, did not convene here to legislate on all the subjects of the rights of citizens. Our Government is, he contended, a peculiar piece of machinery, an imperium in imperio. The Representatives to Congress left behind them Legislatures, whose province it was to take care of the personal rights and the rights of property of our citizens. With these concerns, said Mr. M., we have nothing to do. We meet here under a constitution expressly framed and devised for legislating on select subjects, which, on account of the generality of their nature, could not be confided to the several States. When, then, we consider the narrow grounds we have to legislate on, that our great privileges are left at home, we shall be convinced that there is no occasion that this body should be as numerous as if we were concerned in the great questions of property and right, which are secured by the constitution, under the guardianship of the State Legislatures, and of the courts for the furthering of justice. If I were to quote a precedent of a Legislature for commanding influence, and for wisdom and sagacity in carrying us through an arduous contest whilst struggling for our liberties, I should quote the Old Congress—limited in number, but remarkable for the honesty and fidelity with which they performed what a more numerous body could not have accomplished. And, if I wished to cite an instance of the evils to be dreaded from a numerous assembly, I should quote the National Convention of France, where representatives, assembling in great number, exhibited such a spectacle of disorder as I hope we shall never, by a multitude of counsellors, run the risk of imitating.
Mr. Pitkin said that he had not expected that a bill of so much importance would have progressed so far, and gone through the Committee of the Whole in so rapid a manner as this had. What, he asked of the House, was settled by the passage of this bill? Nothing was, or could be settled by the present Congress, unless the returns were made from the different States of the number of inhabitants in each State, before the bill became a law; for Congress alone could designate and specify the number of Representatives which each State should send. The laws heretofore passed, designating the number of Representatives, had, at the same time, declared the ratio, and specified the number of Representatives of each State. Congress alone were competent to decide on the legality of the returns, and on their act alone could the State Legislatures proceed. Mr. P. presumed no member would say that it should be left to the Executive, or any Department of the Government, to say how many Representatives each State should send to Congress. The present Congress might fix the ratio as they pleased, but it would not be obligatory on the next Congress, who could, and undoubtedly would, modify or reverse it as they should think proper. This bill was, therefore, premature, and, in fact, would not settle the principle which it proposed to decide. He was, therefore, on this ground, opposed to the passage of this bill; and he believed the inconvenience of deciding it now would be greater than if the business were to rest until after the returns were made.
Mr. Quincy said that the agitation of this question at the present moment had taken him as much by surprise as it had the gentleman from Connecticut. He had no idea that a question so pregnant with interest would be hurried through the House in this way. His object in rising was to obtain a postponement of the question till some time in the next week, for the consideration of a point, which to his mind was important. He objected to the bill on the principle that it would be a violation of the constitution to pass it. It went to establish a ratio which, in its effect, must be abortive. The constitution says: