From this document, and the treaties referred to, it appears that in the month of October, 1764, when the whole of Louisiana, with the island and town of New Orleans, was delivered to Spain, that Great Britain was in the peaceable possession of all the country on the east of the Mississippi. That with respect to Florida particularly, Great Britain was in possession, and nobody dreamed at that time, that Florida either East or West, was any part of Louisiana. Had it been so considered under the orders of the French King, to deliver the whole of the province to Spain, undoubtedly Florida would have been delivered.

Immediately after the cession of '62-3, Great Britain took possession of all the country on the east of the Mississippi, except only the town and island of New Orleans, and, in the year 1763 or '4, erected Old Florida, Pensacola, the river and port of Mobile, &c., into two distinct provinces, under the name of East and West Florida, names which they have borne ever since. In 1783, at the close of our Revolutionary war, Great Britain ceded to Spain East and West Florida, which, from that period to the present time, have been held by Spain under these names, as separate provinces from Louisiana. In the year 1800, when Spain was in possession of East and West Florida and Louisiana, as three several and distinct provinces, the famous Treaty of St. Ildefonso was concluded, whereby Spain "retrocedes to France the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it; and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States." This treaty likewise has not been published, but the part just referred to is cited in the treaty between the United States and France of the 30th of April, 1803, whereby France cedes to the United States Louisiana, as fully and in the same manner as she acquired it of Spain by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. Spain delivered possession in pursuance of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso to France, and France, in pursuance of the treaty of 1803, delivered possession to the United States, both powers receiving the country on the West of the Mississippi, with the island and city of New Orleans, like Spain originally received it from France, as the whole of Louisiana.

I have now, I believe, sir, given a full and I trust fair and correct statement of the evidences and facts relative to the question of title. A few remarks will close what I have to say on this head. The letter from the King of France to M. L'Abbadie, is a very important document. It shows that the King of France, under whom we claim, and by whose admissions we are bound, so long ago as 1764, treated and considered the country on the west of the Mississippi as the whole of Louisiana. That, so considering it, he ceded and delivered it to Spain, together with the island and town of New Orleans, from which latter words it may be inferred that even the island and town of New Orleans were then not considered a part of Louisiana. In 1800, when Spain ceded back the colony of Louisiana to France, that country was only known on the west of the Mississippi. The war '56, and the treaties of '62-3, had fixed the line and obliterated forever the name of Louisiana on the east of that river.

The Treaty of St. Ildefonso, of 1800, is a mere treaty of retrocession. The translation purports to be a treaty of cession, it is true, but acknowledged on all sides to be erroneous. The original treaty was in the French language, and it is by that we are to be governed. The expression in the original is "Sa Majesté Catholique promit et s'engage, de son cote, à retroceder à la Republique Française," &c. A retroceder signifying to retrocede, to restore, or to use a term familiar in the State I have the honor to represent, reconvey the colony of Louisiana to France, as it was when France conveyed it to Spain. The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. Pope,) pressed by this argument, could only get round it by alleging that the original treaty between France and Spain was dated in 1761, prior to the settlement of the line and the cessions to Great Britain. But, unfortunately, he could not produce one title of authentic evidence to establish his position, a position absolutely negatived by the official letter to M. L'Abbadie. But that gentleman has further told us, that from the words "with the same extent it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between other States," an intention may be raised to include Florida. I fully subscribe to the gentleman's rule, that we must give such a construction to the treaty, and particularly to the passage just referred to, as will give effect, if possible, to all the parts; and this I apprehend may be done without having recourse to the forced construction contended for. In the first place, the two first members of the passage may be reconciled and have effect by considering them as a twofold description of the same territory. From abundant caution it is not uncommon to give various descriptions of the same object. Sometimes the name is simply used, sometimes it is described by metes and bounds, and sometimes by the names of the adjacent countries. Sometime a twofold, and sometimes a threefold description is given. And upon a critical examination, I think it will be found that this is the only true construction the instrument will bear. If you give it the construction the gentleman contends for, to wit: that the second member of the passage is an extension of the description given by the first, then the second includes the first, and of consequence the first would be nugatory and superfluous; which would be doing violence to the gentleman's own rule of construction. But if the gentleman will insist on giving to the second member an enlarged or extended sense, it may be done by applying it to the western boundaries of Louisiana. It is said that when France ceded Louisiana to Spain, in '62, the country extended on the west to the river Sabine, and that Spain, prior to the treaty of 1808, detached from Louisiana the territory south of the waters emptying into the Red River, and erected it into a new province under the name of the "Province of Texas." Sir, the operations on the Sabine are memorable. It is well known how mysteriously they were suspended by an arrangement in 1806, by which it was agreed that the Spaniards should not cross the Sabine, and that the Americans should not extend their settlements as far as that river. And for this purpose, to prevent collisions, until the difference should be settled, instructions were given that no surveys should be made west of a meridian passing by Nachitoches.

If the gentleman is not satisfied by travelling to the west, by going to the east he may find an application—the town and island of New Orleans, which, though named in the cession to Spain, are not named in the treaty of retrocession to France.

As to the third member of the passage, it is a formal provision introduced into most treaties, and would be understood if not expressed. Of course the cession would be subject to prior treaties with other States. In 1795, Spain concluded a treaty with the United States, whereby she agrees that the navigation of the Mississippi, in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean, shall be free to the citizens of the United States, and that they shall have the right to deposite their merchandise and effects in the port of New Orleans, free of duty for three years, and after that period, if the privilege is not extended at the port of New Orleans, she is to assign to the United States, on another part of the banks of the Mississippi, an equivalent establishment. To these provisions the clause in question I apprehend refers.

The holding or possession of Louisiana is correspondent with the construction I have given the treaty. When possession was originally delivered by France to Spain, Florida was not delivered or considered any part of the cession. When Louisiana, under the Treaty of St. Ildefonso was restored to France, Florida was not delivered. When Louisiana, under the treaty of 1803, was delivered to the United States, Florida was not comprehended. Indeed the Government of the United States then treated the country on the west of the Mississippi, including the town and island of New Orleans, as the whole of Louisiana, by receiving it and paying the purchase money, which by the terms of the treaty they were not bound to do, and which by the act of Congress creating the Louisiana stock they were not authorized to do, till after full and entire possession had been delivered.

Mr. President, is it conceivable that after the boundary in question had been established by the most solemn compact of nations, and consecrated by a long and bloody war, and, too, by a lapse of near forty years—is it conceivable that the territory in question, excluded by that boundary, and raised into a distinct province under a distinct name—a name it ever bore after the establishment of the boundary—is it, I say, sir, conceivable, if the parties meant to have included this province in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, that it should not have been specifically named?

Mr. Clay.—Mr. President, it would have gratified me if some other gentleman had undertaken to reply to the ingenious argument which you have just heard. But not perceiving any one disposed to do so, a sense of duty obliges me, though very unwell, to claim your indulgence while I offer my sentiments on this subject, so interesting to the Union at large, but particularly to the western section of it. Allow me, sir, to express my admiration at the more than Aristidean justice, which, in a question of territorial title between the United States and a foreign nation, induces certain gentlemen to espouse the pretensions of the foreign nation. Doubtless, in any future negotiations, she will have too much magnanimity to avail herself of these spontaneous concessions in her favor, made on the floor of the Senate of the United States.

It was to have been expected, that in a question like the present, gentlemen, even on the same side, would have different views, and although arriving at a common conclusion, would do so by various arguments. And hence the honorable gentleman from Vermont entertains doubts with regard to our title against Spain, while he feels entirely satisfied of it against France. Believing, as I do, that our title against both powers is indisputable, under the Treaty of St. Ildefonso between Spain and France, and, the treaty between the French Republic and the United States, I shall not inquire into the treachery by which the King of Spain is alleged to have lost his crown; nor shall I stop to discuss the question involved in the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy, and how far the power of Spain ought to be considered as merged in that of France. I shall leave the honorable gentleman from Delaware to mourn over the fortunes of the fallen Charles. I have no commiseration for princes. My sympathies are reserved for the great mass of mankind, and I own that the people of Spain have them most sincerely.

I will adopt the course suggested by the nature of the subject, and pursued by other gentlemen, of examining into our title to the country lying between the Mississippi and the Rio Perdido (which, to avoid circumlocution, I will call West Florida, although it is not the whole of it)—and the propriety of the recent measures taken for the occupation of it. Our title depends, first, upon the limits of the province or colony of Louisiana, and secondly, upon a just exposition of the treaties before mentioned.

On this occasion it is only necessary to fix the eastern boundary. In order to ascertain this, it is proper to take a cursory view of the settlement of the country; the basis of European title to colonies in America being prior discovery or prior occupancy. In 1682, La Salle migrated from Canada, then owned by France, descended the Mississippi and named the country which it waters, Louisiana. About 1698, D'Iberville discovered by sea the mouth of the Mississippi, established a colony at the Isle Dauphine or Massacre, which lies at the mouth of the bay of Mobile, and one at the mouth of the river Mobile, and was appointed, by France, governor of the country. In the year 1717, the famous West India Company sent inhabitants to the Isle Dauphine, and found some of those who had been settled there under the auspices of D'Iberville. About the same period Biloxi, near the Pascagoula, was settled. In 1719, the city of New Orleans was laid off, and the seat of the Government of Louisiana was established there. In 1736, the French erected a fort on Tombigbee. These facts prove that France had the actual possession of the country as far east as the Mobile at least. But the great instrument which ascertains, beyond all doubt, that the country in question is comprehended within the limits of Louisiana, is one of the most authentic and solemn character which the archives of the nation can furnish. I mean the patent granted in 1712, by Louis XIV. to Crozat. [Here Mr. C. read such parts of the patent as were applicable to the subject.] According to this document, in describing the province or colony of Louisiana, it is declared to be bounded by Carolina on the east and Old and New Mexico on the west. Under this high record evidence, it might be insisted that we have a fair claim to East as well as West Florida, against France at least, unless she has by some convention or other obligatory act, restricted the eastern limit of the province. It has, indeed, been asserted that by the treaty between France and Spain, concluded in the year 1719, the Perdido was expressly stipulated to be the boundary between their respective provinces of Florida on the east and Louisiana on the west; but as I have been unable to find any such treaty, I am induced to doubt its existence.

About the same period, to wit, towards the seventeenth century, when France settled the isle Dauphine and the Mobile, Spain erected a fort at Pensacola. But Spain never pushed her actual settlements or conquests further west than the bay of Pensacola, whilst those of the French were bounded on the east by the Mobile. Between those two points, a space of about thirteen or fourteen leagues, neither nation had the exclusive possession. The Rio Perdido, forming the bay of the same name, discharges itself into the Gulf of Mexico between the Mobile and Pensacola, and, being a natural and the most notorious object between them, presented itself as a suitable boundary between the possessions of the two nations. It accordingly appears very early to have been adopted as the boundary, by tacit if not express consent. The ancient charts and historians, therefore, of the country so represent it. Dupratz, one of the most accurate historians in point of fact and detail of the time, whose work was published as early as 1758, describes the coast as being bounded on the east by the Rio Perdido. In truth, sir, no European nation whatever, except France, ever occupied any portion of West Florida, prior to her cession of it to England in 1762. The gentlemen on the other side do not indeed strongly controvert, if they do not expressly admit, that Louisiana, as held by France anterior to her cession of it in 1762, reached to the Perdido. The only observation made by the gentleman from Delaware to the contrary, to wit, that the island of New Orleans being particularly mentioned could not for that reason constitute a part of Louisiana, is susceptible of a very satisfactory answer. That island was excepted out of the grant to England, and was the only part of the province east of the river that was so excepted. It formed in itself one of the most prominent and important objects of the cession to Spain originally, and was transferred to her with the portion of the province west of the Mississippi. It might with equal propriety be urged that St. Augustine is not in East Florida, because St. Augustine is expressly mentioned by Spain in her cession of that province to England. From this view of the subject I think it results that the province of Louisiana comprised West Florida, previous to the year 1762.

What is done with it at this epoch? By a secret convention of the 3d of November of that year, France ceded the country lying west of the Mississippi, and the island of New Orleans to Spain; and by a contemporaneous act, the articles preliminary to the definitive Treaty of 1763, she transferred West Florida to England. Thus at the same instant of time she alienated the whole province.

Posterior to this grant, Great Britain, having also acquired from Spain her possessions east of the Mississippi, erected the country into two provinces, East and West Florida. In this state of things it continued until the peace of 1783, when Great Britain, in consequence of the events of the war, surrendered the country to Spain, who for the first time came into the actual possession of West Florida. Well, sir, how does she dispose of it? She re-annexes it to the residue of Louisiana; extends the jurisdiction of that Government to it, and subjects the Governors or commandants of the districts of Baton Rouge, Feliciana, Mobile, and Pensacola, to the authority of the Governor of Louisiana, residing at New Orleans; whereas the Governor of East Florida is placed wholly without his control, and is made amenable directly to the Governor of the Havana. And I have been credibly informed that all the concessions or grants of land, made in West Florida, under the authority of Spain, run in the name of the government of Louisiana, You cannot have forgotten that about the period when we took possession of New Orleans, under the Treaty of Cession from France, the whole country rung with the nefarious speculations which were alleged to be practising in that city, with the connivance, if not actual participation of the Spanish authorities, by the procurement of surreptitious grants of land, particularly in the district of Feliciana. West Florida, then, not only as France has held it, but as it was in the hands of Spain, made a part of the province of Louisiana, as much so as the jurisdiction or district of Baton Rouge constituted a part of West Florida.

What, then, is the true construction of the Treaties of St. Ildefonso and of April, 1803, from whence our title is derived? If an ambiguity exist in a grant, the interpretation most favorable to the grantee is to be preferred. It was the duty of the grantor to have expressed himself in plain and intelligible terms. This is the doctrine not of Coke only, (whose dicta I admit have nothing to do with the question,) but of the code of universal law. The doctrine is entitled to augmented force when a clause only of the instrument is exhibited, in which clause the ambiguity lurks, and the residue of the instrument is kept back by the grantor. The entire convention of 1762, by which France transferred Louisiana to Spain, is concealed, and the whole of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, except a solitary clause. We are thus deprived of the aid which a full view of both of those instruments would afford. But we have no occasion to resort to any rules of construction, however reasonable in themselves, to establish our title. A competent knowledge of the facts, connected with the case, and a candid appeal to the treaties, are alone sufficient to manifest our right. The negotiators of the treaty of 1803 having signed with the same ceremony two copies, one in the English and the other in the French language, it has been contended, that in the English version the term "cede" has been erroneously used instead of "retrocede," which is the expression in the French copy. And it is argued that we are bound by the phraseology of the French copy, because it is declared that the treaty was agreed to in that language. It would not be very unfair to inquire if this is not like the common case, in private life, where individuals enter into a contract, of which each party retains a copy, duly executed. In such case neither has the preference. We might as well say to France we will cling by the English copy, as she could insist upon an adherence to the French copy; and if she urged ignorance on the part of Mr. Marbois, her negotiator, of our language, we might, with equal propriety, plead ignorance on the part of our negotiators of her language. As this, however, is a disputable point, I do not avail myself of it; gentlemen shall have the full benefit of the expressions in the French copy. According to this, then, in reciting the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, it is declared by Spain in 1800, that she retrocedes to France the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it then had in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States. This latter member of the description has been sufficiently explained by my colleague.

It is said that since France in 1762 ceded to Spain only Louisiana west of the Mississippi, and the island of New Orleans, the retrocession comprehended no more—that the retrocession ex vi termini was commensurate with and limited by the direct cession from France to Spain. If this were true, then the description, such as Spain held it, that is in 1800, comprising West Florida, and such as France possessed it, that is in 1762, prior to the several cessions, comprising also West Florida, would be totally inoperative. But the definition of the term retrocession, contended for by the other side, is denied. It does not exclude the instrumentality of a third party. It means restoration or reconveyance of the thing originally ceded, and so the gentleman from Delaware acknowledged. I admit that the thing restored must have come to the restoring party from the party to whom it is retroceded, whether directly or indirectly is wholly immaterial. In its passage it may have come through a dozen hands. The retroceding party must claim under and in virtue of the right originally possessed by the party to whom the retrocession takes place. Allow me to put a case: You own an estate called Louisiana. You convey one moiety of it to the gentleman from Delaware, and the other to me; he conveys his moiety to me, and I thus become entitled to the whole. By a suitable instrument I reconvey or retrocede the estate called Louisiana to you as I now hold it, and as you held it; what passes to you? The whole estate or my moiety only? Let me indulge another supposition: that the gentleman from Delaware, after he received from you his moiety, had bestowed a new denomination upon it, and called it West Florida, would that circumstance vary the operation of my act of retrocession to you? The case supposed is in truth the real one between the United States and Spain. France in 1762 transfers Louisiana west of the Mississippi to Spain, and at the same time conveys the eastern portion of it, exclusive of New Orleans, to Great Britain. Twenty one years after, that is in 1783, Great Britain cedes her part to Spain, who thus becomes possessed of the entire province; one portion by direct cession from France, and the residue by indirect cession. Spain then held the whole of Louisiana under France, and in virtue of the title of France. The whole moved or passed from France to her. When, therefore, in this state of things, she says, in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, that she retrocedes the province to France, can a doubt exist that she parts with, and gives back to France, the entire colony? To preclude the possibility of such a doubt, she adds, that she restores it, not in a mutilated condition, but in that precise condition in which France had, and she herself possessed it.

Having thus shown, as I conceive, a clear right in the United States to West Florida, I proceed to inquire if the proclamation of the President directing the occupation of property, which is thus fairly acquired by solemn treaty, be an unauthorized measure of war and of legislation, as has been contended.

The act of October, 1803, contains two sections, by one of which the President is authorized to occupy the territories ceded to us by France in the April preceding. The other empowers the President to establish a provisional government there. The first section is unlimited in its duration; the other is restricted to the expiration of the then session of Congress. The act, therefore, of March, 1804, declaring that the previous act of October should continue in force until the first of October, 1804, is applicable to the second and not the first section, and was intended to continue the provisional government of the President. By the act of the 24th of February, 1804, for laying duties on goods imported into the ceded territories, the President is empowered, whenever he deems it expedient, to erect the bay and river Mobile, &c., into a separate district, and to establish therein a port of entry and delivery. By this same act the Orleans Territory is laid off, and its boundaries are so defined as to comprehend West Florida. By other acts the President is authorized to remove by force, under certain circumstances, persons settling or taking possession of lands ceded to the United States.

These laws furnish a legislative construction of the treaty, correspondent with that given by the Executive, and they vest in this branch of the Government indisputably a power to take possession of the country, whenever it might be proper in his discretion. The President has not, therefore, violated the constitution, and usurped the war-making power, but he would have violated that provision which requires him to see that the laws are faithfully executed, if he had longer forborne to act. It is urged that he has assumed powers belonging to Congress in undertaking to annex the portion of West Florida between the Mississippi and the Perdido to the Orleans Territory. But Congress, as has been shown, has already made this annexation the limits of the Orleans Territory, as prescribed by Congress, comprehending the country in question. The President, by his proclamation, has not made law, but has merely declared to the people of West Florida what the law is. This is the office of a proclamation, and it was highly proper that the people of that Territory should be thus notified. By the act of occupying the country, the Government de facto, whether of Spain, or the revolutionists, ceased to exist; and the laws of the Orleans Territory, applicable to the country, by operation and force of law, attached to it. But this was a state of things which the people might not know, and every dictate of justice and humanity required, therefore, should be proclaimed. I consider the bill before us merely in the light of a declaratory law.

Never could a more propitious moment present itself for the exercise of the discretionary power placed in the President of the United States, and, had he failed to embrace it, he would have been criminally inattentive to the dearest interests of this country. It cannot be too often repeated, that if Cuba on the one hand, and Florida on the other, are in the possession of a foreign maritime power, the immense country belonging to the United States, watered by streams discharging themselves into the Gulf of Mexico—that is, one-third, nay more than two-thirds of the United States, comprehending Louisiana, is placed at the mercy of that power. The possession of Florida is a guarantee absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the navigation of those streams. The gentleman from Delaware anticipates the most direful consequences from the occupation of the country. He supposes a sally from a Spanish garrison upon the American forces, and asks what is to be done? We attempt a peaceful possession of the country, to which we are fairly entitled. If the wrongful occupants under the authority of Spain assail our troops, I trust they will retrieve the lost honor of the nation in the case of the Chesapeake. Suppose an attack upon any portion of the American army within the acknowledged limits of the United States by a Spanish force? In such event there would exist but a single honorable and manly course. The gentleman conceives it ungenerous that we should at this moment, when Spain is encompassed and pressed on all sides by the immense power of her enemy, occupy West Florida. Shall we sit by, passive spectators, and witness the interesting transactions in that country—transactions which tend to jeopardize, in the most imminent degree, our rights, without interference? Are you prepared to see a foreign power seize what belongs to us? I have heard in the most credible manner that, about the period when the President took his measures in relation to that country, the agents of a foreign power were intriguing with the people there to induce them to come under his dominion.

Whether this be the fact or not, it cannot be doubted, that if you neglect the present auspicious moment—if you reject the proffered boon, some other nation, profiting by your errors, will seize the occasion to get a fatal footing in your southern frontier. I have no hesitation in saying, that if a parent country will not or cannot maintain its authority in a colony adjacent to us, and there exists in it a state of misrule and disorder, menacing our peace, and if moreover such colony, by passing into the hands of any other power, would become dangerous to the integrity of the Union, and manifestly tend to the subversion of our laws; we have a right, upon eternal principles of self-preservation, to lay hold of it. This principle alone, independent of any title, would warrant our occupation of West Florida. But it is not necessary to resort to it, our title being in my judgment incontestably good.

Monday, December 31.

John Taylor, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of South Carolina, in place of Thomas Sumter, resigned, produced his credentials which were read; and the oath prescribed by law having been administered to him, he took his seat in the Senate.

Wednesday, January 2, 1811.

Andrew Gregg, from the State of Pennsylvania, took his seat in the Senate.

Monday, January 7.

James A. Bayard, from the State of Delaware, took his seat in the Senate.

Tuesday, January 8.

Thomas Worthington, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Ohio, in place of Return Jonathan Meigs, resigned, produced his credentials, which were read; and the oath prescribed by law having been administered to him, he took his seat in the Senate.

Monday, January 14.

James Turner, from the State of North Carolina, took his seat in the Senate.

Tuesday, January 29.

Mississippi Territory.

Mr. Anderson presented the memorial of the Legislative Council and House of Representatives of the Mississippi Territory, praying that the said Territory may be admitted as a State into the Union, upon the footing of the original States, and the memorial was read, and referred to a select committee to consider and report thereon by bill or otherwise; and Messrs. Anderson, Bayard, and Dana, were appointed the committee.

The memorial is as follows:

Wednesday, January 30.

Territory of Orleans.

The Senate took into consideration the amendment proposed yesterday, by Mr. Dana, to the bill, entitled "An act to enable the people of the Territory of New Orleans to form a constitution and State Government, and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and for other purposes:" and, on motion, by Mr. Clay, it was agreed to divide the question; and, on the question to agree to the first division of the amendment, to wit:

It was determined in the negative—yeas 10, nays 18, as follows:

On the question to agree to the second division of the amendment, to wit:

It was determined in the negative—yeas 8, nays 17, as follows:

On motion, by Mr. Bradley, to postpone the further consideration of the bill to the second Monday in February next, it was determined in the negative.

On the question, Shall the bill be read a third time as amended? it was determined in the affirmative—yeas 17, nays 10, as follows:

Friday, February 1.

The credentials of James A. Bayard, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Delaware, for the term of six years from the third day of March next: and of William H. Crawford, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Georgia, for the term of six years from the third day of March next, were severally read, and ordered to lie on file.

Wednesday, February 6.

Mr. Bradley presented the petition of Charlotte Hazen, relict of the late Brigadier General Moses Hazen, praying a grant of land may be made to her, as a Canadian refugee, or that a small addition, in lieu thereof, may be added to her present pension from Congress, for reasons stated at large in the petition; which was read, and referred to a select committee, to consider and report thereon by bill or otherwise; and Messrs. Bradley, Franklin, and German, were appointed the committee.

Monday, February 11.

Bank of the United States.

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day of February, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one.

Mr. Anderson said that having been a member of the committee who reported the bill before the Senate, and not feeling himself at liberty to oppose the introduction of the report, yet, thinking it might be advisable to try the principle before they proceeded to discuss the details, he should move to strike out the first section of the bill. He would barely observe that, was this not a question which was generally understood, on which not only every member of this House, but every citizen of the United States had made up his mind, he should feel himself bound to offer reasons in support of the motion; but, inasmuch as it was a question which every gentleman had doubtless decided in his own mind, he felt unwilling to take up any more of the attention of the Senate, especially so late in the session, when there was so much business of importance before them which required to be acted on.

Mr. Crawford said that he should proceed, though reluctantly, to explain the reasons of the committee for reporting the bill, which is now under consideration. After the most minute examination of the constitution, the majority of that committee were decidedly of opinion that the Congress of the United States were clearly invested with power to pass such a bill. The object of the constitution was twofold: 1st, the delegation of certain general powers, of a national nature, to the Government of the United States; and 2d, the limitation or restriction of the State sovereignties. Upon the most thorough examination of this instrument, I am induced to believe, that many of the various constructions given to it are the result of a belief that it is absolutely perfect. It has become so extremely fashionable to eulogize this constitution, whether the object of the eulogist is the extension or contraction of the powers of the Government, that whenever its eulogium is pronounced, I feel an involuntary apprehension of mischief. Upon the faith of this imputed perfection, it has been declared to be inconsistent with the entire spirit and character of this instrument, to suppose that after it has given a general power it should afterwards delegate a specific power fairly comprehended within the general power. A rational analysis of the constitution will refute in the most demonstrative manner this idea of its perfection. This analysis may excite unpleasant sensations; it may assail honest prejudices; for there can be no doubt that honest prejudices frequently exist, and are many times perfectly innocent. But when these prejudices tend to destroy even the object of their affection, it is essentially necessary that they should be eradicated. In the present case if there be any who, under the conviction that the constitution is perfect, are disposed to give it a construction that will render it wholly imbecile, the public welfare requires that the veil should be rent, and that its imperfection should be disclosed to public view. By this disclosure it will cease to be the object of adoration, but it will nevertheless be entitled to our warmest attachment.

The 8th section of the 1st article of the constitution contains among others the following grant of powers, viz: to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; to establish post-offices and post roads. This selection contains five grants of general power. Under the power to coin money it is conceived that Congress would have a right to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the money after it was coined, and that this power is fairly incidental to, and comprehended in, the general power. The power to raise armies and provide and maintain a navy comprehends, beyond the possibility of doubt, the right to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; and yet in these three cases, the constitution, after making the grant of general power, delegates specifically the powers which are fairly comprehended within the general power. If this, however, should be denied, the construction which has been uniformly given to the remaining powers which have been selected, will establish the fact beyond the power of contradiction. Under the power to regulate commerce, Congress has exercised the power of erecting light-houses, as incident to that power, and fairly comprehended within it. Under the power to establish post-offices, and post roads, Congress has provided for the punishment of offences against the Post-Office Department. If the Congress can exercise an incidental power not granted in one case, it can in all cases of a similar kind. But it is said, that the enumeration of certain powers excludes all other powers not enumerated. This is true so far as original substantive grants of power are concerned, but it is not true when applied to express grants of power, which are strictly incidental to some original and substantive grant of power. If it were true in relation to them, Congress could not pass a law to punish offences against the Post-Office Establishment, because the constitution has expressly given the power to punish offences against the current coin, and as it has given the power to punish offences committed against that grant of general power, and has withheld it in relation to the power to establish post-offices and post roads. Congress cannot, according to this rule of construction, so warmly contended for, pass any law to provide for the punishment of such offences. The power to make rules for the regulation and government of the land and naval forces, I have shown to be strictly incidental to the power to raise armies, and provide and maintain navies; but, according to this rule of construction, all incidental powers are excluded except the few which are enumerated, which would exclude from all claim to constitutionality, nearly one-half of your laws, and, what is still more to be deprecated, would render your constitution equally imbecile with the old articles of confederation. When we come to examine the 4th article, the absurdity of this rule of construction, and also of the idea of perfection which has been attributed to the constitution, will be equally manifest. This article appears to be of a miscellaneous character and very similar to the codicil of a will. The first article provides for the organization of Congress; defines its powers; prescribes limitations upon the powers previously granted; and sets metes and bounds to the authority of the State Governments. The second article provides for the organization of the Executive Department, and defines its power and duty. The 3d article defines the tenure by which the persons in whom the judicial power may be vested shall hold their offices, and prescribes the extent of their power and jurisdiction. These three articles provide for the three great departments of Government called into existence by the constitution, but some other provisions just then occur, which ought to have been included in one or the other of the preceding articles, and these provisions are incorporated and compose the 4th article. The 1st section of it declares, that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." In the second section it declares, that a person, charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime. A similar provision is contained in the same section, relative to fugitives who are bound to labor, by the laws of any State. In the first case which has been selected, express authority has been given to Congress, to prescribe the manner in which the records, &c., should be proved, and also the effect thereof, but in the other two, no authority is given to Congress, and yet the bare inspection of the three cases will prove that the interference of Congress is less necessary in the first than in the two remaining cases. A record must always be proved by itself, because it is the highest evidence of which the case admits. The effect of a record ought to depend upon the laws of the State of which it is a record, and, therefore, the power to prescribe the effect of a record was wholly unnecessary, and has been so held by Congress—no law having been passed to prescribe the effect of a record. In the second case there seems to be some apparent reason for passing a law to ascertain the officer upon whom the demand is to be made; what evidence of the identity of the person demanded and of the guilt of the party charged must be produced before the obligation to deliver shall be complete. The same apparent reason exists for the passage of a law relative to fugitives from labor. According, however, to the rule of construction contended for, Congress cannot pass any law to carry the constitution into effect, in the two last cases selected, because express power has been given in the first and is withheld in the two last. Congress has nevertheless passed laws to carry those provisions into effect, and this exercise of power has never been complained of by the people or the States.

Mr. President, it is contended by those who are opposed to the passage of this bill, that Congress can exercise no power by application, and yet it is admitted, nay, even asserted, that Congress would have power to pass all laws necessary to carry the constitution into effect, whether it had given or withheld the power which is contained in the following paragraph of the 8th section of the 1st article: "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof." If this part of the constitution really confers no power, it at least, according to this opinion, strips it of that attribute of perfection which has by these gentlemen been ascribed to it. But, sir, this is not the fact. It does confer power of the most substantial and salutary nature. Let us, sir, take a view of the constitution upon the supposition that no power is vested in the Government by this clause, and see how the exclusion of power by implication can be reconciled to the most important acts of the Government. The constitution has expressly given Congress power "to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court," but it has nowhere expressly given the power to constitute a supreme court. In the 3d article it is said, "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The discretion, which is here given to Congress, is confined to the inferior courts, which it may from time to time ordain and establish, and not to the Supreme Court. In the discussion which took place upon the bill to repeal the judicial system of the United States in the year 1802, this distinction is strongly insisted upon by the advocates for the repeal. The Supreme Court was said to be the creature of the constitution, and, therefore, intangible, but that Congress, possessing a discretionary power to create or not to create inferior tribunals, had the same discretionary power to abolish them whenever it was expedient. But if even the discretionary power here vested does extend to the Supreme Court, yet the power of Congress to establish that court must rest upon implication, and upon implication alone. Under the authority to establish tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, the power to establish a Supreme Court would, according to my ideas, be vested in Congress by implication. And, sir, it is only vested by implication, even if the declaration, that Congress shall have power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the power vested in any department or officer of the Government should be held to be an operative grant. Under this grant, Congress can pass laws to carry into effect the powers vested in the judicial department? What are the powers vested in this department. That it shall exercise jurisdiction in all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, &c., in all cases affecting ambassadors, &c., but the power to create the department and to carry into effect the powers given to or vested in that department, are very different things.

The power to create the Supreme Court cannot be expressly granted in the power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers vested in that court, but must, as I have endeavored to prove, be derived from implication. Let me explain my understanding of a power which exists by implication, by an example which will be comprehended by all who hear me. In a devise, an estate is granted to A, after the death of B, and no express disposition is made of the estate during the life of A; in that case A is said to have an estate for life, by implication, in the property so devised. So when the constitution gives the right to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, the right to create the Supreme is vested in Congress by implication. Shall we after this be told that Congress cannot constitutionally exercise any right by implication? By the exercise of a right derived only from implication, Congress has organized a Supreme Court, and then, as incidental to power, existing only by implication, it has passed laws to punish offences against the law by which the court has been created and organized. Sir, the right of the Government to accept of the District of Columbia, exists only by implication. The right of the Government to purchase or accept of places for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards, exists only by implication, and yet no man in the nation, so far as my knowledge extends, has complained of the exercise of those implied powers, as an unconstitutional usurpation of power. The right to purchase or except of places for the erection of light-houses, as well as the right to erect and support light-houses, must be derived by implication alone, if any such right exists. The clause in the constitution which gives Congress the power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings," certainly gives no express power to accept or purchase any of the places, destined for the uses therein specified. The only power expressly given in this clause is that of exercising exclusive legislation in such places; the right to accept or purchase must be derived by implication from this clause, or it must be shown to be comprehended in or incidental to some other power expressly delegated by the constitution. I shall now attempt to show, that according to the construction which has been given to other parts of this constitution, Congress has the right to incorporate a bank to enable it to manage the fiscal concerns of the nation. If this can be done, and if it can also be shown that the correctness of such construction has never excited murmur or complaint—that it has not even been questioned, I shall have accomplished every thing which it will be incumbent on me to prove, to justify the passage of the bill upon your table. The power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, together with the power to pass all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into effect the foregoing powers, when tested by the same rule of construction which has been applied to other parts of the constitution, fairly invests Congress with the power to create a bank. Under the power to regulate commerce, Congress exercises the right of building and supporting light-houses. What do we understand by regulating commerce? Where do you expect to find regulations of commerce? Will any man look for them any where else than in your treaties with foreign nations, and in your statutes regulating your custom-houses and custom-house officers? What are the reasons for vesting Congress with the right to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States? The commerce of a nation is a matter of the greatest importance in all civilized countries. It depends upon compacts with other nations, and whether they are beneficial or prejudicial depends not so much on the reciprocal interest of nations as upon their capacity to defend their rights and redress their wrongs. It was therefore highly important that the right to regulate commerce with foreign nations should be vested in the National Government. If the regulation of commerce among the several States had been left with the States, a multiplicity of conflicting regulations would have been the consequence. Endless collisions would have been created, and that harmony and good neighborhood, so essential between the members of a Federal Republic, would have been wholly unattainable. The best interest of the community, therefore, imperiously required, that this power should be delegated to Congress. Not so of light-houses. The interest of the States would have induced them to erect light-houses, where they were necessary, and when erected they would have been equally beneficial to their own vessels, the vessels of their sister States, and of foreign nations. The performance of this duty could have been most safely confided to the States. They were better informed of the situations in which they ought to be erected than Congress could possibly be, and could enforce the execution of such regulations as might be necessary to make them useful. How then has it happened that Congress has taken upon itself the right to erect light-houses, under their general power to regulate commerce? I have heard and seen in the public prints a great deal of unintelligible jargon about the incidentality of a law to the power delegated and intended to be executed by it, and of its relation to the end which is to be accomplished by its exercise, which I acknowledge I do not clearly and distinctly comprehend, and must therefore be excused from answering. I speak now of the public newspapers, to which I am compelled to resort to ascertain the objections which are made to this measure, as gentlemen have persevered in refusing to assign the reasons which have induced them to oppose the passage of the bill. But, sir, I can clearly comprehend that the right to erect light-houses is not incidental to the power of regulating commerce, unless every thing is incidental to that power which tends to facilitate and promote the prosperity of commerce. It is contended that under the power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and duties, you can pass all laws necessary for that purpose, but they must be laws to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and duties, and not laws which tend to promote the collection of taxes. A law to erect light-houses is no more a law to regulate commerce, than a law creating a bank is a law to collect taxes, imposts and duties. But the erection of light-houses tends to facilitate and promote the security and prosperity of commerce, and in an equal degree the erection of a bank tends to facilitate and insure the collection, safe-keeping, and transmission of your revenue. If, by this rule of construction, which is applied to light-houses, but denied to the bank, Congress can, as incidental to the power to regulate commerce, erect light-houses, it will be easy to show that the same right may be exercised, as incidental to the power of laying and collecting duties and imposts. Duties cannot be collected, unless vessels importing dutiable merchandise arrive in port; whatever, therefore, tends to secure their safe arrival may be exercised under the general power; the erection of light-houses does facilitate the safe arrival of vessels in port, and Congress therefore can exercise this right as incidental to the power to lay imposts and duties.

But it is said the advocates of the bank differ among themselves in fixing upon the general power to which the right to create a bank is incidental, and that this difference proves that there is no incidentality, to use a favorite expression, between that and any one of the enumerated general powers. The same reason can be urged, with equal force, against the constitutionality of every law for the erection of light-houses. Let the advocates for this doctrine lay their finger upon the power to which the right of erecting light-houses is incidental. It can be derived with as much apparent plausibility and reason from the right to lay duties, as from the right to regulate commerce. Who is there, now, in this body who has not voted for the erection of a light-house? And no man who reads one of these will believe it to be a regulation of commerce. And no man in the nation, so far as my knowledge extends, has ever complained of the exercise of this power. The right to erect light-houses is exercised, because the commerce of the nation, or the collection of duties, is greatly facilitated by that means; and, sir, the right to create a bank is exercised because the collection of your revenue, and the safe-keeping and easy and speedy transmission of your public money is not simply facilitated, but because these important objects are more perfectly secured by the erection of a bank than they can be by any other means in the power of human imagination to devise. We say, therefore, in the words of the constitution, that a bank is necessary and proper, to enable the Government to carry into complete effect the right to lay and collect taxes, imposts, duties, and excises. We do not say that the existence of the Government absolutely depends upon the operations of a bank, but that a national bank enables the Government to manage its fiscal concerns more advantageously than it could do by any other means. The terms necessary and proper, according to the construction given to every part of the constitution, imposes no limitation upon the powers previously delegated. If these words had been omitted in the clause giving authority to pass laws to carry into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the National Government, still Congress would have been bound to pass laws which were necessary and proper, and not such as were unnecessary and improper. Every legislative body, every person invested with power of any kind, is morally bound to use only those means which are necessary and proper for the correct execution of the powers delegated to them. But it is contended, that if a bank is necessary and proper for the management of the fiscal concerns of the nation, yet Congress has no power to incorporate one, because there are State banks which may be resorted to. No person who has undertaken to discuss this question has, as far as my knowledge extends, ventured to declare that a bank is not necessary. Every man admits, directly or indirectly, the necessity of resorting to banks of some kind. This admission is at least an apparent abandonment of the constitutional objection; for, if a bank is necessary and proper, then have Congress the constitutional right to erect a bank. But this is denied. It is contended that this idea rests alone upon the presumption that the Government of the United States is wholly independent of the State governments, which is not the fact; that this very law is dependent upon the State courts for its execution. This is certainly not the fact. The courts of the United States have decided, in the most solemn manner, that they have cognizance of all cases affecting the Bank of the United States. Sir, it is true that the Government of the United States is dependent upon the State governments for its organization. Members of both Houses of Congress, and the President of the United States, are chosen by the State governments, or under the authority of their laws. But it is equally true, that wherever the constitution confides to the State governments the right to perform any act in relation to the Federal Government, it imposes the most solemn obligation upon them to perform the act. The Constitution of the United States, as to these particular acts, is the constitution of the several States, and their functionaries are accordingly sworn to support it. Can it, then, be seriously contended, that because the constitution has in some cases made the Government of the United States dependent upon the State governments, in all which cases it has imposed the most solemn obligations upon them to act, that it will be necessary and proper for Congress to make itself dependent upon them in cases where no such obligation is imposed? The constitution has defined all the cases where this Government ought to be dependent upon that of the States; and it would be unwise and improvident for us to multiply these cases by legislative acts, especially where we have no power to compel them to perform the act, for which we have made ourselves their dependents. In forming a permanent system of revenue, it would be unwise in Congress to rely, for its collection and transmission from one extreme of this extensive empire to the other, upon any accidental circumstance, wholly beyond their power or control. There are State banks in almost every State in the Union, but their existence is wholly independent of this Government, and their dissolution is equally so. The Secretary of the Treasury has informed you that he conceives a bank is necessary to the legitimate exercise of the powers vested by the constitution in the Government. I know, sir, that the testimony of this officer will not be very highly estimated by several honorable members of this body. I am aware that this opinion has subjected him, and the committee also, to the most invidious aspersions; but, sir, the situation of that officer, independent of his immense talents, enables him to form a more correct opinion than any other man in the nation of the degree of necessity which exists at the present time for a national bank, to enable the Government to manage its fiscal operations. He has been ten years at the head of your Treasury; he is thoroughly acquainted with the influence of the bank upon your revenue system; and he has, when called upon, declared that a bank is necessary to the proper exercise of the legitimate powers of the Government. His testimony is entitled to great weight in the decision of this question, at least with those gentlemen who have no knowledge of the practical effects of the operations of the bank in the collection, safe-keeping, and transmission of your revenue. In the selection of means to carry any of your constitutional powers into effect, you must exercise a sound discretion; acting under its influence, you will discover that what is proper at one time may be extremely unfit and improper at another. The original powers granted to the Government by the constitution can never change with the varying circumstances of the country, but the means by which those powers are to be carried into effect must necessarily vary with the varying state and circumstances of the nation. We are, when acting to-day, not to inquire what means were necessary and proper twenty years ago, not what were necessary and proper at the organization of the Government, but our inquiry must be, what means are necessary and proper this day. The constitution, in relation to the means by which its powers are to be executed, is one eternal now. The state of things now, the precise point of time when we are called upon to act, must determine our choice in the selection of means to execute the delegated powers.

Mr. Lloyd.—Mr. President: This is indeed, sir, an up-hill, wind-mill sort of warfare—a novel mode of legislative proceeding. That a bill should be brought in on a very important subject which has been long under consideration, and that a gentleman should move to strike out the first section of the bill, which comprises all its vitality, (for it is the first section which provides for the continuance of the bank,) and should be supported in it, without deigning to assign any other reasons than may be derived from newspaper publications, which are so crude and voluminous that not one man out of ten will so far misspend his time as to take the trouble to read them, is indeed extraordinary. Still, if gentlemen choose to adopt this dumb sort of legislation, and are determined to take the question without offering any arguments in support of their opinions, I certainly should not have interfered with their wishes, had I not been a member of the committee who had reported the bill, who had heard the testimony offered by two very respectable delegations from Philadelphia; one from the master manufacturers and mechanics of the city, and the other from the merchants; and had I not taken minutes of this testimony, which I find it is expected from me that I should relate to the Senate.

Sir, I consider the motion to strike out, now under consideration, as going to the entire destruction of the bill, without any reference to its details or modifications; it therefore appears to me in order, to take into consideration only the material principle of the bill; that is, whether it be proper that the charter of the bank should be renewed on any terms whatever, let those terms be what they may.

Sir, it is admitted by the Secretary of the Treasury, in his communications to Congress, that the concerns of this bank have been "skilfully and wisely managed," that the bank has made a very limited and moderate use of the public moneys deposited with it; and that it has greatly facilitated the operations of Government by the safe-keeping and transmission of the public moneys. It has at all times met the wishes of the Government in making loans. It has done this even at six per cent., while the Government have been obliged, in one instance, for a considerable amount to pay eight per cent. to other persons for the loans obtained from them. It is admitted, sir, that the bank, at the request of the Treasury Department, has established branches for the purpose of facilitating the operations of the Government at places where such establishments could not but be inconvenient to them in point of management, and disadvantageous in point of profit. I allude more particularly, sir, to the branches of the bank which has been established at New Orleans and at Washington. We have been told this session, sir, by a gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Smith,) that the Territory of Orleans is a very wealthy one, that it probably contains a greater number of rich inhabitants, for its population, than any other district in the Union. Sir, if this be the fact, of whom does this wealthy population consist? Not of the inhabitants, but of the planters; men who are not borrowers of the bank, who, when they realize the sales of their produce, invest the surplus proceeds of it beyond their expenditure in the funds, or in the acquisition of new lands, or in the purchase of an additional number of negroes. Sir, it is notorious, that from the recent possession by the United States of Louisiana, and the certainty that New Orleans must soon be the emporium of an immense western commerce, that city has become more the resort of the young, the adventurous, the enterprising and the rash among the mercantile men of our country, than any other city in the Union; and it is obvious, sir, in proportion as the borrowers from a bank consist of persons of this description, in the same proportion must the circumstances of such bank be unsound; and without possessing any particular knowledge whatever on the state of this bank, if the collections of its debts are speedily made, I would not make the purchase at a discount of twenty-five per cent. from the nominal amount of them.

Sir, we can judge with more accuracy when we come nearer home. What is the state of the bank in this city? What the ability of its debtors to meet their engagements? It is stated the branch has a loan out here of four hundred thousand dollars. Where is the navigation?—where the wealthy merchants?—where are the opulent tradesmen?—the extensive manufacturers, to refund this money, when they are called on to do it? Sir, they are not to be found; they do not exist here; there are but very few opulent men in the city, and those are either not borrowers of the bank, or not borrowers to an amount of any importance. Where, then, is the money to be found, or what has been done with it? It has probably been taken out of the Bank of the United States to build up the five or six District banks which you have chartered the present session; to furnish the means of erecting the fifty or sixty brick houses which we are told have made their appearance during the last Summer; to encourage speculations in city lots, and to enable the proprietors to progress with the half-finished canal which nearly adjoins us. Well, sir, if the bank promptly calls in its loan of four hundred thousand dollars, will the debtors be enabled to meet their payments? Can they sell these lots, these brick houses, these canal shares? No, sir, in such a state of things they could find no purchasers, they could nearly as well create a world as to furnish the money; and if the bank is to stop, and the payment of this debt be speedily coerced, I would not give two hundred thousand dollars for the whole of it.

In addition to this, I shall show presently, from testimony which cannot be controverted, that the conduct of the Bank of the United States, or its directors, or rather the stockholders, whose agents they are, in addition to being wise and skilful, and moderate, as the Secretary of the Treasury states them to have been, that they have also been honorable, and liberal, and impartial; and if, in addition to this, it be proved that the bank has, in every instance where it had the ability to do it, met the wishes of the Government, and to facilitate its views in the security and collection of the revenue, it has also established branches where it must have been obviously and palpably to the disadvantage of the bank to do it—if it has furnished capitals for the extension of our commerce, if it has provided means for the establishment of important manufactories, if it has had a tendency to raise the price of our domestic produce, and has thus encouraged industry, and improved and embellished the interior of the country—it would seem pretty strongly to follow, that if it be expedient to preserve the existence of an institution similar to this, then these gentlemen, on the score of merit, added to the experience of twenty years' successful operation, have a fair claim on the Government for a preference in favor of that which is already in operation.

I am aware, sir, that it may be stated in opposition to this claim, that these stockholders have enjoyed a boon for twenty years from which others of their fellow-citizens have been deprived, except on such terms as the sellers of shares chose to prescribe; that the charter expires by its own limitation, and that beyond this period they have no right to expect any thing which may not arise from the interest and convenience of the Government. I admit, sir, there is considerable strength in these objections. The exclusive right contained in the charter ever appeared to me as furnishing the most solid constitutional objection against the bank. The creation of monopolies; the granting of exclusive privileges, except so far as to secure to the authors of useful inventions the benefit of their discoveries; the tying up of the hands of the Legislature, and depriving itself of the power of according to a set of citizens, who may come into legal existence to-morrow, or ten years hence, what it had given to another; ever appeared to me hostile to the genius and spirit of the people of the United States, and of all their institutions. Highly then, sir, as I am induced to think of the conduct of this bank, from the best evidence I can obtain, still, from the considerations I have just mentioned, did the question now before us simply affect the stockholders, I should certainly not trouble the Senate with any remarks in reference to it, and should sit down in entire acquiescence, whether the prayer of their petition for the renewal of the charter of the bank were granted or rejected.