The House having agreed to consider these resolutions—

On motion of Mr. Troup, they were ordered to lie on the table, as he stated, to give every member the same time to consider them as he had himself taken.

Tuesday, December 5.

Two other members, to wit, from Maryland, John Campbell; and from Georgia, Dennis Smelt, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

Tuesday, December 7.

Another member, to wit, from New York, Uri Tracy, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Challenges, Duels, &c.

Mr. Bacon said he held in his hands three propositions which deemed it his duty to submit to the House. They were not for the regulation of the great concerns with foreign nations, but for the necessary object of regulating themselves. It would be seen that these resolutions had not grown out of any personal considerations, nor out of any particular case, but out of the serious evils to which the House had been exposed by the want of such regulations from the commencement of the Government. In 1796, the evil had risen to such a height that the House had unequivocally expressed its opinion on it.[10] Mr. B. said he felt it his duty to express his sense on the subject by laying the resolutions on the table, and more particularly as he understood that the subject was now agitated in the committee appointed to draught rules and orders for the government of the House. He would merely remark that the resolutions might not be correct in form, or they might be altogether erroneous in principle. He was not anxious as to the particular form; but he was decidedly in favor of the general object, and wished to take the sense of the House upon it. For himself he was well prepared to act on them; but for the convenience of others he wished them to lie on the table.

Ordered to lie on the table.

Friday, December 8.

Two other members, to wit: from Maryland, Philip B. Key, and from Virginia, Daniel Sheffey, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

Monday, December 11.

Several other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, William Stedman and Edward St. Loe Livermore; from New York, Barent Gardenier; and from Pennsylvania, John Ross, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from Wilson C. Nicholas, resigning his seat as one of the members of the House, for the State of Virginia. The letter was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

Batture at New Orleans.

A motion was made by Mr. Sheffey, that the House do come to the following resolutions:

The said resolutions were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

British Minister—Mr. Jackson's Circular.

Mr. Quincy observed that he perceived that in the letter from Mr. Smith to Mr. Pinkney accompanying the Message from the President of the United States of the 29th November, 1809, an allusion was made to an important paper headed "Circular," which had not been communicated to Congress. He perceived, also, that by the resolution just received from the Senate, a specific declaration was required as to the contents of that very paper. It appeared to him extremely proper that the House should have that paper on its files, and within the reach of its members, before a declaration was made respecting it. Under this impression he offered the following resolution:

Mr. Dana observed that there was another document which it might be of some importance to have on the file of the House, and which it might be also necessary to consult—that was, the despatch from Mr. Canning, which it appeared was sent by Mr. Pinkney to the Secretary of State. He moved to add that paper to the resolution.

Mr. Quincy accepted the amendment as a part of his resolution.

Mr. Eppes asked for a division of the question. He said he was willing to call for any paper which was, or might be presumed to be in possession of the Department of State; but it could not be presumed that the circular of Mr. Jackson was in that office in any other form than that referred to in Mr. Smith's letter, viz: in a printed form. Certain it was that it could not be in the Department of State, because it was dated subsequently to the intimation that no further communication would be received from that source by the Secretary of State. The only reason, he presumed, why the other paper alluded to had not been communicated to Congress, was, that it was a printed paper, purporting to be a despatch from Mr. Canning. He had no further objection to the call for either of these papers, other than it was neither decorous nor proper to call upon the President for that which could not be officially in his possession.

Mr. Gardenier observed that, in addition to other forcible considerations, it would be treating the Executive rudely, when he had called their attention to a particular paper, to go to any other source to procure it; besides that, in the latter case, a spurious copy might be imposed upon the House. If the President referred to a certain document as justifying his conduct, by procuring that document the House would have the whole ground before it. What would be the situation of the House, if, pursuing the ideas of some gentlemen, every member was to bring forward a document which he believed to be the legitimate one, and all these copies should differ? Who was to decide which was the correct one? If the House were to act at all on this subject, it was not only respectful and just to the President, but extremely civil, to inquire of him on what ground he has acted. As a true American, and staunch republican, Mr. G. was desirous to give the President every opportunity of doing himself justice.

Mr. Quincy said that a copy of this circular having been forwarded to our Minister in England, a copy must remain on the files of the Secretary of State's office; and, therefore, he asked for it merely that the House might have on this occasion precisely that information which the Secretary of State had communicated to Mr. Pinkney.

The question was taken on the first part of the resolution, viz: on that part moved by Mr. Quincy, and finally carried—yeas 53, nays 52.

The question was then taken on Mr. Dana's amendment, viz: on that part calling for a copy of the paper purporting to be a despatch from Mr. Canning to Mr. Erskine, and carried without opposition.

Mr. Whitman offered an amendment understood to be intended to embrace in the papers to be called for, the note from Mr. Erskine to Mr. Smith containing the "three conditions" which are admitted in Mr. Smith's letter of October 19, to have been submitted to him by Mr. Erskine.

On the suggestion of Mr. Quincy, this motion was declared to be out of order, as it was now too late to receive an amendment to the resolution, both clauses of it having been affirmed by the House.

The question was then put on the whole resolution, as amended, and the yeas and nays being demanded on its passage.

Mr. Rhea said he should vote against the resolution, as by passing it the House could add nothing to its stock of information, nor receive any official document; in both cases it could receive only a printed paper.

The question was then decided by yeas and nays, in the affirmative—yeas 69, nays 46.

Mr. Quincy and Mr. Dana were appointed a committee to present the foregoing resolution to the President of the United States.

Tuesday, December 12.

Another member, to wit, from Massachusetts, Ebenezer Seaver, appeared, and took his seat.

Committee of Manufactures.

Mr. Sawyer called for the consideration of the motion submitted by him for appointing a separate Committee of Manufactures.

The House agreed to consider the resolution, ayes 68.

Mr. Seybert supported the motion on the ground of the propriety of paying a more particular attention to the subject of manufactures, which had lately become of great importance.

Mr. Newton opposed the motion as unnecessary, because the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures was competent to the performance of all the business assigned it, and had always manifested a disposition to foster the manufactures of the United States.

The question on the resolution was decided in the negative, 24 members only rising in the affirmative.

Friday, December 15.

Mr. Jackson's Circular.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

[The first paper enclosed was the "Independent American" of November 21, containing a copy of the "Circular." The second was a piece cut out of a London newspaper.]

The circular is as follows:

On motion of Mr. Quincy, these papers were ordered to be printed—for the motion 59, against it 40.

Monday, December 18.

Another member, to wit, from New York, Herman Knickerbacker, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Thursday, December 21.

Conduct of the British Minister.

The House again went into Committee of the Whole on the resolution from the Senate.

Mr. Emott concluded his speech against it, as given entire in preceding pages.

Mr. Gholson said, that notwithstanding much had already been said on the subject before the committee, he hoped he should be pardoned for occupying a small portion of their attention. The resolution before us seems to embrace several objects pre-eminently entitled to the dispassionate consideration of Congress; objects altogether unconnected with those factions and political dissensions which have unhappily too long prevailed among brethren of the same common family, and which may one day prove fatal to political liberty. The first question which presents itself in the investigation of this subject, involves on the one hand the veracity and dignity of the American Government, and, on the other, the character and reputation of a British Envoy, and, in some degree, of the British Ministry.

In my remarks on this subject, I consider it regular to commence with the origin of the mission from Great Britain to the United States; out of which has arisen the present unpropitious posture of the affairs between the two countries. What, sir, were the circumstances under which that mission was despatched here? In the month of May last, it was known to the British Ministry that a commercial arrangement had been made by their Envoy resident here, (Mr. Erskine,) with the American Government, but under the allegation that it was made contrary to instructions, it was no sooner known than it, and the Minister making it, were disavowed. Mr. Jackson was then appointed to substitute Mr. Erskine, the disavowed agent, and at the time he (Mr. Jackson) was sent to this country, it was well known by the British Ministry that the Government of the United States stood solemnly pledged to the American people to maintain, and that they had inviolably and steadily adhered, to certain points and principles in our differences with England, a surrender of, or departure from which, would be a sacrifice of the honor and best interests of this nation.

Yes, sir, when they well knew that, in the affair of the Chesapeake, our Executive would not, and the voice of almost the whole nation had pronounced that he ought not to make the first advance to a reconciliation, Mr. Jackson was charged, not only to require the first advance from us, to wit: that in the document which should contain the adjustment of that affair, the revocation of the President's proclamation of 1807, interdicting the British armed ships from our own water, should be recited as an indispensable preliminary; but to require from us also the violation of the principles of our naturalization laws, by insisting on the surrender of foreigners who had become naturalized. As to the Orders in Council, we know not what specific propositions he was charged with in relation to them. As far as we are able to deduce any thing from facts before us, it must be understood that the British Government had determined to accept of no conditions for the repeal of the Orders in Council except such as had been previously declared on the part of the American Government to be inadmissible. Notwithstanding what has been said by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Emott,) I think it is easily to be demonstrated that the British Government did not intend to make any arrangement different from that contemplated by the celebrated instructions of the twenty-third of January, transmitted to Mr. Erskine. If the British Government, so recently as May last, disavowed an arrangement, and recalled its Minister, under an allegation that he violated his instructions, was it to be supposed that they would, in two or three months, so far change their policy as to authorize an arrangement on the same principles that they had just rejected? Certainly not, sir. It is evident that such an accommodation could not have been designed, because Mr. Canning says that such measures must be adopted as should secure the objects of the Orders in Council. That they did not by this mean the mere continuance of the non-intercourse law as to France, is manifest; for Mr. Canning says to Mr. Pinkney, that a repeal as to Great Britain, would be a repeal as to the whole world, unless the British Navy were to be permitted to enforce the law interdicting intercourse with France by the seizure of such vessels as should be found violating it.

These, sir, were the circumstances under which the mission commenced. What were those that characterized its progress and termination? I think it very easy to show that the conduct of the Minister himself, after he arrived, partook strictly of the same character as the conduct of the Ministry who sent him. I think I have shown that the disposition manifested by the Ministry in sending him here was insulting to this country. Let us next inquire into the character disclosed, and the conduct displayed by that Minister after his arrival. And, in this inquiry, without wading through all the documents, which gentlemen can as well understand by perusing them in their chambers as by hearing them read here, I will merely advert to the offensive expressions used by Mr. Jackson, and to the manner in which those expressions were met by the Secretary of State. By doing this, it will be very discernible, not only that the facts stated in the resolution are sustained by the correspondence, but that the resolution does not go so far as facts would warrant. In Mr. Jackson's letter of the 11th of October, he says, that the arrangement with Mr. Erskine was made under such circumstances as could only lead to a disavowal. If the circumstances were such as could only lead to a disavowal, they must have been dishonorable, and Mr. Jackson, by intimating that our Government had a knowledge of these circumstances, charges it with being particeps criminis. Can any thing be more palpable than this? He expresses this idea in still stronger terms when he intimates that Mr. Smith had a principal agency in the misconduct on this occasion. It certainly was not in Mr. Smith's power to substitute conditions for those which he declined accepting, but it must have been done by Mr. Erskine. But, notwithstanding this, he charges Mr. Smith, not only with conniving at a conduct improper in itself, because it could only lead to rejection of the arrangement growing out of it, but insinuates that he was the principal actor in the scene. In Mr. Smith's letter in answer to Mr. Jackson, the animadversions are too clear in their object to be mistaken. Mr. J. is informed of the displeasure of the American Government at such insinuations; and, in the very first letter which was written by the Secretary of State, he disclaims pointedly having had any knowledge whatever of the deficiency of Mr. Erskine's instructions at the time of making the arrangement. And what says Mr. Jackson in reply? He says again, that Mr. Erskine's instructions were known to Mr. Smith. Sir, I acknowledge very candidly, that on a superficial perusal of the correspondence, the charge of falsehood, from the art and adroitness with which it is wrapt up, does not appear so palpable as when it is more closely examined. Yet, sir, notwithstanding all knowledge of the instructions had been denied by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jackson reiterates the assertion that they were known. Do gentlemen say that there is no insult in this? That there is nothing wrong in the assertion of a knowledge on the part of the Secretary of State which he had before formally and solemnly disclaimed. In Mr. Smith's letter to Mr. Jackson, of the first of November, he intimates to Mr. Jackson that a language implying such a knowledge on the part of the American Government, was altogether inadmissible. What is Mr. Jackson's reply in his letter of the 4th of November, which is the last communication that a proper self-respect on the part of the American Government would permit it to receive from him? After again insinuating that our Government had a knowledge of Mr. Erskine's instructions, he says: "That any thing therein (in his former letter) contained may be irrelevant to the subject, it is of course competent to you to endeavor to show; and as far as you succeed in so doing, so far will my argument lose of its validity; but, as to the propriety of my allusions, you must allow me to acknowledge only the decision of my own Sovereign, whose commands I obey, and to whom alone I can consider myself responsible." In speaking of the propriety of his allusions, he acknowledges that he had made them, and does not deny that they are of the character ascribed to them. This insolent letter is concluded by expressions too plain for any misconception whatever. He says: "I have carefully avoided drawing conclusions which did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation where I was unable to substantiate a fact." He here, in fact, recognizes the insinuation imputed to him, and says he would not have made it if he could not have substantiated it. Collecting all his insinuations, on the one hand, and the refutation of them, on the other, I draw the conclusion that Mr. Jackson not only insulted the Government, but charged it with one of the foulest crimes—with direct falsehood.

If the circumstances under which he was sent, and his conduct after he arrived here, were such as I have described, I ask if the occasion does not require that the American Government should take a firm and dignified stand? That we should repel insults and respect ourselves? Shall the authority to whom only is entrusted the most solemn act of government which can be performed, the act of deciding on the last appeal of nations, stand by and see the Executive insulted by an emissary, such as Mr. Jackson was? I hope not, sir.

Sir, I consider the present no time for the causeless crimination of our own Government, and much less is it a time to countenance any other. We should discard domestic differences and party spirit, which, at a juncture like this, may be disastrous to our country. If we differ among ourselves, in the name of God let us unite against foreign aggression and foreign insult. It is admitted by gentlemen on the other side, that both Great Britain and France have done us wrong. If so, why not unite against the one as well as against the other? A conduct like this must produce the happiest consequences. If any thing like union is discovered against insult and injury, I believe in God that it would not be long ere we met on reciprocal terms of amity. Sir, for my country, I only desire the rule of right; that we must obtain. If it is thought I wish any disaster to befall the British nation, I am misunderstood. I am willing that Great Britain should be great, happy, and prosperous. I should view her downfall as an inauspicious event; consequences might result from it which I will not undertake to estimate; but I hope that the expectation never will be encouraged from this Hall, that Great Britain can or will receive any terms from us other than such as are fair, honorable, and reciprocal.

The terms which have been offered to us are not of that kind. I submit it to gentlemen's own decision. We have long experienced injustice, and if we are only capable of being firm to our purpose, and adhering to the principles of neutrality which have hitherto guided the councils of our country, and especially the enlightened policy of the Executive department, we shall no doubt obtain justice.

In every view, therefore, it appears to me that the resolution from the Senate not only is supported by the correspondence laid before us, but is rendered peculiarly important by the occasion. The appeal made by Mr. Jackson from the Executive, from the organ with which alone a foreign Minister can have communication, to the people, to a tribunal with which he cannot communicate, adds great force to the arguments in favor of a firm stand on our part. I hope it will be made, and that it never will be abandoned till we receive that justice which has been but too long delayed.

Mr. Ross observed: I, for one, am an Administration man, if that Administration act correctly, whether it shall, in a time of great difficulty and doubt, insure a prospect of peace with Great Britain, or whether it may find it necessary in asserting the rights and independence of the Government to involve the nation in war. I think the importance of the one course is as great as the other, and I will, under such circumstances, equally support them when they are likely to make war as to make peace, however other gentlemen may differ from me on this head.

Before I proceed to state, sir, what I conceive necessary to be understood, in order to come to a correct judgment on these resolutions, permit me to premise that there is more than a presumption that Mr. Erskine had a power to enter into the arrangement which he made. 1st. Because he himself declared he had such power. 2dly. Because he acted in conformity to that declaration; and, 3dly. Because Mr. Jackson does not deny he had such power. Mr. Jackson does not pretend to say that Mr. Erskine had not other despatches and other instructions than those of the 23d of January, and that, in them, there were not other conditions of a different grade and character from those contained in that despatch. Hence, I think it is fairly to be concluded, that Mr. Erskine had the power to enter into the agreement. It has, however, been said by the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Dana,) that this is not so much a question of what our Government was ignorant of, as of what they knew, or what they ought to have known; and he has entered into a long examination of the mode of commissioning diplomatic characters, whether by letters of credence or by full powers, and has drawn a distinction between the two. In the first place, I apprehend it is in nowise material, to enable the House to decide on the resolution, whether the President did or did not know the nature of Mr. Erskine's powers. But it is necessary to rescue him from the imputation which those are disposed to cast on him who are desirous to pull down the Administration. What was the amount of the gentleman's showing on this occasion? That in all cases, in order to complete a treaty, it is necessary there should be a commission or full power. But has he shown that it is necessary in order to make a preliminary arrangement similar to that entered into? I apprehend he has not. On referring to the letter quoted by him from Mr. Jefferson, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Hammond, we find the former calling upon the latter to exhibit his powers to enter into a negotiation; but Mr. Jefferson afterwards recedes from that demand, and receives the word of Mr. Hammond that he is possessed of power to negotiate as sufficient evidence of his being clothed with the proper power without the exhibition thereof. But the ratification was not withheld, as has been justly said, because there was an absence of a full power on this occasion. Mr. Jackson himself states that this was not the ground on which the ratification was withheld. It must first be proved that it was obligatory on the Executive to call for Mr. Erskine's full power, and it must then be proved that he did not, before his observations can be brought to bear on the question. Where is the proof that the Executive did not call for those powers? It is not pretended that Mr. Erskine had not a power to make an arrangement, but that it was not concluded in pursuance of his instructions. Therefore, if he had produced ten thousand powers, unless his instructions had authorized him to do what he did, the British Ministry would have rejected the terms stipulated for them, as they have done. But why is it necessary to know, on this occasion, whether the President did call for these powers or not? The inquiry composes no part of the resolution; it is neither expressly mentioned nor glanced at; and why this inquiry is raised, I confess I am utterly at a loss to know, unless it was to prove that the President of the United States had a knowledge of the instructions, and that they restricted Mr. Erskine's powers. The gentleman has not ventured to infer that the President of the United States had this knowledge, but the course of his argument goes to show that, in his opinion, he did possess this knowledge. He lays down the position, that it was the duty of the President to have seen those powers, and, I presume, supposes that the conclusion will be drawn that the President performed his duty; and, of course, taking it for granted that there were no other instructions than those of the 23d of January, that the President must have seen those instructions, and consequently have known that Mr. Erskine had not power to conclude the arrangement. All his argument went to raise a structure to induce a belief in this House, and in the public at large, that this knowledge must have been in possession of the President. The gentleman, at the same time, professes the utmost regard and respect for Mr. Madison. This, I confess, is following the direction of the poet, who says:

But let us inquire if the President had any knowledge that Mr. Erskine had no full power; for if I show, beyond all doubt, that the President did not know it, all this insidious fabric, which is designed to produce so many delusions, will vanish at once. I think it is to be presumed that the President had no knowledge that Mr. Erskine had not full powers, because he entered into the arrangement. What object could he have in view which should induce him to conclude an arrangement, except with full confidence of its being carried into effect? Not to get rid of the embargo—that had long before been interred by its fathers with a truly Christian spirit. Not to get rid of the non-intercourse—because the moment the arrangement was disavowed, the President breathed life and spirit into that act, and gave it renewed existence. It was not from any hostile disposition to England, because he could have no reason to wish for a war. And because, if he had desired a war with that country, he had no occasion to seek a pretext therefor, inasmuch as long antecedents, and up to the very time of making the arrangement, the causes for war against Great Britain were great and numerous, as has been agreed by all parties. If not to get rid of the embargo, nor of the non-intercourse, nor for war, what object could he have, with such knowledge as has been imputed to him, not expressly, but by inference, in making the arrangement of April? Will gentlemen be good enough to condescend so far as to assign some object that the Executive could have had in view from such conduct? For it is not to be presumed that men, in or out of office, act without motive and without object. Therefore, hearing no reason assigned why the President should act thus preposterously, as it is attempted to be insinuated he did, by those in opposition, it would be reasonable to conclude that he had no such knowledge. But, in opposition to this insinuation, also, you have the solemn declaration of the President of the United States, through the Secretary of State. Humiliating in the extreme must it be to hear this solemn asseveration questioned, even in a side-way, in order to support the insolence of a British Minister! Was it not enough that the country has been enabled to endure, in order to secure the great object of remaining in peace, insult after insult, outrage after outrage, and even that the Government should be insulted by foreign diplomatic characters, without doubts and suspicions being insinuated by members of this House? Pray, sir, let me ask this House, or the whole of the United States, what the President of the United States has ever done in any official character, among the many which he has filled with honor to himself and reputation to his country, that the correctness of his declarations, made through his Minister of State, should be disputed? But I might suffer the humiliation of going still further into the subject. We have the word of the recalled Minister, if that be considered more conclusive by gentlemen than that of the President of the United States, that he did not communicate his instructions to Mr. Smith. We have, 1st. The presumption that the Executive had no knowledge of Mr. Erskine's instructions, because he could have no object in view in concluding an arrangement with that knowledge; 2d. We have his declaration to that effect through the Secretary of State; 3d. We have the declaration of the Minister, whose act was disavowed, to the same effect. What have we to destroy this proof? The deceptive, poisonous insinuations of Mr. Jackson. Mr. Erskine repeatedly declared that he had ample powers. On the news being received during the last session of the issuing of the order of the 26th April, he declared that he had no doubt his arrangement would be carried into effect. He, to the last moment, declared that he acted in the spirit, if not in the letter, of his several letters of instructions. How, therefore, was it possible for the President to receive information from Mr. Erskine that he was not invested with competent power, when Mr. Erskine himself declared and believed he was, and acted accordingly.

From these considerations I apprehend it most clearly appears that the President of the United States had not a knowledge, neither was it his duty to have had a knowledge that Mr. Erskine did not possess powers to make the arrangement which he did.

Tuesday, December 26.

Two other members, to wit: from Massachusetts, Benjamin Pickman, jr.; and from Virginia, William A. Burwell, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

Thursday, December 28.

Conduct of the British Minister.

The House again resumed the consideration of the report of the Committee of the Whole on the resolution from the Senate approving the conduct of the Executive in refusing to receive any further communications from Francis J. Jackson.

The motion for indefinite postponement being still under consideration—

Mr. Stanford said, so many were the objectionable features of the present resolution before the House, he should vote for its indefinite postponement, and with permission of the House he would give his reasons for his vote. In the first place, he thought the language and style of the resolution highly objectionable, and calculated to render that which was already bad enough still worse; that it was, in the second place, a strange innovation upon all former practice and usage under our present Government; and lastly, that it was clearly unconstitutional. Thus much he should endeavor to show, and trusted he would be able to do it to the satisfaction of the House.

Mr. S. then premised that he had disapproved the introduction of the resolution of approbation at the last session; that he considered unnecessary; but the present he considered not only unnecessary, but even pernicious. That was a pacific one; this belligerent in all its aspects. He had suggested a mode to one or two gentlemen, of getting rid of that one, if they had thought proper, and in which case he would have contributed his vote to have got clear of it. But, had the question been put in a direct form, he should have differed from his colleague, (Mr. Macon,) inasmuch as he should have voted for it. He could not have done honestly otherwise, as he had most cordially approved the arrangement made by our Government with Mr. Erskine. Further, that as respected the rejection of Mr. Jackson, he thought entirely with his colleague, that he might well have been dismissed on the receipt of his first letter. He tells us for what he had been sent and commanded to do. In the case of the Chesapeake, to make "declarations" and to receive counter "declarations" simultaneously. In other words, for the arrogance, insults, and murders, we had borne and suffered, he came to stipulate atonement, if we would stipulate a sort of counter atonement at the same time. Stipulation for stipulation, at any rate. It had "not appeared to His Majesty necessary to command him to propose to our Government any formal agreement" to take place of the rejected one. For the matter, said Mr. S., of Mr. Jackson's instructions, much rather than for the manner of his negotiation, might the communication have been cut off with him. Both matter and manner were, to be sure, objectionable, but the former, in his estimation, formed much the most solid ground of dismissal. It was but too obvious the mission of Mr. Jackson would end as the former one had done. That he did not come to propitiate us was but too manifest.

While the resolution before us, sir, affects to support the Executive Government against insult, and language "highly indecorous," it descends into a style of expression, itself more culpable and degrading; unworthy, indeed, of the country and the dignity of its Government. It was a flattering truth to know that in the style of diplomatic correspondence the American side of the question suffered not in comparison with that of any other. In the late, as well as former instances, the advantage has been calculated, as he presumed, to inspire every American bosom with just sentiments of pride. Had it, therefore, been recommitted, as his colleague (Mr. Macon) had advised, he had no doubt it could have been amended, and rendered more worthy of consideration as a State paper, than it is likely to be in its present dress and form.

Besides, Mr. Speaker, if the measure be intended to have any effect, it must be a bad one. It looks toward war. Already are our difficulties with Great Britain critical enough, but if gentlemen wish war, the thing is altogether appropriate to its end; well calculated not to support, but to thwart the pacific views and intentions of the Executive. We may, in this way, foreclose the door of amicable negotiation which the Executive by his first Message showed us he had kept open. If rudeness of expression had been resorted to on the part of the British Minister, in his correspondence with our Government, had it not been repelled on their part? Had they not amply redressed the insult of the individual? It might well afford some consolation to ourselves and the country, if other wrongs and insults have been even as well repaired as this. Besides the murder of Pierce, the more horrid murders on board the Chesapeake, the continuation of impressments for years, we have had instances, more than one, it is said, of other Ministers conspiring with your conspirators, menacing you with war, and putting your Government at defiance, here in the ten miles square, and the sensibility of Congress had never before been awakened to a resolution of this kind in defence of the Executive. The truth is, sir, it never needed it, nor does it now. We have, in very deed, Mr. Speaker, refined upon the more substantial insults we have suffered, till we have literally reduced it to a war of words. It is the expressions of the individual we are combating, and pledging the whole force of the country to protect the President against the consequences of, and not the more palpable injuries received. Would to Heaven, sir, such a resolution had not been brought forward! It is unworthy of us—unworthy of the political professions we heretofore made, even those made at our last session.

That a resolution of approbation, Mr. Speaker, is against all example for the last eight years; that it is an innovation upon all usage and practice, reference need only be had to the speeches of gentlemen during the last session. They afford the most ample proof. They were then unwilling to pour out the oil of adulation upon the Executive head. It was deemed unnecessary, anti-republican, to do so. He hoped gentlemen understood him. He was using their own language upon that occasion, and not his own. He borrowed it for its excellence and fitness upon the present occasion. Such language conveyed his sentiments then, and still did; and, for his part, he could not comprehend how it could be correct then, and now the reverse of correct. Some gentlemen on the floor perfectly remembered that when Mr. Jefferson came into the Presidency, eight years ago, he changed the mode of personal address into that of written message. "In doing this," said he, in his first Message, "I have had a principal regard to the convenience of the Legislature, to the economy of their time, to their relief from the embarrassment of immediate answers on subjects not yet fully before them, and to the benefits thence resulting to the public affairs." All acquiesced in this new course, and from that time to the late instance mentioned, no time had been wasted in pouring back the oil of adulation or approbation, in any form, on the Executive head. The only instance which could be cited during the last eight years, was found incidentally incorporated in a resolution relating to the navigation of the Mississippi. The words were, "and relying with, perfect confidence on the vigilance and wisdom of the Executive." This, then, was the only drop of this oil which the last Administration produced, and has been called up at this first ordinary session of a new Administration to form an example to follow; or rather, might we not say, to resume the exploded practice of former times, and thus echo back messages in this new form of joint resolution. But what was the style in which gentlemen spoke at our last summer session, when the subject of approbation was then before us? The language of one was, if it were the object to bring before the House a discussion upon the Message of the President, and to return an answer to his Excellency's most gracious Message, he should certainly be opposed to it. If there had ever been a particular part of the former Administration which had met the approbation of the Republicans generally of this country, it was the discontinuance of the practice. Another had told us that he was "opposed to a deviation from what he conceived to be the duty, and becoming the dignity of the House." He thought the House had nobler duties to perform than passing abstract resolutions, out of which no legislative act is contemplated, merely for the purpose of pouring the oil of adulation upon the head of the Chief Magistrate. And again, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Findlay,) whose opinions are always so much relied upon and respected in this House, and he, Mr. S., trusted by few more sincerely than himself, had, upon that occasion, with singular happiness and force, spoken thus: "Law," said the gentleman, "is the only language of a Legislature. It is the only language that can command obedience and respect. Any equal number of citizens met in a tavern, and there passing a resolution of approbation, would have equal force with such a resolution passed in this House, and would be more in character. They are acting without authority from the constitution or the rules of the House." It would be for that gentleman to tell us, to tell the House, and he would beg the gentleman's pardon for the particular request—but he must request that he would take the occasion to let us all know how his doctrine then is now to be got over. For his own part, he could not comprehend how right and wrong could change their respective sides in so short a time.

His colleague, (Mr. Macon,) in referring to former times, had expressed some doubt whether the majority were the same party now they were then. He felt no doubt himself they were the same; but there was no room to doubt, from the present question itself, they had undergone some strange modification since former times. The doctrines then must be well remembered by him, yourself, Mr. Speaker, and a few others on this floor. The advocates of this sort of adulation must go back beyond the times of the late and last Administration, if they would introduce the fashion again. At the opening of the fifth Congress, in the answer of this House to the speech of the President, these words are used: "We cannot omit to testify our approbation of the measure, and to pledge ourselves that no considerations of private inconvenience shall prevent, on our part, a faithful discharge of the duties to which we are called." And again, this sentence: "Whilst we view with great satisfaction, the wisdom, dignity, and moderation, which have marked the measures of the Supreme Executive of our country in its attempt to remove, by candid explanations, the complaints and jealousies of France, we feel the full force of that indignity which has been offered our country in the rejection of its Minister." This language was too much in the style of adulation for us then to brook, and our names, sir, stand recorded together against it. Let gentlemen compare for themselves.

It is the peculiar misfortune, sir, of this system, if again to be revived, that the right of approbation fully implies the right of disapprobation and censure; and during the same Administration of which we are speaking this right of disapproving and censuring was also attempted to be exercised. The resolution was introduced at the first session of the sixth Congress, by a gentleman then from the city of New York, (Mr. Livingston,) in the case of Jonathan Robbins. The same gentleman is occasionally present here at this time, and seems yet to be a stickler for judicial decision, and still thinks the Executive, against an individual, matchless odds. The part of the resolution alluded to, runs thus: "that the decision of those questions by the President of the United States against the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, in a case where those courts had already assumed and exercised jurisdiction, and his advice and request to the judge of the district court, that the person thus charged should be delivered up, provided, only, such evidence of his criminality should be produced as would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, is a dangerous interference of the Executive with judicial decisions." Hence, then, sir, it might be easily seen from a practice of this sort, that a whole session might be wasted without doing any part of the public business. The thing would be endless.

In the fourth Congress, on a subject of a call for papers in relation to the British Treaty, an unhappy difference arose between this House and the Executive. General Washington was the President. His reply to the House was, "that a just regard to the constitution, and to the duty of his office, forbid a compliance with their request." The House, again by resolution, asserted their right, disclaiming, however, at the same time, any agency in making treaties. Notwithstanding the violence and passion of the moment, this House did not then think they had any right to meddle with the making of treaties; but now it would seem the present House were disposed to join the Senate in this sort of interference in the negotiations of the Executive to form a treaty.

In all the cases alluded to, sir, it should be distinctly kept in view, that each House had acted for itself in voting their approbation and homage to Executive speeches and proclamations. He had reference to the proclamation of neutrality by General Washington. This was the first time Congress ever legislated approbation before.

Mr. Quincy.—It is not my intention, Mr. Speaker, to offer any common-place apology for the few observations I shall submit to the House on the subject now under consideration. Such is the character, and such the consequences of these resolutions, that no man, who had at heart the honor and happiness of this country, ought to continue silent, so long as any topic of illustration is unexhausted, or any important point of view unoccupied.

It is proposed, sir, that this solemn assembly, the representative of the American people, the depositary of their power, and in a constitutional light, the image of their wisdom, should descend from the dignity of its legislative duties, to the task of uttering against an individual the mingled language of indignation and reproach. Not satisfied with seeing that individual prohibited the exercise of his official character, we are invited to pursue him with the joint terrors of legislative wrath, couched in terms selected to convey opprobrium and infix a stigma. "Indecorum," "insolence," "affront," "more insolence," "more affront," "direct, premeditated insult and affront," "disguises, fallacious and false:" these are the stains we are called upon to cast; these the wounds we are about to inflict. It is scarcely possible to comprise, within the same compass, more of the spirit of whatever is bitter in invective, and humiliating in aspersion. This heaped up measure of legislative contumely is prepared; for whom? For a private, unassisted, insulated, unallied individual? No, sir. For the accredited Minister of a great and powerful Sovereign, whose character he in this country represents, whose confidence he shares; of a Sovereign who is not bound, and perhaps will not be disposed to uphold him, in misconduct; but who is bound, by the highest moral obligations, and by the most impressive political considerations, to vindicate his wrongs, whether they affect his person or reputation, and to take care that whatever treatment he shall receive shall not exceed the measure of justice, and above all, that it does not amount to national indignity.

Important as is this view of these resolutions, it is not their most serious aspect. This bull of anathemas, scarcely less than Papal, is to be fulminated, in the name of the American people, from the high tower of their authority, under the pretence of asserting their rights and vindicating their wrongs. What will that people say, if, after the passions and excitements of this day shall have subsided, they shall find—and find I fear they will—that this resolution is false, in fact; that a falsehood is the basis of these aspersions upon the character of a public Minister? What will be their just indignation, when they find national embarrassments multiplied, perhaps their peace gone, their character disgraced, for no better reason than that you, their representatives, following headlong a temporary current, insist on making assertions, as they may then, and I believe will, realize to be not authorized by truth, under circumstances, and in terms, not warranted by wisdom?

Let us not be deceived. It is no slight responsibility which this House is about to assume. This is not one of those holiday resolutions, which frets and fumes its hour upon the stage and is forgotten forever. Very different is its character and consequences. It attempts to stamp dishonor and falsehood upon the forehead of a foreign Minister. If the allegation itself be false, it will turn to plague the accuser. In its train will follow severe retribution, perhaps in war; certainly in additional embarrassments, and most certainly, in worse than all, the loss of that sentiment of self-esteem, which to nations, as well as individuals, is "the pearl of great price;" which power cannot purchase, nor gold measure.

In this point of view, all the other questions which have been agitated in the course of this debate dwindle into utter insignificance. The attack or defence of administration, the detection of fault, or even the exposure of crime, are of no importance when brought into competition with the duty of rescuing this House and nation from the guilt of asserting what is false, and making that falsehood the basis of outrage and virulence. I avoid, therefore, all questions of censure or reproach on either the British Minister or the American Secretary of State. I confine myself to an examination of this resolution, particularly of the first branch of it. This is the foundation of all that follows. I shall submit it to a rigid analysis, not for the purpose of discovering how others have performed their duties, but of learning how we shall perform ours. The obligation to truth is the highest of moral and social duties.

It is remarkable, Mr. Speaker, that of all the gentlemen who have spoken, no one has taken the precise terms of the resolution as the basis of his argument, and followed that course of investigation which those terms naturally prescribe. Yet the obvious and only safe course, in a case of such high responsibility, is first to form a distinct idea of the assertion we are about to make, and then carefully to examine how that assertion is supported, if supported at all, by the evidence. With this view I recur to the resolution, in the form in which it is proposed for our adoption, and make it the basis of my inquiries.

[The Resolution.]

This part of the resolution, it will not be denied, is the foundation of the whole. For if no such "idea was conveyed" in the letter of the 23d of October, then there could be no "repetition" of that idea, in the letter of the 4th of November; and if in the former part of his correspondence Mr. Jackson had made no such "insinuation," then the assertion in this letter that he had made none, was perfectly harmless and justifiable. This part, therefore, includes the pith of the resolution. If we analyze it, we shall find that it contains two distinct assertions. First, that the expressions alluded to convey a certain idea. Second, that this idea, so conveyed, is indecorous and insolent. Here again we are enabled to limit the field of our investigation. For, if no such idea, as is asserted, was conveyed, then the inquiry, whether such idea is indecorous and insolent, is wholly superseded. The true and only question, therefore, is whether the expressions alluded to, do convey the asserted idea. I place the subject in this abstract form before the House to the end that, if possible, we may exclude all those prejudices and partialities which so naturally and imperceptibly bias the judgment. In the light in which it now stands, it must be apparent to every one who will reflect, that the question has, so far as it respects the principles on which our decision ought to proceed, no more to do with the relations between Great Britain and the United States, than it has with those between the United States and China, and has no more connection with Mr. Francis J. Jackson and Mr. Robert Smith, than with the late Charles of Sweden, and the old Duke of Sudermania. It is a simple philological disquisition, which is to be decided by known rules of construction. The only investigation is, touching the power or capacity of certain terms to convey an alleged idea. However illy suited a question like this may be for the discussion of an assembly like the present, yet if we would be just to ourselves and the people, we must submit to an examination of it, in that form in which alone certainty can be attained. It is only by stripping the subject of all adventitious circumstances, that we can arrive at that perfect view of its nature which can satisfy minds scrupulous of truth, and anxious concerning duty. It is only by such a rigorous scrutiny that we shall be able to form that judgment which will stand the test of time, and do honor to us and our country when the passions of the day are passed away and forgotten.

The natural course of inquiry now is, into the idea which is asserted to be conveyed, and the expressions which are said to convey it. Concerning the first there is no difficulty. The idea asserted to be conveyed is, "that the arrangement made between Mr. Erskine and Mr. Smith was entered into by the American Government, with a knowledge that the powers of Mr. Erskine were incompetent for that purpose." It would save a world of trouble if the expressions in which this idea is said to be conveyed were equally easy of ascertainment. But on this point, those gentlemen who maintain this result are far from being agreed. Some being of opinion that it is to be found in one place, some in another, and others again assert that it is to be found in the whole correspondence taken together. Never was an argument of this nature before so strangely conducted. Gentlemen seem wholly to lay out of sight that this resolution pledges this House to the assertion of a particular fact, and expresses no general sentiment concerning the conduct of Jackson, or the conduct of his Government. Yet, as if the whole subject of British relations was under discussion, they have deemed themselves at liberty to course through these documents, collect every thing which seems to them indecorous, insolent or unsuitable in Mr. Jackson's language, and add to the heap thus made the whole list of injuries received from Great Britain—impressments, affair of the Chesapeake, murder of Pierce—and all this, for what purpose? Why, truly, to justify this House in making a solemn asseveration of a particular fact! As if any injury in the world could be even an apology for the deliberate utterance of a falsehood. Let the conduct of Mr. Jackson, or of Great Britain, be as atrocious as it will, if the fact which we assert do not exist, we and this nation are disgraced. It is evident, then, that irksome as such a task is, it is necessary that we should submit to a precise inquiry into the truth of that to which we are about to pledge our reputation and that of this people.

In our investigation, let us follow the natural course that is pointed out in the resolution. This alleges that the obnoxious expressions are contained in a letter of the 23d of October, and to this limits our assertion. In this letter, therefore, either directly, or by way of reference to some other, this obnoxious idea or insinuation must be found. For if it be not in this, even if it should be contained in other parts of the correspondence, which is not, however, pretended, still our assertion would be false. Concerning this letter of the 23d of October, I confidently assert, without fear of contradiction, that the obnoxious idea, if contained in that letter, is conveyed in the paragraph I am now about to quote. No man has pretended to cite any part of this letter, as evidence of the asserted insult, except the ensuing, and although there is not a perfect coincidence in opinion as to the particular part in which it resides, yet all agree that it lurks somewhere in this paragraph, if it have any dwelling-place in this letter.

[The paragraph.]

I have quoted the whole paragraph because, in that obscure and general mode of argument in which gentlemen have indulged, it has been read as that entire portion in which the insult is conveyed. It is difficult to conceive how some parts of this paragraph can be thought to convey any insult. However, in prosecution of my plan, I shall first exclude all those parts in which the obnoxious idea cannot be pretended to exist, and then limit my investigation to that part in which it must exist, if, in the letter of the 23d of October, it be conveyed at all.

With respect to the first sentence in this paragraph, I say confidently that the insult is not contained there. It is simply a declaration of the causes of the disavowal, so far from including the obnoxious idea of a knowledge in our Government of the incompetency of Erskine's powers, that in a manner it excludes that idea, by enumerating violation of instructions and want of authority as the only causes of the disavowal. In the first sentence, then, the insult is not. I pass by the second, as it will be the subject of a distinct examination hereafter. The third and fourth sentences it will not even be pretended convey this obnoxious idea. They simply acknowledge the frequency of graduated instructions, and assert the fact that Mr. Erskine's were not of that character. In this there is no insult. As little can it be pretended to exist in the fifth sentence. It merely asserts that Mr. Smith "already," that is, at or before the time Mr. Jackson was then writing, is acquainted with the instructions, (a fact not denied, and not suggested to be an insult,) and that the fact of these instructions being the only ones, Mr. Smith knows from the information of Mr. Jackson—an assertion, which so far from intimating the obnoxious idea of a knowledge in Mr. Smith at the time of the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, that it conveys a contrary idea, by declaring that he was indebted for it to his (Mr. Jackson's) information. Here, then, the insult is not. With respect to the last sentence in this paragraph, the only assertions it contains, are the fact that the terms accepted were not contained in the instructions, and the evidence of this fact derived from the statement of Erskine that those acceded to were substituted by Mr. Smith in lieu of those originally proposed. In all this, the knowledge of Mr. Smith of the incompetency of Mr. Erskine's powers is not so much as intimated. Indeed, no one has pretended directly to assert that they have found it in the parts of this paragraph, from which I have thus excluded the obnoxious idea. Yet, as the whole has been cited, and made the basis of desultory declamation, I thought it not time lost to clear out of the way all irrelevant matter, and to leave for distinct examination the only sentence of this paragraph in which the insult lurks, if it has any existence in this letter. This point we have now attained. And as little inclined as gentlemen may be to precise investigation, they must yield to it. I say, therefore, confidently, and without fear of contradiction, that if the assertion contained in this resolution be capable of justification by any part of the letter of the 23d of October, it is by the following, the only remaining sentence of the cited paragraph which I have not yet examined: "These instructions I now understand by your letter, as well as from the obvious deduction which I took the liberty of making in mine of the 11th instant, were, at the time, in substance made known to you; no stronger illustration, therefore, can be given of the deviation from them which occurred than by a reference to the terms of your agreement." The latter part of this sentence being merely a conclusion from the preceding part, and having no relation to the knowledge of our Government at the time of the arrangement, will be laid out of consideration as being obviously wholly without the possibility of any agency in conveying the obnoxious idea. There remains only the preceding part of this sentence for the residence of the insult. Here, if anywhere, it must exist. Accordingly this is usually shown as the spot where the ghost of insinuation first appeared before the eyes of our astonished Administration. Here we shall again find it; unless, indeed, it were in fact a mere delusion of the fancy, formed of "such stuff as dreams are made." Let us examine by way of analysis.

[Here Mr. Quincy analyzed the paragraph.]

I have thus far proceeded by way of a strict analysis of every part of the correspondence, in which the insulting idea, asserted in this resolution, has been said to be conveyed. I have omitted no part which has been cited in support of this first resolution, and think that I have shown that it exists nowhere in the letter of the 23d of October, either in direct assertion, or by way of reference. And it is concerning what is contained in that letter alone, that the resolution under consideration makes assertion. The House will observe that, according to all rules of fair reasoning, it would have been sufficient for me to have limited myself to show the fallacy of the arguments of the advocates of this insult; it being always incumbent on those who assert the existence of any thing to prove it. I have not, however, thought my duty on so important an occasion fulfilled, unless I undertook to prove what the lawyers call "a negative," and to show, with as much strength of reasoning as I had, the non-existence of the idea asserted in this resolution; with what success, I cheerfully leave to the decision of such thoughtful men in the nation who will take the trouble to understand the argument. There is, however, a corroborative view of this subject, which ought not to be omitted.

The insulting idea said to be conveyed is, that Mr. Smith had a knowledge, at the time of the arrangement, of the incompetency of Erskine's powers, and this because such a knowledge was one of the essential circumstances which could only lead to a disavowal. Now, it does happen that neither Mr. Erskine nor his Government enumerate this knowledge of our Government as one of those essential circumstances. On the contrary, they constantly omit it, when formally enumerating those circumstances. Mr. Canning places the disavowal, solely, on the footing of Mr. Erskine's having "acted not only not in conformity, but in direct contradiction to his instructions." Mr. Jackson, also, in his letter of the 23d, when formally enumerating the causes of the disavowal, says expressly, that the disavowal was "because the agreement was concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions, and altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of it." Now, is it not most extraordinary, that after such formal statements, not including the knowledge of our Government among the essential circumstances, that it is on this knowledge the British Government intend to rely for the justification of their disavowal? I simply ask this question, if the British did intend thus to rely on the previous knowledge of our Government, why do they always omit it in their formal enumerations? And if they do not intend thus to rely, in what possible way could it serve that Government thus darkly to insinuate it? But as if it were intended to leave this House wholly without excuse in passing this resolution, Mr. Jackson expressly asserts, in this very letter of the 23d of October, that the information of that fact was derived from him, the knowledge of which, this resolution asserts, he intended to intimate was known at the time of the arrangement with Erskine. For he specifically says: "I have had the honor of informing you that it (Mr. Erskine's instruction) was the only one by which the conditions on which he was to conclude were prescribed." Now, if Mr. Jackson had remotely intended to intimate that Mr. Smith had a previous knowledge of that fact, would he have asserted that he was indebted to him (Mr. Jackson) for the information? Conclusive as this argument is, there is yet another in reserve, which is a clincher. And that is, that this very knowledge which we propose solemnly to affirm Mr. Jackson intimated our Government possessed at the time of the arrangement, it is, from the nature of things, impossible they should have possessed. The idea asserted to be intended to be conveyed is, a knowledge in our Government that the arrangement was entered into without competent powers on the part of Mr. Erskine. Now, the fact that Mr. Erskine's powers were incompetent, it was impossible for our Government to know, except from the confession of Mr. Erskine. But Mr. Erskine before, at the time, and ever since, has uniformly asserted the reverse. So that, besides all the other absurdities growing out of this resolution, there is this additional, that it accuses Mr. Jackson of the senseless stupidity of insinuating as a fact, a knowledge in our Government, which from the undeniable state of things it is not possible they should have possessed. Mr. Speaker, can any argument be more conclusive? 1. The idea is not conveyed by the form of expression. 2. Mr. Jackson, though expressly enumerating the only causes which led to a disavowal, does not suggest this. 3. Mr. Jackson expressly asserts the knowledge that these were the only instructions derived from him; of course it could not have been known previous to the arrangement. 4. Had he been absurd enough to attempt to convey such an idea, the very nature of things shows that it could not exist. I confess I am ignorant by what reasoning the non-existence of an insinuation can be demonstrated, if it be not by this concurrence of arguments.

Before I conclude this part of the subject, it will be necessary to make a single observation or two, on the following passage in Mr. Jackson's letter of the 4th of November, for although our assertion has relation, in the part of the resolution under consideration, only to the letter of the 23d of October, yet this subsequent passage has been adduced as a sort of accessory after the fact. "You will find that, in my correspondence with you, I have carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation, where I was unable to substantiate a fact. To facts, as I have become acquainted with them, I have scrupulously adhered." This the subsequent part of the resolution under debate denominates, "the repetition of the same intimation." But if the argument I have offered be correct, there was no such "intimation" in the preceding letters, and of course no repetition of it here. For if he had, as I think I have proved, in his former letters uttered no such insinuation as is asserted, then all the allegations in this paragraph are wholly harmless and decorous, neither disrespectful nor improper. "But this," says the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Milnor) "is conclusive to my mind, that Mr. Jackson did intend to insult, for if he had not would he have refrained from giving an explanation when it was asked?" That gentleman will recollect that the assertion of this House is as to the idea which Mr. Jackson has conveyed in the letter of the 23d, not as to the idea which he intended to convey. Suppose he intended it, and has not done it, our assertion is still false. But will that gentleman seriously conclude, contrary to so obvious a course of argument, that he has asserted, or even intended to assert, this particular idea, merely because he does not choose to explain it? Are there not a thousand reasons which might have induced Mr. Jackson not to explain, consistent with being perfectly innocent of the intention originally to convey it? Perhaps he thought that he had already been explicit enough. Perhaps he thought the explanation was asked in terms which did not entitle Mr. Smith to receive it. Perhaps he did not choose to give this satisfaction. Well that now is "very ungentlemanly," says the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Milnor.) I agree, if he pleases, so it was. But does that justify this resolution? Because he is not a gentleman, shall we assert a falsehood?