Prefixed to the First Lord's memorandum was the following statement of twelve years' actual and two years' estimated naval expenditure:—

The First Lord's speech in introducing the Navy Estimates (March 17) came at an acute stage of the Ulster question and was in great part an elaborate defence, addressed to his own party, of the increase during his term of office, and he compared the figures elaborately with those of 1911-12, his predecessor's last year. The increased cost of maintenance—6,250,000l.—was accounted for, he said, mainly by increased pay, wages, and victuals (2,140,000l.), oil reserve (1,500,000l.), and air service (900,000l.). Apart from these two last items, the whole increase was either automatic or proportioned to the increased size and strength of the Fleet, which again was proportionate to that of other Powers. Great Britain was aiming at completing eight battleship squadrons to Germany's five, with the proper proportion of cruisers and flotillas. Again, against sixteen Dreadnoughts in full commission in 1911-12, there were now thirty-three, many of them much larger and more costly, including nine battle cruisers against Germany's five. As to new construction, about 2,500,000l. of the 17,566,000l. appropriated in 1911-12 went over into the succeeding years; but for this, the vote of 1914-15 would be less; but he expected great progress to be made, and more money earned by the contractors, in the new year. In 1915-16 the Estimates would probably be substantially lower. Oil fuel, as he showed from a statement of the Chairman of the Royal Commission on fuel and engines, increased the radius of action, saved labour and stowage, rendered it possible to get fresh supplies at sea, and so to escape submarine attacks when going to oiling stations; and the oil tanks were a capital charge. Oil would be used as the sole fuel for small craft and light cruisers of the Arethusa type, and for capital ships of exceptional speed. The air service had increased enormously during his term of office—the number of aeroplanes had increased from 9 to 103, the personnel by the end of the year might be 180 officers and 1,500 men. The seaplane had a great future, especially in scouting and watching the coast. For the security of the east coast from raids the Admiralty relied largely on patrol flotillas of aircraft grouped and held in strong force at strategic points, and able to be directed to any point of attempted landing. Fifteen airships were built, building, or ordered, of which ten had a speed exceeding forty-five miles an hour. Three officers only had been killed, and 131,000 miles flown. As to personnel, there were 146,000 men against less than 134,000 in 1911, and he asked for 5,000 more. The whole fleet could be fully manned on mobilisation, but the increase in personnel was required to train the men for the fleet of 1916-17. In 1920 Germany would have 108,000, and was reaching that figure by increments of 6,000 annually. After noticing the questions of pay and insurance, and mentioning that instead of grand manœuvres there would be a general mobilisation of the Third Fleet, he dealt inter alia with the supply of officers, and the new rank of Lieut.-Commander (lieutenants of eight years' standing) and then came to matériel. The programme was wholly normal. One of the four battleships would burn oil only. He extolled the 15-inch gun, in which Great Britain was ahead of all other Powers. Naval battles were now like "two eggshells striking each other with hammers"; hence the "awful importance" of good gunnery. After touching on the submarine service—the number to be built being secret—and its dangers, the destroyer flotillas, and the armed merchantmen—seventy by the end of 1914-15, armed with two guns solely for self-defence—he said that the Cabinet had again considered the capture of private property at sea and refused to change the practice, but had decided on the abolition of prize-money. Coming to the question of standards of naval superiority, he interpreted the 60 per cent. standard of superiority (A.R., 1912, p. 45) in Dreadnoughts for the six years following 1912-13 as follows:—

For the provision to cover the period of delay of the Canadian ships, however, there was a special reason—viz., that, in July, 1912, the Cabinet had decided that a British battle squadron should be maintained in the Mediterranean, that Great Britain might be the guardian of her own interests there, and by the end of 1915 a battle squadron of eight battleships, based on Malta, would replace the four battle cruisers now stationed there. The force there would then consist of eight battleships, four large armed cruisers, four light cruisers of the "Town" type and sixteen destroyers of the Beagle type. Hence the acceleration of three ships of the 1913-14 programme and two of the 1914-15 programme; these latter would be ready in the third quarter of 1916. Turning to the Pacific, the situation there was regulated by the British naval strength in European waters, which protected New Zealand and Australia from European Powers, and from any present danger from Japan, and Japan from European attack by sea. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, renewed up to 1921 and likely to continue, was the true protection of Australia and New Zealand, and depended entirely on the maintenance of British naval supremacy. He extolled the policy of New Zealand in giving a splendid ship to strengthen the British Navy at a decisive point; and, though the natural desire of the Dominions to have their ships in their own waters was hard to reconcile with naval strategy, the combination of the two was aimed at by the design of the Imperial squadron, a fleet of large ships supported in each Dominion by local repairing establishments, light cruisers, and small craft, and bringing sufficient aid wherever needed in war. Finally, the First Lord dealt with the supreme importance of a strong Navy to Great Britain, pointing out that while other Powers built navies in order to play a part in the world's affairs, Great Britain's Navy was to her a question of life or death. By sober conduct and skilful diplomacy she could disarm or divide the elements of potential danger; but her diplomacy depended largely on her naval strength, and, in the face of the unprecedented armament increase of Continental Powers, the Government could not feel that they were doing their duty to their country unless its naval strength were solidly, amply, and unswervingly maintained.

Mr. Lee (U., Hants, Fareham) maintained that on the 60 per cent. standard of superiority Great Britain was five ships short (28 against the Germans 21, when there should be 33) and that three ships to replace the Canadian ships should be begun at once; we must keep faith with the Dominions.

The debate, however, was suspended to allow Mr. Butcher (U., York) a resolution declaring that the House was not satisfied that the provision for defence against invasion was adequate, and demanding the publication forthwith of the conclusions of the Defence Committee. After several speeches, the First Lord, after dealing with special points raised, replied that of the new factors in the problem, submarines told against the invader; aircraft and wireless telegraphy in favour of the strongest fleet; on the other hand, the changes in the strategic front told against Great Britain. The Invasion Committee had dealt with all these matters, and the naval manœuvres had yielded important lessons, but he deprecated the popular interpretation of them (A.R., 1913, p. 179). If the Expeditionary Force was at home no invading force could be large enough, if it had left, the Fleet would have been fully mobilised. He vindicated Prince Louis of Battenberg's action and promised a day later in the session for a debate on the Report of the Imperial Defence Committee; and, incidentally, he made an attack on Sir R. Pole-Carew (U., Bodmin) which caused a scene. The motion was rejected by 290 to 190.

Next day the debate was continued by a vigorous and comprehensive attack on Admiralty policy from Lord Charles Beresford (U., Portsmouth). The number of ships, he said, was inadequate, the men were overworked and underpaid, the deficiency of officers was dangerous, and the Admiralty was trusting to oil, which they could not guard, nor could Great Britain produce it. More significant, however, was an attack on the "armaments ring" by Mr. Snowden (Lab., Blackburn) which was applauded (even, contrary to rule, from the Strangers' Gallery). The shareholders in armament companies, he pointed out, included Bishops, the President of the Free Church Council, the Colonial Secretary, and the Postmaster-General; with British co-operation, battleships were being constructed by members of the "ring" for Italy, and Whitehead torpedoes for Austria. The debate was again suspended for a resolution moved by Mr. Aubrey Herbert (U., Somerset, S.), declaring that the protection of the route to India and other services of the Empire demanded the provision of an adequate naval force in the Mediterranean. This discussion extended also to Near Eastern problems. The Foreign Secretary, in the course of a long reply, held that the understandings between the Powers of the Triple Entente had made for peace. As Great Britain could not maintain in the Mediterranean a fleet superior to the combined fleets of all the other nations represented there, her policy should be to keep there a fleet equal to any combination she was likely to have to meet. Foreign policy depended on naval strength rather than conversely, for policy must be so shaped that the country would not have to face a combination that the Navy could not meet. In the Near East British policy was to use diplomatic influence to preserve the integrity of Turkey. There was nothing to offend Mohammedan feeling in the proposed Turco-Greek settlement, and it should be considered as a whole. After a speech from Mr. Lee (U.) on the naval position in the Mediterranean, the motion was withdrawn.

The debate next week (March 23) on the Navy Estimates was almost crowded out by the Ulster and Army crises, but the Votes for wages, victualling and clothing, and works and buildings, were agreed to on March 23, after debate and two divisions. An additional day for the discussion of naval policy was promised after Easter.

But meanwhile the Home Rule controversy had passed into a phase of unprecedented gravity. The "British Covenant" had been supplemented by a "Women's Covenant," and both documents had been numerously and influentially signed, about 3 or 4 per cent. of the signatories, it was said, being Liberals. On the other hand, the First Lord of the Admiralty had spoken at Bradford (March 14), apparently as the messenger of the Cabinet. The Chief Liberal Whip, who presided, declared that the Government's position was impregnable, and that there would be no general election till the three Bills under the Parliament Act had become law. Mr. Churchill, on his part, referred to his own past admissions of Ulster's claim to special treatment; the Prime Minister had made a fair and reasonable offer, with the assent of the Nationalist leaders, and it seemed to him final. It represented the hardest sacrifice ever asked of Irish Nationalism. But the Unionists were not satisfied. The sole return offered was that there would be no civil war. The Ulstermen still showed the old spirit of ascendency. They seemed to think a settlement could only be achieved by threats; but, in the event of violence, the larger issue would be dominant, whether Parliamentary government was to be broken down before the menace of armed force. That had been fought out at Marston Moor. Apparently some sections of the propertied classes desired to subvert Parliamentary government. Against such a mood, when manifested in action, there was no lawful measure from which the Government should or would shrink. He had had to send soldiers out during the railway strike (A.R., 1911, p. 209), and there was no Unionist condemnation then. They knew how the Unionists would treat the Nationalists, and how they applauded martial law in South Africa. The Government met the menace with patience, but with firmness. They were responsible for the peace of the British Empire; who would dare to break it up? There must be one law for all; Great Britain was not to be reduced to the condition of Mexico. If Ulster sought peace and fair play, she knew where to find it; if she were to be made a tool in Parliamentary calculations, if the British civil and Parliamentary systems were to be brought to the challenge of force, he could only say, "Let us go forward together and put these grave matters to the proof."

The finality of the Prime Minister's offer was further emphasised on that day and the next in speeches by Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin; the adverse feeling of the Independent Nationalists by an "All-for-Ireland" Conference (March 14) at Cork; and on March 16 the Prime Minister made a further statement in the Commons, in the form of a collective reply to twenty-six questions, of which notice had been given. Prefacing this reply by a general survey of the situation, he said that the Government had put forward its proposals for the separate treatment of Ulster not as the best way of dealing with Home Rule, but as a basis of settlement; if they were accepted in principle, the Bill would have to be supplemented by a number of adjustments, financial and administrative, which were being worked out, but to discuss them would interfere with a discussion on the main issue. He then began curtly to dispose of the questions; the Unionists objected, as the form of his reply precluded supplementary questions; and he presently intimated that the details would not be formulated unless the general principle were adopted and treated as a basis of agreement. Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson pressed for the details, and, in view of the Prime Minister's replies, a Vote of Censure was determined on. Incidentally, the Prime Minister endorsed the First Lord's speech at Bradford, and the latter was loudly cheered by the Liberals.

The Vote of Censure was moved by Mr. Bonar Law on March 19. It regretted the refusal of the Government to formulate their suggestions before the debate on the second reading of the Home Rule Bill. This moderation in its language was said to represent a reaction from the impatience manifested three days earlier. Mr. Bonar Law's tone, too, was more pacific. He laid stress on the danger of the situation and on his desire to avoid civil war; he and his colleagues had not closed and would not close the door hastily on any proposal put forward by the Government in the hope of securing peace. If the principle to which they were asked to agree was that Ulster was not to be driven out of the Imperial Parliament into a Nationalist Parliament, they accepted it as a basis of discussion; if Ulster was to be brought in automatically against its will, they would help Ulster to resist. He made a formal offer; if the new suggestions were put into the Home Rule Bill and accepted by the country on a Referendum, he had Lord Lansdowne's authority to say that, as far as his influence in the House of Lords went, he would not oppose the will of the people. That, he maintained, was a reasonable offer. Were Ulster brought in as a new Poland, what hope was there for a united Ireland? As to the Army, in a case merely of disorder, it would and ought to obey; if it were a question of civil war, "soldiers are citizens like the rest of us." If blood were shed in Ulster, there would be the same outburst of feeling in Great Britain as there was in the United States when the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter.

The Prime Minister, after protesting against Mr. Bonar Law's view as to the duty of the Army in the case of civil war, restated the aim of his proposal. Ulster was to be excluded for a term of years, to give the electorate of the United Kingdom an opportunity of expressing its opinion, and to enable it to be seen from the working of the Irish Legislature whether the objections of Ulster were well founded. Suppose the proposals accepted on a referendum of the United Kingdom, did the Unionist leaders hold that this would carry with it authority to coerce Ulster? (Mr. Bonar Law indicated assent.) Then, was not the Government's proposal more favourable? Would there be plural voting on the Referendum? (Mr. Bonar Law indicated that there need not.) And would Ulster accept the decision? (Sir Edward Carson offered to answer if it were a "firm offer.") On a Referendum it would be impossible to isolate the issue. He believed the proposals were fair, and the Government were quite satisfied with the Home Rule Bill as it stood. Even partial and temporary exclusion was an evil, but it was only because it offered the only avenue to a pacific settlement that the Government had felt compelled to take it.

Sir Edward Carson (U.) said that, in view of the First Lord's and Mr. Devlin's speeches, he felt that if this were the Prime Minister's last word he ought to be in Belfast. This Government of cowards, who had postponed dealing with the Ulster movement and would not remove the time-limit because of Mr. Redmond, were now going to entrench themselves behind the King's troops. They had been discussing at the War Office for the last two days how many they would require and whether they would mobilise. They wanted an outbreak as a pretext for putting the Ulstermen down. Gamble in anything else, but not in human life. After a bitter attack on Mr. Churchill, he suggested to the Prime Minister that the parts of Ulster in question should be excluded till Parliament further ordered, or till the question was reconsidered with a view to federation. Ulster, alone in Ireland, had always been on the best of terms with the Army; but under the direction of the Government the Army would become assassins.

After a scene, provoked by Mr. Devlin (N., Belfast, W.), by denouncing Sir Edward Carson's desertion of the Liberal party, after Home Rule had been defeated in 1886, as that of "a man on the make," Sir E. Carson, who was very unwell, left—for Belfast, however, and amid a great Opposition demonstration—and Mr. Devlin, continuing, declared that the civil war in Ulster was a "masquerade" and a sham, organised by the Unionist party, which had no policy. He ridiculed some of the "critical incidents" which, according to The Times, had nearly brought about an earthquake, and pointed out that the eleven bye-elections since August, 1913, had shown 69,661 votes for Home Rule and 50,885 against it. He thought the exclusion proposals were needless, and at most only four counties would adopt them, possibly not one. He emphasised the Nationalist sacrifice, and believed that six years hence the Protestants would be contributing to the future power and glory of Ireland.

Among subsequent speakers Mr. Cave (U., Kingston, Surrey) suggested devolution to Irish provincial assemblies, Mr. Pirie (L., Aberdeen, N.) moved an amendment, declaring that a settlement might be found in the exclusion of the Ulster counties until legislative provision for a general system of devolution for the whole of the United Kingdom was ready to come into operation, such provision to take place within six years. Mr. A. Ward (U., Herts, Watford) urged the Unionists to consider their position and press for the continuance of negotiations between the leaders. Mr. A. Chamberlain, summing up for the Opposition, complained of the provocative speech of Mr. Devlin, and dwelt on the dangers of the Government's proposal; he regretted that Mr. Cave's suggestions, anticipated by some Unionists in the autumn, had been ignored, and that the Prime Minister would not accept the Referendum. The Chief Secretary for Ireland, winding up for Ministers, said that it was a considerable advance to have got to discussing the compatibility of the exclusion of Ulster and Home Rule. He had thought Ulstermen would be inclined to accept this proposal on consideration. He laid stress on the patience of the Ulster Nationalists under provocation, and thought Mr. Cave's and Mr. Ward's speeches held out hopes of settlement.

The Vote of Censure was rejected by 345 to 252. The amendment was consequently not put.

Sir Edward Carson had left the House to go to Ulster; so had eight Ulster Unionist members. The belief that this portended a new stage in the crisis was heightened by military movements in Ulster, by reports that warrants were out for the arrest of "from 30 to 130" leaders of the Ulster Volunteer Force, and from rumours as to trouble with the officers at the Curragh. The Chief Secretary for Ireland (March 20) and the Attorney-General (March 21) endeavoured to reassure public opinion. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer's utterances at Huddersfield (March 21) had an opposite effect. In one speech he dealt with the land programme and made an eloquent plea for social reform; but earlier in the day he violently attacked the House of Lords and the Orangemen of Ulster, declaring that the former were threatening the doctrine of popular government, and had produced the doctrine of "optional obedience," and that the latter were threatening rebellion that they might not cease to be the dominant caste. He attacked the exclusion of Ulster, and objected that a Referendum would only produce a poll of 40 or 50 per cent. of the electorate, and a majority on that small poll would destroy reform. Let the Home Rule controversy be settled, in order to open the way to deliverance from social wretchedness.

This speech and Sir Edward Carson's departure damped whatever hopes of settlement had been based on certain passages in the Vote of Censure debate. Meanwhile rumours had reached London that officers in Ireland had resigned to avoid serving against Ulster; and many Unionists believed that British troops were to be ordered to shoot down the Ulster Volunteers at once. The chief sources for the history are the Prime Minister's statements to the Press and in the Commons (March 22, 23); the White Paper (March 25); the Morning Post account (March 26), based on information from the officers concerned; the First Lord of the Admiralty's speech (March 30), and Colonel Seely's speech (April 9); the Ulster version issued in April, and the consequent debates in the Unionist motion for an inquiry (post, Chap. III.). In December, 1913, the War Minister had warned the Generals commanding in chief, that while soldiers were justified in contemplating disobedience to outrageous orders, e.g. massacring a demonstration of Orangemen who were not dangerous, they might have to assist in supporting the Civil Power, and that they could not pick and choose between lawful and reasonable orders. Any officer resigning was to be asked for reasons, and, if he indicated that he desired to choose between orders, the War Minister would at once submit to the King that his name should be removed. On March 14 it was determined to protect certain military stores in Ireland from possible raids by Ulster Volunteers. General Sir Arthur Paget, commanding in Ireland, was ordered to take the necessary steps. Cavalry and horse artillery were to support the infantry, and, as the Great Northern Railway of Ireland was expected to refuse to convey the troops, preparations were made to send them by sea, and one company was actually sent by sea to Carrickfergus; but the railway authorities accepted the troops. As was afterwards revealed, naval support was provided for the operations (p. 60). On March 20 Sir A. Paget arrived in Dublin and conferred, first, with General Gough, commanding the Third Cavalry Brigade, who apparently refused to serve against Ulster, preferring to be dismissed the service; next, with the other generals, and, according to the Morning Post (April 7), his instructions were as follows: The Third Cavalry Brigade was to move forward to seize the bridges across the Boyne and to wait there till relieved by the infantry; a fleet was to anchor in Belfast Lough and co-operate with the Army, 25,000 troops were to be employed, and a division of infantry got from England. The force was made large apparently in order to deter the Volunteers from attacking it, but the Unionists insisted that it was provocative. It appears to have been intimated also to the officers that the Ulster Unionist leaders were to be arrested, and possibly—though as to this there is a conflict of evidence—that the orders were in accordance with the wishes of the King. It seemed that Sir A. Paget might unintentionally have misinterpreted the intentions of the Government. However, he telegraphed to the War Office that evening that the Brigadier and fifty-seven officers, Third Cavalry Brigade (out of a total of seventy), preferred to accept dismissal if ordered North; and General Gough sent him a Minute, saying that, while these officers were prepared to maintain order and preserve property, they had rather be dismissed than initiate active military operations against Ulster. (These officers comprised all those of the Sixteenth Lancers, nearly all those of the Fourth Hussars and Fifth Lancers, and six out of thirteen of the Third Brigade Royal Horse Artillery.) Next day, March 21, Sir A. Paget attempted to remove their fears. He assured them that the measure contemplated was merely a measure of precaution, but he spoke of "massacres," of "battles," of a possible disarmament of regiments which refused to move, which would be the "Indian Mutiny over again," and finally said that "there were worse things than a Court Martial," which was interpreted to refer to the possibility of a capital sentence for disobeying orders. For these explanations the authority is the Morning Post account, based apparently on statements from the officers concerned. The situation was not bettered by them, or by the wild rumours which were published in London (March 21 and 22) of mutinies of infantry regiments in Ireland. On Sunday, March 22, therefore, the Prime Minister authorised The Times to state: (1) That the recent movements of troops in Ireland were purely precautionary and intended only to safeguard the depots of arms, while the naval movements merely consisted in sending troops to Carrickfergus by two small cruisers without the necessity of marching them through Belfast; (2) that no warrants were issued for the arrest of the Ulster leaders, and no such step was contemplated; (3) it was untrue that the Government contemplated instituting a general inquiry into the intentions of officers if asked to take up arms against Ulster; it was hoped that this contingency might never arise.

It was under these circumstances that both Houses met on Monday, March 23. In the Commons the War Minister stated that on the evening of March 20 General Sir A. Paget had notified the War Office that some officers might be unable to carry out his instructions; the Army Council telegraphed asking him to state the circumstances, and ordering the senior officers concerned to report themselves at the War Office. An inquiry held by the Army Council showed that the incident was due to a misunderstanding of questions put them by Sir A. Paget, and, with his approval, they had been ordered to rejoin their units. The movements of troops ordered on the night of March 19 from information received were: One company of infantry was instructed to move to Enniskillen, Omagh, Armagh, and Carrickfergus respectively; one battalion of infantry was ordered, half to Dundalk and half to Newry, and one from Victoria Barracks, inside Belfast, to Holywood Barracks, just outside. The reason was the necessity for protecting Government arms, ammunition, stores, and other property. All these movements had been completed in accordance with instructions from the General commanding in Ireland, and all orders had been punctually and implicitly obeyed.

To make a discussion possible, the Prime Minister moved the adjournment, at Mr. Bonar Law's request. The latter said that a new danger had arisen—that the Army should be destroyed before their eyes. The resignations were not confined to the Cavalry Brigade; an officer in an infantry regiment at the Curragh had written stating that on Thursday, March 20, the following proposal had been put before the officers: "Any officer whose home is in Ulster can be given leave; officers who object to fighting against Ulster can say so and will be at once dismissed from service;" and they were given half an hour to decide. Nine or ten objected to go on any conditions. He read a letter from an officer who had heard Sir A. Paget's address at the Curragh, stating that he had said that "active operations" were to be taken against Ulster, and that he expected the country "to be in a blaze" by March 21. Officers domiciled in Ulster were to be "allowed to disappear," and would subsequently be reinstated, but must give their word not to fight for Ulster; others who would not fight against Ulster would be dismissed. This meant more than merely protective operations, and in his belief certain Ministers, probably without the Prime Minister's knowledge, had made the movement either to provoke or to intimidate the people of Ulster. Neither officers nor men should be compelled to take part in civil war against their will. (Labour members interjected inquiries whether the Army was also entitled to refuse to act in suppressing the railway strike.)

The Prime Minister replied. It was the duty of the Army to protect military property and stores, and to aid the civil power in the maintenance of order. Any officer or private who refused to assist in doing these duties was guilty of a breach of duty and was liable to be dismissed. In December, 1913, instructions were issued to General Sir A. Paget, and the rule as to excusing officers domiciled in an area of disturbance would apply anywhere as far as practicable. Long before the First Lord's speech the danger of a seizure of the guns and stores had been pointed out, and the operation was purely protective, and was over. The Cavalry Brigade had not been ordered to move. Sir A. Paget had had no instructions beyond those of December, except to make these particular movements. Brigadier-General Gough and his officers had misinterpreted his speech, and he denied using anything like the language given. General Gough and the officers concerned, had returned to their posts and expressed their willingness to carry out the duties required. (These explanations were greatly interrupted by the Opposition.) Finally, if officers and soldiers were to discriminate between the validity of different laws, the fabric of society would crumble. Suppose acute labour troubles and a stoppage of food, transport, and fuel, were the troops to follow their sympathies?

Mr. Balfour (U.) ridiculed the Prime Minister's explanation, and contended that the Government had intended to coerce Ulster, and had shrunk from doing so. Ulster might be wrong, but her conviction was rooted, and Ministers had aroused forces which could only be pacified by a broad and statesmanlike treatment which they had given no indications of being able to adopt.

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald (Lab.) said that the Syndicalists who had failed to poison the Labour party with their doctrines had apparently succeeded with the Tories; and Mr. John Ward (Lab., Stoke-on-Trent) declared that the officers had thrown over their allegiance to the King. The motion for adjournment was withdrawn; and a debate in the House of Lords added no further information.

The course of the debate and of events pleased only the Labour party, who foresaw that, since the option given to officers must logically be extended to men, the Army could not now be used in labour troubles. The Unionists believed that the Government had meant to coerce Ulster and had climbed down. Many Liberals held that it had gone too far in concession to the officers, and a Liberal member was said to have described the situation as "our Zabern." The Manchester Guardian said that the Prime Minister had gone very far towards recognising the right of officers to lay down the conditions of service, and cited Hearson v. Churchill (a naval case, 1892) and Clode's "Military Forces of the Crown," to show that officers had no right to resign without leave. In the country the Labour members' deductions made a great impression; on the other hand, an Ulster Defence Fund, started in the City by Mr. H. H. Gibbs, soon reached 100,000l.

The Labour view of the position was emphasised (March 23) in a debate in the Commons, started by Mr. Amery (U., Birmingham, S.), on the Report of the Army Vote. Mr. J. Ward (Lab.) read a Syndicalist manifesto "to the men of the British Army" published that day, urging them to remember that officers had exercised an option as to obeying orders, and asking them to resolve that they would never fire a shot against their own class. He added that when this once began it was not officers alone who would have consciences; the question was whether the people, through their representatives in Parliament, were to make the law without interference from King or Army. Later, Mr. J. H. Thomas. (Lab., Derby) remarked that the Railway Servants' Union had refused to assist one of their own members who had distributed pamphlets asking soldiers not to shoot down their fellow-workmen. He himself agreed with the action of the Prime Minister in August, 1911, in using troops to secure the food supplies of the nation in the railway strike; and he warned the House that his union had given notice to the railway companies in the name of 400,000 railwaymen which would expire on November 1. He would do his best to effect an amicable settlement, but, if the Opposition doctrine held good, his duty would be to tell the railwaymen to organise their forces and to spend the union's half-million of capital in providing arms and ammunition.

These speeches greatly pleased the Liberals, and Mr. Ward was enthusiastically cheered ("for saying what we all think") when he was introduced by a member into the smoking-room of the National Liberal Club. It was stated, also, that they roused much sympathy in the Army among the rank and file. The Liberals were further startled by the White Paper published next day (March 25). Following the correspondence already quoted, it contained a letter in which General Gough asked the Adjutant-General to make clear whether, if the Home Rule Bill became law, the officers "could be called upon to enforce it in Ulster under the expression of maintaining law and order;" and a minute was written in reply, and signed by the War Minister, General Sir John French, and General Sir J. S. Ewart, which ran as follows:—

General Gough, it was rumoured, had at once shown this document and talked freely to reporters, and had received an ovation on his return to the Curragh.

The whole White Paper, and especially the letter above quoted, filled the Liberals with anger and dismay. The Westminster Gazette described it as "incredible," and declared editorially that it would prefer the defeat of the Government to an abject surrender to the Army.

On March 25 the position was further elucidated on the second reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill. Before this, however, there was another sensation and a scene. Questioned by Lord Charles Beresford as to the movements of the Third Battle Squadron, alleged to be meant to intimidate Ulster, the First Lord of the Admiralty said that a fortnight earlier the Cabinet had decided to station a battle squadron at Lamlash (Arran) as a convenient place to exercise from, and near Ireland if there should be serious disorder. On March 22, the precautionary movements of troops having been carried out without opposition, it was decided to delay the movement till after the Easter period of leave. The field-guns were asked for by the Admiral to exercise the men ashore at Lamlash if the weather was bad (a statement scoffed at by the Opposition). The insinuation made by a Unionist member that the precautionary movements were provocative he repudiated as "hellish." Subsequently Colonel Seely, the War Minister, stated in detail the facts relating to the correspondence published and to the statement quoted above. Having seen General Gough, he went to the Cabinet meeting and said he would ask the Adjutant-General to draft a document for him. He then had to go to the King, and (he said parenthetically) the suggestion made outside Parliament that His Majesty had taken any initiative in the matter was "absolutely without foundation." When he returned, the Cabinet had separated, having discussed the draft prepared by the Adjutant-General (Sir J. S. Ewart). He added the two concluding paragraphs to conform to the statement he had made. On receiving this document General Gough asked Sir John French if it meant that he would not be called on to order his brigade to assist in coercing Ulster to submit to Home Rule, and Sir John French wrote across it "I should read it so." Sir John French and Sir J. S. Ewart did not know that it was a Cabinet document, and no blame rested on them or on Sir A. Paget; but blame rested on himself for altering it, and, having been absent from the Cabinet meeting, he did not apprehend that his colleagues had seriously considered the document and regarded it in the form in which it had left their hands as a matter of vital concern. Having unintentionally misled his colleagues, he had tendered his resignation. It appeared, however, that this had not been accepted; and Mr. Balfour, after scouting the Ministerial explanation of the naval and military movements and defending Ulster's right to resist, asked how the Government explained the two "peccant paragraphs" which were binding on Colonel Seely and the Army Council, and which "the whole Army would take as its charter." They made it impossible to coerce Ulster.

The Prime Minister, after declaring that the King had throughout observed every rule comporting with the dignity of a constitutional Sovereign, pointed out that in fact the Government had offered the Ulster counties exclusion till after two consultations of the electorate against an offer by the Opposition of one such consultation at once. Was it really believed that there was a plot to provoke Ulster? The movements were purely protective, and were ordered on March 14. Sir Edward Carson and his friends might equip a force said to number 100,000, but, if the Government consulted their general, it was an intrigue and an outrage. General Paget acted like any prudent general in the circumstances. The officers were uneasy, as to the possible initiation of active operations against Ulster, and sent in their resignations. When they came to the War Office, every one realised that there had been a misconception. On the 23rd, after the interviews, the Cabinet received the draft of the proposed letter from the Army Council to General Gough. They did not know of his previous letter nor did the War Secretary. They authorised the three first paragraphs of the letter from the Army Council, which gave no assurance of any sort and stated plainly the duties of the officers. As soon as he received the copy of the whole letter, he sent for the War Secretary, who explained how the two last paragraphs had been added, and said that it was too late to alter them, for General Gough had had the letter. Mr. Asquith pointed out to the House that General Gough's letter shifted the question to a remote and hypothetical contingency It was not right to ask an officer what he would do in such a contingency, still less could it be right for an officer to ask a Government to give him any assurance. Such a claim, once admitted, would put the Government and the House at the mercy of the Military and the Navy. (This was received with prolonged Liberal and Labour cheers and waving of handkerchiefs and papers.) Were that issue once raised, he had little doubt as to the verdict of the country. The War Secretary, under great stress, had committed an error of judgment, but to accept his resignation would be ungenerous and unjust.

Mr. Bonar Law declared that the Government had decided on a great military and naval demonstration to impress the people of Ulster, and Sir A. Paget's statement was inconsistent with their explanation. He read a letter from an infantry officer, stating that Sir Charles Fergusson had told his officers that "steps had been taken so that any aggression must come from the Ulsterites." He insisted that the position amounted to civil war, and, with reference to the Labour attacks on the Ulster people and the Army, he declared that the Ulster Volunteers were thoroughly democratic, and the feeling among the rank and file of the Army was as strong as among the officers. If he were an officer he would resign, and (he hoped) would face a court martial rather than be sent against Ulster. The Government's duty was to find some means of saving the nation from an impossible position.

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald (Lab.) declared that Mr. Bonar Law's statement was an encouragement to mutiny. The sentence quoted from Sir Charles Fergusson meant that the offensive must not be taken against Ulster. The officers were acting as party politicians, and had communicated with the Press. Had the position revealed in the White Paper been that of the Government, the Government could not have lived for twenty-four hours.

Later, the Foreign Minister said that the Government repudiated the two paragraphs because they appeared as an answer to General Gough's letter making conditions, and General Gough had returned unconditionally. His question was not one that an officer should put. No question must be raised by the Army as to the orders given them.

After a stormy scene, caused by a remark of Mr. Holt (L., Northumberland, Hexham), Mr. Austen Chamberlain (U.), in a long speech, said that the Government's account was incompatible with the permission to officers domiciled in Ulster to disappear, and with the movements of the Fleet, of which the Prime Minister apparently did not know when he communicated with the Press on March 22. He also stated that the draft had been prepared by Colonel Seely in conjunction with Lord Morley of Blackburn, that it contained the guarantee embodied in the paragraphs in question, and that Lord Morley was present at the Cabinet meeting at which the draft was amended. The Cabinet would not throw over a colleague for doing what it had assented to in fact. The First Lord replied that Lord Morley's only connexion with the full document was that the War Minister had shown it to him after the meeting of the Cabinet when he asked what he was to say in the House of Lords on behalf of the Government. He said also that two great issues had emerged, Parliament versus the Army, and the Army versus the People, and that the Opposition had laid down the principle that it was always right for the soldier to shoot down a Radical and a Labour man. The debate ended in uproar, but the second reading was passed and the Government sustained by 314 to 222.

In the House of Lords, meanwhile, Lord Morley of Blackburn described the idea of a plot as "a sinister hallucination," and mentioned incidentally that the peccant paragraphs had been drafted with his aid. The Marquess of Lansdowne thought the Government had contemplated a coup d'état by paralysing the loyalists.

Next day the crisis was dealt with in Parliament only by angry questioning in the Commons; but it was announced in the Press that Sir John French and Sir J. S. Ewart had tendered their resignations and persisted in them. A statement was promised, but not made, on the adjournment of the Commons; and on Friday, March 27, it was officially promised at 5 P.M., as the Cabinet was still sitting; a suggestion by Mr. Bonar Law that the House should adjourn was rendered nugatory by the ruling of the Speaker that only a Minister could move the adjournment on a Friday, and after a somewhat stormy conversation, the House passed to other business. Just before 5 P.M. the Prime Minister entered; and in reply to Sir R. Pole-Carew (U.) he stated that the officers in question had tendered their resignations, as they had initialled the memorandum to General Gough; but the Cabinet, as there was no difference of policy, had asked them not to persist in their request, as their resignations would be a serious misfortune to the Army and the State. To avoid future misconceptions, a new Army order had been issued, as follows. It was headed "Discipline."