A second attempt was made by Germany on August 10, after the capture of Liège, to obtain the consent of Belgium to the German armies passing through Belgian territory on the understanding that "Germany would evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so," but this proposal was also rejected by the Belgian Government (Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 62 to 65).

A German "White Paper" was issued in August under the title "How the Franco-German Conflict could have been Avoided," which contained the telegrams exchanged between Prince Henry of Prussia, the King of England, and the German Emperor before the outbreak of the war. It was issued from the Government printing office in Berlin in English, not in German. Prince Henry's telegram to the King, dated Berlin, July 30, stated that the Emperor his brother "is much preoccupied" and "is trying his utmost" to fulfil the Tsar's appeal to him to "work for the maintenance of peace," adding that Germany has "taken no measures, but may be forced to do so any moment should our neighbours [France and Russia] continue," and urging the King to use his influence on France and Russia "to keep neutral." The Emperor, he concluded, "is most sincere in his endeavours to maintain peace," but "the military preparations of his two neighbours may at last force him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which would otherwise remain defenceless." A telegram from the German Emperor to the King, dated July 31, stated that the proposals of the British Government (that Russia and France should suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a hostage for the satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their military operations) "coincide" with his ideas and the statements he had got that night from Vienna and forwarded to London, but that the German Chancellor had just informed him that an official notification had arrived that the Tsar had "ordered the mobilisation of his whole Army and Fleet, not even awaiting the results of the mediation he" (the German Emperor) "was working at," and leaving him without any news. He had accordingly left for Berlin to take measures for insuring the safety of his Eastern frontiers, "where strong Russian forces were already posted." Finally, on August 1, the German Emperor telegraphed to the King, with reference to a suggestion by the German Ambassador in London that Germany might refrain from attacking France in a war between Germany and Russia if France remained neutral, that "on technical grounds" this suggestion could not be accepted, as the German mobilisation, which had been proclaimed that afternoon, "must proceed against two fronts, East and West, as prepared, and cannot be countermanded," but that if France should offer her neutrality, "which must be guaranteed by the British Fleet and Army," he would "refrain from attacking France and employ his troops elsewhere." He added that the troops on his frontier were "in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France." It was afterwards explained that the suggestion had created a misunderstanding, as it would probably have been incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance.

In another German White Paper, entitled "Memorandum and Documents with Regard to the Outbreak of War," the "Memorandum" stated that the Balkan League against Turkey had been organised under the patronage of Russia, and that when the League was successful in the Turkish Campaign and had been broken up in consequence of the dissensions of its members, Russia desired a new Balkan League "whose activities should be directed this time not against Turkey ... but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy." Serbia was under this plan to "cede to Bulgaria the section of Macedonia that she had won in the last Balkan War and compensate herself by the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Austria-Hungary, in view of this scheme, considered that "it was not consistent with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action," and asked Germany's opinion in the matter. Germany assured her ally "most heartily" of her agreement with the Austro-Hungarian view, while fully aware "that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question" and might draw Germany into war "in accordance with her duties as an ally." Recognising, however, that "the vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake, Germany could neither advise her ally" to a compliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity "nor deny her Germany's support," especially as "her interests were also seriously threatened," for "if Serbia with the assistance of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the existence of Austria-Hungary any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall of the monarchy and her submission to Slavonic sway under the Russian sceptre, thus making the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable. A morally weakened Austria-Hungary, breaking down under the advance of Russian Panslavism, would no longer be an ally on whom Germany could count such as she needs in view of the attitude of her Eastern and Western neighbours.... Austria was therefore given a free hand in her action against Serbia, in the preparation of which Germany took no part." This was "Austria's affair; she alone would have to settle it with Serbia, and Germany therefore devoted her entire efforts to localising the war," holding that "no civilised nation had the right in this struggle against barbarism and criminal political morality to prevent Austria from inflicting a just punishment on Serbia." Although the Austrian Government had declared through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg that it had no plans of conquest, the first reports of Russian mobilisation had reached Berlin on the same day, and in the evening the German Ambassadors in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were directed to call the attention of the English, French, and Russian Governments energetically to the danger of this measure, "for the decision as to the peace of the world lay entirely in St. Petersburg." The Ambassador at St. Petersburg especially was directed to inform the Russian Government that if it mobilised Germany would also have to mobilise, "both against Russia and France." On the following day (July 27) the "Russian Minister of War, M. Sukhomlinoff, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honour that no mobilisation order had yet been issued; for the present only preparatory measures had been taken, but if Austria crossed the Serbian boundary the military districts facing Austria would be mobilised."

Meanwhile Germany "continued her mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the monarchy," but "unluckily all these mediatory acts were soon overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On July 29 the Russian Government officially announced in Berlin that it had mobilised four Army districts, and reports arrived of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on land and sea." Yet on the same day the Chief of the Russian Staff had informed the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg "that everything had remained the same as had been explained by the Minister of War two days before, and gave his word of honour in the most formal manner that mobilisation had begun nowhere up to three o'clock that afternoon; though he could not answer for the future." At the same time he declared most emphatically that no mobilisation was desired by His Majesty in the districts touching on the German boundary. As numerous and positive reports of the levying of reservists in these districts had reached St. Petersburg, Warsaw and Vilna, the Attaché expressed the opinion to his Government that the statement of the Chief of the Russian General Staff "was an attempt to mislead Germany with regard to the extent of the measures that had already been taken." The assembling, the Memorandum proceeds, "of troops on the East Prussian border and the declaration of a state of war in all important places on the Russian Western boundary no longer left any doubt that Russian mobilisation was actively going on against Germany," notwithstanding the denials "on his word of honour" of the Russian Minister of War. The Memorandum further publishes the text of telegrams exchanged between the Emperor William and the Tsar. On July 28 the former expressed "the greatest disquietude" at the impression which he heard Austro-Hungary's action against Serbia was making in the Russian Empire. "The unscrupulous agitation," he said, "which has gone on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which the Archduke Ferdinand was the victim. The spirit which allowed the Serbians to murder their own King and his wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that you and I, as well as all Sovereigns, have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment." He knew how difficult it was for the Tsar and his Government to resist the pressure of public opinion, and remembering "the heartfelt friendship which had bound him and the Tsar closely for a long time," he was exerting "all his influence to endeavour to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfactory understanding with Russia." He "earnestly hoped, therefore, that the Tsar would help him in his efforts to set aside all obstacles that may yet arise." To this the Tsar replied on July 29 with an urgent appeal that "in this serious moment" the Emperor would help him. A disgraceful war, he said, had been declared on a weak nation; the indignation at this, which he fully shared, was immense in Russia, and he foresaw that soon he would not be able longer to withstand the pressure that was being brought to bear upon him, and that he would be "forced to adopt measures which will lead to war." In order to prevent such a calamity he asked the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to do all that is possible to prevent his ally from going too far. The Emperor replied that he shared the Tsar's wish for the maintenance of peace, but that he cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action "a disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Serbia's promises, when they are only on paper, are quite unreliable, and full guarantees must be secured that Serbia's promises shall be turned into deeds. Russia might, he thought, remain in the rôle of a spectator towards the Austro-Serbian War without dragging Europe "into the most terrible war that it has ever seen." He therefore suggested a direct understanding between St. Petersburg and Vienna as "possible and desirable"—an understanding which his Government was endeavouring to help with all its power. He added, however, that military measures by Russia would hasten a calamity which they both wished to avoid, and would undermine his position as mediator. On July 30 the Emperor repeated that if Russia mobilised against Austria-Hungary, his position as mediator, which he had accepted at the Tsar's urgent request, would be jeopardised, if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the decision now rested on the Tsar's shoulders; they must bear the responsibility for war or peace. To this the Tsar replied that the military measures now being taken "were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations," and that he hoped "with all his heart" that these measures would not influence in any way his (the German Emperor's) position as mediator. On July 31 the Tsar again expressed his thanks to the Emperor for his mediation, "which permits a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peaceably," but added that "it is a technical impossibility" for Russia to halt her military preparations "which became necessary through Austria's mobilisation," though "we are far from being desirous of war." So long as the negotiations continue with Austria regarding Serbia "my troops will not undertake any challenging action, I solemnly pledge my word as to that. I am trusting in the grace of God with all my might, and hope for the success of your mediation at Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe—Your sincerely devoted Nicholas." The Emperor replied that upon the Tsar's appeal to his friendship and plea for his help he had undertaken a mediatory action between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments, but that while this negotiation was under way the Tsar's troops were mobilised against Austria-Hungary, and that his mediation was thereby rendered almost illusory. Notwithstanding this, he had continued it; but now he was in receipt of reliable reports of serious preparations for war on his Eastern boundary also, and responsibility for the safety of his Empire compelled him to take defensive measures. He had carried his efforts for the maintenance of the world's peace to the utmost limit, and it was not he that bore the responsibility for the calamity that now threatened the entire civilised world. Yet at this moment it lay in the Tsar's power to stave it off. No one threatened the honour and might of Russia, which might have awaited the result of his mediation. "The friendship," the Emperor concluded, "for you and your Empire which was bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred to me, and I have been faithful to Russia when she was hard pressed, especially in her last war. It is still possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary."

The mobilisation of the entire fighting force of Russia, the Memorandum adds, which had been ordered in the forenoon of the day when these telegrams were despatched, was in full swing—"the Tsar's telegram was sent at two o'clock in the afternoon"; and this "shows clearly that Russia desired the war," and "in the afternoon of August 1 Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on German territory. By this move Russia began the war." To the question put to the French Cabinet as to what steps it would take "the reply given on the afternoon of August 1 was that France would do what her interests seemed to warrant. A few hours later, at five in the afternoon, the complete mobilisation of the French Army and Navy was ordered, and on the morning of the following day France opened hostilities." A long reply to the French Yellow Book published by the North German Gazette on December 21 further states, with regard to the argument that Austria and Russia were on the point of coming to an understanding respecting the Note to Serbia, when Germany suddenly destroyed all chances of peace by declaring war, that the general mobilisation ordered by Russia brought to naught the entire mediatory work of Germany, so that nothing can get rid of the fact "that Russia bears the responsibility for unchaining a European war."

Germany was badly served by her diplomatists and Ministers, and also by her generals, though she had perhaps the most efficient, and certainly the best organised, army in the world. She believed up to the last moment that neither Russia nor England would fight, being completely ignorant of the relative strength of the cross-currents of influence at the Russian Court and of the determination of all parties in England to resist the violation of the neutrality of Belgium—a step which only turned against her all the civilised nations of Europe, and probably did not bring her much nearer or more quickly to Paris than if she had invaded France from the South, which was the reason given for Germany's action (no doubt based on the opinion of the German General Staff) by the German Secretary of State (p. 314). Another reason, or rather pretext alleged by the German Government was that it was necessary to anticipate a hostile attack of France through Belgium, and that it had received reliable information to the effect that French forces "intended" to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur; but as a matter of fact there were no French forces in that direction; the attack was made from the Vosges and the subsequent alleged discovery of documents proving that France and England had for some time been preparing together with the Belgian Staff for an attack upon Germany through Belgium only showed that these preparations were made in view of the defence of that country against a possible violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality; besides which both France and England had, in response to an appeal from Belgium to defend her neutrality, replied that they would do so (p. 365).

The German armies forced their way through Belgium with the precision and pitilessness of a machine, but the victories of the Marne and the Aisne in September arrested their progress, and from then until the end of the year they practically remained stationary. In Russian Poland and Galicia, too, although there they had a leader, Field-Marshal Hindenburg, who gained some brilliant victories, they did not succeed in freeing Prussia from the danger of a Russian invasion.[17]

The Germans and Austrians had at the end of the year occupied, besides nearly all Belgium, one twenty-seventh of French territory and one-third of the Kingdom of Poland, while the French and the Russians held respectively about 200 square miles in Alsace, nearly half of Galicia, and some frontier districts of East Prussia; but neither of the great Austrian fortresses, Cracow and Przemysl. Of the important towns in Poland Russia had Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, while Germany held the equally large, though politically not so important, town of Lodz, "the Polish Manchester." The troops engaged on both sides amounted to about 2,000,000 with upwards of 20,000 guns; the Russian artillery, mostly manufactured in the Creuzot works in France, were only surpassed by the German when the latter brought into action their 42 centimetre and 30½ centimetre mortars, the former manufactured at the Krupp works and the latter at Pilsen, in Austria. The last four months of the year were spent in a series of gigantic but inconclusive struggles, accompanied by hideous carnage of hundreds of thousands of men and in which often each side claimed the victory, but whose only appreciable result was the stemming by Marshal Hindenburg of the advance on Silesia by the Russians and by Generals Joffre and French of the advance on Paris by the Germans. In Poland the Germans had the advantage of internal lines and numerous railways by which they could rapidly bring up abundant supplies of men and material, while the Russians were hampered by a lack of railways, by bad roads, and long distances to their base; in France, on the other hand, the Germans had to go long distances for their reserves, and their difficulties were greatly increased by their occupation of Belgium, the cardinal blunder of the war. The losses of the Germans financially were enormous. Professor Julius Wolf, Professor of Political Economy at Berlin, estimated the damage done in East Prussia and in Alsace at about 50,000,000l., and computed that Germany must reckon upon a total waste in three months of 350,000,000l.

The German Navy[18] did not venture to leave its secure harbours in the Baltic except in the battle off Heligoland in August, the two cruiser raids on the East coast of England in November and December, and some attacks on the Russian port of Libau, where the cruisers Magdeburg and Friedrich Karl were destroyed. When the war broke out the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau were in the Mediterranean, and after bombarding Bona and Philippeville made their way to Messina, whence they escaped to the Bosphorus and were renamed as Turkish ships (p. 183). The armed merchant cruiser Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, which endeavoured to arrest traffic between England and the Cape, and the Cap Trafalgar were sunk before they could do much damage (Aug. 27 and Sept. 14), but the light cruiser Emden, which escaped from Kiaochau, and the Karlsruhe captured about thirty-three British merchant ships, and the armoured cruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, which had also escaped from Kiaochau, after being engaged by the British unsuccessfully off Coronel, on the Chilian coast, were caught on December 8 off the Falkland Islands and sunk (pp. 226, 247). By the end of the year the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean were nearly free of German cruisers. The submarines of the Germans were equally active and enterprising, but beyond sinking the Cressy, Aboukir, and Hogue in the North Sea in September and the cruiser Hermes in the Straits of Dover in November (pp. 212, 225) they were not very effective in their attacks either upon the Navy or on merchant ships; more were lost by striking the German mines which were laid at the mouth of the Thames and off Ireland. The German airships, too, did not prove very effective.

In the Pacific Ocean Germany lost all her Colonies. On August 18 Japan demanded of Germany the delivery of the entire leased territory of Kiaochau with a view to its restoration to China, and no reply having been given, besieged its fortified port, Tsing-Tao, from October 31 to November 7, when its garrison surrendered. This was by far the most valuable of the German colonies. The Marianne, Caroline, and Marshall Islands were also taken from Germany by the Japanese. German New Guinea and New Britain were captured by an expedition from Australia, and Samoa by one from New Zealand. In Africa Togoland was occupied by the British and French on August 7. In September some raids were made by the Germans on British East Africa, Nyasaland, and British South Africa which were repelled after heavy fighting. On September 19 Lüderitzbucht, in German South-West Africa, was occupied by the Union Defence Force.

On September 27 the British and French invaded the German Colony of Cameroon, whose capital, Duala, surrendered to them, but an attack by British and Indian troops from Bombay on Tanga, in German East Africa, on November 4, was repelled, and the troops then embarked, as it was considered inadvisable to attempt a second attack without adequate reinforcements. In November the Germans made a raid on the Portuguese Colony of Angola, which was repeated in December, although the German Consul had presented a formal apology to the Portuguese Government for the first raid. Finally, on December 30 an Australian force occupied Bougainville, the largest of the Solomon Islands, and hoisted the British flag, and on the following day the British Colony of Walfish Bay, which had been raided by the Germans, was reoccupied by the British.

The horrible atrocities committed by the Germans in Belgium and Poland—the massacres, rapes, and acts of mutilation of unarmed and inoffensive members of the civil population, the placing in front of the troops of male and female civilians to shield them from the fire of the Allies, the taking of hostages to be made responsible for the conduct of the population, the burning of villages and churches and the execution of parish priests, the killing of wounded soldiers and the disregard of the Red Cross—which far exceeded the devastation wrought by the Cossacks in East Prussia and by the Austrians in Serbia—aroused the reprobation of the whole civilised world, and Germany, by way of making some compensation to the Poles, and in contrast to the policy of Russia in forcing her language and religion upon the Ruthenians of Galicia, sanctioned the appointment of a Pole, Dr. Likowski, as Archbishop of Posen, dissolved the anti-Polish Ostmarkenverein (Eastern Colonisation Society) in that province, and in the districts of Russian Poland which were occupied by the German troops, announced that Polish and German would be recognised as the official languages instead of Russian. The German Humanity League issued on September 20 from Rotterdam an appeal "to the civilised world" concluding as follows:—

On August 19 the Emperor issued an Army order to his troops urging them to use all their skill and valour "to exterminate first the treacherous English and walk over General French's contemptible little army," and on December 3, in reply to a deputation from the Army in Poland, he said: "We shall continue to fight successfully as hitherto, for Heaven is on our side. With God's help we shall win a long peace, for our nerves are stronger than those of the enemy."

In both the Prussian and German Parliaments all parties united in declaring that the war should be pursued to a successful end. In the German Parliament on December 2 the Imperial Chancellor, dressed in the grey service uniform of a general, declared that the German nation was fighting "a defensive war for right and freedom," and that "though the apparent responsibility for the war fell on Russia, the real responsibility fell on the British Government," as the latter "would have made the war impossible if it had without ambiguity declared at Petrograd that Great Britain would not allow a Continental war to develop from the Austro-Serbian conflict; such a declaration would have obliged France to take energetic measures to restrain Russia from undertaking warlike operations," and the German "action as mediators between Petrograd and Vienna would have been successful." "But Great Britain did not act thus. Great Britain was aware of the bellicose machinations of the partly irresponsible but powerful group around the Tsar. She saw how the ball was rolling, but placed no obstacle in its path. In spite of all its assurances of peace, London informed Petrograd that Great Britain was on the side of France, and consequently on the side of Russia. The Cabinet of London allowed this monstrous world-wide war to come about, hoping, with the help of the Entente, to destroy the vitality of England's greatest European competitor on the markets of the world. Therefore, England and Russia have before God and men the responsibility for the catastrophe which has fallen upon Europe. Belgian neutrality, which England pretended to defend, was nothing but a disguise. On the evening of August 2 we informed Brussels that we were obliged in the interests of self-defence and in consequence of the war plans of France, which were known to us, to march through Belgium, but already on the afternoon of the same day, August 2, before anything of our démarche in Brussels could have been known in London, the British Government promised France unconditional assistance in case the German fleet should attack the French coast. Nothing was said about Belgian neutrality. How can England maintain that she drew the sword because we violated Belgian neutrality? How could the British statesman, whose past is well known, speak at all of Belgian neutrality? When on August 4 I spoke of the wrong which we were committing with our march into Belgium, it was not yet established whether the Belgian Government at the last hour would not desire to spare the country and retire under protest to Antwerp."

In September, in reply to an informal inquiry made of the Imperial Chancellor by the American Ambassador at Berlin as to whether the German Emperor would be willing to discuss terms of peace, the Chancellor replied that as the Allies had formed a compact under which none of them would cease hostilities except by common agreement, the inquiry should be addressed to them, but that there were three pre-requisites to Germany's consideration of peace negotiations: first, that England should forego her demands for a war to a finish and the complete crushing of Germany; second, that while negotiations might be considered with regard to the German Colonies the German Empire in Europe must remain intact; and third, that Germany should be secured against interference by the other Powers around her in future. These conditions were considerably enlarged in a statement made at New York by Herr Dernburg, the Emperor's financial agent in America, in December. He said that Germany "would not consider it wise" to take any European territory, but would make "minor corrections of frontiers" by occupying such frontier territory as has proved a weak spot in the German armour. Belgium, which belonged geographically to the German Empire, would be incorporated in the German Customs Union like Luxemburg; but her neutrality, "having been proved an impossibility," would be abolished, and her harbours secured for all time against British or French invasion. Great Britain having "bottled up" the North Sea, a mare liberum must be established, and the Channel coasts of England, Holland, Belgium and France must be neutralised even in time of war, and the doctrine that private property should enjoy the same freedom of seizure on the high seas as it does on land must be guaranteed by all nations. All cables must be neutralised, and all Germany's Colonies returned, and in view of Germany's growing population she must take Morocco "if it is really fit for the purpose." There must be a recognised sphere of German influence for commercial and industrial purposes from the Persian Gulf to the Dardanelles, and no further development of Japanese influence in Manchuria. Finally, all small nations, such as Finland, Poland, and the Boers of South Africa, must have the right to frame their own destinies, while Egypt is to be returned, if she desires it, to Turkey.

On December 10 the British Government proposed to Germany through the American Government that arrangements should be made for the exchange of British and German officers and men, prisoners of war, who were physically incapacitated for further military service, and this offer was accepted by the German Government on December 31.

The Government was authorised by the German Parliament at the beginning of the war to borrow 200,000,000l., and a War Loan was accordingly started in. September bearing interest at 5 per cent., the issue price being 97½. Extraordinary efforts were made to insure the success of the loan, and the Government sought to raise a minimum sum of 50,000,000l. by offering Treasury bills to that amount. The total subscribed amounted to 223,000,000l., but only 188,000,000l. of this sum was paid up at the end of November. The enormous increase of the expenditure in armaments was shown by the announcement of the firm of Krupp that its share capital would be increased from 9,000,000l. to 12,000,000l. and that of the new amount 1,750,000l. would be paid up at the end of the year. All the deposits of Russia, France, Belgium, and England in the German financial institutions were declared at the beginning of the year to be confiscated, and any repayment of such deposits was to be punished as an act of high treason.

In December General von Moltke, who had not displayed any of the military qualities which had made his uncle famous, was dismissed from the post of Chief of the General Staff, and succeeded by Lieutenant-General von Falkenhayn, Minister of War. His dismissal was ascribed to a difference of opinion between the Kaiser and himself. General Moltke desired a plan of campaign which would concentrate the German efforts on breaking through the Allies' line at Verdun and forcing the British Army to retire in a northerly direction. The Kaiser, however, preferred the plan of breaking through to Calais, and his favourite, General von Falkenhayn, worked out the plan, with the well-known results at Dixmude and Ypres and on the Yser (pp. 222, 369).

II. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

The result of the second Balkan War was so far favourable to Austria-Hungary that it broke up the Balkan League, but it left as the predominant State in the peninsula Serbia, which aspired to be the Piedmont of the Southern Slavs, and had long pursued a pan-Serbian agitation in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Dalmatia, which had become very formidable with the prestige gained by the Serbian victories. The danger to the very existence of the Empire, seeing that Serbia was secretly encouraged and supported by Russia, was patent, and there was a general feeling in Austria-Hungary that the only way to avert it was to compel Serbia by force of arms, if necessary, to cease her agitation in the Austrian provinces on her border. The Austrian and German Emperors had combined in the previous year to prevent what might have become a European war (A.R., 1913, p. 34), but the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne by a Serbian, with arms furnished by a Serbian officer, precipitated a crisis which was bound to come sooner or later. One of the outcomes of the pan-Serbian agitation was the attempt on May 20 on the life of Baron Sterletz, Ban of Croatia, by two Serbian students, who were sentenced on October 8 to five and eight years' penal servitude respectively.

The trial of the persons accused of promoting an agitation among the Ruthenians of Eastern Galicia and Hungary with the object of their conversion to the Russian Church as a first step towards the annexation of their country by Russia, which had been begun in the previous year (A.R., 1913, p. 329), was concluded on March 3, and thirty-two of the accused were sentenced to various periods of imprisonment, combined with fines, varying from six months to four and a half years. A similar trial began at Lemberg on March 9. The accused, who were all Ruthenians, were a journalist, two "Orthodox" priests, and a law student, and they were also charged with espionage in favour of Russia. The jury before whom they were tried was composed entirely of Poles, who acquitted them because, it was said, they wished to avoid interference with the internal affairs of the Ruthenians.

The racial struggle in Bohemia (A.R., 1913, p. 328) continued to make the assembling of the Diet impossible, and the Czech members of the Reichsrath retaliated by obstruction in the Reichsrath, which was consequently adjourned sine die early in March. It was not summoned again even after the outbreak of the war.

The Austro-Hungarian Delegations were opened by the heir to the throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, on April 29, after a meeting, described as "very cordial," between Count Berchtold and the Marquis of San Giuliano, accompanied by their diplomatic staffs, at Abbazia. The estimates for the financial year from July 1, 1914, showed that the naval expenditure for the year would amount to 7,386,083l., of which 2,000,000l. was set down as a first instalment of a new naval programme to be completed in five years at a total estimated cost of 17,781,830l. An explanatory note attached to the Estimates stated that the object of this programme was "to make provision against the marked shifting of naval power in the Mediterranean which recent changes in the Near East may be expected to bring about." Four battleships, each of 24,500 tons displacement, were to be substituted for the three old vessels of the Monarch class and the Hapsburg, and were to form the second Dreadnought division of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, besides which three fast cruisers were to be built of 4,800 tons each, to take the place of the three cruisers of the Zenta class built in 1897, and six torpedo gun-boats of 800 tons each and two new gun-boats for service on the Danube. Provision was also made for the extension of the arsenal at Pola and the naval base at Sebenico, about half-way down the Dalmatian coast, which has a good natural harbour, is the headquarters of a rear-admiral with a command extending from Zara to Cattaro, and possesses a torpedo station, though it is not, like Pola, a naval base in which the ordinary necessaries for a modern fleet are to be found, and it was proposed to make it such a base in order to provide for a partial decentralisation of the Fleet, the necessity for which was alleged to have been shown by the recent crisis in the Balkans. Baron Engel, the Assistant Finance Minister, succeeded the late Minister, Count Zaleski, on October 21.

Among the prosecutions for espionage, which were frequent this year in Austria-Hungary, as in other countries, were those of three former officers of the Austrian Army on February 24 and March 6 and 10, who were sentenced to three, nineteen, and seventeen and a half years' penal servitude respectively for espionage in favour of Russia.

An important statement as to the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary was made by Count Berchtold to the Delegations after the President of the Austrian Delegation had expressed the hope that "while preserving the non-aggressive policy of the monarchy, steps might be taken to put a decisive check upon the anti-Austrian propaganda carried on in the frontier districts." Count Berchtold, speaking of the mutual relations of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, noted "a certain slackening of the tension" between them, which he attributed to the policy of Great Britain. "In the attitude adopted by England at the decisive moments of the Balkan crisis," he said, "and more recently, we can perceive efforts to prevent in the future dangers to European peace similar to those threatened in the events of the most recent past. Such a policy is capable of removing misunderstandings which may arise between the two groups of Powers, and thereby to compensate in some measure for the defects which attach to the practical translation into activity of a rigid system of equilibrium"—a hint that such a system is only too likely to produce a European war. The Count also spoke in friendly terms of the relations between the Dual Monarchy and Russia, which he hoped would develop still further in the direction of mutual confidence. Turning to the Balkan States, he referred especially to the desire for closer commercial relations between the monarchy and Bulgaria, the negotiations as to the section of the Orient railways in the new Serbian territories (A. R., 1913, p. 359), the visit to Vienna of the Greek Premier, M. Venizelos, "which showed that the friendly feeling of Austria-Hungary towards Greece was reciprocated at Athens," and to the political and economic interests of the monarchy in the Ottoman Empire, which "could be best served by the continued development of friendly relations with the Porte." As to Roumania, he said that "no serious Roumanian politician could think of risking the loss of the great advantages which the hitherto close and friendly relations with the monarchy had brought to the country."

Francis Kossuth, the head of the Hungarian Independence party, died on May 25. Brought up as an engineer, he had none of the qualities of a great political leader, and he owed his position mainly to his name; he did not inherit even the oratorical gifts of his celebrated father.

The murder of the heir to the Austrian throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife, which was the immediate cause of the war, took place at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, on June 28. The Archduke, who was Inspector-General of the Army, was on a tour of inspection, and as his car was driving to the town hall a bomb was thrown at him, but without effect. Half an hour later, as the Archduke was returning from the town hall, another bomb was thrown which did not explode, and the man who threw it, a Serbian student of the high school, then fired three shots with a pistol, two of which hit the Archduke and the third his wife. Both expired shortly after. It was stated that this was not the act of isolated assassins, but of a Serbian conspiracy, as widespread as that which had brought about the murder of King Alexander of Serbia and his Queen (A.R., 1902, pp. 322-3), and an outburst of horror and indignation followed all over the Empire. At Sarajevo the Croats, who, though of the same race as the Serbians, are Roman Catholics while the Serbians are "Orthodox" Greeks, and are consequently separated by deep religious as well as political differences, marched through the streets together with a large contingent of Moslems who are Serbian by race but Mohammedan by religion, and broke the windows of houses belonged to "Orthodox" Serbians; and at Agram, the capital of Croatia, large crowds of Croats marched in procession crying, "Down with the Serbian murderers." The general belief was that the conspiracy had its source in Belgrade, and the chief of the police at Sarajevo was said to have arrived at the same conclusion from the examination of the men who had taken part in the murder. According to the evidence taken at the trial of these men, which took place in October, they were the paid agents of a conspiracy whose leaders were Ministers and other functionaries of the Serbian Government, officers of the Serbian Army, and even, as was suggested by one of the witnesses, possibly the Crown Prince of Serbia himself, whose father was alleged to have been in correspondence with the assassins of King Alexander and Queen Draga, and had loaded them with honours on his accession to the throne. Five of the accused, said to have been furnished with arms and bombs by the Serbian Government for the express purpose of the murder, were condemned to death, one to imprisonment for life, and ten others to various periods of imprisonment, from three to twenty years. A dramatic incident in this connexion was the sudden death of M. Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, while on a visit to Baron Giers, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, for the purpose, it was said, of defending himself against the charge which was freely made at the time, of his having been an accomplice in the murder. The funeral of the late Archduke took place on July 8, and on the same day the aged Emperor issued a patriotic message to his people, expressing his profound affliction at a crime which "had taken from him a dear relative and faithful helper and robbed his children, still of tender age and still in need of protection, of all that was dear to them on earth," and declaring that as through sixty-five years he had shared joy and sorrow with his people, remembering even in the hours of deepest gloom his high duties and responsibility for their destinies, he was only strengthened by this fresh painful trial in the resolve to follow to his last breath the way he knew to be right for their welfare.

The new heir-presumptive, the Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, was the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand's nephew, a young man twenty-seven years of age, very popular, especially with the Poles and Ruthenians, among whom he served for some years with his cavalry regiment, but more through his pleasant manners and those of his wife, the Archduchess Zita of Bourbon-Parma, than by any special qualities of character or ability, while his uncle was impetuous and quick-tempered, with very strong opinions, chiefly in an Ultramontane direction; and an enthusiastic champion of the idea of a politico-religious conquest of the Western Balkans by Hapsburg influence, if not by Hapsburg arms, and by the propagation of Roman Catholicism among the Southern Slavs—an idea which was of course abhorrent to the Pan-Serbians, and was probably the cause of the conspiracy to which he fell a victim. The murder of the heir-presumptive of a great European State by the members of a conspiracy in a neighbouring country called for immediate and vigorous action. Accordingly, on July 23, the Austrian Minister at Belgrade presented a peremptory note to the Serbian Government, demanding a reply before 6 o'clock on July 25. The Note began by recalling the statement made by the Serbian Government on March 31, 1909, and drawn up by Great Britain (A.R., 1909, p. 346), to the effect that it would alter its policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and live in future on good neighbourly terms with her. So far from fulfilling the engagement thus contracted, the Note proceeded, "the history of recent years has shown the existence in Serbia of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy—a movement which had its birth under the eyes of the Serbian Government, and was carried out by a series of acts of terrorism, outrages, and murders." The Serbian Government had "done nothing to repress this movement"; it had permitted "the criminal machinations of various societies and associations," had "tolerated apologies for the perpetrators of outrages and the participation of Serbian officers and civil officials in the movement," and had "permitted all the manifestations which have incited the Serbian people to hatred of the monarchy and contempt of its institutions." Passing to the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Note stated that the depositions and confessions of perpetrators of the outrage had shown that it was "hatched in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which they were provided had been given to them by Serbian officers and civil officials belonging to the society Narodna Oprava, and that their passage into Bosnia was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Serbian frontier service." It was therefore impossible for the Austro-Hungarian Government "to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it had maintained for years in face of the machinations started in Belgrade and thence propagated to the territories of the monarchy"; and in order to put an end to these machinations, "which form a perpetual menace to its tranquillity, it demands from the Serbian Government a declaration, to be published on the front page of the Official Journal for July 26, and communicated to the Serbian Army as an Order of the Day by the King, stating that it condemns the movement whose final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging to it," that it "regrets that Serbian officers and civil functionaries have participated in the movement and thereby compromised the neighbourly relations to which Serbia was solemnly pledged by its declaration of March 31, 1909," and that "henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress." The Note also made the following demands of the Serbian Government: 1. The suppression of all publications inciting to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy or whose tendency is directed against its territorial integrity. 2. Immediate dissolution of the Narodna Obrana and confiscation of all its means of propaganda, also of all other societies with the same objects. 3. Elimination from public instruction in Serbia of everything serving to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. 4. Removal from the service of all officers and civil functionaries guilty of such propaganda whose names and acts shall be communicated by the Austro-Hungarian Government to that of Serbia. 5. Representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government to be accepted by Serbia for the purpose of collaborating in the suppression of the above propaganda. 6. Judicial proceedings to be taken against accessories to the plot of June 28 who are on Serbian territory, and delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government to take part in the investigation relating thereto. 7. The immediate arrest of Major Jankasitch and the Serbian State functionary, Ciganovitch, who were found to be implicated in the plot at the official inquiry at Sarajevo. 8. The prevention by effective measures of the co-operation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, and the dismissal and severe punishment of the officials of the frontier service who had facilitated the passage of the frontier for the perpetrators of the outrage of June 28. 9. Explanation of the utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who notwithstanding their official position did not hesitate after the crime of June 28 to express themselves in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government. 10. Notification to the Austro-Hungarian Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The general feeling at Vienna was that notwithstanding the hard and uncompromising tone of the above Note, Serbia would yield as she did in 1909 and 1913. Everything depended, now as then, on Russia, and the Tsar was known to be strongly opposed to a European war. The Serbian reply, however, which was delivered by M. Pashitch, the Premier, to the Austro-Hungarian Minister within the time stipulated, after a busy exchange of telegrams between Belgrade and St. Petersburg, though it accepted "in principle," but with reservations, nearly all the Austrian demands, protested against the claim that Austro-Hungarian officials shall take part in the judicial inquiry into the complicity of persons on Serbian territory in the murder and in the suppression of the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and suggested that the matter should be settled by arbitration. At Vienna the Serbian reply was regarded as merely a device to gain time for Russian and Serbian mobilisation, and a request on the part of Russia that the period in which the reply was to be given might be extended was similarly interpreted. Diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were at once broken off, orders were given for a mobilisation of the Austro-Hungarian Army, part of the Landsturm was called up for service, and all ordinary traffic on the railways was stopped. In reply to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for the mediation of the four Powers, the Austro-Hungarian Government, while expressing entire agreement with him as to the desirability of localising the war, stated that "things had proceeded much too far" to allow anything to be done for the suspension of military operations; both Russia and Serbia had been mobilising for some time, and Austria-Hungary could not risk being behindhand, especially if the outcome should be a European war.

On July 28 war was declared against Serbia, and the Emperor Francis Joseph addressed a manifesto to his people, stating that it had been his fervent wish to consecrate the years still remaining to him to the works of peace, and to protect them from the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. "The intrigues of a màlevolent opponent," however, had compelled him, in the defence of the honour and dignity of the monarchy, of its position as a Power, and of the security of its possessions to grasp the sword after long years of peace. When, "after three decades of fruitful work for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," the Emperor extended his sovereign rights to those lands, Serbia, whose rights were in no wise injured, had assumed an attitude of "bitterest hate" to the monarchy, notwithstanding which it had only required her to reduce her Army to a peace footing and to promise that in future "she would tread the path of peace and friendship." Again, when Serbia was embroiled two years ago in a struggle with the Turkish Empire, it was to Austria-Hungary, which had "restricted its action to the defence of the vital interests of the monarchy," that Serbia "primarily owed the attainment of the objects of the war." But "the hope that Serbia would appreciate the patience and love of peace of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and would keep its word," had not been fulfilled. "The flame of its hatred" for the Emperor and his House had "blazed always higher," and the design to tear from it by force inseparable portions of Austria-Hungary "had been made manifest." "A criminal propaganda extended over the frontier with the object of destroying the foundations of State order," of making the people "waver in their loyalty to the ruling House and the Fatherland," and of inciting their youth "to mischievous deeds of madness and high treason." A series of murderous attacks, an organised, carefully prepared, and well carried out conspiracy, "whose process had wounded him and his people to the heart," had marked with its bloody track the secret machinations which were operated and directed in Serbia with this object. In vain did his Government make a last attempt to preserve the honour, dignity and interests of the monarchy from these criminal shocks, "and to induce Serbia, by means of a serious warning, to desist." Serbia had rejected "the just and moderate demands" of his Government; he must, therefore, proceed by force of arms to secure "those indispensable pledges which alone can ensure tranquillity to the monarchy at home and lasting peace abroad." Finally, the Emperor declared that "in this solemn hour he was fully conscious of the whole significance of his resolve and his responsibility before the Almighty"; that he had "examined and weighed everything," and with a serene conscience would "set out on the path to which duty points," trusting in his people "who throughout every storm always rallied in unity and loyalty round the throne, and were always prepared for the severest sacrifices for the honour, the prestige, and the might of the Fatherland," in his "brave and devoted forces," and "in the Almighty to give the victory to his arms."

The ultimatum to Serbia was, as Sir Edward Grey described it, unprecedented in the harshness of its demands of an independent State, and its style was so different from that of Count Berchtold that it was believed at Vienna to have been drafted at the Emperor Francis Joseph's request by Baron Burian, the Hungarian Minister a latere of the Emperor, an expert in South Slavonic affairs and himself of Slovak origin. The German Chancellor and his Secretary of State professed a total ignorance of the text of the ultimatum, but there seems to be no doubt that it was sent to the German Emperor in Norway and met with his complete approval, as it was more in accordance with the policy of "the mailed fist" than the polished and conciliatory despatches of Count Berchtold. The latter repeatedly asked the Emperor Francis Joseph to be relieved of his post, and only remained to carry out a policy distasteful to him out of loyalty to his Imperial master. He strove up to the last for a pacific issue, and he announced in London and Paris on July 31 that he would consent to submit to mediation the points in the Note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Serbian independence,[19] but the matter had by that time passed into the hands of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian military leaders and could not be pursued diplomatically any further. The policy initiated by the late Count Aehrenthal in 1908, the disastrous consequences of which Count Berchtold had done his best to minimise, was now again predominant at the Hofburg, and threatened to lead Austria-Hungary to her ruin.

War was declared against Russia, France, and England, on August 6, and the Austrian troops marched across the Russian frontier, which had been left unguarded, on August 7. The Austro-Hungarian Army was well organised and equipped, and though composed of men of several different nationalities, showed a unity of action and a rigid discipline not surpassed by that of its German ally. The Polish legion, numbering 20,000 men, many from Russian Poland, and equipped out of a fund raised by private subscription among the Poles of Galicia, greatly distinguished itself by its headlong valour and the high military qualities of its officers. Austria-Hungary was a most efficient ally for Germany, but the task assigned to her of invading Serbia, defending her own territories against the overwhelming forces of Russia, and at the same time assisting the Germans in their defence of East Prussia, was beyond her strength. This was the cause of her failures in Serbia; she crossed the frontier at Shabatz on August 13, after having bombarded Belgrade, but the necessity of massing her troops in Galicia to resist the Russian invasion prevented her from sending sufficient reinforcements to the army of 15,000 men with which she had occupied Shabatz, and she announced on August 23 that as she was "obliged to gather all her forces for the principal struggle in the north-east," her attack upon Serbia was to be regarded "as a punitive expedition and not as a definite war." The campaign which followed (p. 360) was disastrous to the Austro-Hungarian arms; three attempts were made to invade Serbian territory, and in the third, further troops having been brought up from Hungary, they succeeded in capturing Belgrade, but a fortnight after the Serbians recaptured their capital and drove the Austro-Hungarians in disorder from the country (p. 361). Montenegro having joined Serbia in declaring war upon Austria her coasts were blockaded on August 12 by the Austro-Hungarian Fleet and the Montenegrin fortress of Lowczen, opposite Cattaro, was bombarded with little effect. The Montenegrins and Serbians repeatedly attempted to invade Bosnia, but did not succeed in reaching Sarajevo, the capital, being on each occasion beaten back by the Austrians.

The capture of Lemberg by the Russians and the Austro-Hungarian disasters in Serbia were a great blow to Austrian prestige, and much discontent was expressed at Vienna because Germany had apparently neglected the interests of her ally in her anxiety to protect Prussian territory against Russia. Repeated negotiations took place on the subject between the two Governments, and Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, was sent on a mission to the German headquarters, the result of which was that numerous German troops were sent to assist in a fresh expedition against Serbia.

War was declared against Belgium on August 27, and a treaty of arbitration with Switzerland was concluded on September 2.