In the case of an encyclopædia, review, magazine, periodical work, or other work published in a series of books or parts, the publisher must register:[246]
The Actual Title.—This must be registered: a description of the book will not be sufficient, even although accurate. Thus in Harris v. Smart[247] the plaintiffs' book was intituled "Illustrated Catalogue and Price List," and they registered it as "Illustrated Book of Shop-fittings." The Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of Mathew and Grantham, JJ., held that the objection to the registration was fatal. When there is a clear and distinct title, that title they held must be registered. It might be different if a book had no title; perhaps such a book could not be registered at all; but probably a description of the book, stating that [50] it had no title, would be sufficient.[248] In Collingridge v. Emmott[249] the plaintiff's newspaper was intituled "Warehousemen and Drapers' Trade Journal and Review of the Textile Fabric Manufacturers"; but it was registered as "Warehousemen and Drapers' Trade Journal: Failures and Arrangements." Kay, J., thought that the discrepancy was fatal to the registration.
It has been questioned whether in the case of a volume, a considerable part of which, being old matter, is not entitled to copyright, and which is published under one comprehensive title, there must not be some indication on the book itself or on the register that the owner does not claim copyright in the whole work. The point has never been definitely decided. It has been held that one who adapts new words and music to an old air and describes himself proprietor of the whole composition is entitled to protection;[250] but the question raised in these cases was whether the author was entitled to copyright at all unless he could show that the whole was original. It should always be remembered in questions of this kind that the purpose of registration is not, as has frequently been suggested in argument, to notify to an intending copyist what he may copy and what he may not. In Cate v. Devon[251] the plaintiffs had published a "Commercial Compendium," containing lists of bankruptcies and bills of sale. They reprinted several copies of it under another title, viz. "The London Association for the Protection of Trade," and it was issued "privately and confidentially" to that association. The defendants copied matter from the latter issue and pleaded that it was unregistered, and therefore that they were entitled to copy it. North, J., held that the act of the defendants was an infringement of copyright in the "Commercial Compendium," which was registered under that title. In his judgment he said:
"It is not intended that there should always be complete registration of the publication in which there is copyright in order that persons may know what they may legitimately copy and what they cannot copy. The [51] Act itself contains provisions which make that clear. It is well known that registration is only necessary as a condition precedent to suing, and the almost universal practice on the part of large publishers notoriously is that they do not register until just on the eve of taking some proceeding. Then they take care to register their copyright and sue upon it. I think, therefore, that the contention that the defendants have not been warned by registration of the title under which the document appears is one which cannot be entertained."[252]
The Time of First Publication.—This must be exactly entered to the day of the month. In Low v. Routledge[253] an entry of "23rd May 1864" was held to be bad when the actual publication was on the 25th of May 1864.[254] Under the International Copyright Act, 1844, an entry of the year only was held to be fatal,[255] and under the Copyright Act of 1842 it has been held in two cases that an entry of the month only is bad.[256] When a subsequent edition of a book is published, in so far as it is a reprint of the first edition, it will not be protected unless the first edition and the date of the first publication thereof is entered on the register;[257] in so far as it consists of new matter there must be an entry bearing the date of the publication of the edition in which such new matter was first published;[258] but the previous editions and the date of their respective publications do not require to be entered in order to protect the new matter,[259] and subsequent editions do not require to be entered in order to protect old matter.[260] Where a book has been revised and altered as each new edition has come out, every edition should be entered separately in the register, with the date of the publication of such edition. When a story, or article, or serial story, or a series of articles is published in a magazine or other periodical, the proprietor of the magazine need only register the first number of the magazine and the date of the publication thereof in order to entitle him to sue.[261] If, however, the action is at the instance [52] of the author of a contribution to a collective work against third parties, the proper registration would be of the story or article only with the date of the first publication in the collective work of such story or article, or if serial, of the first part thereof.[262] Against the proprietor, for publishing separately without permission, the author does not require to be registered, as the right sued on is not one of copyright but presumably of implied contract.[263] If the owner of the periodical has acquired the entire copyright in a story or article, he can sue on a registration either of the first number of the magazine or of the first part of the story or article.[264]
The Name and Place of Abode of the Publisher.—The publisher to be entered is the first publisher of the book.[265] No subsequent publisher, unless of a revised edition, need be entered on the register.[266] If the publishers are a firm it is sufficient to enter their firm name, such as Newby & Co.; the individual names of the members of the firm need not be entered.[267] A publisher's ordinary place of business describes sufficiently his "place of abode": his private residential address need not be entered.[268]
The Name and Place of Abode of the Proprietor.—The proprietor to be entered is the proprietor at the time of registration, and it is unnecessary to trace his title from the first proprietor.[269] The joinder of the unregistered proprietor as co-plaintiff with a person who has been erroneously registered, or who, being rightly registered, is no longer proprietor, will not render an action for infringement of copyright maintainable.[270] It is not sufficient to register a mere agent or nominee of the proprietor.[271] The registered proprietor, however, if legal owner, may sue as trustee for the equitable owner of the copyright.[272] If the plaintiff [53] in an action is the assignee of a former proprietor already registered, either the assignment must have been by entry in the register, or the assignment, if made otherwise, must be entered. In every case the plaintiff, either as proprietor at the date of registration or as his assignee, must appear on the face of the register.[273] It is probably not necessary to register every mesne assignment from the proprietor originally registered to the plaintiff.[274] When the original proprietor is registered, and the assignee from him is subsequently registered, it is necessary that both entries should be correct, in order to entitle the assignee to sue.[275] If the proprietor has no fixed abode in the United Kingdom, an address in the United Kingdom through which he can be conveniently communicated with will probably be a sufficient compliance with the statute.[276]
If there is an error in any of the particulars required to be entered in the register it is fatal to the success of an action, even although caused by neglect or carelessness on the part of one of the officials at Stationers' Hall.[277] If the necessary particulars are entered it is immaterial that superfluous matter is also entered.[278]
Certificate of Registration.—The officer appointed by the Stationers' Company for the purposes of registration under the Copyright Acts must, whenever reasonably required, give a copy of any entry in the Book of Registry, certified under his hand and impressed with the stamp of the Stationers' Company, to any person on payment of five shillings, and such copies are to be received in evidence in all Courts, and are primâ facie proof of the proprietorship or assignment of copyright or licence, but subject to be rebutted by other evidence.[279] Registration does not, however, give a title against the whole world except the true owner.[280] [54]
False Entries.—If any person wilfully makes or causes to be made any false entry in the Registry Book of the Stationers' Company, or wilfully produces in evidence any paper falsely purporting to be a copy of any entry in such book, he will be guilty of an indictable misdemeanour.[281]
Rectification of Register.—If any person "deems himself aggrieved" by any entry in the Registry Book, he may apply by motion to the King's Bench Division for an order that such entry may be expunged or varied.[282] An order to expunge will not be made at the trial of an action:[283] it must be applied for by motion in accordance with section 14, unless, perhaps, it is specifically claimed in the statement of claim in the action. There is probably no appeal from an order to expunge.[284] If a wrong entry has been made in the Book of Registry, the proprietor of the copyright in the book so erroneously entered is, even although he has by mistake made the wrong entry himself, a person aggrieved within the meaning of the statute, and can apply to the Court for an order to vary such entry.[285] An order to expunge or vary will not be made without definite proof that the existing entry is erroneous, and that the proposed entry in lieu thereof is correct.[286] By the words "deem himself aggrieved" the legislature did not mean that any person who said he was aggrieved could apply: the applicant must show to the Court that he has a right to consider himself aggrieved.[287] When the copyright in a book is in dispute either party claiming the right is a party aggrieved.[288] If a non-copyright book is entered on the register, probably any one who wished to copy it would be a party aggrieved;[289] but it is not open to any one to make application to the Court on the ground of technical flaws in a registration.[290] The applicant, unless he claims the copyright, [55] must be able to show a substantial defect on the merits of the registered proprietor's title.[291]
When once an entry on the register has been struck out, the Court has probably no power to restore it.[292]
Copies of all books first published in the United Kingdom after 1842 must be delivered to the undermentioned libraries by the publisher. In default the respective librarians may recover from the publisher:[293]
The proceedings may either be summary by way of conviction before two Justices of the Peace in the county or place where the publisher making default resides, or by action in any Court of Record in the United Kingdom.[294]
The following copies are to be delivered:
I. To the British Museum:[295]
One of the best copies published (complete with maps and prints) of
i. Every book first published. ii. Every subsequent edition of a book, unless (a) it contains no additions or alterations, and (b) some preceding edition has been delivered:Within one calendar month after publication or offering for sale in London.
Within three calendar months after publication or offering for sale elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
The copy must be delivered between 10 A. M. and 4 P. M. on any day except Sunday, Ash Wednesday, Good Friday, and Christmas Day.[296]
The officer of the Museum appointed to receive these copies is required to give a receipt in writing.[297] [56]
II. To each of the following Libraries,[298] or to Stationers' Hall for their use:
The Bodleian Library at Oxford. The Public Library at Cambridge. The Library of the Faculty of Advocates at Edinburgh. The Library of Trinity College at Dublin.One copy of those copies of which the largest number is printed for sale, and in the like condition of
i. Every book first published. ii. Every subsequent edition of a book, unless (a) it contains no alterations or additions.Within one month after demand.
Provided that within twelve months after publication demand has been made to the publishers under the hand of the officer of the Company of Stationers or other person authorised thereto by the respective libraries.
The officer at Stationers' Hall and librarians of the several libraries are required to give a receipt in writing when a copy of a book is delivered to them.
The clauses as to delivery of copies are to be considered as being strictly penal. In The British Museum v. Payne,[299] under the similar provisions in 54 Geo. III. c. 156, it was held that when a book was published in parts, a single part was not demandable. The Court refused to consider the question when, if ever, the complete book would be demandable.
It will be noticed that neither the copyright nor the right to sue is affected by non-delivery of these copies. The only consequence of omission to do so is a penalty on the publisher.
The right of the various bodies to delivery of a copy applies to all books published within the United Kingdom and not only to those entered at Stationers' Hall.[300]
Protection dates from first publication.
Generally.—The period of protection is for the natural life of the author and for seven years after his death, or for forty-two [57] years from the date of publication, whichever period shall be longer.[301]
Posthumous Works are protected for forty-two years from the date of publication.[302]
Encyclopædias are protected for the life of the proprietor and seven years (by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, sec. 18, the proprietor of a collective work enjoys the same rights as if he were the actual author thereof), or for forty-two years from the date of publication, whichever period shall be the longer.[303]
Reviews, Magazines, and other periodical works of a like nature[304] have two separate copyrights, viz.:
New Editions.[305]—As to each edition, the copyright runs from the date of publication thereof, in so far as the matter therein is then first published.
Joint Works.—Although there is no statutory provision, they are probably protected for the life of the surviving author and seven years, or for forty-two years from first publication.[306]
There is no lecturing right, i. e. no exclusive statutory right to deliver a lecture in public. The only Act applying to lectures is 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 65, which, under pain of penalties, prohibits printing or publishing, or knowingly selling lectures, which at the time of delivery have not been published in book form, without leave of the author thereof, or of the person to whom [58] the author thereof has sold or otherwise conveyed the same. The remedy is action in the High Court for: (i) Forfeiture of copies. (ii) One penny per copy; half to the Crown and half to informer. A condition precedent of protection under this Act is the giving of notice in writing to two justices living within five miles from the place where such lecture or lectures are delivered, two days at least before delivering the same. The Act has fallen into entire desuetude, partly, no doubt, on account of this somewhat troublesome stipulation as to notice, but principally because a lecturer has, in fact, full protection at common law, if, as is usually the case, he can make out an implied contract between himself and his audience that the delivery of the lecture is for purposes of instruction only, and that those present are entitled to make no other use of it whatsoever.[307] His remedy at common law will be for damages and injunction. Of course he cannot sue for penalties, unless he has brought himself within the Act.
The Lectures Act does not apply so as to protect any lecture or lectures delivered in any university, or public school or college, or on any public foundation, or by any individual in virtue of, or according to, any gift, endowment, or foundation.[308] The law relating to such lectures is declared to be the same as if the Lectures Act had not been passed. The result of this proviso is that these special kinds of lectures are nearly always protected at common law by implied contract in the same way as other lectures.[309] [59]
When the Crown ceased to have the complete control which it originally exercised over the printing-press, it still claimed to retain, as its prerogative, the exclusive right of printing such works as it considered its own peculiar property.[310] These included the authorised translation of the Bible, the Common Prayer Book, Acts of Parliament[311] and Proclamations,[312] Latin Grammars and Year Books. Law books, such as "Rolle's Abridgment," and reports collected by the judges were also claimed by the Crown on the ground that the laws were the King's Laws. Classical books, almanacs and the like, were claimed by the Crown as bona nullius and things derelict. As regards those books which the Crown claimed as its own property, it granted licences and patents. The Stationers' Company, the King's printers, the Universities, and from time to time various individuals received grants of authority to print such works.
Many of the claims, for instance, to almanacs, law reports, Latin grammars, have for long been abandoned. The patentees of the Crown, however, still claim a prerogative copyright in—
The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge and the King's [60] printers have each the right to print the Bible and the Prayer Book.
No objection has ever been taken on behalf of the Crown or her patentees to the printing of the Bible with notes, and this is in practice constantly done without authority. The notes, however, must be substantial and not merely illusory.[315]
In 1887 the Treasury published a Minute[316] in which the claims of the Crown to the exclusive right of publishing Government publications are set out. The Minute was published in the London Gazette.
The following publications are declared to be free from restriction of any kind, and any person may therefore publish them with or without notes:
In the following works the Government claims to retain the copyright:
The ancient prerogative claimed by the Crown was a perpetual copyright. The Crown is not mentioned in the Copyright Act, and it is open to doubt whether it could enforce a perpetual copyright in works compiled by its servants, or [61] whether it could only claim the term of copyright granted by the Copyright Act.
By an Act of George III.[317] provision is made for the vesting of copyrights in perpetuity in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the Scottish Universities and the Colleges of Eton, Westminster, and Winchester. These privileges were obtained in consequence of the decision in Donaldson v. Beckett[318] in the House of Lords to the effect that there was no perpetual copyright.
Perpetual Copyright under the Universities' Act attaches to those books which are "bequeathed or otherwise given" to one of the Universities or Colleges. A work such as The Revised Version of the Bible, which was compiled under the direction and at the expense of the two Universities, will probably not have perpetual copyright under the Act since it is neither bequeathed nor given. The same would apply to copyrights purchased by a university or college.
The book in which University privilege is claimed must be registered within two months after the time when the bequest or gift of the copyright comes to the knowledge of the Vice-Chancellor of the University or head of the college, as the case may be.
The remedy against unauthorised printing or importing or knowingly selling, publishing, or exposing for sale any book in which there is University copyright is an action in the High Court for—
The perpetual privilege granted by the Act only subsists so long as the book is printed only within the respective Universities or Colleges, and for their sole benefit and advantage. [62] This does not debar them from selling the copyright, but if sold it will only subsist for the term granted to authors by the Copyright Act, 1842.
Quære if some of Jowett's works, for instance, were printed in the United States in order to acquire American copyright, whether that would destroy the perpetual copyright by reason of copies being printed outside the University.
Copyright in every book published in the lifetime of the author thereof "shall be the property of such author and his assigns."[319] Copyright therefore in the first instance ordinarily vests in the author. The word author is not defined in the Act, and from time to time difficult questions have arisen as to who is the author of a particular book within the meaning of the Act. Difficulties have generally arisen from the fact that two or more people have been engaged in the production of a book. The rule appears to be that, if the literary matter is composed by those who make the manuscript,[320] the author is the man from whom emanates the general conception and design, and that although much of the detail may have been the work of subordinate brains and hands, he is the author of the entirety, and may sue for any infringement of it. Thus in Scott v. Stanford,[321] where the plaintiff compiled and published periodically statistical returns of the London coal market, Page Wood, V. C., in giving judgment, said that it appeared to him quite immaterial whether the plaintiff had been assisted in the compilation by his own clerks or by those of the Corporation. In Barfield v. Nicholson[322] a case under the statute of Anne, Leach, V. C., said that he was of opinion that under the statute the one who formed the plan and embarked on the speculation of a work, and employed various persons to compose different parts of it adapted to their own peculiar acquirements, was the author and [63] proprietor of the work, if not within the literal expression, at least within the equitable meaning of the statute of Anne. In Hatton v. Kean[323] the defendant had arranged certain of Shakespeare's plays with adjuncts of scenery, music, dancing, &c., and employed artists and authors to aid him in carrying his design into effect; amongst others, the plaintiff was employed to compose and arrange the orchestral accompaniments. The Court of Common Pleas held that the defendant was the author of the entire production. Erle, C. J., said:
"I am of opinion that the music so composed by the direction and under the superintendence of the defendant, and as part of the general plan of the spectacle, must, as between him and the plaintiff, become the property of the defendant, and that consequently the defendant has violated no right of the plaintiff in causing it to be represented in the manner alleged."[324]
In Wallerstein v. Herbert,[325] where the facts were similar to those in Hatton v. Kean,[326] that case was approved by the Court of Queen's Bench. Cockburn, C. J., said:
"Looking at the nature of this composition, it is clear that it became a part and parcel of the drama, and was not an independent composition."
These decisions seem equally applicable to books which are not dramatic compositions, but quære whether Hatton v. Kean[327] did not go too far. It seems a strange thing to say that the arranger of a play becomes the author of, inter alia, the musical accompaniment of which, perhaps, he could not have composed a single bar. Would, for instance, the author of a book be also the author of illustrations which he had procured another to draw for him? Kekewich, J., in Petty v. Taylor, thought not.[328]
The mere suggestion of a subject or idea which is then entirely designed and executed by another does not constitute the originator of the idea an author, even although the actual [64] composer is his employee.[329] In Shepherd v. Conquest[330] the plaintiffs, proprietors of a theatre, employed a "stock author" who, on payment of a weekly salary and travelling expenses, composed plays for them. Under this employment the author composed "Old Joe and Young Joe," a dramatic piece, which he handed over to the plaintiffs, and which was produced by them at their theatre. There was no contract or assignment in writing, but there was an oral understanding that the plaintiffs should have the sole right of representing the piece in London. It was held in the Court of Common Pleas that the plaintiffs had acquired no title under the Dramatic Copyright Act, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 15, by reason of which they could sue an infringement of the performing right.[331] Jervis, C. J., delivered the judgment of the Court:
"We do not think it necessary in the present case to express any opinion whether, under any circumstances, the copyright in a literary work or the right of representation can become vested ab initio in an employer other than the person who has actually composed or adapted a literary work. It is enough to say in the present case that no such effect can be produced when the employer merely suggests the subject, and has no share in the design or execution of the work. It appears to us an abuse of terms to say that in such a case the employer is the author of a work to which his mind has not contributed an idea."
There may be joint authorship of a book. To constitute joint authorship the work must be produced by joint labour in prosecution of a preconceived joint design. In Levy v. Rutley[332] A wrote a play, to which subsequently B added a scene, and made a few alterations and additions in other parts of the piece. It was held that there was not joint authorship. Byles, J., said:
"If the piece had been originally written by A and B jointly in prosecution of a preconcerted joint design, the two might have been said to be the co-authors of the whole play, notwithstanding that different portions were respectively the sole productions of either."
[65]
And Keating, J., said:
"I entirely agree with my brother Byles that though it may not be necessary that each should contribute the same amount of labour, there must be a joint labouring in furtherance of a common design."
Quære whether co-authors are joint owners with the right of survivorship. In Marzials v. Gibbons[333] it was suggested that they were, but see the decisions where co-assignees are held to be owners in common, or part owners without the right of survivorship.[334] Quære also whether each co-author, as is the case with each co-assignee,[335] is entitled to sue in respect of an invasion without the concurrence of the other co-author or co-authors.
Until Walter v. Lane[336] was decided in the House of Lords, it was a prevalent opinion that the author must be he who actually designs and by himself or through others composes the literary matter contained in the book. That case, however, demonstrates that the author is the first producer of literary matter in "book" form, i. e. in some permanent form from which it can be copied by the printer's compositor, usually, but not necessarily, manuscript. As a rule such person is also the composer of the literary matter contained in the book, but this is not a necessary attribute of the character of author. In Walter v. Lane[337] Lord Rosebery had delivered without reserve of any kind certain public speeches. They were delivered orally, not having been previously committed to writing. On the various occasions when they were delivered reporters from the Times were present, and they took down the speeches verbatim. From these reports they were transcribed into long hand, and published in the Times. Mr. Lane, a publisher, took these speeches from the columns of the Times, and without any authority from the proprietors thereof, published them in a volume entitled "Appreciations and Addresses, by Lord Rosebery." In this action at the instance of the proprietors of the Times for the infringement of the copyright in their reports, it was finally held in the House of Lords, firstly, that as these reports contained literary matter published [66] for the first time in "book" form, they were the subject of copyright, and secondly, that the reporters were the authors within the meaning of the Act, since they first reduced the literary matter orally delivered by Lord Rosebery to "book" form.
Under Section 18.—An employer is ab initio entitled to the copyright when he employs an author within the meaning of and subject to the conditions imposed by section 18. Section 18[338] enacts that—
"When any publisher or other person shall before or at the time of the passing of the Act have projected, conducted, and carried on, or shall hereafter project, conduct, and carry on, or be the proprietor of any encyclopædia, review, magazine, periodical work, or work published in a series of books or parts, or any book whatsoever, and shall have employed or shall employ any persons to compose the same in any volumes, parts, essays, articles, or portions thereof for publication in or as part of the same, and such works, volumes, parts, essays, articles, or portions, shall have been or shall hereafter be composed under such employment on the terms that the copyright therein shall belong to such proprietor, projector, publisher, or conductor, and paid for by such proprietor, projector, publisher, or conductor, the copyright in every such encyclopædia, review, magazine, periodical work, and work published in a series of books or parts, and every volume, part, essay, article, and portion so composed and paid for shall be the property of such proprietor, projector, publisher, or other conductor, who shall enjoy the same rights as if he were the actual author thereof, and shall have such term of copyright therein as is given to the authors of books by this Act; except only that in the case of essays, articles, or portions forming part of and first published in reviews, magazines, and other periodical works of a like nature, after the term of twenty-eight years from the first publication thereof respectively, the right of publishing the same in a separate form shall revert to the author for the remainder of the term given by this Act: provided always that during the term of twenty-eight years the said proprietor shall not publish any such essay, article, or portion separately or singly without the consent previously obtained of the author thereof or his assigns: provided also that nothing herein contained shall alter or affect the right of any person who shall have been or who shall be so employed as aforesaid to publish any such his composition in a separate form, who by any contract, express or implied, may have reserved or may hereafter reserve to himself such right; but [67] every author reserving, retaining, or having such right, shall be entitled to the copyright in such composition when published in a separate form, according to this Act, without prejudice to the right of such proprietor, projector, publisher, or conductor, as aforesaid."
The nature of a proprietor's rights in the articles contributed to his periodical under section 18 is well summarised by Chitty, J., as follows:
"This 18th section when fairly examined comes to this: the author of a literary work is the proprietor of the copyright under the general sections of the Act. If it is unpublished matter, probably the better term is to say that his right is to prevent any one else from publishing. If it is published matter, then his right is a true copyright, and it is to prevent anybody else from multiplying copies, and that right is vested in him.... Then comes this 18th section, the short effect of which is to transfer for a limited period a portion of the copyright to the proprietor of the periodical for whom the article has been composed; it being a condition that there shall not only be a composition of the article on the terms that it shall belong to the proprietor or publisher, but also that the sum agreed to be paid has been paid."[339]
Scope of Section.—In some of the earlier cases it seems to be suggested that section 18 applies only to works of a periodical nature.[340] But this gives no meaning to the words "or any book whatsoever," which surely could not be construed as including only books ejusdem generis as periodicals. The first part of the section appears to include all books if produced under the conditions as to employment and payment there enacted.[341] The judgment in Shepherd v. Conquest[342] suggests that in the opinion of the Court in that case section 18 did not apply when the performing right in a play was claimed by the proprietors of a theatre, the play having been produced by a "stock author" in their employment. It is difficult to see why section 18 should not be equally applicable to the performing right as to the copyright. Section 20 of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 provides that—
"The provisions hereinbefore enacted in respect of the property of such copyright and of registering the same shall apply to the liberty of [68] representing or performing any dramatic piece or musical composition as if the same were herein expressly re-enacted and applied thereto, save and except that the first public representation or performance of any dramatic piece or musical composition shall be deemed equivalent in the construction of this Act to the first publication of any book."
Under such Employment.—The author must be "employed" and the work must be composed "under such employment." It appears therefore that a work or part of a work would not come within this 18th section unless actually executed in the course of the author's employment by the proprietor. In other words, there must be antecedent employment.[343] A contribution voluntarily sent to a magazine would not, even although accepted and paid for on the terms that the copyright should belong to the proprietors, come under the provisions of section 18. It is submitted that it would become the sole property of the proprietor of the magazine for all purposes without any reservation of the right of separate publication to the author.[344]
If A employs B, who in his turn employs C, the copyright will vest in A if B acted as a mere agent for A. Thus in Stubbs v. Howard,[345] Stubbs employed the Mercantile Press to obtain the necessary information for their Gazette, and the Mercantile Press employed P. to collect and compile. It was held that the copyright vested ab initio in Stubbs under section 18. But if A employs and pays B to do certain literary work, and B, of his own authority, employs and pays C, D, and E to do certain portions of it, it is doubtful whether the copyright in these portions will vest in A under section 18. The author has been neither employed nor paid by the proprietor of the work since B acted not as an agent for him, but as an independent contractor.[346] The operation of section 18 seems to be exhausted in the first employment.
"On the terms that the copyright therein shall belong to such proprietor."—The terms may be implied from the nature of the employment and the circumstances under which the work is [69] composed. In Sweet v. Benning[347] various members of the bar had furnished reports of cases to the plaintiffs, the proprietors of the Jurist. The reporters selected what cases they thought fit to report and were paid for their work. The arrangements were entirely oral, and nothing seems to have been said about copyright. The Court of Common Pleas held that the proprietors of the Jurist became the owners of the copyright under the 18th section. Maule, J., in support of his opinion said:
"When a man employs another to write an article or to do anything else for him, unless there is something in the surrounding circumstances or in the course of dealing between the parties to require a different construction, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, it is to be understood that the writing or other thing is produced upon the terms that the copyright therein shall belong to the employer."
In Trade Auxiliary v. Middlesborough[348] the proprietors of Stubbs' Weekly Gazette and two other weekly papers jointly employed on salary two men to examine the official records and extract the particulars of bills of sale and deeds of arrangement registered in accordance with the Acts. The information so obtained was published in the weekly papers. It was held that the proprietors of the respective papers became owners of the copyright under section 18. In Lamb v. Evans[349] the plaintiff employed and paid several persons in canvassing for advertisements and arranging them under appropriate headings in a Trades Directory. Lindley, L. J., in giving judgment, said he thought that—
"The burthen of proof was on the plaintiff to show that the headings were composed upon the terms that the copyright therein should belong to him; but the statute does not say anything about the kind of evidence which is to be adduced for the purpose of proving that an article has been composed on these terms.... If there is no express agreement the question is, what is the inference to be drawn from the circumstances of the case. In drawing the inference regard must be had to the nature of the articles which are here merely the headings to groups of advertisements with translations, and the view expressed by Mr. Justice Maule in Sweet v. Benning[350] may be very safely acted upon, viz. that primâ facie at all events [70] you will infer, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, from the fact of employment and payment that one of the terms was that the copyright should belong to the employer. That is not a necessary inference; but in a case of this sort, where any other inference would be unbusinesslike, I should not hesitate myself to draw that inference."
Bowen, L. J., in the same case, says:
"From where are you to collect the terms? You may collect them from what passed between the parties, that is to say between the plaintiff and the persons whom he employed, but you may also collect them from the nature of the business itself, and it seems to me to be impossible as a matter of business to suppose that these headings were composed and furnished to the plaintiff upon any other terms than that he was to have the copyright in them, because otherwise those who composed them having furnished them to the plaintiff might themselves have published them and defeated his object."
On the other hand in Walter v. Howe,[351] Jessel, M. R., held that the Times could not sue in respect of a biography of Lord Beaconsfield which had appeared in their columns. There was evidence that the author had been paid for his literary services, but there was apparently no evidence as to whether he had been "employed" "on the terms that the copyright should belong" to the plaintiff. Notice that in this case no antecedent employment whatsoever is shown. In Johnson v. Newnes[352] a series of stories were contributed to the Weekly Dispatch under an arrangement between the proprietor and the author. The author was not on the permanent staff of the Weekly Dispatch. He was paid by the proprietors for his contributions, the arrangement being that the author should have the right of separately publishing the stories, provided such separate publication did not take place until after all the stories had appeared in the Weekly Dispatch. In an action by the author against an infringer, Romer, J., in giving judgment for the plaintiff, said that he had come to the conclusion that although the plaintiff was paid he was not paid on the terms that the copyright in the stories should belong to the proprietors of the journal. The author had therefore not parted with the copyright and was the proper plaintiff.[353] [71]
In Aflalo v. Lawrence[354] the defendants published a work called "The Encyclopædia of Sport." A, one of the plaintiffs, agreed with the defendants that he would edit the work. He was to receive £500 for his services, and to write without further remuneration 7000 words of special articles. He was entitled to pursue his literary work in so far as it did not interfere with the performance of his duties. A contributed an article to the encyclopædia under this agreement. A, by the request of the defendants, procured C, the other plaintiff, to write certain articles for the encyclopædia at the rate of £2 per thousand words. The articles of both plaintiffs were published in the encyclopædia. Joyce, J., held that the contributions of neither plaintiff came within section 18, since there was nothing to show that they were contributed on the terms that the copyright therein should belong to the defendants. The defendants were therefore not entitled to publish the plaintiff's articles in any other form than as part of the encyclopædia. In view of the earlier authorities I think this decision is extremely doubtful.
Joint Employers.—As has been seen above in the case of Trade Auxiliary v. Middlesborough,[355] two or more proprietors of several periodicals may jointly employ an author so as to acquire the copyright under this section. Each has a separate copyright in his respective paper, and, although the matter contributed to the several papers is the same, may sue without joining the other proprietors. Each is "a transferee by virtue of section 18 of a limited portion of the copyright in that particular composition."[356]
Payment.—Not only must there be employment for reward, but payment is a condition precedent. If payment is not proved the section will not operate to transfer the copyright from the author.[357] Payment must be made before the commencement of an action.[358] It has been suggested that it must be made before piracy, and this appears a sound view since there is no copyright in the proprietor until payment, and an infringement before [72] copyright is assigned is no cause of action in the assignee.[359] There is nothing to suggest that payment must be made before publication.[360]
Author's Separate Rights.—When an author has contributed to a periodical and the conditions of the section have been fulfilled so as to vest the copyright in the proprietor of the periodical, it would seem that for twenty-eight years, i. e. until the right of publishing in separate form reverts to the author, the author has no right to sue third parties in respect of an infringement without joining the proprietor of the periodical as co-plaintiff. If, however, the author, while contributing on the terms that the proprietor should have the copyright, reserves the right of publishing his composition in a separate form within the meaning of the proviso at the end of the section, when he does publish in separate form he will be entitled to copyright concurrently with the proprietor, but semble that he will have no right to sue alone until publication in separate form,[361] or until the lapse of twenty-eight years.
During the twenty-eight years the proprietor of a periodical work is not, apart from express agreement, entitled to publish the contribution in separate form. If the proprietor does publish separately in breach of the provision of the section, the author has a right of action against him, and the author's right not being one of copyright but in respect of a breach of implied or statutory contract he does not require to be registered.[362] "Separate" means in any other form than the original collective publication, whether as a single work by itself or in conjunction with other matter. When the proprietor of a magazine reprinted certain stories which had appeared in the magazine from time to time, and published them as a supplement to the current number, this was held to be a publication in separate form which the author could prevent.[363] So also the republication of the Christmas number of a periodical under a different title, form, and price, is a separate publication of an article contained [73] in such number.[364] A Christmas number of a serial publication, although published in an entirely different form with separate pagination and sold at a different price from the ordinary numbers, is part of the periodical, and separate publication of the stories therein will be prohibited under section 18.[365]
An article may be contributed to a periodical under express or implied terms that the copyright shall belong to the proprietor for all purposes, in which case there will be no reservation of a right of separate publication.[366]
It should be clearly noted that the second part of section 18 applies only to periodical works. Therefore in the case of an encyclopædia or similar collective works the owner has, apart from special terms, a right to publish the contributor's article separately from the original publication.
Employer's Rights where Section 18 does not Apply.—A question of some difficulty has been raised from time to time to which there is no definite authoritative answer, viz. whether apart from the provisions of section 18 the copyright ever vests ab initio in the employer of an author. We shall see in dealing with assignment that probably the sole right before publication to acquire the copyright of a book on first publication may pass from the author to his assignee without writing, either by an implied gift on delivery of the manuscript or by express oral assignment. The question now considered is whether by the fact of employment alone the work of the employee may not ipso facto on production become the property of his employer. In Sweet v. Benning[367] it was held that the employment of certain members of the bar as reporters came within section 18, and that the copyright vested in the employers themselves; but during the argument Maule, J., is reported to have said:
"One might almost infer without the aid of an Act of Parliament that one who employs another to write an article or to make anything else for him is the owner or proprietor."
I think that this suggestion is wrong if applied to the case of an independent contractor, and that if such an employment does not come within section 18 there will be no proprietary right in the [74] employer ab initio, although it may be transferred to him before publication by mere delivery of the manuscript with the mutual intention to convey all rights. But in the case of a servant or agent who produces literary work in the course of his employment, I think it is different. I think that his work will vest ab initio irrespective of section 18, and that section 18 only applies to an independent contractor and not to a servant. In Hildesheimer v. Dunn[368] Kekewich, J., takes this view. He says:
"I entertain a strong opinion that when a person has composed verses, we will say on behalf of another, that is to say as his servant or agent, whether for pay or not, the person on whose behalf such verses are composed is properly registered under the Act as the proprietor, notwithstanding that there is no assignment in writing or indeed any assignment at all."