17. The Foundation of the Anti-Corn-Law League [History of the Anti-Corn-Law League by Archibald Prentice, I, pp. 101-2, 1853], 1839.

2. That in order to secure unity and efficiency of action this meeting recommends that delegates be appointed by the several Anti-Corn-Law Associations of the kingdom. Those manufacturing and commercial towns not already possessing such societies are earnestly recommended to form Anti-Corn-Law Associations; and in case they require information or advice, they are invited to put themselves immediately in correspondence with the Manchester Association, whose fundamental rule, prohibiting the discussion of any party or political topics, is especially recommended for the adoption of all similar bodies elsewhere.

3. That the agricultural proprietor, capitalist, and labourer are benefited equally with the trader, by the creation and circulation of the wealth of the country; and this meeting appeals to all those classes to co-operate for the removal of a monopoly which, by restricting the foreign commerce of the country, retards the increase of the population, and restrains the growth of towns; thus depriving them of the manifold resources to be derived from the augmenting numbers and wealth of the country.

4. That this meeting cannot separate without expressing its deep sympathy with the present privations of that great and valuable class of their countrymen who earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brow; many of whom are now suffering from hunger in the midst of boundless fields of employment, rendered unproductive solely by those unjust laws which prevent the exchange of the products of their industry for the food of other countries. So long as a plentiful supply of the first necessaries of life is denied by acts of the British legislation to the great body of the nation, so long will the government and the country be justly exposed to all the evils resulting from the discontent of the people. With a view to avert so great a danger by an act of universal justice, this meeting pledges itself to a united, energetic, and persevering effort for the total and immediate repeal of all laws affecting the free importation of grain.[397]

18. The Bank Charter Act [Statutes 7 and 8 Victoria 32], 1844.

Be it enacted that from and after the thirty-first day of August, one thousand eight hundred and forty-four, the issue of Promissory Notes of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, payable on demand, shall be separated and thenceforth kept wholly distinct from the general Banking business of the said Governor and Company; and the business of and relating to such issue shall be thenceforth conducted and carried on by the said Governor and Company in a separate department, to be called "The Issue Department of the Bank of England," subject to the rules and regulations hereinafter contained; and it shall be lawful for the Court of Directors of the said Governor and Company, if they shall think fit, to appoint a committee or committees of directors for the conduct and management of such Issue Department of the Bank of England, and from time to time remove the members, and define, alter, and regulate the constitution and powers of such committee, as they shall think fit, subject to any bye-laws, rules or regulations which may be made for that purpose: provided nevertheless, that the said Issue Department shall always be kept separate and distinct from the Banking Department of the said Governor and Company.

II. And be it enacted, that upon the thirty-first day of August, one thousand eight hundred and forty-four, there shall be transferred, appropriated, and set apart by the said Governor and Company to the Issue Department of the Bank of England securities to the value of fourteen million pounds, whereof the debt due by the public to the said Governor and Company shall be and be deemed a part; and there shall also at the same time be transferred, appropriated, and set apart by the said Governor and Company to the said Issue Department so much of the gold coin and gold and silver bullion then held by the Bank of England as shall not be required by the Banking Department thereof; and thereupon there shall be delivered out of the said Issue Department into the said Banking Department of the Bank of England such an amount of Bank of England notes as, together with the Bank of England notes then in circulation, shall be equal to the aggregate amount of the securities, coin and bullion so transferred to the said Issue Department of the Bank of England; and the whole amount of Bank of England notes then in circulation, including those delivered to the Banking Department of the Bank of England as aforesaid, shall be deemed to be issued on the credit of such securities, coin, and bullion so appropriated and set apart to the said Issue Department; and from thenceforth it shall not be lawful for the said Governor and Company to increase the amount of securities for the time being in the said Issue Department, save as hereinafter is mentioned, but it shall be lawful for the said Governor and Company to diminish the amount of such securities, and again to increase the same to any sum not exceeding in the whole the sum of fourteen million pounds, and so from time to time as they shall see occasion; and from and after such transfer and appropriation to the said Issue Department as aforesaid it shall not be lawful for the said Governor and Company to issue Bank of England notes, either into the Banking Department of the Bank of England, or to any persons or person whatsoever, save in exchange for other Bank of England notes, or for gold coin or for gold or silver bullion received or purchased for the said Issue Department under the provisions of this Act, or in exchange for securities acquired and taken in the said Issue Department under the provisions herein contained: provided always, that it shall be lawful for the said Governor and Company in their Banking Department to issue all such Bank of England notes as they shall at any time receive from the said Issue Department or otherwise, in the same manner in all respects as such issue would be lawful to any other person or persons.

IV. And be it enacted, that from and after the thirty-first day of August, one thousand eight hundred and forty-four, all persons shall be entitled to demand from the Issue Department of the Bank of England, Bank of England notes in exchange for gold bullion, at the rate of three pounds, seventeen shillings and ninepence per ounce of standard gold. Provided always, that the said Governor and Company shall in all cases be entitled to require such gold bullion to be melted and assayed by persons approved by the said Governor and Company at the expense of the parties tendering such gold bullion.

V. Provided always, and be it enacted, that if any banker who on the sixth day of May one thousand eight hundred and forty-four was issuing his own bank notes, shall cease to issue his own bank notes, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council at any time after the cessation of such issue, upon the application of the said Governor and Company, to authorize and empower the said Governor and Company to increase the amount of securities in the said Issue Department beyond the total sum or value of fourteen million pounds, and thereupon to issue additional Bank of England notes to an amount not exceeding such increased amount of securities specified in such Order in Council, and so from time to time: provided always that such increased amount of securities specified in such Order in Council shall in no case exceed the proportion of two thirds the amount of bank notes which the banker so ceasing to issue may have been authorized to issue under the provisions of this Act; and every such order in Council shall be published in the next succeeding London Gazette.

XII. And be it enacted, that if any banker in any part of the United Kingdom who after the passing of this act shall be entitled to issue bank notes shall become bankrupt, or shall cease to carry on the business of a banker, or shall discontinue the issue of bank notes, either by agreement with the Governor and Company of the Bank of England or otherwise, it shall not be lawful for such Banker at any time thereafter to issue any such notes.

XIV. Provided always, and be it enacted, That if it shall be made to appear to the Commissioners of stamps and taxes that any two or more banks have, by written contract or agreement (which contract or agreement shall be produced to the said Commissioners), become united within the twelve weeks next preceding such twenty-seventh day of April as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the said Commissioners to ascertain the average amount of the notes of each such bank in the manner hereinbefore directed, and to certify the average amount of the notes of the two or more banks so united as the amount which the united Bank shall thereafter be authorized to issue, subject to the regulations of this Act.

19. Debate on the Corn Laws [Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. 73, Cols. 68, 69-71, 849-850, 1345-1347], 1846.

Sir, the immediate cause which led to the dissolution of the Government in the early part of last December, was that great and mysterious calamity which caused a lamentable failure in an article of food on which great numbers of the people in this part of the United Kingdom, and still larger numbers in the sister kingdom, depended mainly for their subsistence. That was the immediate and proximate cause, which led to the dissolution of the Government. But it would be unfair and uncandid on my part, if I attached undue importance to that particular cause. It certainly appeared to me to preclude further delay, and to require immediate decision—decision not only upon the measures which it was necessary at the time to adopt, but also as to the course to be ultimately taken with regard to the laws which govern the importation of grain. I will not assign to that cause too much weight. I will not withhold the homage which is due to the progress of reason and to truth, by denying that my opinions on the subject of protection have undergone a change.

Sir, those who contend for the removal of impediments upon the import of a great article of subsistence, such as corn, start with an immense advantage in the argument. The natural presumption is in favour of free and unrestricted importation. It may, indeed, be possible to combat that presumption; it may be possible to meet its advocates in the field of argument, by showing that there are other and greater advantages arising out of the system of prohibition than out of the system of unrestricted intercourse; but even those who so contend will, I think, admit that the natural feelings of mankind are strongly in favour of the absence of all restriction, and that the presumption is so strong, that we must combat it by an avowal of some great public danger to be avoided, or some great public benefit to be obtained by restriction on the importation of food. We all admit that the argument in favour of high protection or prohibition on the ground that it is for the benefit of a particular class, is untenable. The most strenuous advocates for protection have abandoned that argument; they rest, and wisely rest, the defence of protective duties upon higher principles. They have alleged, as I have myself alleged, that there were public reasons for retaining this protection. Sir, circumstances made it absolutely necessary for me, occupying the public station I do, and seeing the duty that must unavoidably devolve on me—it became absolutely necessary for me maturely to consider whether the grounds on which an alteration of the Corn Laws can be resisted are tenable. The arguments in favour of protection must be based either on the principle that protection to domestic industry is in itself sound policy, and that, therefore, agriculture, being a branch of domestic industry, is entitled to share in that protection; or, that in a country like ours, encumbered with an enormous load of debt, and subject to great taxation, it is necessary that domestic industry should be protected from competition with foreigners; or, again—the interests of the great body of the community, the laborious classes, being committed in this question—that the rate of wages varies with the price of provisions, that high prices imply high wages, and that low wages are the concomitants of low prices. Further, it may be said, that the land is entitled to protection on account of some peculiar burdens which it bears. But that is a question of justice rather than of policy; I have always felt and maintained that the land is subject to peculiar burdens; but you have the power of weakening the force of that argument by the removal of the burden, or making compensation. The first three objections to the removal of protection are objections founded on considerations of public policy. The last is a question of justice, which may be determined by giving some counterbalancing advantage. Now, I want not to deprive those who, arguing a priori, without the benefit of experience, have come to the conclusion that protection is objectionable in principle—I want not to deprive them of any of the credit which is fairly their due. Reason, unaided by experience, brought conviction to their minds. My opinions have been modified by the experience of the last three years. I have had the means and opportunity of comparing the results of periods of abundance and low prices with periods of scarcity and high prices. I have carefully watched the effects of the one system, and of the other—first, of the policy we have been steadily pursuing for some years, viz., the removal of protection from domestic industry; and next, of the policy which the friends of protection recommend. I have also had an opportunity of marking from day to day the effect upon great social interests of freedom of trade and comparative abundance. I have not failed to note the results of preceding years, and to contrast them with the results of the last three years; and I am led to the conclusion that the main grounds of public policy on which protection has been defended are not tenable; at least, I cannot maintain them. I do not believe, after the experience of the last three years, that the rate of wages varies with the price of food. I do not believe that with high prices, wages will necessarily rise in the same ratio. I do not believe that a low price of food necessarily implies a low rate of wages. Neither can I maintain that protection to domestic industry is necessarily good.

Adjourned Debate. February 13, 1846.

House of Commons.

Sir Douglas Howard said:[398]

I have often imagined—and it was for this that I moved for, and obtained the order of this House for, the extensive returns which are now preparing, namely, the various colonial tariffs and commercial relations at present subsisting between all the Colonies of the Empire and the mother country, and between the Colonies themselves—that it might really be possible to treat Colonies like counties of the country, not only in direct trade with the United Kingdom, but in commercial intercourse with each other, by free trade among ourselves, under a reasonable moderate degree of protection from without, and so resolve the United Kingdom, and all her Colonies and possessions, into a commercial union such as might defy all rivalry, and defeat all combinations. Then might colonization proceed on a gigantic scale—then might British capital animate British labour, on British soil, for British objects, throughout the extended dominions of the British Empire. Such an union is the United States of America—a confederation of sovereign States, leagued together for commercial and political purposes, with the most perfect free trade within, and a stringent protection from without; and signally, surely, has that commercial league succeeded and flourished. Such an union, too, is the German Customs League; and it has succeeded to an extent that really is, in so short a time, miraculous. But free trade—the extinction of the protective principle—the repeal of the differential duties—would at once convert all our Colonies, in a commercial sense, into as many independent States. The colonial consumer of British productions would then be released from his part of the compact—that of dealing, in preference, with the British producer; and the British consumer of such articles as the Colonies produce, absolved from his; each party would be free to buy in the cheapest, and sell in the dearest market. I defy any hon. member opposite to say that this would not be a virtual dissolution of the colonial system.

Adjourned Debate. February 20, 1846.

Mr. B. Disraeli:[399]

I have now nearly concluded the observations which I shall address to the House. I have omitted a great deal which I wished to urge upon the House; and I sincerely wish that what I have said had been urged with more ability; but I have endeavoured not to make a mere Corn Law speech; I have only taken corn as an illustration; but I don't like my friends here to enter upon that Corn Law debate which I suppose is impending, under a mistaken notion of the position in which they stand. I never did rest my defence of the Corn Laws on the burdens to which the land is subject. I believe that there are burdens, heavy burdens, on the land; but the land has great honours, and he who has great honours must have great burdens. But I wish them to bear in mind that their cause must be sustained by great principles. I venture feebly and slightly to indicate those principles, principles of high policy, on which their system ought to be sustained. First, without reference to England, looking at all countries, I say that it is the first duty of the Minister, and the first interest of the State, to maintain a balance between the two great branches of national industry; that is a principle which has been recognised by all great Ministers for the last two hundred years; and the reasons upon which it rests are so obvious, that it can hardly be necessary to mention them. Why we should maintain that balance between the two great branches of national industry, involves political considerations—social considerations, affecting the happiness, prosperity, and morality of the people, as well as the stability of the State. But I go further; I say that in England we are bound to do more—I repeat what I have repeated before, that in this country there are special reasons why we should not only maintain the balance between the two branches of our national industry, but why we should give a preponderance—I do not say a predominance, which was the word ascribed by the hon. member for Manchester to the noble lord the member for London, but which he never used—why we should give a preponderance, for that is the proper and constitutional word, to the agricultural branch; and the reason is, because in England we have a territorial Constitution. We have thrown upon the land the revenues of the Church, the administration of justice, and the estate of the poor; and this has been done, not to gratify the pride, or pamper the luxury of the proprietors of the land, but because, in a territorial Constitution, you, and those whom you have succeeded, have found the only security for self-government—the only barrier against that centralising system which has taken root in other countries. I have always maintained these opinions; my constituents are not landlords; they are not aristocrats; they are not great capitalists; they are the children of industry and toil; and they believe, first, that their material interests are involved in a system which favours native industry, by insuring at the same time real competition; but they believe also that their social and political interests are involved in a system by which their rights and liberties have been guaranteed; and I agree with them—I have these old-fashioned notions. I know that we have been told, and by one who on this subject should be the highest authority, that we shall derive from this great struggle, not merely the repeal of the Corn Laws, but the transfer of power from one class to another—to one distinguished for its intelligence and wealth, the manufacturers of England. My conscience assures me that I have not been slow in doing justice to the intelligence of that class; certain I am, that I am not one of those who envy them their wide and deserved prosperity; but I must confess my deep mortification, that in an age of political regeneration, when all social evils are ascribed to the operation of class interests, it should be suggested that we are to be rescued from the alleged power of one class only to sink under the avowed dominion of another. I, for one, if this is to be the end of all our struggles—if this is to be the great result of this enlightened age—I, for one, protest against the ignominious catastrophe. I believe that the monarchy of England, its sovereignty mitigated by the acknowledged authority of the estates of the realm, has its root in the hearts of the people, and is capable of securing the happiness of the nation and the power of the State. But, Sir, if this be a worn-out dream; if, indeed, there is to be a change, I, for one, anxious as I am to maintain the present polity of this country, ready to make as many sacrifices as any man for that object—if there is to be this great change, I, for one, hope that the foundations of it may be deep, the scheme comprehensive, and that instead of falling under such a thraldom, under the thraldom of Capital—under the thraldom of those who, while they boast of their intelligence, are more proud of their wealth—if we must find a new force to maintain the ancient throne and immemorial monarchy of England, I, for one, hope that we may find that novel power in the invigorating energies of an educated and enfranchised people.

INDEX