CHAPTER II.

'Now,' quod Love, 'trewly thy wordes I have wel understonde.

Certes, me thinketh hem right good; and me

wondreth why thou so lightly passest in the lawe.'

'Sothly,' quod I, 'my wit is leude, and I am right blynd, and

that mater depe. How shulde I than have waded? Lightly

might I have drenched, and spilte ther my-selfe.'

'Ye,' quod she, 'I shal helpe thee to swimme. For right as

lawe punissheth brekers of preceptes and the contrary-doers of the

written constitucions, right so ayenward lawe rewardeth and

yeveth mede to hem that lawe strengthen. By one lawe this

rebel is punisshed and this innocent is meded; the shrewe is

enprisoned and this rightful is corowned. The same lawe that

joyneth by wedlocke without forsaking, the same lawe yeveth

lybel of departicion bycause of devorse both demed and

declared.'

'Ye, ye,' quod I, 'I fynde in no lawe to mede and rewarde in

goodnes the gilty of desertes.'

'Fole,' quod she, 'gilty, converted in your lawe, mikel merit

deserveth. Also Pauly[n] of Rome was crowned, that by him the

maynteyners of Pompeus weren knowen and distroyed; and yet

toforn was this Paulyn cheef of Pompeus counsaile. This lawe

in Rome hath yet his name of mesuring, in mede, the bewraying of

the conspiracy, ordayned by tho senatours the deth. Julius Cesar

is acompted in-to Catons rightwisnesse; for ever in trouth

florissheth his name among the knowers of reson. Perdicas was

crowned in the heritage of Alexander the grete, for tellinge of

a prevy hate that king Porrus to Alexander hadde. Wherfore

every wight, by reson of lawe, after his rightwysenesse apertely

his mede may chalenge; and so thou, that maynteynest lawe of

kynde, and therfore disese hast suffred in the lawe, reward is

worthy to be rewarded and ordayned, and †apertly thy mede

might thou chalenge.'

'Certes,' quod I, 'this have I wel lerned; and ever hens-forward

I shal drawe me therafter, in oonhed of wil to abyde, this

lawe bothe maynteyne and kepe; and so hope I best entre in-to

your grace, wel deservinge in-to worship of a wight, without

nedeful compulsion, [that] ought medefully to be rewarded.'

'Truly,' quod Love, 'that is sothe; and tho[ugh], by constitucion,

good service in-to profit and avantage strecche, utterly

many men it demen to have more desert of mede than good wil

nat compelled.'

'See now,' quod I, 'how †many men holden of this the contrary.

And what is good service? Of you wolde I here this

question declared.'

'I shal say thee,' quod she, 'in a fewe wordes:—resonable

workinges in plesaunce and profit of thy soverayne.'

'How shulde I this performe?' quod I.

'Right wel,' quod she; 'and here me now a litel. It is hardely

(quod she) to understande, that right as mater by due overchaunginges

foloweth his perfeccion and his forme, right so every

man, by rightful werkinges, ought to folowe the lefful desyres in

his herte, and see toforn to what ende he deserveth. For many

tymes he that loketh nat after th'endes, but utterly therof is

unknowen, befalleth often many yvels to done, wherthrough, er he

be war, shamefully he is confounded; th'ende[s] therof neden to

be before loked. To every desirer of suche foresight in good

service, three thinges specially nedeth to be rulers in his workes.

First, that he do good; next, that he do [it] by eleccion in his

owne herte; and the thirde, that he do godly, withouten any

surquedry in thoughtes. That your werkes shulden be good, in

service or in any other actes, authoritès many may be aleged;

neverthelater, by reson thus may it be shewed. Al your werkes

be cleped seconde, and moven in vertue of the firste wercher,

whiche in good workes wrought you to procede; and right so

your werkes moven in-to vertue of the laste ende: and right in

the first workinge were nat, no man shulde in the seconde werche.

Right so, but ye feled to what ende, and seen their goodnes

closed, ye shulde no more †recche what ye wrought; but the

ginning gan with good, and there shal it cese in the laste ende, if

it be wel considred. Wherfore the middle, if other-wayes it drawe

than accordant to the endes, there stinteth the course of good,

and another maner course entreth; and so it is a partie by him-selve;

and every part [that] be nat accordant to his al, is foul and

ought to be eschewed. Wherfore every thing that is wrought

and be nat good, is nat accordant to th'endes of his al hole; it is

foul, and ought to be withdrawe. Thus the persons that neither

don good ne harm shamen foule their making. Wherfore, without

working of good actes in good service, may no man ben accepted.

Truely, the ilke that han might to do good and doon it nat, the

crowne of worship shal be take from hem, and with shame shul

they be anulled; and so, to make oon werke acordant with his

endes, every good servaunt, by reson of consequence, muste do

good nedes. Certes, it suffiseth nat alone to do good, but goodly

withal folowe; the thanke of goodnesse els in nought he

deserveth. For right as al your being come from the greetest

good, in whom al goodnesse is closed, right so your endes ben

directe to the same good. Aristotel determineth that ende and

good ben one, and convertible in understanding; and he that in

wil doth awey good, and he that loketh nat to th'ende, loketh nat

to good; but he that doth good and doth nat goodly, [and]

draweth away the direction of th'ende nat goodly, must nedes

be badde. Lo! badde is nothing els but absence or negative

of good, as derkenesse is absence or negative of light. Than he

that dooth [not] goodly, directeth thilke good in-to th'ende of

badde; so muste thing nat good folowe: eke badnesse to suche

folke ofte foloweth. Thus contrariaunt workers of th'ende

that is good ben worthy the contrary of th'ende that is good

to have.'

'How,' quod I, 'may any good dede be doon, but-if goodly it

helpe?'

'Yes,' quod Love, 'the devil doth many good dedes, but

goodly he leveth be-hynde; for †ever badly and in disceyvable

wyse he worketh; wherfore the contrary of th'ende him foloweth.

And do he never so many good dedes, bicause goodly is away,

his goodnes is nat rekened. Lo! than, tho[ugh] a man do good,

but he do goodly, th'ende in goodnesse wol nat folowe; and thus

in good service both good dede and goodly doon musten joyne

togider, and that it be doon with free choise in herte; and els

deserveth he nat the merit in goodnes: that wol I prove. For

if thou do any-thing good by chaunce or by happe, in what thing

art thou therof worthy to be commended? For nothing, by reson

of that, turneth in-to thy praysing ne lacking. Lo! thilke thing

doon by hap, by thy wil is nat caused; and therby shulde I

thanke or lacke deserve? And sithen that fayleth, th'ende which

that wel shulde rewarde, must ned[e]s faile. Clerkes sayn, no man

but willinge is blessed; a good dede that he hath doon is nat

doon of free choice willing; without whiche blissednesse may nat

folowe. Ergo, neither thanke of goodnesse ne service [is] in that

[that] is contrary of the good ende. So than, to good service

longeth good dede goodly don, thorow free choice in herte.'

'Truely,' quod I, 'this have I wel understande.'

'Wel,' quod she, 'every thing thus doon sufficiently by lawe,

that is cleped justice, [may] after-reward clayme. For lawe and

justice was ordayned in this wyse, suche desertes in goodnesse,

after quantitè in doinge, by mede to rewarde; and of necessitè of

suche justice, that is to say, rightwysenesse, was free choice in

deserving of wel or of yvel graunted to resonable creatures.

Every man hath free arbitrement to chose, good or yvel to

performe.'

'Now,' quod I tho, 'if I by my good wil deserve this Margarit-perle,

and am nat therto compelled, and have free choice to do

what me lyketh; she is than holden, as me thinketh, to rewarde

th'entent of my good wil.'

'Goddes forbode els,' quod Love; 'no wight meneth otherwyse,

I trowe; free wil of good herte after-mede deserveth.'

'Hath every man,' quod I, 'free choice by necessary maner of

wil in every of his doinges that him lyketh, by goddes proper

purvyaunce? I wolde see that wel declared to my leude understanding;

for "necessary" and "necessitè" ben wordes of mokel

entencion, closing (as to saye) so mote it be nedes, and otherwyse

may it nat betyde.'

'This shalt thou lerne,' quod she, 'so thou take hede in my

speche. If it were nat in mannes owne libertè of free wil to do

good or bad, but to the one teyed by bonde of goddes preordinaunce,

than, do he never so wel, it were by nedeful compulcion

of thilk bonde, and nat by free choice, wherby nothing he

desyreth: and do he never so yvel, it were nat man for to wyte,

but onlich to him that suche thing ordayned him to done.

Wherfore he ne ought for bad[de] be punisshed, ne for no good

dede be rewarded; but of necessitè of rightwisnesse was therfore

free choice of arbitrement put in mans proper disposicion. Truely,

if it were otherwyse, it contraried goddes charitè, that badnesse

and goodnesse rewardeth after desert of payne or of mede.'

'Me thinketh this wonder,' quod I; 'for god by necessitè

forwot al thinges coming, and so mote it nedes be; and thilke

thinges that ben don †by our free choice comen nothing of necessitè

but only †by wil. How may this stonde †togider? And so

me thinketh truely, that free choice fully repugneth goddes

forweting. Trewly, lady, me semeth, they mowe nat stande

†togider.'

CHAPTER III.

Than gan Love nighe me nere, and with a noble countenance

of visage and limmes, dressed her nigh my

sitting-place.

'Take forth,' quod she, 'thy pen, and redily wryte these

wordes. For if god wol, I shal hem so enforme to thee, that thy

leudnesse which I have understande in that mater shal openly be

clered, and thy sight in ful loking therin amended. First, if thou

thinke that goddes prescience repugne libertè of arbitrement, it is

impossible that they shulde accorde in onheed of sothe to

understonding.'

'Ye,' quod I, 'forsothe; so I it conceyve.'

'Wel,' quod she, 'if thilke impossible were away, the repugnaunce

that semeth to be therin were utterly removed.'

'Shewe me the absence of that impossibilitè,' quod I.

'So,' quod she, 'I shal. Now I suppose that they mowe

stande togider: prescience of god, whom foloweth necessitè of

thinges comming, and libertè of arbitrement, thorow whiche thou

belevest many thinges to be without necessitè.'

'Bothe these proporcions be sothe,' quod I, 'and wel mowe

stande togider; wherfore this case as possible I admit.'

'Truely,' quod she, 'and this case is impossible.'

'How so?' quod I.

'For herof,' quod she, 'foloweth and wexeth another

impossible.'

'Prove me that,' quod I.

'That I shal,' quod she; 'for somthing is comming without

necessitè, and god wot that toforn; for al thing comming he

before wot, and that he beforn wot of necessitè is comming, as

he beforn wot be the case by necessary maner; or els, thorow

necessitè, is somthing to be without necessitè; and wheder, to

every wight that hath good understanding, is seen these thinges

to be repugnaunt: prescience of god, whiche that foloweth necessitè,

and libertè of arbitrement, fro whiche is removed necessitè?

For truely, it is necessary that god have forweting of thing withouten

any necessitè cominge.'

'Ye,' quod I; 'but yet remeve ye nat away fro myne understanding

the necessitè folowing goddes be foreweting, as thus. God

beforn wot me in service of love to be bounden to this Margarite-perle,

and therfore by necessitè thus to love am I bounde; and

if I had nat loved, thorow necessitè had I ben kept from al

love-dedes.'

'Certes,' quod Love, 'bicause this mater is good and necessary

to declare, I thinke here-in wel to abyde, and not lightly to passe.

Thou shalt not (quod she) say al-only, "god beforn wot me to be

a lover or no lover," but thus: "god beforn wot me to be a lover

without necessitè." And so foloweth, whether thou love or not love,

every of hem is and shal be. But now thou seest the impossibilitè

of the case, and the possibilitè of thilke that thou wendest

had been impossible; wherfore the repugnaunce is adnulled.'

'Ye,' quod I; 'and yet do ye not awaye the strength of necessitè,

whan it is said, th[r]ough necessitè it is me in love to

abyde, or not to love without necessitè for god beforn wot it.

This maner of necessitè forsothe semeth to some men in-to coaccion,

that is to sayne, constrayning, or else prohibicion, that is,

defendinge; wherfore necessitè is me to love of wil. I understande

me to be constrayned by some privy strength to the wil

of lovinge; and if [I] no[t] love, to be defended from the wil of

lovinge: and so thorow necessitè me semeth to love, for I love;

or els not to love, if I not love; wherthrough neither thank ne

maugrè in tho thinges may I deserve.'

'Now,' quod she, 'thou shalt wel understande, that often we

sayn thing thorow necessitè to be, that by no strength to be

neither is coarted ne constrayned; and through necessitè not

to be, that with no defendinge is removed. For we sayn it is

thorow necessitè god to be immortal, nought deedliche; and it

is necessitè, god to be rightful; but not that any strength of

violent maner constrayneth him to be immortal, or defendeth him

to be unrightful; for nothing may make him dedly or unrightful.

Right so, if I say, thorow necessitè is thee to be a lover or els

noon; only thorow wil, as god beforn wete. It is nat to understonde

that any thing defendeth or forbit thee thy wil, whiche shal

nat be; or els constrayneth it to be, whiche shal be. That same

thing, forsoth, god before wot, whiche he beforn seeth. Any

thing commende of only wil, that wil neyther is constrayned

ne defended thorow any other thing. And so thorow libertè of

arbitrement it is do, that is don of wil. And trewly, my good

child, if these thinges be wel understonde, I wene that non

inconvenient shalt thou fynde betwene goddes forweting and

libertè of arbitrement; wherfore I wot wel they may stande

togider. Also farthermore, who that understanding of prescience

properlich considreth, thorow the same wyse that any-thing be

afore wist is said, for to be comming it is pronounced; there is

nothing toforn wist but thing comming; foreweting is but of

trouth[e]; dout[e] may nat be wist; wherfore, whan I sey that god

toforn wot any-thing, thorow necessitè is thilke thing to be comming;

al is oon if I sey, it shal be. But this necessitè neither

constrayneth ne defendeth any-thing to be or nat to be. Therfore sothly,

if love is put to be, it is said of necessitè to be; or els, for it

is put nat to be, it is affirmed nat to be of necessitè; nat for that

necessitè constrayneth or defendeth love to be or nat to be. For

whan I say, if love shal be, of necessitè it shal be, here foloweth

necessitè the thing toforn put; it is as moch to say as if it were thus

pronounced—"that thing shal be." Noon other thing signifyeth

this necessitè but only thus: that shal be, may nat togider be

and nat be. Evenlich also it is soth, love was, and is, and shal

be, nat of necessitè; and nede is to have be al that was; and

nedeful is to be al that is; and comming, to al that shal be.

And it is nat the same to saye, love to be passed, and love

passed to be passed; or love present to be present, and love to

be present; or els love to be comminge, and love comminge to be

comming. Dyversitè in setting of wordes maketh dyversitè in

understandinge; altho[ugh] in the same sentence they accorden

of significacion; right as it is nat al oon, love swete to be swete,

and love to be swete. For moch love is bitter and sorouful, er

hertes ben esed; and yet it glad[d]eth thilke sorouful herte on

suche love to thinke.'

'Forsothe,' quod I, 'outherwhile I have had mokel blisse in

herte of love that stoundmele hath me sorily anoyed. And

certes, lady, for I see my-self thus knit with this Margarite-perle

as by bonde of your service and of no libertè of wil, my herte wil

now nat acorde this service to love. I can demin in my-selfe

non otherwise but thorow necessitè am I constrayned in this

service to abyde. But alas! than, if I thorow nedeful compulsioun

maugre me be with-holde, litel thank for al my greet traveil have

I than deserved.'

'Now,' quod this lady, 'I saye as I sayde: me lyketh this

mater to declare at the ful, and why: for many men have had

dyvers fantasyes and resons, both on one syde therof and in the

other. Of whiche right sone, I trowe, if thou wolt understonde,

thou shalt conne yeve the sentence to the partie more probable

by reson, and in soth knowing, by that I have of this mater

maked an ende.'

'Certes,' quod I, 'of these thinges longe have I had greet lust

to be lerned; for yet, I wene, goddes wil and his prescience

acordeth with my service in lovinge of this precious Margarite-perle.

After whom ever, in my herte, with thursting desyre wete,

I do brenne; unwasting, I langour and fade; and the day of my

desteny in dethe or in joye I †onbyde; but yet in th'ende I am

comforted †by my supposaile, in blisse and in joye to determine

after my desyres.'

'That thing,' quoth Love, 'hastely to thee neigh, god graunt

of his grace and mercy! And this shal be my prayer, til thou be

lykende in herte at thyne owne wil. But now to enforme thee in

this mater (quod this lady) thou wost where I lefte; that was:

love to be swete, and love swete to be swete, is not al oon for to

say. For a tree is nat alway by necessitè white. Somtyme, er it

were white, it might have be nat white; and after tyme it is

white, it may be nat white. But a white tree evermore nedeful

is to be white; for neither toforn ne after it was white, might it

be togider white and nat white. Also love, by necessitè, is nat

present as now in thee; for er it were present, it might have be

that it shulde now nat have be; and yet it may be that it shal nat

be present; but thy love present whiche to her, Margarite, thee

hath bounde, nedeful is to be present. Trewly, som doing of

accion, nat by necessitè, is comminge fer toforn it be; it may be

that it shal nat be comminge. Thing forsoth comming nedeful is

to be comming; for it may nat be that comming shal nat be

comming. And right as I have sayd of present and of future

tymes, the same sentence in sothnesse is of the preterit, that is

to say, tyme passed. For thing passed must nedes be passed; and

er it were, it might have nat be; wherfore it shulde nat have

passed. Right so, whan love comming is said of love that is to

come, nedeful is to be that is said; for thing comming never is nat

comminge. And so, ofte, the same thing we sayn of the same; as

whan we sayn "every man is a man," or "every lover is a lover,"

so muste it be nedes. In no waye may he be man and no man togider.

And if it be nat by necessitè, that is to say nedeful, al thing

comming to be comming, than somthing comming is nat comminge,

and that is impossible. Right as these termes "nedeful,"

"necessitè," and "necessary" betoken and signify thing nedes

to be, and it may nat otherwyse be, right [so] †this terme "impossible"

signifyeth, that [a] thing is nat and by no way may it be.

Than, thorow pert necessitè, al thing comming is comming; but

that is by necessitè foloweth, with nothing to be constrayned.

Lo! whan that "comming" is said of thinge, nat alway thing

thorow necessitè is, altho[ugh] it be comming. For if I say,

"to-morowe love is comming in this Margarites herte," nat therfore

thorow necessitè shal the ilke love be; yet it may be that it shal

nat be, altho[ugh] it were comming. Neverthelater, somtyme it

is soth that somthing be of necessitè, that is sayd "to come"; as

if I say, to-morowe †be comminge the rysinge of the sonne. If

therfore with necessitè I pronounce comming of thing to come, in

this maner love to-morne comminge in thyne Margarite to thee-ward,

by necessitè is comminge; or els the rysing of the sonne

to-morne comminge, through necessitè is comminge. Love sothely,

whiche may nat be of necessitè alone folowinge, thorow necessitè

comming it is mad certayn. For "futur" of future is said; that is to

sayn, "comming" of comminge is said; as, if to-morowe comming

is thorow necessitè, comminge it is. Arysing of the sonne, thorow

two necessitès in comming, it is to understande; that oon is

to-for[e]going necessitè, whiche maketh thing to be; therfore it shal

be, for nedeful is that it be. Another is folowing necessitè, whiche

nothing constrayneth to be, and so by necessitè it is to come; why?

for it is to come. Now than, whan we sayn that god beforn wot

thing comming, nedeful [it] is to be comming; yet therfore make

we nat in certayn evermore, thing to be thorow necessitè comminge.

Sothly, thing comming may nat be nat comming by no

way; for it is the same sentence of understanding as if we say

thus: if god beforn wot any-thing, nedeful is that to be comming.

But yet therfore foloweth nat the prescience of God, thing thorow

necessitè to be comming: for al-tho[ugh] god toforn wot al

thinges comming, yet nat therfore he beforn wot every thing

comming thorow necessitè. Some thinges he beforn wot comming

of free wil out of resonable creature.'

'Certes,' quod I, 'these termes "nede" and "necessitè" have

a queint maner of understanding; they wolden dullen many

mennes wittes.'

'Therfore,' quod she, 'I wol hem openly declare, and more

clerely than I have toforn, er I departe hen[ne]s.

CHAPTER IV.

Here of this mater,' quod she, 'thou shalt understande

that, right as it is nat nedeful, god to wilne that he wil,

no more in many thinges is nat nedeful, a man to wilne that

he wol. And ever, right as nedeful is to be, what that god wol,

right so to be it is nedeful that man wol in tho thinges, whiche

that god hath put in-to mannes subjeccion of willinge; as, if

a man wol love, that he love; and if he ne wol love, that he love

nat; and of suche other thinges in mannes disposicion. For-why,

now than that god wol may nat be, whan he wol the wil of man

thorow no necessitè to be constrayned or els defended for to

wilne, and he wol th'effect to folowe the wil; than is it nedeful,

wil of man to be free, and also to be that he wol. In this maner

it is soth, that thorow necessitè is mannes werke in loving, that

he wol do altho[ugh] he wol it nat with necessitè.'

Quod I than, 'how stant it in love of thilke wil, sithen men

loven willing of free choice in herte? Wherfore, if it be thorow

necessitè, I praye you, lady, of an answere this question to

assoyle.'

'I wol,' quod she, 'answere thee blyvely. Right as men wil

not thorow necessitè, right so is not love of wil thorow necessitè;

ne thorow necessitè wrought thilke same wil. For if he wolde

it not with good wil, it shulde nat have been wrought; although

that he doth, it is nedeful to be doon. But if a man do sinne, it

is nothing els but to †wilne that he shulde nat; right so sinne

of wil is not to be [in] maner necessary don, no more than wil is

necessarye. Never-the-later, this is sothe; if a man wol sinne,

it is necessarye him to sinne, but th[r]ough thilke necessitè nothing

is constrayned ne defended in the wil; right so thilke thing that

free-wil wol and may, and not may not wilne; and nedeful is

that to wilne he may not wilne. But thilke to wilne nedeful is; for

impossible to him it is oon thing and the same to wilne and not to

wilne. The werke, forsothe, of wil, to whom it is yeve that it be that

he hath in wil, and that he wol not, voluntarie †or spontanye it is;

for by spontanye wil it is do, that is to saye, with good wil not

constrayned: than by wil not constrayned it is constrayned to

be; and that is it may not †togider be. If this necessitè maketh

libertè of wil, whiche that, aforn they weren, they might have ben

eschewed and shonned: god than, whiche that knoweth al

tr[o]uthe, and nothing but tr[o]uthe, al these thinges, as they

arn spontanye or necessarie, †seeth; and as he seeth, so they

ben. And so with these thinges wel considred, it is open at the

ful, that without al maner repugnaunce god beforn wot al maner

thinges [that] ben don by free wil, whiche, aforn they weren,

[it] might have ben [that] never they shulde be. And yet ben

they thorow a maner necessitè from free wil †discended.

Hereby may (quod she) lightly ben knowe that not al thinges to

be, is of necessitè, though god have hem in his prescience. For

som thinges to be, is of libertè of wil. And to make thee to have

ful knowinge of goddes beforn-weting, here me (quod she) what

I shal say.'

'Blythly, lady,' quod I, 'me list this mater entyrely to

understande.'

'Thou shalt,' quod she, 'understande that in heven is goddes

beinge; although he be over al by power, yet there is abydinge of

devyne persone; in whiche heven is everlastinge presence, withouten

any movable tyme. There * is nothing preterit ne passed,

there is nothing future ne comming; but al thinges togider in that

place ben present everlasting, without any meving. Wherfore, to

god, al thing is as now; and though a thing be nat, in kyndly

nature of thinges, as yet, and if it shulde be herafter, yet evermore

we shul saye, god it maketh be tyme present, and now; for no

future ne preterit in him may be founde. Wherfore his weting and

his before-weting is al oon in understanding. Than, if weting

and before-weting of god putteth in necessitè to al thinges whiche

he wot or before-wot; ne thing, after eternitè or els after any

tyme, he wol or doth of libertè, but al of necessitè: whiche thing

if thou wene it be ayenst reson, [than is] nat thorow necessitè to

be or nat to be, al thing that god wot or before-wot to be or nat

to be; and yet nothing defendeth any-thing to be wist or to be

before-wist of him in our willes or our doinges to be don, or els

comminge to be for free arbitrement. Whan thou hast these

declaracions wel understande, than shalt thou fynde it resonable

at prove, and that many thinges be nat thorow necessitè but

thorow libertè of wil, save necessitè of free wil, as I tofore said,

and, as me thinketh, al utterly declared.'

'Me thinketh, lady,' quod I, 'so I shulde you nat displese, and

evermore your reverence to kepe, that these thinges contraryen in

any understanding; for ye sayn, somtyme is thorow libertè of

wil, and also thorow necessitè. Of this have I yet no savour,

without better declaracion.'

'What wonder,' quod she, 'is there in these thinges, sithen al

day thou shalt see at thyne eye, in many thinges receyven in hem-selfe

revers, thorow dyvers resons, as thus:—I pray thee (quod

she) which thinges ben more revers than "comen" and "gon"?

For if I bidde thee "come to me," and thou come, after, whan

I bidde thee "go," and thou go, thou reversest fro thy first

comming.'

'That is soth,' quod I.

'And yet,' quod she, 'in thy first alone, by dyvers reson, was

ful reversinge to understande.'

'As how?' quod I.

'That shal I shewe thee,' quod she, 'by ensample of thinges

that have kyndly moving. Is there any-thing that meveth more

kyndly than doth the hevens eye, whiche I clepe the sonne?'

'Sothly,' quod I, 'me semeth it is most kyndly to move.'

'Thou sayest soth,' quod she. 'Than, if thou loke to the

sonne, in what parte he be under heven, evermore he †hyeth him

in moving fro thilke place, and †hyeth meving toward the ilke

same place; to thilke place from whiche he goth he †hyeth

comminge; and without any ceesinge to that place he neigheth

from whiche he is chaunged and withdrawe. But now in these

thinges, after dyversitè of reson, revers in one thinge may be seye

without repugnaunce. Wherfore in the same wyse, without any

repugnaunce, by my resons tofore maked, al is oon to beleve,

somthing to be thorow necessitè comminge for it is comming, and

yet with no necessitè constrayned to be comming, but with

necessitè that cometh out of free wil, as I have sayd.'

Tho liste me a litel to speke, and gan stinte my penne of my

wryting, and sayde in this wyse.

'Trewly, lady, as me thinketh, I can allege authoritees grete,

that contrarien your sayinges. Job saith of mannes person,

"thou hast put his terme, whiche thou might not passe." Than

saye I that no man may shorte ne lengthe the day ordayned of

his †dying, altho[ugh] somtyme to us it semeth som man to do

a thing of free wil, wherthorow his deeth he henteth.'

'Nay, forsothe,' quod she, 'it is nothing ayenst my saying; for

god is not begyled, ne he seeth nothing wheder it shal come of

libertè or els of necessitè; yet it is said to be ordayned at god

immovable, whiche at man, or it be don, may be chaunged.

Suche thing is also that Poule the apostel saith of hem that tofore

wern purposed to be sayntes, as thus: "whiche that god before

wiste and hath predestined conformes of images of his †sone, that

he shulde ben the firste begeten, that is to saye, here amonges

many brethren; and whom he hath predestined, hem he hath

cleped; and whom he hath cleped, hem he hath justifyed; and

whom he hath justifyed, hem he hath magnifyed." This purpos,

after whiche they ben cleped sayntes or holy in the everlasting

present, wher is neither tyme passed ne tyme comminge, but ever

it is only present, and now as mokel a moment as sevin thousand

winter; and so ayenward withouten any meving is nothing lich

temporel presence for thinge that there is ever present. Yet

amonges you men, er it be in your presence, it is movable thorow

libertè of arbitrement. And right as in the everlasting present

no maner thing was ne shal be, but only is; and now here, in

your temporel tyme, somthing was, and is, and shal be, but

movinge stoundes; and in this is no maner repugnaunce: right

so, in the everlasting presence, nothing may be chaunged; and,

in your temporel tyme, otherwhyle it is proved movable by libertè

of wil or it be do, withouten any inconvenience therof to folowe.

In your temporel tyme is no suche presence as in the tother; for

your present is don whan passed and to come ginnen entre;

whiche tymes here amonges you everich esily foloweth other.

But the presence everlasting dureth in oonhed, withouten any

imaginable chaunging, and ever is present and now. Trewly, the

course of the planettes and overwhelminges of the sonne in dayes

and nightes, with a newe ginning of his circute after it is ended,

that is to sayn, oon yeer to folowe another: these maken your

transitory tymes with chaunginge of lyves and mutacion of people,

but right as your temporel presence coveiteth every place, and al

thinges in every of your tymes be contayned, and as now both

seye and wist to goddes very knowinge.'

'Than,' quod I, 'me wondreth why Poule spak these wordes

by voice of significacion in tyme passed, that god his sayntes

before-wist hath predestined, hath cleped, hath justifyed, and

hath magnifyed. Me thinketh, he shulde have sayd tho wordes

in tyme present; and that had ben more accordaunt to the

everlasting present than to have spoke in preterit voice of passed

understanding.'

'O,' quod Love, 'by these wordes I see wel thou hast litel

understanding of the everlasting presence, or els of my before

spoken wordes; for never a thing of tho thou hast nempned was

tofore other or after other; but al at ones evenlich at the god

ben, and al togider in the everlasting present be now to understanding.

This eternal presence, as I sayd, hath inclose togider

in one al tymes, in which close and one al thinges that ben in

dyvers tymes and in dyvers places temporel, [and] without posterioritè

or prioritè ben closed ther in perpetual now, and maked

to dwelle in present sight. But there thou sayest that Poule shulde

have spoke thilke forsaid sentence †by tyme present, and that

most shulde have ben acordaunt to the everlasting presence,

why gabbest thou †in thy wordes? Sothly, I say, Poule moved

the wordes by significacion of tyme passed, to shewe fully that

thilk wordes were nat put for temporel significacion; for al [at] thilk

tyme [of] thilke sentence were nat temporallich born, whiche that

Poule pronounced god have tofore knowe, and have cleped, than

magnifyed. Wherthorow it may wel be knowe that Poule used tho

wordes of passed significacion, for nede and lacke of a worde

in mannes bodily speche betokeninge the everlasting presence.

And therfore, [in] worde moste semeliche in lykenesse to everlasting

presence, he took his sentence; for thinges that here-beforn

ben passed utterly be immovable, y-lyke to the everlasting

presence. As thilke that ben there never mowe not ben present,

so thinges of tyme passed ne mowe in no wyse not ben passed;

but al thinges in your temporal presence, that passen in a litel

while, shullen ben not present. So than in that, it is more

similitude to the everlasting presence, significacion of tyme passed

than of tyme temporal present, and so more in accordaunce. In

this maner what thing, of these that ben don thorow free arbitrement,

or els as necessary, holy writ pronounceth, after eternitè he

speketh; in whiche presence is everlasting sothe and nothing but

sothe immovable; nat after tyme, in whiche naught alway ben

your willes and your actes. And right as, while they be nat, it is

nat nedeful hem to be, so ofte it is nat nedeful that somtyme

they shulde be.'

'As how?' quod I; 'for yet I must be lerned by some

ensample.'

'Of love,' quod she, 'wol I now ensample make, sithen I knowe

the heed-knotte in that yelke. Lo! somtyme thou wrytest no

art, ne art than in no wil to wryte. And right as while thou

wrytest nat or els wolt nat wryte, it is nat nedeful thee to wryte

or els wilne to wryte. And for to make thee knowe utterly that

thinges ben otherwise in the everlastinge presence than in

temporal tyme, see now, my good child: for somthing is in the

everlastinge presence, than in temporal tyme it was nat; in

†eterne tyme, in eterne presence shal it nat be. Than no reson

defendeth, that somthing ne may be in tyme temporal moving,

that in eterne is immovable. Forsothe, it is no more contrary

ne revers for to be movable in tyme temporel, and [im]movable

in eternitè, than nat to be in any tyme and to be alway in

eternitè; and to have be or els to come in tyme temporel, and

nat have be ne nought comming to be in eternitè. Yet never-the-later,

I say nat somthing to be never in tyme temporel, that

ever is [in] eternitè; but al-only in som tyme nat to be. For

I saye nat thy love to-morne in no tyme to be, but to-day alone

I deny it to be; and yet, never-the-later, it is alway in eternitè.'

'A! so,' quod I, 'it semeth to me, that comming thing or els

passed here in your temporal tyme to be, in eternitè ever now

and present oweth nat to be demed; and yet foloweth nat thilke

thing, that was or els shal be, in no maner ther to ben passed

or els comming; than utterly shul we deny for there without

ceesing it is, in his present maner.'

'O,' quod she, 'myne owne disciple, now ginnest thou [be]

able to have the name of my servaunt! Thy wit is clered; away

is now errour of cloude in unconning; away is blyndnesse of

love; away is thoughtful study of medling maners. Hastely

shalt thou entre in-to the joye of me, that am thyn owne

maistres! Thou hast (quod she), in a fewe wordes, wel and

clerely concluded mokel of my mater. And right as there is

no revers ne contrarioustee in tho thinges, right so, withouten

any repugnaunce, it is sayd somthing to be movable in tyme

temporel, †afore it be, that in eternitè dwelleth immovable, nat

afore it be or after that it is, but without cessing; for right

naught is there after tyme; that same is there everlastinge that

temporalliche somtyme nis; and toforn it be, it may not be, as

I have sayd.'

'Now sothly,' quod I, 'this have I wel understande; so that

now me thinketh, that prescience of god and free arbitrement

withouten any repugnaunce acorden; and that maketh the

strength of eternitè, whiche encloseth by presence during al

tymes, and al thinges that ben, han ben, and shul ben in any

tyme. I wolde now (quod I) a litel understande, sithen that

[god] al thing thus beforn wot, whether thilke wetinge be of tho

thinges, or els thilke thinges ben to ben of goddes weting, and so

of god nothing is; and if every thing be thorow goddes weting, and

therof take his being, than shulde god be maker and auctour

of badde werkes, and so he shulde not rightfully punisshe yvel

doinges of mankynde.'

Quod Love, 'I shal telle thee, this lesson to lerne. Myne

owne trewe servaunt, the noble philosophical poete in Englissh,

whiche evermore him besieth and travayleth right sore my name

to encrese (wherfore al that willen me good owe to do him

worship and reverence bothe; trewly, his better ne his pere in

scole of my rules coude I never fynde)—he (quod she), in a tretis

that he made of my servant Troilus, hath this mater touched, and

at the ful this question assoyled. Certaynly, his noble sayinges

can I not amende; in goodnes of gentil manliche speche, without

any maner of nycetè of †storiers imaginacion, in witte and in

good reson of sentence he passeth al other makers. In the boke of

Troilus, the answere to thy question mayst thou lerne. Never-the-later,

yet may lightly thyne understandinge somdel ben lerned,

if thou have knowing of these to-fornsaid thinges; with that thou

have understanding of two the laste chapiters of this seconde

boke, that is to say, good to be somthing, and bad to wante al

maner being. For badde is nothing els but absence of good;

and [as] that god in good maketh that good dedes ben good,

in yvel he maketh that they ben but naught, that they ben bad;

for to nothing is badnesse to be [lykned].'

'I have,' quod I tho, 'ynough knowing therin; me nedeth of

other thinges to here, that is to saye, how I shal come to my

blisse so long desyred.'