Q. Was there any property beside railroad property destroyed?

A. No, I think not; not that I know of.

Q. What day was the other property destroyed—before or after the destruction of the bridge?

A. That was afterwards.

Q. The bridge then, I understand, was the first thing?

A. No. These cars, at this side of the bridge, were the first, I understood, that were burnt, afterwards the bridge, and then, on Monday—this was on Saturday night—and on the Monday, there was some property destroyed on Seventh street; coal trains were arrested, and the coal was dumped down right on the track, at different places. The watchman's house was turned upside down.

Q. Now, I understand you to say that the citizens, some of them, sympathized with the railroad employés who had been discharged, and some sympathized with the railroad company? That is the way you put it, I believe?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Well, now, was there any sympathy manifested by the citizens of Reading for those strikers or employés after they began to destroy property—or, in other words, in sympathy with the destruction of property?

A. None whatever, that I could learn.

By Mr. Means:

Q. There was no disposition on the part of the rioters, Mr. Goodhart, if I understand you, to destroy any property except that which belonged to the Reading railroad?

A. Yes; just so.

Q. Not outside of it?

A. Not outside of it.

Q. Where did you get your information in regard to Mr. Mullin having proffered his services to the sheriff?

A. Got it from his own testimony.

Q. Before you at the coroner's inquest?

A. Before me; yes, sir, and through Mr. Wootten, also. He testified to the same thing.

E. F. Evans, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You were mayor of the city of Reading during the past summer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You may tell us, if you please, where you were when the difficulties in July occurred?

A. On the Friday morning preceding the riot in this city, which occurred on the Monday, or rather the burning of the bridge, took place on Sunday night. What was known as the riot, followed on Monday night, and the firing of the troops, and so forth. I left this city for four or five days, and went down to Ocean Grove, following the example of the Executive of the State, the mayor of Philadelphia, and the mayor of Scranton, to spend a few days there, intending to return the following week, and at that time I did not dream or apprehend of any danger here with a strike or anything of that kind. On the following Monday morning, at the Grove, I received a telegram about half past ten or eleven o'clock, from the chief of police of this city, that a number of cars were on fire. At that time it said nothing of the bridge, in fact that had not been fired, I believe, at that time. I picked up my things, and left in the first train, which was shortly after twelve o'clock. After reaching Allentown that night, at probably seven o'clock, I was informed that the train had been taken off the East Penn road, and I could not reach home. I then telegraphed to Mr. Wootten. I stated my position in the telegram that I could not get home. He then ordered a train to bring me over—a special car and engine was placed at my disposal—and we started out and ran here, probably at half past ten or eleven o'clock. That was on Monday evening—on, I believe, the 23d, if I mistake not; at any rate, it was Monday evening.

Q. Monday evening was the 23d?

A. I reached this city after the firing had taken place, and these men had been wounded. I came in from the depot and came down to my office, issued a proclamation requesting our citizens to uphold the authorities of the city. Had it published that night, or rather in the morning paper. I then went up to the depot and remained there until two or three o'clock in the morning, requesting during that time that if there was any trouble, the military being out there, that they should take charge, my police officers then, five or six of them being wounded, and they had been on duty Sunday night, and all day Monday and Monday night. On the following day, then—I think it was the following day—I swore in probably from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty men, furnishing them with maces, to go on duty if any further danger was apprehended. There was but little occurred after Monday night. I believe the tracks were torn up in some places on Seventh street, but not to any extent. Didn't amount to anything, and that was about the closing of what I—we did everything we could after I returned home—the city authorities—to suppress any further violence or outbreak.

Q. And succeeded in preserving the peace?

A. After that there was nothing occurred.

Q. Did the citizens respond heartily to your call?

A. As a general thing, as I have stated, probably one hundred and twenty-five or one hundred and fifty were sworn in, and they were willing to do duty when called upon.

Q. Was there any question about your authority to call out a posse of citizens?

A. It was voluntary. It was supposed, that the sheriff, having unlimited power, should have acted, whether in my absence or not, particularly in my being absent, and should have called on parties up there. I do not know when he reached here. There was a train or engine sent for him to bring him back to the city. He resides somewhere below the city. Of course, hearsay evidence does not amount to anything, but they said he didn't act as promptly as he should have done. That is what I heard after I reached home. When I reached home on Monday evening, I learned he had issued a proclamation sometime that evening.

Q. Everything was quiet on Friday, as I understand you, when you left?

A. I didn't apprehend any danger at all. There was nothing spoken of riot or any outbreak, or anything of the kind—didn't dream of such a thing.

Q. Was there any larger number of idle men, discharged men, in the city at that time than usual?

A. Not that I know of. I passed around portions of the city, the greater part of it, and I found nothing that would be necessary to call into order the police officers after I returned home.

Q. How large a police force had you at the time?

A. That I cannot exactly tell. At that time it was reduced, either before or after that, I think, however, before that—amounting to some twenty-six or twenty-nine men.

Q. Did you make any arrests after?

A. There were quite a number of arrests made. I think in all to be probably fifty—forty or fifty, or along there.

Q. Did you learn what the cause of the outbreak was?

A. Only from hearsay.

Q. What did the men themselves assign? What did they give as their reasons?

A. I didn't converse with any of the men on the subject.

Q. Did you form any opinion of yourself?

A. In reference to the outbreak?

Q. In reference to the cause of the outbreak.

A. I didn't. Nothing more, than I presume it was stimulated by the action taken in other portions of the country. There was then an outbreak, I believe, in some portions of Maryland, if I mistake not, near Baltimore, and perhaps in Pittsburgh, or near there.

By Senator Torbert:

Q. The bridge was burned down before you returned?

A. Yes, sir; I believe Stokley left the same day I did, and also the Scranton man.

At this point, the committee adjourned till half-past one o'clock, this afternoon.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

Reading, April 19, 1878.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment. All members present, except Messrs. Reyburn, Larrabee, and Yutzy.

Peter Cullen, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State where you reside?

A. I reside 1022, Centre avenue.

Q. Were you connected with the police officers of the city of Reading in July last?

A. I was.

Q. In what capacity?

A. Chief of police.

Q. State what day the first disturbance or assemblage of strikers in any considerable number occurred?

A. That was on Sunday night, July 22.

Q. Had there been any difficulty threatened before that, to your knowledge?

A. There didn't appear to, in a general way, going round the streets—the principal streets. There had been a great deal of talk. Parties gathering, would talk quietly. Some were excited; that is, on the news received from Pittsburgh. That seemed to start them up some, but there was not anything particular done until Sunday night, on 22d, when the mob went out to the outer depot, or the new depot of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and the first intimation I had that a mob had gone out there; in fact, I did not expect anything serious. The first intimation I had, was standing at the corner of Fifth and Penn, and I was informed that the crowd, or mob, had gone out to the depot, and were at the depot. That they were there, hooting and yelling, and throwing stones before the engines, and pulling down engineers, and so forth. I immediately started out this street, to go to the depot, and I got as far as Fifth and Elm, and found that box 35 fire-alarm sounded, and I also saw the flame of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company's property. Saw flames near Fifth street bridge, between the depot and the bridge, just about a square off—not more from the depot; and I took Fifth street route, and then saw the crowd had gone over into the cut, and on to the track of the Lebanon Valley road, and I saw the cars were on fire. As I got to Fifth and Elm, I found Chief Engineer Boyer going out in his usual style, and I proceeded to the fire, and when I got there, I found there were a good many people there. The cabooses were on fire and burning on the tracks at that time. There didn't appear to be any disturbance of any kind, but the crowd was very large. That was Sunday evening, July 22, and the crowd was large, and somewhat excited; but there was no fighting. There was nothing in the way of any disturbance going on at that time, as the work had been done, which it appears the rioters had accomplished—which was intended. That was to burn the cars. I saw Chief Engineer Boyer then, and asked him about the fire department going into service, and he said he had been stopped, companies had been stoned, and were not allowed to go into service. We consulted together, and told him we would do all in our power to get the fire department into service. He was willing to do anything; and then G. A. Nichols, the vice president of the Philadelphia and Reading road, he came there, and myself and Chief Engineer Boyer and Mr. Nichols talked about this matter together, and Nichols asked me how many officers I had there. I looked around, and found I had about six or seven officers, and Mr. Nichols asked me if we had all revolvers and pistols. I told him, I was not so sure about that. I thought the most of the men had. I had, and I thought most of the men had. I came to the conclusion that this matter was a very serious disturbance, and we agreed that I would get the entire police force together, and to go immediately to the scene of the riot, and to get the fire department in the service, and instructed the men on the ground to do all in their power to assist Chief Engineer Boyer, of the fire department, and keep the peace, so far as was in their power to do so, until I could get back with the balance of the force. I got as many of the men together as I possibly could, and instructed them to proceed at once to Chief Engineer Boyer, to render him such aid as was in their power to do so; and we found by the time I had got around, or not quite around—and found a box on Jefferson street had sounded an alarm, and the cry was raised that the Lebanon Valley bridge was on fire, and I saw the illumination, which showed that the bridge was on fire. I proceeded to the telegraph office, and telegraphed to Mayor Evans to come home at once, that the cabooses were burning, and that there was serious trouble apprehended, and the state of affairs at that time was very bad in the city. The whole population was very much excited, and there were a great many of the people in the city, in the confusion, running round in the streets, in all directions. Everything seemed to be confused. When I found the bridge had been on fire, instructed the officers to go to the bridge, and they did so; but when they got out, that work of destruction had been completed, so far as the bridge was concerned. The city that night was in a continual state of excitement, and the property of the Reading Railroad Company seemed to be in danger, if not the city of Reading, and matters went on in that way, and also on the following day, (Monday.) The mob kept together. They stopped engines, and were drinking around and disorderly, and they seemed to have a great many sympathizers in the city at the time. I sent out for two hundred men. There were two prominent gentlemen in Reading, Captain E. P. Boas and Henry S. Eckart, that called upon me at the office, and asked what could be done. I told them I was willing to do anything, but we wanted more help, and this thing done right, and they agreed at once that they would be responsible for two hundred men. They would see that they were paid, and they would equip them and give them all seven-shooters and cartridges, and so forth. I then detailed a number of men—cannot tell the exact number—to go out in the different parts of the city, and to prevail upon parties to come to the city hall, and to go on duty to help squelch the riot. I waited and waited, and all in vain, and the reports that came in by the different officers was that they could not get anybody to assist. They would only laugh, and make different kinds of remarks; they didn't want their heads shot off, and they were going against their friends, and it was a workingman's fight, and all that sort of thing.

Q. What time was that?

A. This was immediately after dinner, on Monday, the 23d, and I only found there was one man I could get in the whole city to respond to the call of two hundred men. I inquired about the sheriff that night.

Q. State what inquiries you made of the sheriff?

A. I first went to the residence of the sheriff, where he lived, on South Sixth street—that was about twelve o'clock, or half-past twelve, Sunday night—and they informed me that he was not in the city. He had been down home, somewheres near or in the neighborhood of Pottstown—a little this side. I didn't know what to do at the moment, so I called on Judge Hagenman and told him the state of affairs, and how the city was, and how the town was in danger of being destroyed, that the torch of incendiaries had been applied to the property, and all that, and I asked what might be best to do under the circumstances. I told him Sheriff Yorgy was not home, and he advised me at once to try to get Yorgy to come to the city as quick as possible. I immediately, then, went to the office of Mr. Paxton, the master machinist of the P. and R. Railroad Company, and I met him at his office. That was on Monday morning, about one or half-past one o'clock. It might have been in the neighborhood of two. I asked him whether he would accommodate me—whether he could send a telegram for Sheriff Yorgy to come on at once to the city, that there was a riot here, and a large mob had gathered here and were destroying the property of the P. and R., and the city of Reading was in danger. Mr. Paxton was willing to do anything, and had the telegram sent. I also asked Mr. Paxton if he would furnish a special engine to bring the sheriff on to Reading, as it was very important. Mr. Paxton did so, and had an engine furnished to the sheriff, and he had also a conveyance from the sheriff's house to the engine. The sheriff arrived, to the best of my knowledge, early in the morning, about daylight, or thereabouts. I went to the sheriff's office on that Monday morning, and found him in his office in the court-house. I went to consult him as regards the situation, and making arrangements to see what could be done. Told him it was necessary to act at once, and act promptly, and to get at least five hundred men if he possibly could. He seemed, at that time, willing, and said he had sent for William B. Albright. He wanted to consult with him as regards the matter, and he showed all signs of willingness to act and perform his duty on that occasion. I told him I was willing to do anything to aid, help, or assist in the matter, and to have this thing wiped out; and I came back to the office, then, on that morning, and waited there with the intention of reporting to the sheriff, and about nine or ten o'clock on that morning Mr. J. E. Wootten, the superintendent, at that time, I believe, of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and he informed me at the city hall that the sheriff had backed out, and was not going to act; that he would not do anything. I was very much surprised to hear that answer, as he had seemed to be willing in the morning, and matters were getting worse all the time. On that Monday evening, at six o'clock, I took the entire police force.

Q. Now, starting with the Monday evening, you give a full history here in this evidence? [Indicating testimony taken before coroner's inquest.]

A. From there on, as to what occurred?

Q. A full history you give here?

A. Yes; it is about correct there as to the trouble.

Q. State whether this is evidence given by you before the coroner's inquest?

A. Yes; that is all correct.

Q. This is your evidence, given under oath?

A. That is evidence given under oath before Coroner Goodhart at the city hall, immediately after the trouble.

Testimony offered in evidence is as follows:

On Monday evening, at six o'clock, I started out with the force for Seventh and Penn streets, where a large crowd had collected. I informed the officers that we would have to go there, and do our duty. I found that nearly all the officers had pistols. Marched them to Seventh and Penn. Saw thousands of people there. Many strangers whom I had never seen before. There were people in all directions. The pavements and walls, as far as I could see along Seventh street, were lined with people, and the crowd extended up and down Penn street; and I got into the crowd at Seventh and Penn streets. I called upon the crowd to disperse, but the people paid but little attention to me. I then ordered the force up, for the purpose of pressing the force back, which they did, and I succeeded in clearing the pavements. Cleared the whole corner and crossings, and I kept the passage open on one side for a certain length of time to allow parties to pass, as also the street cars. A large number were forced up the cut in driving them away, most of whom were strangers, which made the crowd there much larger. I then drew the force up in line from Bechtol's corner over toward the Ubil house. I was expecting an attack at that time from the party in the cut. I noticed then, that they disconnected the engine, and commenced running it up towards us, as also the freight car, and I expected that they intended to attack our police force. They came forward to within sixty or seventy-five yards of us. They saw our lines were firm and solid, and they then stopped. I remained in that position for some time with the force. I found then that the party I had at first dispersed, had come in around me in all directions. Things then became quiet in the cut, and the people remained there. I then formed the force north and south, with the right resting on Breneiser's corner. I had all the police force that was at my command. I had them along the one track. I then detailed men to open the crossings, which they succeeded in doing. That position enabled us to keep the crossings clear, and to allow street cars to pass. The crowd was very large during all this time. There were thousands there. The first disturbance that I heard, was on Sunday evening about nine o'clock. I heard they had stopped a train, and that they had things their own way. There had been gatherings on Saturday evening, but there was nothing of a serious nature. There were no arrests made until Tuesday. I had twenty-six or twenty-eight men on the force at my command. I consulted on Monday with some of the officials of the road, also on Sunday. They made no report to me of threatened destruction of their property. I was at the firing of the caboose on Sunday evening, and had seven or eight men there. I received information of a disturbance at the depot, and went there—the alarm struck before I got there. I saw the light from Fifth and Elm streets. I was not at the Lebanon Valley railroad bridge. I met Howard Boyer at the first fire. He told me his carriage had been stoned, that the mob would not let him put any water on the fire. I consulted with Howard Boyer, and we concluded that it would be best not to interfere. We had no idea who the parties were who were implicated in this matter—they were not all strangers—some of them have since been arrested. I applied for special power. I was authorized by two citizens to raise a special force of two hundred men. I sent the members of my force out to endeavor to enlist men to do special duty up to six o'clock in the evening, but failed to obtain any. There was no person here who had appointing power. Persons laughed at our policemen when they asked for help. Five officers of the force were seriously wounded on Monday evening. I received information on Monday evening, at Seventh and Penn, that troops were coming. Half an hour afterwards heard that troops had arrived at the outer depot. I was not present at their arrival, was not requested to be there, had no communication with them. Did not know who ordered them here, or for what purpose they had come. The first I heard, was two pistol shots from above Court street. I didn't see any bricks thrown, as I had enough to do at Seventh and Penn. I couldn't see anything but the people, as everything was a solid mass. I saw some of the killed and wounded, and helped to carry some of them off. I knew Mr. Weaver, who was killed. The first I saw of the soldiers, was when they passed down Penn. I saw no wounded soldiers then, but have seen several since. During Sunday night and Monday I felt that my force was entirely inefficient, from the large crowds which were gathering and the excitement. I had a consultation with Sheriff Yorgey in his office in the court-house, soon after his arrival. I had telegraphed for him to come at quarter past two o'clock on Monday morning. I telegraphed from the depot, after trying at several other places. I had arranged with Mr. Paxton to furnish a special train to bring him up. He arrived about five o'clock. I informed the sheriff of the condition of affairs at seven o'clock in the morning. Told him it would be necessary for him to summon a thousand men, or thereabouts. He told me he had intended to do it, but it would take some time. I was certain he intended to do it, but he told me had sent for William B. Albright, and was waiting for him. I telegraphed him that I wanted help. Two hours after my interview, Mr. Wootten, of the Reading railroad, called upon me and said that Sheriff Yorgey refused to act, which very much surprised me. There was no force called out until to-day. I placed myself in communication with the mayor, telegraphed to him at a quarter past twelve, A.M., on Monday, July 23. I informed him of the condition of affairs. Asked him to come home at once, that tracks were being torn up, freight cars had been burned, &c. I was told that the telegraph office at Ocean Grove had closed. The mayor arrived in Reading on Monday night. The men on the police force obeyed my commands whenever I asked them to do so.

I heard two pistol shots in the cut, and immediately afterwards I heard a volley. Those balls did not come down our way, of any account. The next volley came into us, as well as the third volley. I realized the situation at once. The people commenced running in all directions. I requested all of them to get out of the way. I was struck by a ball on my left breast, while on duty at Seventh and Penn. I was expecting that the military, upon their arrival, would report to some of the civil authorities. All the information that I received was, that the troops had arrived at the outer depot.

There were shots fired on Penn street. Know that shots were fired down, as I was in the party. At about half past seven in the evening, was informed of the arrival of troops at the outer depot. Things looked very serious that night after the militia arrived. They reported to me at Fifth and Penn. I found the people were greatly excited in regard to the shooting, and I kept them away from the soldiers as well as I could. There were no riotous disturbances in this city after that, except the tearing up of the tracks. I do not know who ordered the soldiers to come here. Was satisfied they were coming, but did not expect that they were coming in the way in which they did.

On being re-called, Chief Cullen said (while the cars were burning) I consulted Mr. Boyer in regard to the situation, and asked him whether it wouldn't be better to attack the party and try to get the fire department into service. I had only seven or eight men with me that evening, and the crowd was very large. When I was there every person was quiet, and the cars were burning on the track. There was no breach of the peace there, so far as I saw. When I asked Mr. Boyer whether it wouldn't be better to make an attack, I believe he answered, "Yes." He told me he was not armed, and I said that under the circumstances I would go into town and get as many men together as I possibly could for the purpose of doing my entire duty; but before I was half way through I noticed that box No. 7 struck an alarm, and immediately afterwards I saw a light looming up along the Lebanon Valley railroad, and I knew there would be trouble, and I told my men to go out and do everything in their power to assist Mr. Boyer to get the department into service. At that time a number of the police were taking lunch, and I had difficulty to get them together. By that time box No. 7 struck again, and I saw the fire looming up at the Lebanon Valley bridge. After I got as many of the force together as I could to go out there, I went to the telegraph office and telegraphed to Mayor Evans to come home at once, telling him of the situation. Then I went to the City hotel to see the sheriff and I was told that he had gone to his home in the country. I then went to see Judge Hagenman at his residence, as affairs were very serious. I told him that neither the mayor nor the sheriff was in town. Judge Hagenman advised me that the best thing to be done would be to telegraph for the sheriff at once. I immediately started out and found the telegraph office closed. I went down to Seventh and Chestnut and saw Mr. Blackman, and asked him where the telegraph operator was, and he told me that he had just gone home. He sent for him then and the operator came to the office, and I telegraphed to the sheriff at once that there was a mob here of about two thousand persons and there was great excitement, that they were tearing up the tracks and burning cars, and so on, and that he shouldn't fail to come. I then saw Mr. Paxton, master machinist, and I asked him whether he would furnish an engine to bring the sheriff up to Reading at once, and he said he would, and he also engaged a conveyance to bring him to the depot, and the sheriff arrived in Reading, as far as I know, at about five o'clock in the morning. I addressed the crowd at Seventh and Penn streets on Monday evening. The feeling seemed to be all one way among the persons who had gathered there. I approached Seventh and Penn with the police, in front of Breneiser's store, and I announced to the crowd to disperse. I appealed particularly to all good citizens to go to their homes so that we would know with whom we had to contend. My voice was loud, so that the people could hear me a considerable distance on Penn and Seventh.

I had no power to appoint persons on the police force or call out a posse. Made an effort to get two hundred and fifty men, but failed to get even two men. Found it difficult to get anybody. Persons who were asked, laughed and said they didn't want their heads shot off. The mayor left on Friday morning previous to the disturbance, when everything appeared to be quiet. The city charter, I believe, empowers the mayor to raise a posse the same as the sheriff. This power, I believe, can not be conferred upon the chief of police. Two hundred men, armed, would have done a great deal towards quelling the disturbance.

Q. Did you have any conversation with the men engaged in the riot, at any time?

A. I had, on Sunday—Sunday afternoon, the 22d of July.

Q. What complaints did they make?

A. They were talking about the Pittsburgh troubles, and that seemed to be all the go on Sunday, seemed to excite them, and they talked about it, and that was all that was done, so far as talking and exciting and gathering in crowds. I did go into one party, and they were talking over these troubles. In Pittsburgh, the riot was going on at the time, and I had said to them that they would be a great deal more thought of and respected by keeping out of difficulties of the kind, and attending to their business, than in gathering, and going into riots, and one party made the remark, "That was not bread and butter," and that seemed to be the feeling generally among the elements that were going around the streets, and gathering in crowds. The sympathy seemed to be considerably in favor of riot, on the Sunday and Monday, and it only commenced to turn about on Tuesday.

Q. What did they appear to complain of—set out as their grievance? Did they seem to have any particular thing?

A. No; they did not seem to say much on the matter, so far as that was concerned, as I know of, but the whole feeling seemed to originate from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and the feeling in the city of Reading was very strong in favor of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; at least two thirds of the city, as near as I could calculate, they seemed to sympathize with the men's dispute between the company and themselves, and that feeling seemed to follow in reference to the troubles commencing here.

Q. Do you know what that dispute was?

A. As near as I understand, and so far as I was informed, the Philadelphia and Reading requested the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers that they would have to quit the organization called the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and to apply to something similar of their own, which would be beneficial, and as much derived from it as what they would have received from their own, and that the company would not have them in their employ unless they complied with those terms. I heard that spoken of. I cannot say to that officially, because I don't know it. That seemed to be the general talk.

Q. Had there been a large number of them discharged by the company prior to this disturbance?

A. Well, they were all either discharged or else quit. I believe the men quit. I don't think there were any discharged. I believe the men all quit, that is, the engineers and firemen, and a great many brakemen quit, and I believe some conductors quit.

Q. Was it the engineers that had been discharged—the idle employés of the railroad here that first started this disturbance?

A. It appears so, that is, some parts of them—not all. There were some men of their brotherhood implicated in these troubles from the first start-out, others did not appear to have much to say or do as far as we know.

Q. What class of men, so far as you could judge, were engaged in the actual destruction of property, and burning of the bridge?

A. I have knowledge of two of the party that I had caused the arrest of. One of them was a railroad man employed by the company, and the other man had nothing at all to do with the railroad company, so far as I knew; who used to boat on the canal, and perhaps he would be brought into their employ in that way. I believe he was a boatman.

Q. Was this one employed by the railroad company at the time?

A. He was one of the men that quit the employ of the company.

Q. What in your judgment was the actual cause of the riot here?

A. I do not believe we would have had a riot in Reading, if the troubles had not started in Pittsburgh. That is my opinion of it, and I would judge to the best of my knowledge, and from what I know, that the troubles originated in this city from the dispute between the P. and R. engineers and the company. That seemed to be at the bottom of it, because some of their men participated in private meetings, held in this city previous to the outbreak which we knew of.

Q. And the news from the city of Pittsburgh from the outbreak there stimulated the movement?

A. That stimulated the movement, or give it a start. That seemed to start them up, and made them quite lively on having some disturbance.

Q. Do you know what the damage done to the railroad property was. What it was estimated at, including the bridge and the burning cars?

A. I can't say exactly; but it may have been—it was in the neighborhood of anywheres between $150,000, it may have been more, or a little less, may have gone probably about that. The loss of the bridge was somewheres in the neighborhood of $100,000. I believe there was some ten or twelve freight cars burned, and some cabooses burned. There were telegraph poles cut down, tracks burned up, engines damaged to some extent, and soon. The actual amount, of course, I am unable to say; but I suppose somewheres in the neighborhood of $150,000, may be less and may be more.

Q. I understood you to say that this bridge was on fire before you reached the place with your police?

A. Yes, sir; the party, when they made this start to go to the Lebanon Valley road from the depot, after they had the engine stop there, &c, and committed their depredations, they started out on the tracks going right from us, and they commenced setting the cars on fire right straight along. There were a number of freight cars standing between the Fifth street bridge, where the first cars had burned, and the Lebanon Valley bridge, and they had them set on fire, and they appeared to keep on right straight ahead, until the whole thing was in flames. There did not appear to be any disturbance we know of, in all that movement. It seemed to be a concocted and well understood plan.

Q. Was there any sympathy with the strikers manifested by any of your police force?

A. Well, I can't say about that. To the best of my knowledge there was not. They did not express this in my presence. If there was, I have no knowledge of them expressing themselves as being in sympathy with the rioters, that I heard of.

Q. Did you have any trouble in getting them to obey orders, or do anything you required of them to do to preserve the peace?

A. No, sir; they did just as I told them, I had no trouble whatever. They were willing to just obey any order that was given in the performance of their duty.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Do you know of any communication between the railroad employés of the city of Reading, and any of the railroad employés of the city of Pittsburgh during this strike?

A. No, sir; I do not. I have no knowledge at all on that subject.

Q. You said in your testimony, that had it not been for the troubles at Pittsburgh, you would not have had any trouble at Reading. Now I want to know how you know that?

A. The reason I know that, is owing to telegrams being brought here to the city of Reading, and posted on bulletin boards.

Q. To whom were those telegrams sent?

A. The telegrams I have referred to, were sent to the Eagle office, they were on the bulletin boards of the Eagle office.

Q. To the editor of the Eagle?

A. I can't tell who they were sent to, but I saw them on the bulletin boards.

Q. What was the import of those telegrams?

A. Well, they were about the trouble there, and about firing—the trouble in Pittsburgh, in a general way, showing a great deal of trouble, and fighting, and riot going on there.

Q. In short, those telegrams were to the effect that the rioters had possession of the railroad property at the city of Pittsburgh?

A. I believe that was about the way it worded, or something like that. I cannot say positively the exact wording of the telegram.

Q. I just want this for information?

A. Certainly, I understand, I will answer all questions.

Q. I just want to know this, that if there was an understanding—did you as an officer, in the absence of the mayor of the city of Reading, believe that there was an understanding between these rioters, in the city of Reading, and the city of Pittsburgh?

A. There may have been, but I do not know it. I have no knowledge of that at all. As regards any understanding between the parties here, and the parties in Pittsburgh, I do not know. The only reference I had in regard to the trouble in Pittsburgh, is, as I stated, that I believed that had it not been for the trouble there, the probability is, we might not have had any here, because the news coming here, seemed to stimulate the matter.

George S. Goodhart, recalled:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State whether this is the testimony taken before you at the coroner's inquest held here in July last? [Indicating paper.]

A. It is; yes, sir; I took it down.

Q. You reduced it to writing yourself?

A. I did, myself.

Q. The witnesses here were all sworn?

A. Sworn.

Q. This is the testimony of John E. Wootten, as it was taken down by you? [Indicating.]

A. Yes, sir; verbatim.

The testimony of John E. Wootten, taken at the coroner's inquest, offered in evidence, and is as follows:

John E. Wootten, General Manager Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, sworn:

I called at Sheriff Yorgey's office at about nine and a half o'clock on Monday morning, 23d July, and said to the sheriff that I had come to see him for the purpose of asking him to take some means for the protection of the property of the railroad company, and for the suppression of the mob then threatening to destroy not only the railroad company's property but that of the citizens of Reading. The sheriff said, "Well, what can I do?" I asked him if he had learned of the destruction of the Lebanon Valley bridge and of the burning of the company's cars. He said that he had. I replied that he should issue his proclamation, and call out a force for the suppression of violence and incendiarism. "Yes, I know that, but the men when called upon would not come." I then told him that in such an event I would engage to furnish him with a sufficient force to suppress the mob, and if he wished it, the force would be well armed. He replied "Yes, but the rioters also have arms?" I then said, "Do I understand you to say that nothing can be done by you to check the riotous and incendiary spirit that now threatens to destroy so much property, and for which damage the county is liable?" He replied by saying that he did not see that he could do anything. I said, "Suppose you advise with counsel in relation to the matter." He replied that he had had a talk with Judge Sassaman about it. I asked what he said. The sheriff replied that he did not know what course would be taken.

I then left the office, and in the corridor I met Reverend B. R. Miller, who said that the existing condition of affairs at Reading required immediate action, and that he, for one, was ready for any call that might be made upon him to assist in the suppression of the mob. I replied that I was very glad to hear him say so, and told him that I had just called upon the sheriff, who was disinclined to act, and that I would make another appeal to the sheriff if he would accompany me to his office, which he did. I then told the sheriff that Mr. Miller had made a tender of his services for the suppression of disorder, and that I thought there would be no difficulty in getting as many more of our citizens as he might want. To which he replied that he didn't know yet what he would do in the matter, and after somewhat of a repetition of my previous conversation with him, in the presence of Mr. Miller, I left the sheriff's office and proceeded to the office of Chief of Police Cullen. Immediately after the interview with the sheriff I went to Philadelphia and conferred with President Gowen. At the time of my interview with the sheriff, so far as I knew, no one had any intimation that any troops were coming. The troops were sent at the order of General W. J. Bolton. After my arrival in Philadelphia, I telegraphed General Bolton that Reading was entirely without protection.

Q. State whether this is the testimony of Reverend B. R. Miller, as taken down by you, at the time? [Indicating paper.]

A. It is so.

Testimony of Reverend B. R. Miller offered in evidence, and is as follows:

Reverend B. R. Miller, affirmed, said:

My story is a short one. Coming from my home, on Monday morning, July 23, I saw an unsettled state of affairs at Seventh and Penn. Of course, I knew what had been going on the night before, and I stopped, and then passed on about my business. I saw Mr. Wootten enter the sheriff's office, and followed him, and I said, when he came out, "This is a great scare, and if the sheriff will give me arms and ammunition, I will raise fifty men, and quell the riot before night," and he said, "Come in, and we will see him." Mr. Wootten said to the sheriff, "Here is a volunteer, will raise men for you." The sheriff said, "I would rather not do anything about that," and wouldn't entertain the proposition at all, and Mr. Wootten turned around on his heels, perfectly disgusted, and left the office. This was between nine and ten o'clock in the morning. I didn't know the soldiers were coming until I met them on the platform. Don't know who ordered them through the cut. When I offered to raise men, I thought that was the time to work, but the sheriff wouldn't do anything.

Q. State whether this is the testimony of Sheriff George R. Yorgey, as taken down by you?

A. It is.

Testimony of George R. Yorgey offered in evidence, and is as follows:

George R. Yorgey, sworn:

I am the high sheriff of Berks county. Noticed no collision between the militia and citizens or disorderly persons on Monday night. Was in my office at the time, and remained in the office until eleven o'clock that night—Monday night. No officer of the militia, nor any person called upon me between those hours at my office to quell this riot. I had no notice, whatever, that any troops would arrive on that night. Was not aware that any troops were here until I heard the firing, and after they told me. I was never consulted in reference to the military at all. I never ordered them nor knew nothing about them being ordered. They never formed any part of my posse. Daniel Francis and the watchman of the court-house were with me in my office. I was waiting for orders which detained me until eleven o'clock. After the firing, I inquired to know the result and what had been done. Was told that the crowd had dispersed. I did not visit the scene of disaster. I was there once on Monday, saw the crowded condition of the streets, and witnessed the riotous proceedings. Saw this when I posted up my proclamations on the four corners. I should have been informed of the coming of the troops, but was not informed. I do not know whose business it was to tell me. I informed the railroad officials where they might find me if they wanted me to call out the posse comitatus. I telegraphed this to Mr. Gowen, Monday afternoon about four o'clock, shortly before I issued my proclamation, and I received no answer from Mr. Gowen. The militia came here without my knowledge, and I had nothing to do with them after they were here. In the forenoon things were middling quiet, and in the afternoon I had my proclamations struck off. I was not in the city on Sunday night, and came up from my Douglass township farm Monday morning at five o'clock. I heard the news Monday morning, and in the evening at five issued my proclamation. I did not think I should have issued my proclamation early on Monday morning instead of waiting until nearly night. In the forenoon of Monday, Mr. Wootten called on me and offered to furnish me with men. I did not issue my proclamation sooner because I could not get ready any sooner.

Peter Cullen, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State what the conduct of the militia under the command of General Reeder was during their stay in Reading, so far as you are able to judge.

A. Well, the conduct of General Reeder and his troops was good, so far as I know. They behaved well, and obeyed the commands of the officers, I know. Immediately after the firing, he marched his command right in front of the Mansion house; and he asked me what was best to be done, or something to that effect, in a general way to inquire about things, and I told him that the Philadelphia and Reading Company seemed to be the property in danger, and I suggested to him that it would be a good idea to go to the new depot, and I furnished a guide to escort his command to the depot. It was then dark, probably half past eight o'clock in the evening, and a great many of the mob followed down. The streets were filled with people at that time, and, undoubtedly, there were a great many of the rioters there—I know there were—and he had his command formed here in front of the Mansion house, Fifth and Penn, and there were some of the men going to attack the soldiers with their sleeves rolled up, and some had brickbats in their hands. One man I had requested one officer to arrest, and he was locked up, and he was going to attack the soldiers of Reeder's command, but Reeder's command was all soldierly, and had a good line of battle when they formed in front of the Mansion house, after their fight in the cut; they seemed to have perfect discipline all throughout.

Q. Were there any other troops here whose conduct was not as good as General Reeder's?

A. The Sixteenth regiment was here. I saw some of the members of the Sixteenth regiment on the streets, walking about loosely, and one of the members I asked him where he was going to, and got into a conversation with him, and I saw he was away from his command, and I asked him why he did not stay with his command, and he told me, he was not going to fire on his fellow workmen—that he didn't come here to do that. He showed me his hand, and says he, "Do you see that I am a workingman myself? I am not going to fire on any workingman."

Q. Who commanded the Sixteenth regiment?

A. I can't say positively about that. I believe Colonel Good is commander, or was the commander.

Q. Did you meet him, or have any conversation with him?

A. I did not come in contact with any of the officers of the Sixteenth regiment then.

Q. Knew nothing of his conduct but what was soldierly?

A. Never heard anything but what was right on the part of the officers of the regiment; and, undoubtedly, a large portion of the Sixteenth regiment was right. And I had received positive information that members of the Sixteenth regiment had been dealing out ammunition amongst the rioters in the crowds on the street during the day time.

Q. Of what day?

A. That was on Tuesday, the 24th of July.

Q. Did you have any conversation with more than one of the regiments?

A. Yes; I spoke to several, as they were walking about, and they did not seem to care about being connected with the military at all. They were walking round independent—didn't seem to care whether they had any duty to perform as soldiers. I did not see very many of them. I saw, probably, five or six in that way; but I heard a number of reports in regard to their giving out ammunition. I have that from worthy sources.

Q. Did you call the attention of the commanding officer to that fact?

A. I had word sent to that effect to the officer at the depot, but whether it was communicated to him, I am unable to say. But I did send word out to the depot that some of the men had been in amongst the crowd of rioters dealing out ammunition. That made the worst feeling of all that occurred—the soldiers giving their ammunition away, and mingling around with the rioters, and being away from their command. I cannot tell whether they were away from their command with leave. I suppose, certainly, they ought not to have leave given in a crisis of this kind, and I judge they must have been absent without leave.

Q. How long was the regiment here?

A. The Sixteenth were here, I believe, about a day and a half, to the best of my knowledge.

By Mr. Means:

Q. I would like to know from whom you received the fire—or if you did receive any—at the cut at Penn street, I believe you call it?

A. Seventh and Penn.

Q. You received a volley of musketry, or pistol shots, or something there. Whom did you receive it from?

A. From the military. I had a police force right on our tracks.

Q. It was at Seventh and Penn, if I am rightly informed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is a part I had already forgotten, but it came into my mind a while ago, that while you had that police force there, you received a volley fired by somebody there at that point. I would like to know who it was from?

A. To the best of my knowledge, it was from the soldiers.

Q. Of what command?

A. General Reeder's command. The soldiers came down through the cut, and the first firing we heard, there were some parties said they are firing blank cartridges. The first firing I heard was pistol shots, that was the starting of the fire, but the crowd was very large on both sides of the cut, and the cut was pretty well filled with the rioters—with the mob, and the first I heard was pistol shots, and then I heard louder shots that seemed more like gun shots, and rifle shots. There were several of them, and immediately afterwards, there was a regular volley fired right down in the crowd.

Q. Have you ever been in active service in the army?

A. Yes; I have been three years and nine months.

Q. And from what you know of being there, did you consider that this shooting was musketry, or was it pistol shots?

A. It was musketry, it was rifle firing—there was pistol firing and rifle firing. The shots were sharp enough, that I knew they were minie balls.

Q. Could you tell whether there was a volley or skirmishing?

A. First, there were a few shots fired that went over our heads. Then a second volley was fired—a heavy volley, and just took a low range.

Q. You were there at that time, if I am rightly informed, endeavoring to clear that track, and keep that cut open?

A. Keep the crowd open, trying to disperse the crowd at that time.

Q. That is the time you received the volley?

A. That is the time we received the volley. The military did not see the police force, nor did the police force see the military. It was just dusk, and about that time the crowd was very large, and they came marching into the cut, and were at the corner of Seventh and Penn, right on the railroad tracks, and they got very close upon us before we knew it, owing to the large crowd.

Q. If I understand you, the military fired on the party, not knowing who they were firing on?

A. They were brick-batted and stoned, and pistol shots fired on the soldiers in the cut before they fired, and from the best information I have, and in that way I judge they did it in self-defense.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You don't think that they knew, or had any intention of firing on the police?

A. No; I don't believe that. About the place where the military commenced firing was in the cut, between Court street and Washington street bridge, or about there, and the crowd or mob was all up along that place, from Walnut street, for two squares above in the street, and on the sidewalk, and all along the walls of the cut, and it appears the military came in through the cut, and when they got in they were attacked, and the pistol shots fired, and to the best of my knowledge the shots came from the wall of the cut, right above, over the soldiers' heads.

Q. That is what I wanted to know—if you believed that the firing was done in self-defense?

A. That is the way I looked at it. I looked at it in that light. They did it in self-defense, and the pistol shots seemed to come from the wall. That was pretty close—only half a square from the place where the firing took place.

At this point the committee adjourned, to meet at the call of the chairman.