In regard to the classification mentioned in the paper, I will say this, that there is no classification in brakemen or flagmen. When you come to the conductors, they receive a certain rate, which I do not remember, for the first year, and ten per cent. over that for the second, and ten per cent. over that for the third, where they remain so long conductors. Now come the engineers. When promoted from firemen to engineers, they receive a certain rate, and the second year ten per cent. more, and the third year ten per cent. more, and the fourth year ten per cent. more—four classifications. That arrangement was made at their request, some four years ago, perhaps longer.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. These men were men who would have been suspended under the orders to run double-headers?

A. No. These men had taken such an active part previous to this Saturday, that I do not think they would have been kept in our employ, but we had no opportunity to discharge them.

David M. Watt, sworn with uplifted hand:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. At East Liberty, on the line of the Pennsylvania railroad.

Q. You are in the employ of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company?

A. Yes; in the capacity of chief clerk of the Pittsburg division.

Q. How long have you been employed in that capacity?

A. It will be fourteen years in July next.

Q. You were filling the place of Mr. Pitcairn on the Thursday before the riot occurred?

A. Yes; during his absence.

Q. Have you any knowledge of any disagreements between the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and their employés prior to that date?

A. There are continually matters coming up for settlement in the superintendent's office.

Q. But disagreements leading to the riots?

A. There were none to my knowledge. Had there been, I should have known it.

Q. Had there been any reduction in wages?

A. Yes; a reduction of ten per cent., which had been notified in May, to take effect on all the employés from and after June 1.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. All employés?

A. Except those whose pay amounted to one dollar per day, or who were paid by the month, and whose pay amounted to the rate of one dollar per day or less.

Q. Did that cause any complaint from the employés?

A. We were compelled to reduce our force on account of the condition of business. The volume of traffic governs the amount of wages, and the number of men we work. We had more men than we had the opportunity to give full time to. It was decided to reduce the force after the 1st of June, and the idea was to select the older men, and the men who by their services had proven themselves good and capable. To retain these and let the single men go, so as to give the married men a chance to make all the time we could afford to give them in the running of the traffic. It was also decided to run all the trains double-headers. A portion of them had been running for years as double-headers, but a notice was issued in July, advising all the employés that on and after a certain date—July 19, was the date fixed upon—all trains to and from Derry would be run as double trains. No complaint in the interval, between the date of the issuing of the order and the date upon which it was to go into effect, had been made at the superintendent's office, to either the superintendent or myself. Nor had there been any, so far as we had knowledge, to any of the subordinate officers, such as train-masters and others. Some of the men complained, of course, at not having work. It was a mooted question as to who would be the ones to go off.

Q. What date was that order to go into effect?

A. Upon July 19; Thursday. Mr. Pitcairn had arranged to go east on Thursday, July 19, in the day express, and I came to town, reaching the office about eight and a half o'clock in the morning, and up to that time no trouble had occurred, nor was any anticipated by the train-masters nor any one in our employ. About the time the eight-forty's—the extras—were to leave, the dispatcher came to the office and reported that some of the men had refused to go out. I made inquiry as to the reason of their refusal, and was told that they refused to go out on account of its being a double-header. Conductor Ryan was the man whose train did not go out. In the making up of his train he was ready to go out, but his men refused to go. I then instructed the dispatcher to call upon all the men on the road, with those out at the train-men's room. He called upon, I believe, some twenty-five men, brakemen, who refused to go out. They gave different reasons, some because they were double-headers, and some because they would not go if others did not go. Mr. Garrett, the assistant train-master, came in on the train that reaches there about nine o'clock. I sent for him, and told him what had been reported to me, and asked him to go out and see the men and see what they wanted, and report. Mr. Garrett, and Mr. McCabe, and Mr. Hunter, dispatchers, all three tried to induce the men to go out, but these twenty-five that had first refused got the balance to join them in refusing to man the trains. Mr. Garrett, I believe, requested Mr. McCabe, the general yard dispatcher, to make up a crew from the yard brakemen to man that train. Conductor Ryan was at all times ready to go out, and the engineers belonging to that train professed a readiness to run. We had a number of conductors there ready to run, and Conductor Gordon was the man who was going to take the train out after Mr. McCabe had secured the crew among his yard men. The crew, in making up their train, were assaulted with stones, and links, and pins, and driven from the train by a number of those men who had first refused to go out. I found that we were unable to get the train out. Then it came time for the nine-forty's to go out. In the meantime the crowd had increased somewhat, and they had taken possession of the switch which is west of Twenty-eighth street, leading on to the main track, over which a train to go east would have to be moved. It was reported to me that they would not allow the engine to go over that switch. The crowd was increasing. I then started, after a consultation with Mr. Garrett and other men there, to call upon the mayor. I asked that he should protect us in the movement of our trains, by removing from Twenty-eighth street, or that immediate neighborhood, those parties interfering with the switches.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you call in person upon the mayor?

A. I did; between ten and eleven o'clock. I drove to the mayor's office, and stated the trouble to him, and called upon him in the name of the company for protection. He replied that he had no force.

Q. Mayor McCarthy?

A. Yes; he said that the day-light force had been taken off, probably, about the 1st of July, and that he had nothing but the night force. I asked him to give me the front office force. He said he could not send them away. I told him I must have protection of some kind. He said that he might send out and gather up a force. He wanted to know how many men I wanted. I told him if he would send up ten men in uniform, that with our own force from the depot, if he could go up to the ground with me, and I had a buggy to take him, I thought the trouble would be all over before twelve o'clock. I thought the simple fact of his presence, without the police, would disperse the crowd there at that time. He refused to go, saying that he could not leave the office. I rather urged the matter upon him. The mayor then said he had been sick, and was not fit to go. He gathered a force of some ten men, I believe, and sent officer Charles McGovern, one of the front office men, in charge of them. They were to report at the Union depot, and be moved from there by a passenger car to run especially to Twenty-eighth street. Before the force was sent, the question was asked of me, who was to pay for the men.

Q. By whom?

A. The question was suggested by Mr. O'Mora, and addressed to the mayor. The mayor then addressed me, and desired to know whether I was in a position to assume the expense. I told him certainly, that I must have protection, and that if he could not give the force, and I must pay for it, I was then ready, and would become responsible for the payment of the men. I went to the outer depot, and got there a few minutes before the squad of police arrived. I walked up to Twenty-eighth street, in company with one of the dispatchers, I think McCabe, and was then advised that we could not turn the switch, that those parties held the switch, and would not allow the engine to back down. The engineer was John Sweeny, and the conductor was S. K. Moore. We wanted to take the engine down to couple on to a draft of cars to take them out on the Wilkensburg siding. I directed Moore to turn the switch. He refused, saying to me that he was afraid, that there were men there to shoot him the moment he attempted to turn the switch. I replied: "Very good, I will turn the switch," and I made a step forward for the purpose of getting to the switch, when the crowd gathered around me, and a brakeman by the name of D. D. Davis, who, I believe, at the time was in the employ of the Pan Handle road, or else a discharged employé from there—he was not in our employ—jumped in front of me, and waving his hand, or his hat, called out: "Boys, we will die right here." I placed my hand upon his coat, and called upon officer McGovern to arrest him. While my hand was upon his coat, some one delivered a blow, and hit me in the eye. That was from behind this man Davis. Immediately an attempt was made on the part of the police officers to arrest him. Others interested with him were throwing themselves in the way of the police officers to prevent the capture, but he was finally captured, and taken to the station-house. Prior to that time, however, I had reported to Mr. Pitcairn on the day express east that there was trouble, but that I did not anticipate it would amount to a great deal, and that he need not hurry home, unless further advised by me. The first place I could reach him was at Altoona. After having been struck, and finding the crowd increasing, and determined to prevent the running of the trains, I made a still further report, stating the condition of things, and he came back to Pittsburgh on the next train on which he could reach here, the fast line west that night. After I was struck, I believe I directed Mr. Smith to write a message, either in my name, or in Mr. Pitcairn's, I do not recollect, and addressed to the mayor, calling upon him for an additional force of not less than fifty men. It may have been a portion of those men who came up on the Atlantic express, six or eight, in charge of William J. White. Mr. Garrett reported from Torrens an immense crowd gathered there. I went up on the Atlantic with this police force to try to endeavor to get the stock. There were forty-six cars, all loaded with stock, waiting for this train to come out. We expected every moment to get some train started. Mr. Garrett had made an arrangement to side track some train coming west, and to take the engines and turn them at Torrens, and go east with the stock. They were there interfered with by quite a large crowd, who notified the employés on the trains that had come west that they must not couple to or touch the cars, intimidating them and threatening that they would be killed, or that something would happen.

Q. Who composed that crowd?

A. A number of railroad employés of our road and other roads and parties I didn't know, but supposed them to be not railroad men.

Q. Who seemed to be leading the crowd at Torrens?

A. A man who had been in our employ until the morning of Thursday—Andrew Hice. He notified the parties that he would be damned if any stock should move there, and that no train should pass there until the matter was settled.

Q. Was he an engineer?

A. He had been at one time a conductor on the road. Up until that Thursday morning he was in the employ of the company as a flagman. I might here state that when I directed Mr. Garrett to go out and see the men, he was told to notify all those employés who were called upon, and who refused to go out, that they might consider themselves as discharged. One party was paid off immediately; the others had not come for their pay, and nothing was said about paying or reporting them discharged until after the troubles were over.

Q. Did you have any conversation with those men yourself at that time?

A. Which men?

Q. With that crowd—those leaders?

A. I did have a conversation at Twenty-eighth street, before going to Torrens. I called upon the crowd to disperse and leave the ground of the company, that we proposed to move our trains, and did not desire to have any trouble.

Q. Did they make any demands at that time, and if so, what were the nature of those demands?

A. They did not. They simply said it was a question of bread or blood with them. At Torrens I had a conversation with the engineers and conductors of the trains coming west, and tried to persuade them to couple on to the stock and go ahead. They, however, refused, and gave as a reason, that they were afraid for their lives to do so. Mr. Thomas Scott, day stock agent at East Liberty, and the dispatcher both said to the crews that they would couple the cars if they would back the engines; but the crews were too much intimidated to do that. Mr. Garrett started with those engines to go east, and was to stop at Wilkensburg to take there a draft of twenty-two to thirty-two freight cars, and start for Derry with them. He and I had an understanding that I would attempt to get the stock from there somehow. I was to advise him after he left whether he might expect it. We gave it out that the stock was to be unloaded, and the shifting engine at the station, there for the purpose of shifting around the yard, backed down against the stock, and, that being coupled to the train, they started at once, and before they discovered what we were after, the train was out of reach, and this train that Mr. Garrett had taken east stopped and took on the stock at Walls. This was the last stock that we got away from East Liberty. East Liberty is four and five tenths miles, and Torrens is half a mile further east. I staid at Torrens waiting the movements of a train from Pittsburgh—the train that should come out in the afternoon. An attempt was made about four o'clock to move that train. A crowd interfered after the engines had started, and the engineers left their engines, and the crews gave up the trains. I then came back to Pittsburgh and went to the office, and made a still further report to Mr. Pitcairn. I then drove again to the mayor's office. I met Captain Bachelor at the office. He wanted to know if he could do me any service.

Q. He called in the capacity of a private citizen?

A. Yes.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Who is he?

A. The president of the Mason's bank. I found, on inquiry, that the mayor was not about when I got to his office. I was informed by his clerk, Mr. Metzgar, that he had gone out to Castle Shannon in the afternoon. That his wife was sick, and that he had gone to see her. I then asked whether anything could be done to call out the night force, fearing from the way the crowd was increasing that there might be considerable trouble. They said they could not send the police force out there and leave the balance of the city unprotected. I then drove up here to the sheriff's office—or rather the captain drove up—and found all closed here. I then drove to the sheriff's residence, on Washington street, and they replied that he was out of the city, but was expected back during the evening. I then went back to the office, and found that we could not make any movement that night, though we held the crews ready to go in case we had a chance to move.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. What night was this?

A. It was on Thursday night. I reported the condition of affairs to Mr. John Scott, who had called at the office on his way into town, in pursuance of a message from the east, to consult with Mr. Pitcairn. During that night, and before twelve o'clock, the crowd was accumulating, and had entire possession of the tracks at Twenty-eighth street, so that we were unable to move even the engines engaged in the yard transfer work. The engineers had all been notified to put up their engines, and go into the house, and the movement of stock was interfered with. The movement of stock from the western roads—some was turned back. There seemed to be some trouble among the parties themselves as to whether the stock should go on or be sent back. I called at the office of the Pennsylvania company, to get the Honorable John Scott to go with me, and we called upon the sheriff in the name of the company for protection, and stated all that had been done up to that time. The sheriff got his deputy, who lived across the way, and we all drove out to the outer depot. On the way out we saw Mr. Pitcairn walking up, and took him in and rode to the outer depot—I think a little after twelve o'clock, midnight; the sheriff, after a consultation, went with General Pearson and some twenty or thirty men of our employés, myself among the number, to Twenty-eighth street. He there mounted upon a plank leading up on to a gondola, so that his head was above the crowd, and addressed them, advising them to leave and go to their homes, stating what his duty would be in case they did not go. He was greeted with all sorts of vile abuse, and told to go home. I will not repeat the language. He found he could do nothing there with them. He was jeered at, and while he was addressing the crowd pistol shots were fired in the air. That crowd was composed of some few railroad men, but the majority were not railroad men—a great number of them were mill men, and some of them with no occupation at all.

Q. How large was the crowd at that time?

A. I should judge in the neighborhood of two hundred men. The sheriff then went back to the superintendent's office, and entered into communication with Harrisburg and other points, sending the telegrams as described by Mr. Scott. There was no other attempt made that night to move anything, except stock to the stockyard from the connecting lines.

Q. What occurred on Friday morning?

A. We had crews brought in from Derry—that is the train-masters. They came in as passengers, ready to take the trains east. The majority of the engineers, up to this time, had professed their entire willingness to run at any and all times, but the crowd, on Friday, had increased to such an extent that it was not deemed prudent to attempt to start the trains without some protection afforded to the men running them, at least through the crowd. Very little was done during Friday, except the movement of stock. Friday night the troops were moved, the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments, I believe, to the neighborhood of Twenty-eighth street. I expected on Saturday morning that we would start our trains without much trouble. I believe they took almost complete and entire possession of Twenty-eighth street and the switches that we needed to get our trains out.

Q. That is the troops took possession?

A. Yes; they had full possession of Twenty-eighth street on Saturday morning.

Q. And all the switches you needed to get your trains out?

A. Yes. But the crowd assembled in very large numbers, and it was not long before the crowd had possession of them, and all the ground.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Driving the troops off?

A. There was no conflict at all. The troops were stationed, one regiment on the hillside, probably some two hundred feet back from the line of the railroad, with their arms stacked, and another regiment was stationed on the road leading up to the hospital grounds, east of Twenty-eighth street, with their arms stacked, and a few men were on the crossing.

By Mr. Means:

Q. I want to know if those troops left their arms stacked while the crowd was still accumulating?

A. The crowd was in and about there. Do you mean whether or not the crowd could have taken possession of any of those arms without interference?

Q. No; but whether while the crowd was still accumulating the troops had their arms stacked?

A. The crowd was accumulating, and continued accumulating up to the time of the firing.

Q. And the arms were still stacked?

A. Yes, sir; while I was there.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. That is Friday evening?

A. No; Saturday morning. Mr. Pitcairn, and Mr. Cassett, and General Pearson, and other officers were at the Union depot. I remained at Twenty-sixth street, awaiting any instruction that might be sent me. I was advised by Mr. Pitcairn to hold myself in readiness to move some trains on Saturday afternoon—that the sheriff and posse were coming up the track, and that they would be followed by the troops, and that he expected that the crowd would be dispersed, and that we would be furnished a sufficient guard to place upon each one of those trains to move them out beyond Torrens, or to any other point where we might expect trouble. I waited, and met them as they came up. They were followed by quite a large concourse of persons. The troops held the track about opposite Twenty-fifth street, and there the Second brigade of the Philadelphia troops was left. I do not now remember the name of the general in command. However I was left with him. The First brigade moved on to Twenty-eighth street. This Second brigade threw out a skirmish line across the entire yard, with instructions from the general to drive back everybody. It was General Loud. He threw out a skirmish line and drove all parties west a sufficient distance for us to couple together all our cars and to make up our trains to go out.

Q. Drove them towards the city, you mean?

A. Yes; quite a crowd of the transfer clerks, and some of our engineers, and oil men, and repair men were on the tops of the cars, who claimed to be employés, and had business there. General Loud sent an officer to me and asked if they were to remain there or whether we wanted them. I told him that we did not want anybody within a certain distance. When we had made attempts, prior to that, to couple up the trains, the links and pins all along had been taken out. I went down and advised the transfer clerks to go into the office, and I told the officer that when any of our men had business to be inside, they should be let through, and I told them that if we wanted them we could advise them. After having cleared off that space, we heard firing. I looked up in the direction of Twenty-eighth street, and saw a crowd coming down, a portion of them coming down towards where I was, right opposite the mouth of Twenty-sixth street. Seeing the crowd coming, I had the gate thrown open—the gate that closes the shops and the exit gate on Liberty street thrown open—and directed colonel, some one of the Greys, to throw a body across to prevent them going down the space he had cleared, and that we could turn them out at that point out on Twenty-sixth street. That firing occurred about five o'clock. When I speak of time in my testimony, I speak altogether of railroad time. There was no further attempt made that night to start trains. The excitement was so great, and it was quite late, so the men refused to go for fear of being thrown off the track at some point on the road. I believe that brings me up to the time of the firing.

Q. You had a space sufficient cleared to enable you to get your cars out?

A. Our engines were backed down from the round-house on to those tracks that the trains were standing on. We had cleared off a space there from the side hill to the line of the "transfer" clear of anyone and everyone.

Q. What prevented you from moving out your trains at that time?

A. The men got frightened at the firing, and started off. They were afraid that if they made an attempt at that time in that excitement that they would be thrown from the track.

Q. Where were the militia then?

A. General Loud was still in his position between Twenty-sixth street, and, I should judge, Twenty-fourth. The First division was at Twenty-eighth street, and a considerable portion of the crowd was between Twenty-sixth and Twenty-eighth streets, between the two bodies of troops. I asked the colonel in charge of this Grey regiment not to allow his men to fire on the crowd coming down, that they could be turned out at Twenty-sixth street, and that some of our men were there who were all right. He got in front of his men and cautioned them. He first gave the command to a captain to have his men load their pieces. That was done, and then he cautioned his men, saying it was a very delicate matter, indeed, and that the men should be very careful, and that when there was any necessity for any firing that the men must remember that he would give the command.

Q. How long did the troops remain stationed as you have described?

A. I cannot answer that as to time. I went to the office and there saw General Pearson and General Brinton, and some of the others in consultation. They were all close around the shops, and they then turned and moved into the shops. I suppose it was then about six o'clock.

Q. Where did the troops stay during the night?

A. I was not there during the night.

Q. Do you know from your own knowledge?

A. They stayed in what we call the lower round-house and lock-shops.

Q. What troops stayed there?

A. I understand the Philadelphia troops, General Brinton's command, and the two pieces belonging to the battery here were taken into the round-house. The Fourteenth regiment had been stationed at the transfer building. The reason, I think, for their going into the shops, as I understood it, was that the men who were there had come without any preparation, and as there were to be no trains run out that night, they would go into the shops to be as comfortable as possible.

Q. Was any further effort made during that night to start any trains?

A. We were unable to make any efforts further.

Q. Can you tell us what became of the crowd during the night?

A. The crowd around the buildings accumulated so that in front of the office, at the corner of Twenty-sixth and Liberty, and for some distance on either side of it—that being the head-quarters—the office—they had taken possession of Mr. Pitcairn's office for the head-quarters—the crowd was very dense, and packed down Twenty-sixth street, probably half way to Penn, and on Liberty street, in every direction, for a square—an immense crowd of people yelling with rage against the troops.

Q. How many would you judge were there at that time?

A. Not less than five thousand people.

Q. Did they remain in force during all the night?

A. I was not there during all the time, but I understood they were constantly accumulating.

Q. Until Sunday morning?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How large was the crowd on Sunday morning?

A. I cannot answer that. I was on the side hill early on Sunday morning, and I could see immense crowds in all directions moving up Liberty street.

Q. Can you tell us what the result of that firing, at the point cleared, was as to loss of life?

A. I am not prepared to answer that. If you will remember, I was stationed at Twenty-sixth street, and was not at Twenty-eighth street. At the time of the firing, I was with the second brigade of General Brinton's division. There passed me, and were taken into our office, several soldiers belonging to the First regiment, and a boy who was shot down. I should judge a boy about twelve or fourteen years of age. There were two men carrying him. Quite a number of wounded soldiers were taken to the office, and they sent for Doctor Hamilton.

Q. Can you state what efforts were made, after the troops were taken into the round-house and the shops, by the officers of the militia to drive back the crowd and disperse it there that night or Sunday morning, or during the day of Sunday?

A. When they went into the round-house, I understood they would keep under cover. I do not think, from all I understood, it was the intention of the troops to come into any collision. They felt that they were brought there to protect the movement of trains, and that there would be a guard go out on each train, after having obtained possession of the Twenty-eighth street switches.

Q. What time did the firing of cars commence by the mob?

A. I cannot answer that from my own knowledge. I believe in the neighborhood of ten o'clock.

Q. Saturday night?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was any attempt made by the officers of the troops, or by the civil authorities, either of the county or city, to prevent that, and to drive back the crowd when they began to fire the cars and destroy property?

A. I cannot answer that. I did not see any.

Q. By any of the authorities?

A. I did not see any.

By Mr. Engelbert:

Q. Did it appear that the citizens were in sympathy with the strikers?

A. I am a Pittsburgher.

Q. But I ask were the citizens in sympathy with the strikers?

By Senator Yutzy: I think, Mr. Chairman, that that question ought to be modified. All the citizens were not present.

By the witness:

A. If you asked me the question whether or not the citizens, or any number of them, came to me and offered their assistance, then I might answer the question. The crowd certainly manifested no disposition to assist in the running of trains. The crowd, of course, was in sympathy. I speak of those who were present at Twenty-eighth street and Twenty-sixth street, on Liberty street, fronting the office, and I should say there were none at all in sympathy with the railroad company, but the soldiers.

By Mr. Engelbert:

Q. But that does not answer my question. I desire to know whether the citizens were not in sympathy with the strikers?

By Senator Yutzy: I repeat, Mr. Chairman, that I do not think this question should be put to the witness. I move that the committee retire for a few moments' consultation.

This motion being agreed to, the committee retired.

Upon returning, the chairman of the committee announced to the witness that the question would not be pressed for the present.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. What time did the first firing occur?

A. In the neighborhood of five o'clock. It was, probably, a few minutes after five o'clock.

Q. But when did the first firing occur—that is, when was the fire first kindled by the mob?

A. In the neighborhood of ten o'clock.

Q. Was any effort made by the railroad company, during the night, to prevent the firing and destruction of property?

A. I would hardly know how to answer that. The railroad employés that we had considered loyal and ready to run, when we desired them to go on the trains, had gone to their homes, it not being deemed prudent to run any trains that night. I left the outer depot in the neighborhood of seven o'clock, to go down to the Union depot for supper, and to arrange for the sending of supper for General Pearson's staff, and General Brinton's staff, and all his brigade generals' staff. I went to the Union depot with Mr. Pitcairn and Mr. Cassatt, and, I think, Colonel Smith, on engine forty-five. At that time the military were in possession of the shops and round-house, and I did not anticipate that anything would be done until daylight. The firing of the cars was, I understand, up at Lawrenceville, or just within sight of there, and the cars were dropped down, and the switches so turned that they would run towards the round-house—the burning cars, these, of course, would communicate to other cars.

Q. Would the cars run themselves?

A. It is down grade from East Liberty to Lawrenceville, and there a moderate down grade until about Twenty-sixth street, where there is a short level space, probably, two or three squares, and then there is an up grade west of that point until you reach about opposite St. Bridget's church, where again it is down grade, so that a car started from the east would run towards the round-house, and a car started from the west end of the yard would run toward the round-house.

Q. Do you know how long the troops remained in the round-house?

A. I understand they left between five and six o'clock that morning.

Q. Sunday morning?

A. Yes.

Q. You were not present there?

A. No.

Q. You do not know what occurred from your own knowledge?

A. Except from what I saw from the hillside.

Q. You were present during the day—Sunday?

A. No.

Q. Were you where you could see the movement of the rioters?

A. Not after four o'clock, Sunday morning.

Q. How long did the riotous proceedings continue—in other words, when did the mob disperse and cease their burning and destruction of property?

A. I left town on Sunday night at nine o'clock, and I understand they were still riotous. Of my own knowledge I know nothing after that time. Our head-quarters were at Blairsville intersection.

Q. When did you first get control of your road and property at this point?

A. Mr. Pitcairn came west from Blairsville intersection on Wednesday, July 25, I think on the Johnstown accommodation. We were then running our through connections over the West Penn Division, from Allegheny city to Blairsville intersection, and on the main line as far as East Liberty, our mail trains, and our passenger trains, and our Uniontown express over the south-west road.

Q. Were you present when the troops fired upon the crowd? If so, state all the circumstances that took place at that time?

A. I have already said that I was not at Twenty-eighth street at the time of the firing, but was with General Loud at Twenty-sixth street.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. You know nothing then as to what transpired at Twenty-eighth street?

A. Except by seeing the crowd running, and hearing the firing, which was of an irregular character—not a volley at all.

By Mr. Means:

Q. The firing was something like the firing of a skirmish line?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Who composed the crowd at that time? Were they railroad employés or stragglers in general, or were there any other persons in the vicinity mixed with the crowd to any extent?

A. There was quite a very large number of lookers on, stationed on the hill side above—men, women, and children, scattered all along, probably for a distance of fifty thousand feet.

Q. How close were they to the persons carrying on the riot?

A. Probably from a hundred to two hundred and fifty feet above them. And at Twenty-eighth street, and east and west of Twenty-eighth street, and covering all of the tracks before the troops came up, there were many people. All our trains passing—we were running all the accommodation trains east and west—were boarded at Twenty-eighth street by the crowd, who filled them up, and ran through the cars, and piled upon the engines, so as to seriously interfere with the men in the performance of their duties. The crowd, many through curiosity, went upon the trains in such force that it was useless for any of our men to attempt to collect fare. The engines were perfectly black, both in front of the engine and the tank and the platform. A great number of those men got on and would go through the trains to see who was in them, before they would let them proceed.

Q. Were the passenger trains interfered with by the mob?

A. All were stopped at Twenty-eighth street, and the mob went through and examined each and every train for soldiers.

Q. And then allowed them to go on?

A. Sometimes it was a very serious question. If we had not had some engineers determined that they were going to try to get their trains through, they would have cut the passenger trains off and allowed nothing but mail cars to go.

By Mr. Means:

Q. On the 23d of July, did the sheriff not throw a guard around the burned district?

A. I was stationed then at Blairsville Intersection, and I cannot answer that question of my own knowledge.

Q. Then you do not know whether on or after the 23d day of July the railroad company could or could not have had entire control, if they had seen fit?

A. Most decidedly they could not, simply for the fact that they could not get beyond Lawrenceville station.

Q. But did not the sheriff throw a guard around the burned district?

A. I don't know. I was not in the city on the 23d of July. But the tracks were all burned between Thirty-third street, or Lawrenceville, and the Union depot.

Orphans' Court Room,
Pittsburgh, Friday, February 8, 1878.

MORNING SESSION.

Pursuant to adjournment, the committee re-assembled at ten o'clock, A.M., this day, and continued the taking of testimony.

The first witness examined was:

Norman M. Smith, sworn with the uplifted hand:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State where you reside and what your official connection with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company is?

A. I reside in the Twenty-second ward of Pittsburgh. I am manager of the Pittsburgh transfer station.

Q. How long have you filled that position?

A. About twelve and a half years.

Q. State to the committee, in your own way, what the causes were that led to the riot, or what the disagreements were between the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and their employés, and give the history of what you saw.

A. My position was not such that I can speak from personal observation as to the causes. Of course, I understood them to be the ten per cent. reduction, which had taken place on the 1st of June, and after that the increased running of double-headers on freight trains. I understood these to be the causes. My more immediate connection with the trouble commenced on the morning of Thursday, July 19. About nine o'clock that morning my foreman came to me, and informed me that there was difficulty in getting out our east bound freights—that the train men had refused to go out, unless the trains stopped running as double-headers. I went from my office up to the outer depot, and there found that the crews had refused to run. Shortly after that I met Mr. Garrett, the assistant train master, and Mr. McCabe, the general dispatcher, and they informed me that they were going to the transfer station to detail our yard crews to run along the road. I remained there long enough to see one of the crews arrive. They came and attempted to couple a caboose car on one of the engines. A brakeman by the name of Gerry was making the coupling, when he was attacked by a number of train men, and driven away with a shower of stones, and links, and coupling-pins. I saw him struck. A further effort to remove the train was not made. About a quarter before twelve, I walked up to the outer depot again, and just at that moment a car came up with some ten or a dozen policemen. I then met Mr. Watt, and walked with him and the policemen up to Twenty-eighth street. A yard engine was standing on the switch there, and an attempt was made to get it out. Mr. Watt instructed a conductor named Moore to turn the switch, in order to let the engine out. Moore declined to do it, giving as his reason that he had been threatened with violence if he did so. Mr. Watt then made the attempt to turn the switch himself. Just at that moment, a man standing there raised his hand, perhaps with his hat in it, and said: "Come on, boys, we will die right here." Mr. Watt directed an officer to arrest him, and at that moment he was struck, by a man named McCullough, in the eye. The policemen made a rush on McCullough, and, after being interfered with by his friends, he was arrested. Mr. Watt then requested me to go to the telegraph office, and telegraph to Mayor McCarthy for fifty additional policemen. I sent a message, as near as I recollect, in these words: "Please send fifty additional policemen at once," and signed Mr. Watt's name to it. That message went a quarter before one, Philadelphia time. I then returned to Twenty-eighth street, and remained there perhaps two hours, and then returned to my office about three o'clock, and then returned to the outer depot. An additional police force of perhaps five or six men had responded to the call for fifty. A train was made up, two engines were attached to it, and it was ready to move. When the order was given to go ahead, a number of strikers got in front, and signaled it to stop, when it commenced moving. One of the engineers whistled down brakes, and the train stopped. There was some wrangling there, and the engineer of the forward engine, a man named Woodward, got off the engine, and was immediately greeted with cheers by the crowd, and made a hero of. I had an engagement at the house then, and left. I did not return until the next morning. The next morning I found the crowd still at Twenty-eighth street, and the condition of the yard the same as the night before. No trains had been moved. About eleven o'clock, a committee of employés at the transfer station came to the office, and informed us that they intended to strike, unless the ten per cent. was restored. We told them we could only submit their demand to those in authority over us, that we had no function in the matter at all. The committee retired to discuss the matter with their fellow workmen. About twelve o'clock, perhaps a little before, a committee from the strikers—a committee of brakemen, I am told—I was not present at the time—came to the men, and made a speech to them, and told them if they would strike, they would protect them, and guarantee places after the strike was over. A majority of our men then went with this committee that came down in the direction of Twenty-eighth street. I remained on the platform, and saw such of the men as I could, and I found those I talked with were opposed to striking, and ready to go to work; and one by one the men who had gone off with the committee returned, or a number of them. These men said they were led into the thing against their wishes and judgment, and that they were ready to work. Of course, they did not like the reduction, but they must work if they could get it. I told them to leave their names with the foreman, directed him to take them, and told them as soon as they had given their names to return to their homes, and that as soon as we wanted them we would send for them. Our work, of course, had stopped with the stopping of the trains. I remained about the office until four o'clock in the afternoon, and then went to the Union depot. I there met Mr. Pitcairn, and he requested me to remain with him. Shortly after my arrival there, I found that a section of artillery and a portion of the Nineteenth regiment had reported for duty. The Eighteenth regiment, under Colonel Guthrie, I had seen going east on a passenger train, about noon, on the way, I ascertained, to Torrens station. Breck's two guns and the Nineteenth regiment were ready for orders. We started out Liberty street. After we had gone a square or so, we halted, and I heard Senator Scott, and Mr. Thaw, and Mr. Cassatt, and Mr. Pitcairn, and General Pearson in consultation. Certain of these gentlemen deprecated the movement of the troops at that time, thinking that the number was not sufficient to meet the strikers then at Twenty-eighth street, and fearing a precipitation of the conflict. After this consultation, those troops were recalled, and brought on to the platform of the Union depot. A number of us, Mr. Pitcairn, Mr. Cassatt, General Pearson, Mr. Watt, and myself, and, perhaps, others, I do not recollect now, discussed the matter there, and General Pearson said that he would await the arrival of the Fourteenth regiment. When that came, probably about nine o'clock, on Friday the 20th, he proposed moving out the tracks to Twenty-eighth street, and hauling his guns after him. I objected to the movement, and was asked the reasons for my objection. I stated them to be, that I thought that at eight or nine o'clock that night the crowd would be very large, and that the movement would be a mistake. I suggested, instead of that movement, to wait until about three o'clock in the morning, when the crowd would be at a minimum, and then move out Bedford avenue with the Fourteenth regiment, and so give time for the Nineteenth regiment to arrive by the time the ground was cleared by the Fourteenth. Then, if the crowd did not go away, to drive them away, and occupy the hill and crossing, and keep them clear. Then, I thought, we could start the trains. After considerable discussion, that plan was adopted. I remained at the Union depot, and met Adjutant General Latta when he arrived.

Q. What time did he arrive?

A. On the fast line, that came in about twelve o'clock Friday night—may be a few minutes later. General Latta was advised of the proposed movement, and was particular in his inquiries in regard to it. He first hesitated in authorizing it, fearing a precipitation of the conflict. We argued that the probability of a conflict would be avoided by making that movement; that perhaps there would only be a couple of hundred men there and that we could occupy the place without difficulty, and once in control could keep it without further trouble. After the facts were presented, he declined to interfere with General Pearson's arrangement. About two o'clock, the Fourteenth regiment was ordered to return to the city, with the understanding that as soon as they got to a certain point they were to turn and go out Bedford avenue. Before this, however, I was directed to arrange to have two gondola cars to mount the guns on, and to have two engines to push them up. I was to man them and run them up on parallel tracks, with the Nineteenth regiment supporting them. I went to the depot master, and requested him to get the gondolas, and asked him how many engines he had. He replied that he had one yard shifter. I told him to order out two engines for the Pacific express, and told him I had authority from Mr. Pitcairn to give the order. The engines were ordered out, but the mob refused to allow but one to go. The Fourteenth regiment had started out Bedford avenue. After my return, I started out the track, and went up through the ravine there west of Twenty-eighth street, overlooking the location of the mob, then I passed the Pest house and met the Fourteenth regiment on Bedford avenue, and turned them through the ravine east of the Pest house, explaining the topography of the hill to the commanding officer, telling him how to deploy his regiment. We then moved forward in regimental front. We started a few people on the hill, and they ran down the track. Just as we got to the lower bench of the hill the battery and the Nineteenth regiment arrived on the ground. The crossing was occupied and cleared. We then returned to the Union depot to prepare some provision for the troops. About seven o'clock we started out, Mr. Pitcairn, General Pearson, myself, and others. At Twenty-eighth street we halted, and I called General Pearson's attention to the hill, and the general location. We had some consultation about it, and General Pearson admitted that it was a position to be occupied and held. He then went to the other side of the tank of the engine, and directed somebody to hold the hill and allow nobody to go on it, and to keep the crossings clear, and to allow nobody to come on them. We then went on to Torren's station, to Colonel Guthrie's camp. He gave his orders, and he then said he would return to the city and await the arrival of the Philadelphia troops. The first detachment arrived at one o'clock, and the second about half past two o'clock. They were given a lunch there, and at about four o'clock, perhaps a little after, we started out the tracks. Sheriff Fife, with a posse of perhaps twelve or fifteen men, marched ahead of the column some distance, with warrants for the arrest of certain parties who were supposed to be ringleaders, and Mr. Pitcairn and myself accompanied the sheriff to point out these men. When we came opposite the transfer station, I pointed out a couple of avenues leading in from Liberty street, and said it might be well to guard them, and we made a detail to guard that place. The rest of the column then moved on. We saw, directly, that the hill side, instead of being kept clear was covered with people, and also the crossings. The troops marched up with the First regiment—I think the regiment of Colonel Benson—in advance, and on Twenty-eighth street came into line. Colonel Benson then formed two sides of a square, making the north and south sides of the square, and two companies came up in company front and formed the first side of the square, facing east. The Gatling guns took position in the rear of the east side of the square. Before this square had been formed, Mr. Pitcairn and myself went with the sheriff among the crowd, but were unable to find the parties for whom the sheriff held warrants. We had some discussion there with the strikers, and General Pearson, I observed, passed us going up the hill where the Pittsburgh troops seemed to have been formed. After the square had been formed, we gave up our discussion with those people, and Mr. Pitcairn and myself sat down on some plank about the center of the square. General Pearson passed us and made some remarks. I forget his words. He referred to the thing looking serious, that more troops should be had, and said he was going to telegraph General Latta, and left us, starting in the direction of the telegraph office.

Q. What time was that?

A. That was about five o'clock. Mr. Pitcairn and myself were chatting together about the situation, when my attention was called to an attempt made by the company that formed the east side of the square to press the crowd back. They formed with arms across, and tried to push the crowd back, but the mob grasped the muskets of some of them. The troops found they could not make any impression, and then the order was given to charge bayonets.

Q. Who gave that order?

A. I do not know. I simply heard the order given. The troops came to a charge bayonets on the mob. Then I recollect seeing one man—one of the mob with a musket in one hand draw a pistol with the other, and fire, and I saw a man fall—whether he was dodging only or whether he was struck, I do not know. At the same moment one or two other pistol shots were fired, and then a volley of stones and pieces of clinker came from the hill on the sides of the square. A number of the troops were struck down. Several of them fell within two or three feet of me. Then one or two shots were fired from the muskets, and others followed, and a fusillade was kept up for a couple of minutes. Mr. Pitcairn and myself were still sitting there, and I said to him it would be prudent to lie down. We kept close for a moment or two, and as soon as the crowd broke we walked to the north side of the square, and I told a lieutenant there, who was in command of a company, perhaps, that he had better make a right wheel, and drive some people out who had got behind a gondola car loaded with coal there. I believe he acted on my suggestion. At the first firing the crowd had broken and run in every direction. Mr. Pitcairn and myself then returned to his office. There I found General Pearson, and I judged, by his surprise, that I gave him the first intimation he had of the firing. Shortly after Mr. Cassatt came into the room. A few minutes after a gentleman on General Brinton's staff. I think Colonel Wilson came in. He was directed to tell General Brinton to report. General Brinton reported, and, after some consultation, General Brinton suggested a move into the round-house. I think I objected, but to no avail, because, as he said, the mob was driven away and he could go into the round-house and get shelter for his men and give them some rest, and that he could protect the property of the company in case of an attack just as well from the round-house as from the position he then occupied. I said to Mr. Pitcairn that I thought it was a great mistake—that the hill should be occupied; but General Brinton and General Pearson, of course, were the military officers who were in charge of the situation, and for the time the railroad officers had relinquished all control. We remained there some time, and the question of supplies came up—of provision for those men—and Mr. Pitcairn, Mr. Watt, Mr. Cassatt, and myself got on an engine and went to the Union depot, and gave orders for provisions. Those provisions were loaded up and started to the outer depot, and I afterwards understood were captured by the mob. We remained at the Union depot that evening. About ten o'clock a person came and told me I had better leave. I asked for his reason, and he said that the mob were then at Saint Fulvia's church, at Fourteenth and Liberty streets, on their way to the Union depot, and said they were going to hang Mr. Cassatt, Mr. Pitcairn, Mr. Watt, and me. I did not place much reliance on the report, but it was afterwards verified that the mob was there and moving down in that direction. The other three gentlemen went away. I was in a different part of the hotel at the time, and remained there some time, but several friends came to me and urged me to leave. I went out through the front door of the depot, and when I got near the elevator, true enough the mob did come, but I do not know what for. I then got into a carriage and drove to my house.

Q. What time was that?

A. About a quarter after ten o'clock on Saturday night. I locate the time from the fact that after I got to my home, I threw myself on the bed, and my wife came to me and said the fire alarm was striking from box sixty-four. I said it was the outer depot, and it would be a big fire in a few minutes, but I did not want to be disturbed. I looked at my watch, and it was a quarter to eleven. Shortly afterward I was again awakened to come and look at the fire. I saw at once that it was the oil cars. I slept a few minutes, and then went to the stock yards. At Torrens station I met Colonel Guthrie, and there we chatted a while, and then I returned to the city. Probably about seven or eight o'clock, I am not sure about the hour, in walking up the track, I met some of our clerks, and they told me that my office was on fire, and that everything was burned, and there was no use to go up. I went up far enough to see the fire there, which was then extending, and I went then to the west end of the Union depot in the endeavor to get a few men together to throw some cars off the track to block it. I feared they would set fire to cars, and run them down the track to burn the depot. I got a number of men together and left them in charge of it. They succeeded afterwards in throwing some cars off, and blocking all the tracks but two. The reason of my leaving was, that I recollected that the night before, Saturday night, I had been requested by General Latta to remove a lot of ammunition which had been stored in the store-room at the east end of the Union depot—some twenty or thirty thousand rounds, perhaps more. I had gone there the evening before with a few gentlemen, and loaded this ammunition up on baggage hoppers, and stored it away in the cellar. I thought of the ammunition, and knew it was important to be saved. I left the parties at the cars and went to General Latta, and asked if any arrangement had been made to get the ammunition out. He said, "yes," that he had requested Captain Breck to attend to it, and that he was then at it, but he asked me to go and see if I could render him any assistance. I went to Captain Breck, and found he was making some effort in that direction. I offered him my services, but he said that he had all the assistance that he required, except that he had no wagon. I then went to a livery stable right opposite the depot and got a large express wagon and had it brought over, and Captain Breck said he had ample assistance to load the ammunition up and get it out. Shortly after I went to the Monongahela house, to which General Latta's head-quarter's had been removed.

Q. Was that ammunition for the troops?

A. It had been brought out with General Brinton's command.

Q. What time did it arrive?

A. It arrived with the troops that came on Saturday afternoon. It remained in the store-room, into which they put it first, until nine o'clock Saturday night, when those gentlemen and myself loaded it up and took it down into the cellar of the hotel. I went to the Monongahela house. I was anxious to see Mr. Cassatt and Mr. Pitcairn. I found Mr. Cassatt there. Previous to this, information had been received of General Brinton's retiring—that he had gone east, and then we heard he was in the Allegheny cemetery. The question of provisions was uppermost in the mind of everybody for those men, and orders were sent to Allegheny for the different bakers to prepare sandwiches, and get all the provisions ready they could. Mr. Scott, the stock agent at East Liberty, came to the hotel about noon, and said that Colonel Guthrie was anxious about ammunition—that he had but little, and had divided what he had with the Philadelphia troops stopped at Wall's station. I wrote out an order on Captain Breck to give to Mr. Scott what ammunition he wanted, and took it to General Latta, who signed it. I knew Colonel Guthrie's position in regard to ammunition, and in about a quarter of an hour I followed Mr. Scott to the Union depot. I found him, and he said that the party with whom he had come in the buggy to get this ammunition had become demoralized and left, at any rate he could not get the ammunition. I think that was the reason he gave. I walked through the depot, and went to the place where the ammunition was stored, and I found it all remaining there; none of it was removed. I walked on the platform, and found the upper end on fire. I came down and walked through the lower part of the depot, and then up stairs through the hotel. I saw very few people—scarcely anybody. I then returned through the crowd, who were dragging every sort of property away from the robbed cars—got through them, and returned to the Monongahela house. General Latta then expressed an anxiety to form a junction between those troops at Wall's station and General Brinton's command, since ascertained to be in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, and expressed an additional anxiety in regard to the question of provisions. After consultation, I volunteered to do what I could to effect a junction between the two commands. Colonel Guthrie had returned from Torrens station, in citizens dress, to consult with General Latta, as he was unable to make any communication with him because the wires were burned. It was decided that I should take a buggy and communicate between those two detachments, and make what effort I could to get provisions. Mr. Cassatt was to take the north side of the river with a provision wagon, and get through the best he could, and I was to take the south side of the river and get through the best I could. I was to remain at General Brinton's camp until I heard from Mr. Cassatt. An order was also given to Colonel Guthrie to bring his regiment from Torrens station into the city. They thought, perhaps, that that regiment could stop the further burning. That regiment had remained solid and intact through the whole trouble.

Q. What time were these orders given?

A. About three o'clock on Sunday afternoon. I drove, then, first out to Torrens, and left Major Sellers there, and returned to my house, and changed my clothes, and then started for General Brinton's camp. I went across the Sharpsburg bridge, and then returned and took the river road. Being unacquainted with the location of General Brinton's command, I stopped at a hotel on the road, and endeavored to make some inquiries. I was not interfered with. In consequence of some replies I got, I went on to Aetna, and there ascertained the exact locality of General Brinton, and met Mr. Campbell Herron, of the firm of Spang, Chalfant, & Co., of the large works there. I explained to him the state of the troops in regard to food, and asked if he could help me. He sent for his manager, and directed that everything in the company's store should be turned over to my order. I arranged with the manager that provisions should be loaded up as soon as it was dark, and hauled out to the camp. I then went on to Claremont, and found General Brinton in camp at that point. I told General Brinton that I had orders from General Latta to effect a junction, if possible, between his command and the detachment of his division at Wall's station, under the command of Colonel Rogers. After talking the matter over, we concluded we had best bring them across from Walls, by the way of the Fairview ferry. General Brinton was to take a detachment at daylight to the ferry, and seize the boat, and hold it until we appeared on the opposite bank. I waited there, awaiting word from Mr. Cassatt. At ten o'clock a citizen of Allegheny came from Walls with word for me from Mr. Cassatt. I then started for Walls Station, distant some eighteen miles from that point. I returned by way of Sharpsburg bridge. I lost my way and got in Barren valley, but finally got on the right road again, and reached Walls station about two o'clock in the morning. I found some men there, and supposed it was a picket post of the troops, but found instead it was some men there, who, I suppose, were railroad men or miners. After some parleying with them, they permitted me to go to the house of one of the passenger conductors of the road, and from him I ascertained that the troops had gone to Blairsville. While talking to them, this party had taken my horse and buggy, but after some difficulty I got it back again, and returned to Claremont, and got there about six and a half o'clock, in the morning. I then found that the First brigade of General Brinton's division was loaded on cars, and was just then pulling out on the way to Blairsville. They had been instructed during my absence to report there. I remained until they were all loaded up, and then returned to my home, changed my clothes, and returned to the city. On my arrival at home, I was told that my neighbors had held a meeting, and had organized a vigilance committee, and placed me in command, and I spent the day in obtaining arms and ammunition for the committee. I remained on duty with that committee for the next week, patrolling the streets—twenty miles of streets. On Friday morning or Saturday, about sun rise, I was on the picket post at Torrens station, and there met Governor Hartranft and the troops returning to Pittsburgh. I remained on duty with my patrol. The next Sunday morning I was sent for by Mr. Pitcairn. He told me that he expected to commence moving trains that day, and wanted me to get ready. I got a force of clerks together, and we commenced starting trains, and in a few weeks things resumed there normal condition.

Q. Did you endeavour to ascertain whether the outbreak on Thursday was the result of a pre-arranged plan among the railroad employés or not?

A. I made no effort to ascertain that. From observation, I think there was a plan in course of arrangement, but I think the execution of it was premature on their part. I believe they did not strike here intentionally, but that it was precipitated by the crews that first refused to go that morning.

Q. What facts have led you to that conclusions?

A. I know from newspaper reports, and from rumors among the employés, that they were organizing a union of some description, to oppose this reduction. I simply have it from general rumor—from report.

Q. Have you ever succeeded in getting anything from the employés themselves—any statement from them that would lead you to that conclusion?

A. Nothing that I can re-call. I have heard them talking among themselves, saying that they would be organized by and by—some passing remark of that description, but nothing very tangible.

Q. Did this commence prior to the issuing of the order to run double-headers?

A. My impression is that it was started with the reduction in pay—the order for it. The order for double-headers affected only the Pennsylvania railroad, but, that for the reduction in pay was general—affecting all the roads.

Q. Have you succeeded in gathering any facts from the men, or from any reliable source, to show whether or not there was any understanding among the men on Thursday morning, in relation to a general strike?

A. I have not, but from my observation, I should think the thing was not understood at all. It was started by one crew and the others gradually came in.

Q. Can you give us the names of the parties for whom the warrants were issued?

A. I cannot now. It is a matter of record in this court-house. I think they were bench warrants.

Q. What reply did the mayor make to the telegram that was sent calling for fifty more policemen?

A. I do not know of a reply of any description. If there had been any reply made it would have come to Mr. Watts. I signed his name.

Q. Explain to us the condition of the crowd at three o'clock on Sunday afternoon, when the orders were given to form this junction between Brinton's men and Colonel Roger's men—the crowd about the depot, and from that point out to Lawrenceville?

A. I went out on this side of the city. I did not pass up the railroad. At the Union depot, when I was there, there was a crowd of half drunken men and women dragging and hauling away every sort of plunder they could lay their hands on. I saw nobody that claims respectability among the crowd committing any depredation. Of course there were some lookers on.

Q. Was the riot still progressing—was the plundering and burning still going on?

A. It was at its heights. The fire was then at the east end of the shed, at the Union depot, and by the time I crossed the Ewalt street bridge I looked back and saw the elevator in flames. After that it burned all the way down to Seventh avenue. They were still burning and destroying property and carrying things away.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. What kind of property?

A. For instance, I saw a woman dragging a sack of salt, another woman a bag of flour in a wheelbarrow, and a great many others carrying leaf tobacco, and some rolling tierces of lard—railroad goods in general—the products of the west going east.

Q. Was it all railroad property?

A. Yes.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Freight?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Can you tell us whether, at that time, there was any reason to apprehend further destruction of property, not only of the railroad company, but of the city itself?

A. There were certainly such reasons. It looked then as if half the city would be burned.

Q. State whether or not you recognized any of the train men among the crowd assembled at Twenty-eighth street?

A. At what time?

Q. On Saturday, I refer to particularly, but at any time during the progress of the riot?

A. I know of but one man thus far that I have been able to recognize, and I know their faces. For instance, I can generally tell an employé of the road here—in a great many cases. But I do not know them all by name. There are one or two now under indictment that I have not seen since the riot. I expect to recognize one when I am called on to give my testimony.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Do you know of any requisition being made on the mayor of Pittsburgh or the sheriff of the county for a force to protect the company's property prior to the arrival of the military, and if so, did either of them respond to the call made?

A. The only requisition that I know of, to my personal knowledge, was the telegram that I sent myself, that I spoke of before, in which I requested the mayor, in Mr. Watt's name, to send fifty additional policemen at once. From the number of policemen we had that afternoon, I should judge that perhaps eight or ten came. I know of no other requisition of my own knowledge.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You know of no requisition being made on the sheriff, of your own personal knowledge?

A. I do not.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. How large was the vigilance committee that was organized—that you were at the head of?

A. There were a number of them. Mine was only one of the number. I had, I should judge, over a hundred men immediately under my command. Some were armed with their own arms.