Harrisburg, Monday, March, 11, 1878.

The committee met pursuant to adjournment, in Senate committee room, No. 6, at four o'clock in the afternoon.

All members present, except Messrs. Means, Torbert, Dewees, and Larrabee.

Chester N. Farr, recalled:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Is this the first dispatch you received? [Indicating.]

A. That is the first dispatch I received. I received that after supper, Thursday night, the 19th.

Q. After supper, about what hour?

A. About nine o'clock. It was shortly after, and little before the train left.

Q. Dated received 9.16.

A. It was about that time. The dispatch was as follows:

Then after I got up here, about one or two o'clock, I received one from Sheriff Fife. That I have not been able to find; but that I answered.

Q. You have not been able to find the dispatch you received from the sheriff?

A. No, sir, I think not. But I can get a copy of it here at the office, if you would like it.

Q. Can you give pretty nearly the contents of it?

A. No, sir; it was a short dispatch, simply asking me if anything was being done.

Q. Is it published in the Adjutant General's report?

A. No, sir; I think not. I have not got it here. I am sorry, I looked over all that I had, but I couldn't find it.

Q. I wish you would state now your knowledge of the disturbance at Reading—any facts that are within your own knowledge, and that you have obtained through an official capacity?

A. I know nothing about the disturbance of my own personal knowledge, except from hearsay after I got there. I got there on Tuesday afternoon—Tuesday evening, I think.

Q. What date?

A. It was the 24th. When we came down from Harrisburg on Tuesday afternoon, we got here just in time for me to take the two-fifty-seven train, and go to Reading. I had heard there was a disturbance over there, and I went over, and when I got there I found the bridge was burned down. We stopped just this side of the bridge, and had to drive in over the other bridge, and found considerable excitement in town, and a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty about the situation of affairs. General Reeder and his command had left about that time, and they expected the Federal troops in, and they came in shortly afterwards while I was there, and there was no further disturbance in town while I was there. There was a meeting of the citizens called for that night. It was attended by I should suppose fifteen or twenty, and some efforts were made to get up a citizens' organization; but it didn't work. There was not a large amount of cheerful alacrity to go into the organization.

Q. By whose authority was the citizens' meeting called?

A. They were called together by the mayor. He was there at that time. He was at the meeting. The sheriff I didn't see.

Q. The sheriff resided in Reading—the sheriff of the county?

A. I think not; but he was in Reading at that time. So I understood, although I didn't see him.

Q. What is the sheriff's name?

A. His name is Yorgy. Captain Linden and his police were there at that time. I saw them. They had stayed to guard the railroad property. About seventeen or eighteen men he had at that time.

Q. Of the city?

A. No, sir; coal and iron police. The police were some twenty or twenty-two. A number of those were hurt in the fire—about seven of them were shot.

Q. Shot in this conflict that took place between the rioters and the troops?

A. Yes. As I understood that matter, Seventh street runs this way, [indicating,] and at the corner—at Penn street—it was where the principle crowd was. The cut opens there, and the police were drawn across Penn street, parallel with Seventh street. When the troops came out of the cut this volley went through the line.

Q. Of the police?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Any of them killed?

A. No, sir; I think one of them lost his foot. Seven of them, altogether, were struck.

Q. How many were killed in the conflict that took place that evening?

A. Said to be eleven, those that were killed, and fifty odd were wounded. When I was there they had torn up the track. I saw that. They had torn up a rail or two out of the track, and overturned the watchman's box there, and had stone piled up. There was certainly no attempt to make a barricade—there was not much of a barricade.

Q. How large a force was assembled there of the rioters when you got there?

A. There were only a few men standing round.

Q. Were they railroad men that were standing about—railroad employés?

A. That I don't know. Of course there were a great many people on the streets, and there were crowds walking around.

Q. What night was it that the conflict took place between Reeder's troops and the rioters?

A. Monday night. The bridge was burned on Sunday, I think—Sunday night.

Q. Did they gather in any considerable force after your arrival in the city?

A. No, sir; I saw no mob.

Q. There was no further disturbance nor breach of the peace?

A. None at all. They commenced to arrest people who were engaged in it immediately.

Q. State what efforts were made by the civil authorities to punish those that were engaged in rioting, so far as you know of your own knowledge?

A. They had arrested—they arrested about sixty or seventy. I think then the next week they were all held for appearance at court. Two of them pleaded guilty—the two that were engaged in burning the bridge. Those two were in court, and the others were tried, and so far as I know of my own personal knowledge, there were about a dozen that I know of were tried and acquitted, and the others were held for the next term of court. I don't know whether they have been tried or not. I suppose they were, but I do not know.

Q. Were those arrests made by the mayor?

A. They were made by the chief of police, assisted by the coal and iron police, and the police of the city.

Q. This coal and iron police you speak of, is that a police kept up by the company—a private company?

A. I understand that to be under some act of Assembly, by which the Governor has power to appoint special policemen. I never looked up the act of Assembly. I know there are policemen appointed that way—special policemen.

Q. For the city?

A. No, sir; for the protection of corporate property. I don't know whether it specially applies to corporate property or not.

Q. Is that a general act?

A. Indeed, sir, I never looked at the act. I don't know. I really don't know where the authority comes from, except I know these appointments are made.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Confined to the coal regions?

A. They call them coal and iron police. I don't know under what act of Assembly.

Q. How are they paid?

A. I suppose they are paid by the companies, I don't know though.

Q. How many of these were there in the city of Reading?

A. I don't know of my own knowledge. I heard there were seventeen or eighteen. There is one correction I want to make. I don't know whether I have stated that I know of my own personal knowledge that Mayor McCarthy came to the room, or whether I said I understood he was sent for. I don't remember him as coming to the room.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. That was at Pittsburgh?

A. At Pittsburgh. I learned afterwards he had been sent for, and did come. I was not introduced then, and had no conversation myself, and didn't enter into the conversation.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Do you know whether he was sent for?

A. That I do not know of my own personal knowledge.

James W. Latta, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State to the committee where you were on the 19th of July last, or when the news first reached you of the disturbance on the Pennsylvania railroad at Pittsburgh, and what action was taken by you with reference thereto?

A. On the evening of the 19th of July, 1877, I was sitting in the room of Post No. 2, Grand Army Republic, at one of its regular weekly sessions, at the corner of Spring Garden and Thirteenth streets, Philadelphia. About nine-thirty o'clock, there was a rap came at the door, and the messenger announced that I was wanted outside. I went outside and found a gentleman in a carriage, who announced himself as an official of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. He told me there was some difficulty upon the railway, and that they would like to see me if I could go down to the West Philadelphia depot. I went back and left word it was doubtful whether I would be back again that night, and I went with him to the depot. I there met Mr. Lockhart, superintendent of the Philadelphia division, and went with two others, whom I do not now recollect by name. They told me all the circumstances that had occurred at Pittsburgh. They produced a number of dispatches, described the action that had been taken by the strikers during that day of Thursday, pulling off men from their trains, and pounding some of their officials when they attempted to run them, and the fact that the mayor had been called on, and had been found to have gone to Castle Shannon. This further fact I am not positive whether it appeared in the dispatches, or whether I simply recollect from having learned it subsequently. My impression is it appeared in the dispatches that the fact was that an effort had been made by the mayor, with some thirteen or fifteen policemen, to assist the railroad people in getting the train out, and it had failed. I have endeavored to get those dispatches, but have not been able to do so.

Q. Was this information communicated to you by the railroad officials at Philadelphia, or was it contained in the dispatches that you received from Pittsburgh?

A. It was communicated to me by them. They showed me the dispatches that contained the information to them, and I read them there in the office. Colonel Scott, it appears, had been sent for. He was somewheres out in the country, and they then said to me, we want troops. I told them they would have to take some other steps to secure the calling for troops before any troops could be ordered. I said, it appears the mayor has been doing something and you must look to the sheriff. They then showed me a dispatch that had been addressed by Mr. Cassatt to the Lieutenant Governor. I was satisfied the Lieutenant Governor had no power in the premises, but, fearing that there might be some question as to whether he had or not, I got the Constitution, and they had Smull's hand-book. I made up my mind conclusively, that he had not, and I telegraphed to the Attorney General. In the meantime, however, Mr. Scott came in, and they, I believe, started off some requests to other people about getting the sheriff on the ground, and I telegraphed to Pearson at the same time, to know something about it myself, and believing it was going to be a serious affair, I went immediately back to my home and took a carriage and drove to the eleven o'clock train, and found Mr. Gardner, who was on a special train. We jumped on his train and came to Harrisburg.

Q. Who is Mr. Gardner?

A. He is general superintendent of the railway. He was going to his home in Altoona.

Q. Pennsylvania railway?

A. Pennsylvania railway. My impression is that is all that occurred at the depot. I got on his train at Lancaster. We had a pretty slow run, we were stopped a good deal, and at Lancaster I got a dispatch from the sheriff which appears in my report and appears in all the official documents.

Q. Sheriff, Allegheny county?

A. Yes, sir; it was addressed to me. It was stating that he had addressed one to the Governor.

Q. That is the one dated July 20, 1877, at one-fourteen, P.M.?

A. That is the only one.

Q. Contained on page No. 1 of your report?

The dispatch referred to, is as follows:

Witness: Meantime, I had seen some telegrams from the Lieutenant Governor, either before or after this, I forget which, that he had no power in the premises. Having received instructions from Governor Hartranft before he left the State of Pennsylvania, which was upon the Monday previous to this date, that in case of trouble, I should assume the responsibility, and the case being one of serious magnitude, knowing the fact that the regular army had been three or four days endeavoring to open the Baltimore and Ohio road, and had failed, I thought the time had come for prompt and immediate action, and I sent a dispatch which reads as follows—from Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to General Pearson. This dispatch shows conclusively, that the military were acting subordinately to the civil authorities:

And I immediately advised the sheriff from Lancaster; the same telegram went to the sheriff:

Q. What time did you send those despatches?

A. Two thirty-five, A.M., in the morning of the 20th July, on the way from Lancaster to Harrisburg. We were running very fast. It was a matter more of form than anything else, to prepare a proclamation. The proclamation I did not conceive to be of any moment, and I thought, as a matter of form, I would let one go out. I got it pretty well finished by the time we got to Harrisburg, and at Harrisburg we met Mr. Farr, and I told him to complete it, and let it go out. That is the proclamation that has been referred to in his testimony and the Governor's, and which appears in the Governor's message—in the appendix to the Governor's message.

Q. The first proclamation that was issued?

A. Yes, sir; the first proclamation.

Q. State what advice you gave them?

A. At Harrisburg—we moved on Friday quickly from Lancaster, and when I got to Harrisburg—an hour and a half afterward I sent the dispatch, which appears on page 2 of my report, as follows:

Q. What time did you send them?

A. That was about four o'clock in the morning.

Q. When did you inform the Governor that you had issued a proclamation?

A. Not until eight or nine o'clock that morning in another dispatch that the Governor produced. The proclamation really had not gone out then.

Q. Did you inform him before or after the proclamation had gone out to the public?

A. I think the proclamation went over the wires about that time, but it had not really become a proclamation and about the time…. I did not recollect of anything of moment or importance occurring between that time of the sending of that dispatch, about the proclamation, which was read here on Saturday, until some time during the morning. I sent a … General Pearson, to know how things were progressing, what things had been done, and at two o'clock I received a reply, which appears in my report, on page 2. It left Pittsburgh one-fifty-eight, P.M. Reads as follows, addressed to me:

I then left Harrisburg with Mr. Farr and Colonel Hassinger and Mr. Russell on the fast line west. During the morning, I might say that Colonel Scott was telegraphing me quite considerably about whether or not there were enough troops, and earnestly suggesting me to put some more in the field, and to show the opinion in which the troops of Pittsburgh were held at that time, there is a dispatch here which has never been published, and which I will read now. I thought I could understand how to handle people I had been with for a good while, and there ain't any question about it, but this Sixth division, of the National Guard, stood the equal of any in the Commonwealth, on the morning of the 20th day of July, and I assured Colonel Scott, the troops were, in my judgment, so far as I understood the situation, satisfactory to me. I sent to Colonel Scott this telegram, dated Harrisburg, July 20, at noon.

Shortly after this dispatch went, some two and a half hours, I got some intimation through the railroad people that the troops were not coming out right, and I told them I could say nothing to them until I heard from General Pearson, who had the whole charge of matters. This dispatch of Pearson's, which appeared in my report, page 3, confirms these suspicions which I had about what these railroad officials had said to me:

To which I replied, as follows.

Then immediately after that I got one from Pearson which opened up the whole situation, and was acted on. That dispatch is on the same page, and reads as follows:

Q. What hour is that dispatch dated?

A. That dispatch is dated six-thirty-five, P.M., Pittsburgh, July 20, 1877, and I got it at McVeytown tower, east of Huntingdon. I immediately ordered the divisions of Generals Brinton, Gallagher, Huidekoper, and White, and the Fifth regiment of General Beaver's division under arms, and advised General Pearson of this by telegram. In view of this fact of sympathetic tendencies on the part of the strikers with the rioters, after I got Pearson's dispatch, in another answer to Colonel Scott, I said I didn't deem it advisable to take any action with the troops just then, until we found out exactly how the troops felt. If the troops were going to be in this condition all over the State, we better study a little before making further movements, and I telegraphed Brinton a private and confidential dispatch, inquiring what the sentiment was there. He telegraphed back, assuring me his people were right, and I might use them on any emergency whatever. Immediately after that I put Brinton in the field, and ordered him to move the whole division to Pittsburgh. I directed Brinton to supply himself with ammunition, such as he had in Philadelphia. I had forty-five thousand rounds prepared for him, and handed to him as he passed through, with instructions to issue it to his troops, not less than ten rounds a man, before they went any further, and I also put in his charge two Gatling guns, which we had at the Harrisburg arsenal, leaving their heavy guns behind them. I pursued my individual movement to Pittsburgh, and, I think I got there some time about one or two o'clock in the morning of Saturday. I do not recollect exactly the time. I found excitement, and things conditioned during the night as I supposed I would find them, from what reports I had. Found these two regiments, the Fourteenth and the Nineteenth, partially gotten together in cars. Pearson was about to execute a movement to carry them out by some strategic plan, about daylight, to Twenty-eighth street, and there hold the crossing with these two regiments and a battery, the object being entirely to avoid bloodshed, that being the tenor of all the dispatches I received. From what I could learn, I thought the movement of that battery and the necessity for two thousand men was rather an unwise one, and I advised against it; but the battery was taken out, and the measure was successfully accomplished. I discovered, much to my surprise, that public sentiment and the press were in pretty strong sympathy and accord with the people who were defying the law. No sheriff, no mayor, that I saw at all. Matters went on until two o'clock, I think, without any change worthy of comment, when Brinton arrived with about six hundred and fifty men. I then asked Pearson distinctly whether he was satisfied, or had enough troops to master the situation, and he said he was satisfied with them, and the movement commenced. I remained at the Union Depot hotel, to say nothing of the transaction at Twenty-fifth street. The firing was first announced to me in a dispatch, which was given in my report. It might be stated, in this connection, that the whole forty-five rounds of ammunition were brought to Pittsburgh, and it was a pretty serious embarrassment in future operations. These facts are all set forth in my report, and the troops were supplied with twenty rounds per man, and the guns with two thousand rounds each—the Gatling.

Q. Before they started from the Union depot?

A. Before they started from the Union depot. We had a vast amount of it lying there. If we had only got it issued, it might have made some change in circumstances. The dispatch announcing the fire, I received at the Union depot, five-twenty P.M.

Q. What page is that on?

A. Page 5.

The object of the movement, was, of course, to open the road, and Mr. Pitcairn told me shortly before the movement commenced, in reply to an interrogatory, that he had fifteen crews ready to carry out trains.

Q. Ready to take out trains?

A. Yes, sir. I never knew the reason why the trains did not run until I read General Brinton's report, which was some ten months afterward. I inquired from a gentleman connected with the railroad company why the trains did not move that day when the tracks were open, ready for them to move, about an hour after the fire occurred, and he told me the reason was that General Pearson said it would not do; but upon referring to General Brinton's report, I found that an offer had been made by the troops to guard the trains, and the railroad people said, we have not got the men to move the trains, and the trains, consequently, could not move. The road was open. The soldiers had discharged their duty, and opened the road.

Q. How long was it kept open?

A. I do not know, but I presume some couple of hours, from all I learn from the official reports, before they withdrew from this position to the round-house.

Q. What time was it that Mr. Pitcairn stated to you that he had fifteen crews to move trains?

A. I should think it was about—just a little while before Brinton came in, with his troops, and he got there at two o'clock. I saw him in the hallway of the hotel, standing about ten or fifteen feet from the desk of the Union Depot hotel clerk's office. I think Pearson stood beside me. I am not so sure of that, though.

Q. Did you have any consultation with General Pearson or railroad men about the propriety of undertaking to start trains that evening—that afternoon?

A. I have no distinct recollection of any consultation with him.

Q. Do you remember of any citizens calling at the office of the Union Depot hotel, and advising against moving the trains that afternoon?

A. No citizens called on me with such advice.

Q. Did any of the civil authorities?

A. I never saw any civil authorities of the city of Pittsburgh, except the mayor, for about ten or twelve minutes, and then I sent for him to come, during all the time I was there.

Q. When did you send for him?

A. About midnight, on Saturday. He met Colonel Quay, and I think the first word he said—I think he said: "If Hartranft had been here the troops would not have been ordered out. Why didn't you do like you did before—telegraph him, and then there would not have been any trouble." I said to him: "I think that if you get out there you can stop this thing now." He said it was beyond his power, and he made some remark I did not like very well, and I turned on my heel, and left him in consultation with Colonel Quay.

Q. Can you remember that remark?

A. No, sir.

Q. The substance of it?

A. No; not well enough to testify to under oath. Colonel Quay and he kept up some considerable conversation.

Q. Was Colonel Quay present when that remark was made?

A. He was; yes, sir.

Q. Where was he?

A. Our room was at the head of the stairs, on the second floor—the first floor—I suppose the hotel would call it the first floor of the Union Depot hotel. This room faces right opposite the stairs. Quay and McCarthy were sitting on a kind of a bench there, and I was standing up. Matters went on. I don't recollect when I first learned that the troops were in the round-house. Oh, yes! here is the dispatch, on page 5, addressed from Pearson to me:

Q. What time did you receive that dispatch?

A. That dispatch must have been received about dark, or shortly afterward. I see it is without hour. Then I placed myself in communication with him. There are two dispatches here. I started a messenger boy off to the arsenal. It appears that Pearson had been in communication with them to advise the officers of the fact of what trouble there was. I was getting replies and sending messages back from these troops. They were on their way … of them without ammunition, and some of them had been unable to get out of there, and wanted to know whether they should use force, and they finally did get out and go to the lower end of Pittsburgh by the next morning.

Q. What time did Pearson reach you at the Union depot that evening?

A. I have reported it at ten o'clock, and I think that hour is about right.

Q. What was that report, then, as near as you state it?

A. He came in with four of his staff, and I was rather astonished at seeing him. The mob had got pretty thick, and I had learned through the entire afternoon that no soldier could appear upon the highway with any safety, unless he had troops with him. A rope, I learned, was put around the neck of General Brinton's staff officers, and he was threatened with assassination and all sorts of things; but there is no question about the fact, unless a soldier was willing to give up his gun, he had no business out among them. Pearson managed to get down unobserved. The cars were four lines deep—were all down to the round-house—and I suppose he got through them. He said he managed to get down there in that way. I told him I was very much surprised to see him there, and he said the object of his visit was ammunition and rations for the troops—they were almost entirely out, and I told him the situation—whether he understood it fully I do not know—it was impossible for him to get back. I thought his usefulness was about ended. He got there, and he could not return again. I told him to go somewhere else, and report to me at daylight. He went to the house of one of the staff officers, somewhere on the outskirts of the town—Richard Evans. Daylight came, and he could not go through, I suppose, if he had tried. I heard nothing further from him until about one o'clock. One of his staff officers brought a note from him at the Monongahela house. He offered to do any duty he could. He said if he came on the street he was satisfied his life would not be his own for a moment; and I did not see anything for anybody to do just then, and I told him I could see nothing to be answered by his coming out at that time, and he might as well remain where he was.

Q. General Pearson was in command of the troops, then, until ten o'clock?

A. O, yes. I must say something else. He was in command up to ten o'clock. Before I told Pearson to go away, I asked him four or five times very distinctly, and put the interrogatory as strong as I could, to know whether he had left General Brinton in absolute command, and he said that he had—that Brinton was the commanding officer, and I have since letters from General Brinton, in which he has assumed that he was in command of those troops.

Q. After General Pearson left, then General Brinton was the commanding officer?

A. He was the commanding officer.

Q. Had entire charge. Did you have any communication with General Brinton?

A. When Pearson left, no fire had broken out. Pearson rather charges disaster on me in his report. The burning did not occur until after he went home. After Pearson left, Mr. Farr and Colonel Norris, Mr. Linn, and Cassatt and Phillips were active and energetic in getting provisions out—trying at least. Having got an engine fired up, they backed it into the Union depot, and I think they got coffee and sandwiches—a tremendous amount of provisions carried out to where the engine was. An engineer had agreed to push it out, and everything was ready for the movement, when the engineer reported that the fire had gotten between the round-house and the Union depot, and he could not go. The cars were burned, and he could not run his engine past them, and the consequence was that the scheme was abandoned. About that time, a man disguised as a working man, at great personal risk and the exercise of a vast deal of tact, presented himself to my room at the hotel. He told me where he had come from, and brought a dispatch from General Brinton. At that time, I suppose, the fire had got pretty well ahead, and it was rather of a demoralizing character. I had had it in mind, if it was possible, to get a communication to Brinton, and propose some plan to get out of the round-house, and clean that mob out; but I desisted from that when I read that dispatch. I unfortunately have lost it, but I recollect I stood up and read it out in the room, and I recollect I said—that subject of ordering the troops out had been discussed—I said I will assume no responsibility of ordering the troops to fight, when a report like that comes from them, and it left me under the impression that the whole thing was gone up. I recollect, I walked up and down the room that night, and I thought every friend I had would be burned to death by morning. I had no idea they would ever get out, and I devoted my entire energies to their relief. I had been the associate of the First regiment since my early boyhood days, and that dispatch left me and everybody else with that idea. I sat down and answered, in the nature of one which appears upon page 7, of that report, and sent it back by this same man. At that time the mob had got to be so serious, that I did not deem it wisdom to order any troops into the city of Pittsburgh without ammunition. The troops of Colonel Rodgers, which was part of the First division, and which should have been supplied with ammunition, were then about somewhere at Walls station. At the time Pearson came in to me, communications stopped with the round-house—wires were cut. We had one Western Union wire running to different points, and that was the only one we could get hold of. None, however, to the round-house. I sent word to this detachment at Walls, and to the detachments on their way, not to come within ten miles of the city, until they got ammunition. Then I sent this dispatch back to General Brinton:

These instructions were not followed; but a different and another route was taken. I had inquired from the people of Harrisburg where the best place was to feed troops at that time in that large body. I was told by those who seemed to know that one of those large hotels at East Liberty could accommodate five or six hundred men, and I had made this direction to go to East Liberty to get the men fed. Men dragged out from their homes, and kept up two nights, cannot exist like the old and heavier campaigner can, who have become inured to privations.

Q. In giving these orders in your communication to General Brinton, and in the orders you gave to Colonel Guthrie and Colonel Rodgers, were you assuming command of the troops, or in what capacity?

A. I was assuming command, so far as that was concerned. I could not assume, as Adjutant General, the command of any troops, unless I relieve the officer commanding, and that would be a very delicate thing to do in the situation we were in. For the purpose of concentration, and for the purpose of a movement, I was acting as commander-in-chief, and for the purpose of giving general directions.

Q. You had plenty of ammunition at the Union depot?

A. Plenty of ammunition.

Q. Could you not, have ordered Colonel Guthrie to have marched down Fifth street by a circuitous route, and brought him to the Union depot at night?

A. He said he hadn't forces enough.

Q. There was no force on Fifth street, was there—running out Fifth avenue?

A. I suppose I could have done all these things, but I didn't conceive, in view of the reports I had, that it was wise to undertake, and my views were fully confirmed by the dispatches that came from Guthrie himself, after I had ordered the movement, because he wired me as follows—after I got him an order for the concentration he wants to know—a Pittsburgher inquired of me what route he shall take.

Q. Did Colonel Guthrie have any ammunition?

A. O, yes; he had some seven to ten rounds, I believe—I know he had some ammunition.

Q. How many rounds did General Brinton have with him in the round-house?

A. I reported twenty—that is my belief.

Q. At the time you sent this communication, on page 7, with the message to General Brinton, could you not have ordered him out of the round-house, and could he not have marched, at that time, down to the Union depot?

A. I cannot answer whether he could have marched down. I could have ordered him to do so.

Q. What is your opinion about his having been able to march down to Union depot, and cut his way to Union depot at that time?

A. I do not think at that time it would have been a wise movement in the night.

Q. A fire had already broken out?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know that Brinton had received that communication?

A. 0, yes; Brinton got that.

Q. Was that discussed, or did that occur to you at the time to order him down to the Union depot?

A. Yes; I have just stated I intended to order him out. I do not mean to say at that particular time, but I intended to suggest, when I got this dispatch, and then I would not assume the responsibility of ordering troops out that were described to be in that condition.

Q. Have you that dispatch?

A. That is lost.

Q. Can you state the nature of it—the contents of it?

A. I do not want to say one thing that is in it. The contents of it were, as I have stated, general demoralization.

Q. Of his troops?

A. I do not mean to say his troops. The impression made by the dispatch was one that created upon the mind of anybody who read it—and there was no use attempt to fight just then with the troops. That was an impression left upon my mind, and upon the minds of those who heard me read it.

Q. Is that dispatch lost?

A. That dispatch is lost.

Q. Who was present and heard that dispatch read?

A. Colonel Farr, Colonel Quay, Colonel Hassinger, and Mr. Russell.

Q. What time was that received?

A. About midnight.

Q. Did General Pearson consult you after the track had been cleared, and after the collision, at about five o'clock—did he consult you as to the disposition of the troops?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you know they were going to be placed in the round-house?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you know where the Fourteenth and the Nineteenth regiments were, commanded by Colonel Gray and Colonel Howard?

A. I knew where they had been sent to in the morning.

Q. Do you know where they were in the evening?

A. I made up my mind they had all disappeared. I must not use that phrase any more, because one of the military newspapers says it is a peculiar one to use—that troops disappear.

Q. Did you know they were ordered in the transfer depot?

A. No, sir; but somebody came in, and told me they were all gone.

Q. Do you know when they were disbanded by order of General Brown?

A. The first I knew of that was, I saw Brown two or three times during the night in citizens' clothes, and toward the early morning, but I had heard all along his troops had gone. The old gentleman was pretty well excited. He was going out and making promises, and coming back, and having interviews, and getting in among the fellows. The next day, Cap. Bigham, he was a pretty strong man, was in the room at the hotel, between nine and ten o'clock, and I said something pretty rough to Bigham, about the troops running away, and Bigham, like a good soldier, would … that he had done what he was told; he said these troops left there by order of General Brown.

Q. That was the first you knew of General Brown's order?

A. That is the first I ever heard.

Q. After General Pearson left, then General Brinton was the commanding officer, as I understand, and you learned that fact by and through General Pearson?

A. By and through General Pearson.

Q. That he had left him in command?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did General Brinton know that the ammunition was at the Union depot?

A. O, yes.

Q. He knew it had been left there?

A. You know he kept sending for us to send it out to him. He left the ammunition under the guard of a detachment of cavalry. They had sabers way up at the lower end of the depot. My recollection is, when things got pretty hot, these men were no earthly account round with their sabers, and I believe a captain and some men of the Fourteenth were standing around there, too. They never reported to me for any special purpose. I sent those gentlemen out. I know I sent some of them out, for they succeeded in getting out, some from this exposed place, down to the cellar of the hotel.

Q. Was Cassatt and Pitcairn out at Twentieth street, at the time of the collision?

A. I am told they were.

Q. Did you have conversation with them after they returned?

A. I had a conversation with one of them.

Q. Did you ask them whether trains had been moved?

A. Yes; and they made answer just as I have stated. Said General Pearson told them not to move—they said General Pearson told them not to move.

Q. And did you have any conversation with General Pearson on the subject, when he came in?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have any consultation before the troops started with the civil authorities?

A. I never saw them.

Q. You don't know what arrangements—as I understand it, the sheriff marched with a posse in front of the troops?

A. I have been told so. I never saw the sheriff but once in my life, and that was two or three weeks afterwards.

Q. Were your instructions to the commanders to keep themselves subordinate to the civil authorities?

A. I have just read my original dispatches—aiding the civil authorities.

Q. When General Pearson left, at ten o'clock, you did practically relieve him from command?

A. Yes. Of course, it was a virtual relief, as explained in that way.

Q. He first asked you whether he had left General Brinton in command?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, did you consider you had power to order the movements of General Brinton, after General Pearson had left?

A. I did; for purposes such as that.

Q. And also of Colonel Guthrie?

A. I did; yes, sir.

Q. And Colonel Rodgers and the troops in that vicinity?

A. Yes, sir. You will observe I did not give Brinton any particular order.

Q. That power you had by virtue of the instructions that the commander-in-chief had given you before he left?

A. I took it I had that power generally in the comprehensive duties of Adjutant General. The conclusion of this dispatch to Brinton is not in the shape of an order. It tells him what to do. Brinton thought he could have done better, he could have gone somewhere else, and when a man don't follow such instructions as that he takes a great deal of risk, just as a man who refuses to obey the order of an adjutant, if the Adjutant General is sustained by his chief, he is going to get a pretty good dressing; if not, he is all right.

Q. General Brinton could have obeyed your instructions or disobeyed them?

A. I am simply applying that remark to the conclusion of this letter, which reads: "If compelled to escape, at least do so to the eastward. Take Penn avenue, if possible, and make for Guthrie, at Torrens." Brinton could have taken that direction, or taken some other one if he thought he could do better by taking some other. When he didn't take the direction I gave him, he assumed a responsibility.

Q. Afterwards, you ordered him to join Guthrie, at Torrens?

A. I did; yes. He had got too far then. After this order went out, they succeeded in getting ammunition to Guthrie. I had ordered a train from Walls by telegraph. The reply I got from Walls was, that the "engineers won't run the trains. I can't move them." Then I ordered the wagon.

Q. Did you see the sheriff after you arrived at Pittsburgh, or the Union depot, before the troops were sent to Twenty-eighth street?

A. I never saw the sheriff nor the mayor until I sent for him.

Q. Did you ask General Pearson whether he had a consultation with the sheriff or the mayor?

A. I did not ask him anything about the mayor, but I had dispatches from Pearson in which he said he had been with the sheriff.

Q. You saw no citizens on Saturday night, I understand you to say?

A. Saturday night—I don't recollect. I think Mr. Rook came in the room for a few moments on Saturday afternoon. Mr. Hampden was in the room.

Q. Who is the solicitor?

A. There was a good many railroad men around there, but outside of the railroad men I have no distinct recollection of any one but Rook.

Q. Did you see James Park, junior, Saturday evening?

A. I don't know such a name. I might know him if I would see him.

Q. He had no conversation with Mr. Cassatt in your presence, that you recollect of?

A. No, sir; nor nobody had any conversation with Mr. Cassatt in my presence during the evening. I didn't see Mr. Cassatt more than a few moments.

Q. On Saturday afternoon, did you see these gentlemen?

A. I don't know—I don't think I did. I might have seen him. If I saw this gentleman I could tell better. I don't know the name.

Q. Did any citizens speak to you or to Cassatt, in your presence, in regard to any meeting any time to move trains on Saturday?

A. No, sir; nobody. I heard it talked of, but nobody ever came to me. It was talked of in our room between us.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. It was talked of in the room?

A. Between ourselves.

Q. Was this before the effort was made to clear the tracks with troops?

A. I do not recollect.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did it occur to you that Saturday would be a bad day to undertake the movement of trains?

A. It has occurred to me. Whether it occurred to me then or not I am not able to answer.

Q. Were you aware that the rolling mills and manufacturing establishments in Pittsburgh closed at noon on Saturday?

A. I don't think I was at that time.

Q. And that a large number of men were idle on Saturday afternoon?

A. I don't think I was at that time, but it is just one of those sort of things I know now, and I cannot give a full recollection or impression. I know this much, there was no direct report to me of this fact with any suggestion that the movement be suspended on account of that fact, because then I would recollect distinctly.

By Senator Reyburn:

Q. Your own understanding when you got to Pittsburgh was the civil authorities had lost all control, and were powerless?

A. When I first got to Pittsburgh?

Q. Yes?

A. Yes; so far as any force they had.

Q. They were powerless to disperse the crowd?

A. Yes, sir; so far as any force which they could control as a civil posse.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. After the burning commenced Saturday—the burning of cars—did it occur to you that it was possible for General Brinton, with the men he had there, to stop that in any way?

A. I don't know. It occurred to me.

Q. Did you take it into consideration?

A. I don't know that I did particularly. I was not thinking particularly about that.

Q. Did you have any consultation with the railroad officials during the night there as to any means—or try to devise any means to stop the burning cars?

A. There was not any of them there.

Q. What became of the railroad officials?

A. I don't know, sir.

Q. When did you miss them?

A. I last saw Mr. Cassatt somewheres towards dark. They were down stairs. I think Mr. Cassatt was down, but I didn't see him. He came back again.

Q. Did you see Pitcairn during the night?

A. I don't think I ever saw Pitcairn after I had talked with him about the cars.

Q. Did you see Mr. Scott?

A. Scott was the first man to tell me about the collision. He came in the room and announced the collision, said it was very sad, and walked out. I saw Mr. Phillips, another railroad man, I recollect, when the fire was getting close to the hotel. He and Russell threw cartridges into the pitcher full of water, thinking it would destroy them.

Q. What time did you arrive at the Union depot?

A. I estimated it at about noon.

Q. Sunday?

A. Sunday, yes, sir.

Q. What means did you take Sunday to try to stop the burning?

A. I didn't take any. I had nothing to take any means with. There were six gentlemen in citizens' clothes—most of them civilians—all civilians I think. The next day when I first heard that, Captain Aull was the first party who came in. He announced that the troops had got out of the round-house. There were two parties from East Liberty who had come into the room to ask me to retain the Eighteenth regiment there, and I looked at them in astonishment when I had ordered them to come in to the relief of General Brinton. While I was talking to those citizens, Captain Aull came in, and he overheard the conversation. He stepped up and told me he had driven through Brinton's troops, and they were marching out. I was relieved from a great deal of anxiety, so I sat down and immediately told Aull—having no other, I think—sat down and dictated a dispatch, which appears here on page 11, addressed to Brinton, signed by me, dated July 22, 1877: