Every violation of law, if suppressed or punished, is done so at the expense of the community where the violation occurs, and the greater the violation the greater the expense. This expense must be met by taxation, and as taxation is so arranged as to reach every member of the community, the result of this, therefore, is that the person who creates a disturbance or commits a crime which requires the intervention of the officers of the law, is forced to pay from his own pocket a portion of the expense incurred in its vindication.
The practice of a little arithmetic ought to convince any one that violating the law is a very expensive luxury, besides bringing him into disgrace and subjecting him to a penalty. This argument is not intended for the professional criminal, as it is not expected that he can be reached by any argument, but it is hoped that it may reach those who usually intend to be law-abiding citizens, and whose fortunes are affected by the good or evil fortune of the community in which they reside, and that this class may be induced to pause and consider before they attempt to use unlawful means to redress any grievances, however great it may seem to them. The destruction of property, although it may belong to a corporation, results in a direct loss to the labor of the country. It is conceded that all property and capital is created or produced by labor, and, therefore, any absolute loss, by the destruction of either, must, in the end, fall upon the laborer. The argument sometimes used, that if property is destroyed its replacement gives employment to the laborer, and that, therefore, it is a benefit to him, is fallacious, for the reason that the capital necessary to pay for the reproduction of the property destroyed must be originally created by labor. The capitalist who loses his property by fire is much less able to furnish employment than he was before, and if this destruction overtakes the property of a whole community, capital to replace what is lost must be drawn from some other locality by borrowing, and while times may seem prosperous during the time the re-building is being done, yet there has been an actual loss to the community, which, sooner or later, must be felt. The draining of capital from one place, to any great extent, causes its loss to be felt there, and there is no way in which the destruction of property, in one place, can be made good there, without the loss being felt somewhere, and in the end most fully and completely realized at the locality where it occurred.
The effects of such destruction of property may be temporarily prevented by bringing capital from other localities, as before suggested, and business affairs may, for a time, seem even more prosperous than ever; but when the capital thus brought is to be repaid, comes the re-action, and the loss is felt even worse than it would have been had no such borrowing have taken place. Witness the city of Chicago, as a notable instance in the recent history of the country. The buildings destroyed by the great fire at that place were speedily rebuilt, a good portion being done by borrowed capital, and it was really surprising to see with what amazing rapidity the losses seemed to be replaced, and the city rise, as the phrase goes, "Phoenix like from its ashes." Business went on, seemingly, as brisk as ever, and it was boastingly proclaimed that Chicago beat any city on the continent in recuperating power, and that it was a greater city than before the fire. But pay day must come. The property destroyed had been replaced, but not by the creation of capital by labor. The seeming wealth had no substantial foundation, the re-growth having been too rapid to come from this source, and how stands that city to-day?
The city treasury bankrupt, with a very serious question arising whether the municipal government can be maintained much longer, and private bankruptcy on every hand, for the pay day has come to considerable of the indebtedness, and the shift of borrowing cannot be resorted to forever. The lesson to be drawn by the striking laborers of Pittsburgh, from this illustration is obvious, and it should be taken to heart and pondered on by all labor organizations throughout the country, lest, by their unwise and hasty action, they may strike a blow which will re-act on themselves with treble the force with which it is aimed at some corporation or capitalist. It may be expected that an opinion will be given as to whether or not the Pennsylvania Railroad Company were justified in making the reduction in wages of ten per cent. on June 11, 1877, and, ordinarily, the question might be answered that this, or any other, corporation or individual has the right to pay such wages as it or he pleases, and to require such services for the money paid as it or he may choose. This rule must be received with considerable modification, in the case of a great corporation, receiving special privileges from the State, and employing thousands of men, scattered from one end of the State to another.
If such corporation should execute a written contract with all of its employés on taking them into its service, specifying fully and particularly the hours and service required from them, the length of time for which each was hired, and the causes for which he could be discharged, no one would claim that they could vary the terms of that contract, without the assent of the employé. From the manner of the employment of the railroad employés in this country, and especially of the trainmen, there is in good faith an implied contract that the employé shall continue to receive the wages the company is at that time paying for the particular duty which he discharges, until the price is changed by mutual consent, and that his term of service shall continue as long as he behaves himself well and performs the services required of men in his position. This ought to be, and is in equity the implied contract between the parties, although not legally enforceable. But the railroad employé has a right to expect such treatment by the company into whose employ he enters. He is required to be on hand whenever called for, to give his entire attention to the business of the corporation, and he settles down with his family in such place as will make it most convenient for him to attend to the business of the company. His whole services are theirs, his arrangements are all made with reference to their business, and when he is discharged, without any reasonable cause, without any prior notice, or his wages reduced while his labor is not reduced, and, as is sometimes the case, increased without his consent, and the order for that purpose made without consulting him in any manner, he has a right to find fault. He is like a soldier, whose whole time has been spent in the service. His occupation is more dangerous than that followed by others, and the kind of services he has to perform unfits him for other duties, and railroad officers should always take these facts into consideration in dealing with him.
The wages of the trainmen, after the reduction in June, 1877, were as follows, to wit; Freight conductors: first class, two dollars and twelve cents per day; second class, one dollar and ninety-one cents per day; brakemen, one dollar and forty-five cents per day, and the day's work averaged from seven hours and twenty-five minutes, the shortest time, to eight hours and thirty-five minutes, the longest time. These wages were good wages for the amount of labor performed per day, and if the men could make full time, would amount to thirty-eight dollars and seventy cents per month for brakemen, and fifty-five dollars and twelve cents for first class conductors. This was higher wages than the same class of men could get in other employments and seemed to be, as stated by the president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, some twenty per cent. higher than the wages paid in other lines of business, the company intending to keep the wages of its men about so much more than is paid in other occupations on account of the risk taken by the trainmen. It is claimed by the railroad officials that the depression in freight traffic on the railroads, both in amount and in price, required a consequent reduction in the expenses of the railroads, and the reduction of June, 1877, they asserted to be justifiable, under all the circumstances, and it is the opinion of your committee that, if before it had gone into effect, the men had been made fully acquainted with the reasons for the step taken, and the necessity of it, in short, treated as if they were reasonable men and entitled to consideration, very much of the dissatisfaction would not have existed, and the country might possibly have been spared the troublous scenes through which it passed at that time. No doubt the fact that a strike of the trainmen of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad had taken place at Martinsburg, West Virginia, on the 16th of July, and was gaining strength and headway, had its influence in determining the trainmen of the Pennsylvania railroad, at Pittsburgh, to commence their strike at that place, and, in consequence thereof, a much less grievance was needed than would otherwise have sufficed, as an excuse for their action. The fact, also, that the trainmen on other railroads were rapidly following suit, and stopping the running of freight trains on such roads, encouraged the men to persist in their course to stand out and prevent, by force, trains from being run on the Pennsylvania railroad.
There seemed at this time to be an epidemic of strikes running through the country, not only among the railroad men, but among all classes of laborers, and this helped to precipitate and bring about strikes at all the places about which this report will treat. The general feeling of uneasiness existing among the laboring classes of the country before mentioned, and the sympathy felt by these classes for each other made them very susceptible to anything which affected their fellow laborers, and, to use a medical phrase, the labor system was in a good condition to receive the epidemic which was spreading over the country, and in a very poor condition to resist and throw off the disease. The strike once inaugurated at Pittsburgh, was strengthened and encouraged by the sympathy the strikers received from nearly all classes of the citizens, and more especially by the sympathy shown by the city officials. Had the community frowned on the attempt of the strikers to prevent, by force, the running of freight trains, as it should have been done, and had the civil authorities shown a firm determination to enforce the law at the outset, as it was their sworn duty to do, there can be no doubt but the mob would have been dispersed without bloodshed and riot, as it was in Philadelphia, Scranton, and other places. Philadelphia and Scranton are particularly mentioned, for at these places there is a much larger proportion of the turbulent class than at Pittsburgh, and consequently a great deal more of the material of which riotous mobs are composed. When any community winks at a small violation of the law, by any person, and more especially by a combination of persons, it is laying the foundation for trouble and difficulty. A crowd of people assembled for the purpose of accomplishing, however worthy, a purpose in a questionable manner, is very easily converted into a riot, and when a crowd proposed to carry out an unlawful object by violence it soon becomes an uncontrollable mob, if encouraged in its purposes by the sympathy, either expressed or passive, of the community and the civil authorities. The small show of force made by the police in the spasmodic manner, it was on July 19th and 20th, was worse than if no police force had ever appeared on the ground, for the strikers knew they had nothing to fear from them, and the lawless characters, who had begun to gather around, construed this action as a sort of license to do what they chose as long as they interfered with nothing but railroad interests.
The refusal of the mayor to go to the scene of the disturbance himself, when specially requested to do so, and to raise a special police to meet the emergency, is inexplicable on any theory of a wish on his part to do his duty and enforce the law, and when contrasted with the vigorous measures taken by the mayor of the sister city of Allegheny, and of nearly every other place in which riots occurred, must be most humiliating to the people who elected such a man as their chief magistrate. Had he shown a proper appreciation of his duty by going to the grounds of the railroad company when requested, he would have known better the extent of the troubles threatened, and if determined to enforce the law, could have prepared to do so by swearing in special policemen, as was done in all other places. If he chose to rely on a subordinate to do what was manifestly his duty, and that subordinate failed from any cause, either incapacity or sympathy with the mob, to appreciate the danger, and take measures to prepare for it, the responsibility must still rest on him. His evidence, that he received reports from his officers through the night of the 19th and 20th, that all was quiet, is belied by all the testimony in the case. When a call was first made by the railroad officials for ten policemen, and for his personal presence, followed in a short time by a call for fifty policemen, and that by a call for one hundred and fifty, most men would have concluded that all was not quiet, even if the police should report to the contrary. This taken in connection with the fact that the morning papers of the 20th, contained the call of the sheriff on the Governor for troops, and the orders for the troops to assemble, and that this was done only after an appeal, soon after midnight, by the sheriff in person to the crowd to disperse, and their answer to him by blasphemy, and hooting, and yelling, and other indignities would leave the people generally to believe that the mayor had willfully shut his eyes to what was transpiring on the premises of the railroad company.
Very blind or confiding policemen they must have been that night of the 19th and 20th, and very confiding was the mayor to go to Castle Shannon, a distance of six miles, and let matters take care of themselves. The mayor, to excuse himself for doing nothing after the sheriff made a call for the troops, says that he considered himself superseded by the sheriff and by the military. It has usually been considered that the military was subordinate to the civil authority, and that the clause of the Constitution, which reads: "The military shall, in all cases, and at all times, be in strict subordination to the civil power," means something, and was placed in the Constitution for a purpose. If the construction of the law, given by the mayor, is to prevail, people have been very much mistaken in their understanding of what is the law, and that all the military need do, under the mayor's dispensation, is to get some authority to call them out, and then, as they supersede the civil authority, they have full control, and can decide for themselves, when the necessity for their services has ceased, and can, therefore, take charge of the affairs of the community as long as any ambitious officer may elect. It is a new doctrine, this of the mayor's, in this country, and he must excuse this committee if they fail to take any stock in it. The other excuse given by the mayor for his inaction, to wit: That the men (meaning the sheriff and military officers,) who had charge of matters after the 19th, were narrow gauge men, and he could not coöperate with them in their views, and the measures necessary to be taken in the emergency, is also untenable. It does not appear that he ever consulted with these men, or any one of them, in regard to what should be done, while it does appear that he was sought after, and frequent attempts made to consult with him by the railroad officials, until they learned that nothing could be expected of him. If his excuse for neglecting his duty in the matters within his immediate jurisdiction, (to wit: Keeping the peace, dispersing a mob, and enforcing the law in the city of which he was chief executive officer,) is a valid one, the others might, with the same propriety, claim that his gauge did not suit them, and, therefore, they could not coöperate with him, to keep the peace in his bailiwick, and refuse to do anything, and the mob allowed to have its own way.
If the officers referred to were superior to the mayor, he should have done what he could to coöperate with them, in dispersing the mob, and suppressing the riot, and on them would rest the responsibility for the measures they adopted; if they were not superior to him, then even he will not claim that he had a right to do nothing. All peace officers (and the military when called out to suppress a riot, is only a posse for the peace officers) are expected, and it is their duty, to coöperate for the purpose of keeping the peace. An officer, willing and anxious to do his duty, will never object to do what he can to enforce the law because some other officer or officers are trying to assist in the same object, even if they do not consult him, while one who is looking for some excuse for evading his duty is very apt to find one that will satisfy himself, although it may be satisfy no one else. Mayor McCarthy, at any time on the 19th day of July, at the head of a determined posse of fifty men, could have dispersed the strikers, and allowed trains to go out, and the trains once running, the strikers would have given up the contest. On the 20th of July, the mayor, with one hundred men, could have dispersed the crowd, and by the arrest of a few ringleaders broken the strength of the strike.
These statements are made on the supposition that the mayor had been in earnest, and acted with the vigor that characterized several of the mayors who were called upon for the same duty in their respective cities at nearly the same time.
The mob knows instinctively the feelings of the bystanders and officers, and a little encouragement makes it very bold, while a determination to enforce the law by a few brave officers will cause the same mob to disperse, for it is an old and true saying that mobs are cowardly. This report has already stated, as a matter of fact, proved by the evidence before the committee, that all classes of the citizens of Pittsburgh sympathized with the trainmen in their strike. Some of the citizens claim this is hardly true, but most of them admit it, but deny that any of them sympathized with the riotous conduct of the mob and the destruction of property by it. The best description of the feeling of that community was given by Sheriff Fife, who testified that there was a general sympathy with the strikers; the entire laboring class sympathized with them; the merchants sympathized with them to a certain extent; that the responsible portion of the people of Pittsburgh were not in sympathy with the riot, but that it took a certain amount of riot to bring them to their senses. That this sympathy with the strikers pervaded the whole community does not admit of a reasonable doubt. There may have been, and no doubt were persons who did not sympathize, but they were isolated cases, and so few as to be of no use in controlling or directing public sentiment. There are a great many evidences of this aside from the direct testimony of most of the witnesses who were asked the question. The fact that Sheriff Fife testifies to that he did not undertake to raise a posse to disperse the mob before calling on the Governor for troops, as it would have been folly to have tried it in the city for he knew the feeling of the people, he might possibly have raised a posse in the country, if he had had time, is one evidence. On Saturday, the 21st, he sent out twenty deputies to raise a posse to assist in arresting the ringleaders, and they did not raise an average of one each, after, as they testify, making a vigorous effort. The action of the Pittsburgh troops, also shows that the same feeling of sympathy pervaded them, and the actions of the mayor and police show conclusively the same thing, so far as they were concerned. The editorials in the newspapers of the city show as strongly as any evidence can, where the sympathy of the community was, these being the best exponents of public sentiment when not repudiated by the people. The prejudice among the shippers over the Pennsylvania railroad against that company on account of the alleged discrimination in freight against them, caused them also to sympathize with the trainmen, and the general feeling was, after the commencement of the strike, to let the company take care of itself. No one can doubt that the existence of this feeling in the community was well known to the strikers, and that it encouraged them to hold out in their purposes and make them more bold in their adoption of measures to resist the company, and prevent by force any freight trains from leaving Pittsburgh.
This feeling of boldness and confidence in disregarding the law communicated itself to the new comers in the crowd, many of them being the worst criminals and tramps, until the mob became so confident that they could do as they pleased, that they did not believe any serious attempt would be made to disperse them, until the railroad company had yielded to the demand of the strikers, and that if such an attempt should be made they could easily repel it. None of the citizens had the remotest idea that the strike would culminate in any serious riot or destruction of property, neither did the strikers themselves expect this would be the result, but the resistance to law once started, the original movers soon lost all control of the movement, and the consequences were such as to astonish the most reckless among them. No one could have foreseen the result, and the experience of the people of Pittsburgh, with strikes prior to that time, had not been such as to lead them to anticipate anything serious in this case. There being many manufacturing establishments in and around that place, employing a large number of men, strikes were quite familiar to them, but as they were usually confined to the men of one establishment, or one branch of trade, they were arranged without serious disturbance of the public peace, and no one realized the danger in winking at the course of the strikers in this case. No strike had ever before taken place under such favorable circumstances to make trouble. Never before were so many of the resident laborers out of work, never before was the country so filled with tramps to flock to such a scene of disturbance, never before was the laboring class of the whole country so ready to join in a move of that kind, and never before were the civil authorities of the city so utterly incompetent to deal with such an outbreak, or if not incompetent, then criminally negligent, in not making an earnest effort to enforce the law. The railroad riots of 1877, have by some been called an insurrection, for the reason that strikes occurred at nearly the same time on several of the main trunk lines of the country, that several Governors of States issued proclamations warning the rioters to disperse, &c., some of them calling on the President of the United States for troops to assist the civil authorities in dispersing the mobs and enforcing the law, and the large number of men engaged in these troubles in the different parts of the county. Insurrection is defined to be "a rising against civil or political authority; the open and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of law in a city or State; a rebellion; a revolt."
The railroad riots in Pennsylvania were not a rising against civil or political authority; in their origin were not intended by their movers as an open and active opposition to the execution of the law. Most of the riots were the result of the strikes by a portion of the railroad men, the strikes being intended to bring the railroad officers to a compromise with the strikers, of the differences between them. In some places the men merely proposed to quit work, and not interfere with the running of trains by any men the railroad authorities could get; in other places they would not allow other men to work in their places, nor railroad officials to send out freight trains, if in their power to prevent. It was in no case an uprising against the law as such, but a combination of men to assert an illegal right as between them and the railroad company. There was no organized movement throughout the country, no pre-arranged plan of the trainmen to prevent the running of freight trains by violence or combination, understanding or agreement between the men on any one railroad and the men on another. Each strike was independent of those on other roads, each having a local cause particularly its own. As before stated, there was a sort of an epidemic of strikes running through the laboring classes of the country, more particularly those in the employ of large corporations, caused by the great depression of business, which followed the panic of 1873, by means whereof many men were thrown out of work, and the wages of those who could get work were reduced to correspond with the reduction in the prices of all commodities and the reduced amount of business to be done. Each strike, except at Reading, although commenced originally by men then at work for a railroad or some other corporation, to carry out their own purposes, was soon joined by all the idlers and vagabonds in the vicinity, and these being by far the largest in number, soon took the movement out of the hands of the originators and carried it clear beyond anything they ever anticipated. The vagabonds having no object but plunder, and having no particular interest in anything else, were ready to resort to violent measures to accomplish their object.
The immediate cause of the strike at Pittsburgh was not similar to any other that has come to the knowledge of this committee, it being the order to run double-headers. No such cause existed anywhere else, and, therefore, the troubles there could not be considered as a part of any general understanding between trainmen. At Reading, the railroad men were not engaged in any strike, nor did they take any part in the riots there. The troubles there were caused solely by idle men, who had some time previously been discharged from the employ of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and for the purpose of venting their spite on the company. At Scranton, although there had been a strike of the railroad men, this had been adjusted, and the men were at work again, when the riots occurred, the riots being engaged in by the idle men and striking miners and mill men. If a riot, growing out of any of these isolated movements, is to be called an insurrection, or if these movements, altogether, are to rise to the dignity of an insurrection, then the word must be given a new definition, for as it now stands, there must have been some pre-concerted arrangement between the men at the different points, to resist the laws of the country, or the move at some point must have been for the purpose of resisting constituted authority, and not the mere purpose of forcing railroad companies, or any other corporations, to come to terms with the strikers, by obstructing the business of the railroad or other corporation. No pre-concerted arrangement of any kind has been proved before your committee, although such persons as might be supposed to know the fact, if it existed at all, were subpœnaed and testified before us, and all of them positively deny that there was any concert of action whatever, among the trainmen, for a strike after the 27th of June, and a local cause for the different strikes in Pennsylvania is given by them all. It has been asserted by many that no rioting or destruction of property would have taken place at Pittsburgh, if the troops had not been called out, and had not fired on the mob. The trifling with the mob, at this place, by the civil authorities, and the sympathy shown by the citizens, with the original strikers, had emboldened and encouraged it to such an extent, that when the Philadelphia troops arrived on the ground, it had, no doubt, got beyond the control of the civil power, as then constituted, and there can be no doubt of the necessity for the presence of those troops. Such mobs as that at the Twenty-eighth street crossing, on Saturday evening, July 21st, at the time the Philadelphia troops were marched out there, would never have dispersed without making serious trouble, troops or no troops.
How long it would take a mob to disperse and melt away of its own accord, which on Thursday numbered from fifty to two hundred men, on Friday from five hundred to fifteen hundred, and on Saturday from two thousand in the morning to seven or eight thousand in the afternoon, and which was growing all the time more turbulent and excited, we leave for the advocates of the do nothing policy to determine if they can. The firing on the mob by the troops, and the subsequent inaction precipitated and aggravated its action, but did not create the riots. When a great line of public travel and traffic like the Pennsylvania railroad is blockaded by a mob, the public interests suffer more than the railroad interests, and every day that it is allowed to continue, damages the community to the extent of thousands of dollars, and it was the duty of the local civil authorities to adopt the most vigorous measures to break the blockade, but if instead of doing this, they temporize with the mob until, in consequence thereof, it becomes too strong to be suppressed by them, and the troops of the State are called on for assistance, the latter cannot be said to have caused the riots, or held responsible for the consequences of an honest effort to enforce the law. If the rioting was caused by the calling out of the troops, and their subsequent actions, then the claim that that was an insurrection falls to the ground, and if there was an insurrection, then the troops cannot have been the cause of the rioting, as the two positions are inconsistent, although held and advocated by a number of prominent men.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
JOHN E. REYBURN,
Chairman.
E. D. YUTZY,
W. L. TORBERT,
Committee of the Senate.
W. M. LINDSEY,
Chairman Joint Committee.
D. C. LARRABEE,
A. F. ENGELBERT,
SAMU'L W. MEANS,
P. P. DEWEES,
Committee of the House.
Laid on the table.
PROCEEDINGS AND TESTIMONY.
Senate Committee Room,
Harrisburg, February 4, 1878.
The committee met and organized by the election of the following officers:
W. M. Lindsey, Chairman.
Samuel B. Collins, Clerk and Stenographer.
J. J. Cromer, Sergeant-at-Arms.
—— ——, Messenger.
Adjourned to meet in Pittsburgh, an the 6th instant.
Orphans' Court Room,
Pittsburgh, Wednesday, February 6, 1878.
The committee met at half past ten o'clock, A.M., this day, in the orphans' court room, city of Pittsburgh.
The roll of members being called, it was found that all the members were present.
The committee engaged in a consultation as to the mode of procedure in taking testimony—as to whether the sessions of the committee should be public, and as to whether counsel should be admitted to represent parties who might be summoned as witnesses.
G. H. Geyer, Esquire, counsel for the county commissioners, was invited before the committee for the purpose of ascertaining what the commissioners desired; also W. B. Rogers, Esquire, counsel for the city of Allegheny, was invited before the committee for the same purpose. The county commissioners in person also appeared before the committee.
The committee was waited upon by Mr. Johnson, a member of the chamber of commerce, who gave information that the chamber had appointed a committee, of which he had been elected chairman, for the purpose of giving aid in obtaining information relative to matters being investigated by the committee. On behalf of the chamber of commerce, he also tendered the use of their hall for the sittings of the committee.
Upon motion of Senator Reyburn, it was ordered that a session should be held this afternoon, from three to six o'clock.
Adjourned.
Orphans' Court Room,
Pittsburgh, Wednesday, February 6, 1878.
Pursuant to adjournment, the committee re-assembled at three o'clock, P.M., this day.
The debate was resumed, as to the mode of procedure in taking testimony.
Upon motion of Senator Reyburn, the chairman of the committee, Mr. Lindsey, was selected to conduct the examination of witnesses on behalf of the committee.
Adjourned.
Orphans' Court Room,
Pittsburgh, February 7, 1878.
Pursuant to adjournment, the committee met at ten o'clock, A.M., this day.
The committee proceeded to the examination of witnesses. The first witness called was:
John Scott, sworn:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. I am still a citizen of Pittsburgh, although I have been attending to my business for the last three months in Philadelphia.
Q. What is your official relation to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company?
A. At present I am the general solicitor of the company.
Q. What was it in July last?
A. I was then what was called the general counsel of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, resident at Pittsburgh.
Q. Can you tell the committee whether, prior to July last, there were any differences existing between the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and its employés?
A. On that subject I have no personal knowledge. Any differences, if they did exist, between the employés and the company were known to the operating officers of the company, over whom I have no control. I only know it as a matter of public history, as other persons.
Q. Were you present at the disturbances of the peace within the city of Pittsburgh in July last?
A. I was during a portion of those disturbances, but not during all of them. If it is desired that I should give you a connected statement of what I did see, I would begin with where my personal knowledge of the transactions commenced.
Q. That is what the committee desire?
A. On the morning of Thursday—that week in which the disturbances occurred—I cannot recollect the date—on that morning there was no appearance of disturbance. I state this from the fact that Mr. Pitcairn, the superintendent of the western division, and I live within a very short distance of each other. We take trains at the same station, and when I went there that morning I found him there with his family, preparing to go, for a visit of some length, to Long Branch. The strike which had occurred on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was the subject of conversation between us during the few moments that we were together there, and I know, at that moment, he had not the most remote apprehension of any disturbance. I came into town on the train, and knew nothing of any disturbance until about noon, when I heard of the assault having been made upon Mr. Watt. I did not see it, or I would narrate it.
Q. Who was Mr. Watt?
A. He was the chief clerk, or assistant to Mr. Pitcairn. About nine o'clock that evening I received a dispatch, stating that Messrs. Hampton and Dalzell, the local solicitors, who took charge of the local business, were absent from the city, and requesting me to come to the outer depot. I did so. I got off at the Twenty-eighth street station. There was quite a large crowd of people at that station. Just when I got off, an engine was coming up from the direction of the Union depot. I do not know from whence it had started. Immediately, there was a cry that it must be stopped, and there was a rush of a large number of that crowd towards the engine. It did stop, and a loud halloo went up from that crowd.
Q. Who composed that crowd, so far as you observed?
A. That I cannot tell. My point was to reach the outer depot, and I spent no more time there than was necessary. At the outer depot I found that Mr. Pitcairn had not yet reached the city, although he had been telegraphed for. I found Mr. Watt there, his assistant, and learned from him the extent to which the disturbance had gone. That he can give you personally. Finding from that statement that a call had been made upon the mayor for assistance to regain the property of the company, and that it had been ineffectual, I went up to my office for the purpose of looking at the act of Assembly passed in 1877, and also the law providing for calling out the military by the Governor. I spent some time in doing that, leaving word for Mr. Watt to come to my office, so we might call upon the sheriff for the purpose of dispersing the mob, and regaining possession of the company's property. He came up in a short time, and we rode to the sheriff's residence, and woke him up out of bed.
Q. Where is his residence?
A. In Washington street, between Wylie and Fifth avenue.
Q. What time was that?
A. That was, probably, between ten—no I am not certain about the hour—about ten or eleven o'clock. I stated to the sheriff that the property of the company was in the possession of a large number of the employés and of citizens—the information was that—I had no personal knowledge of it—Mr. Watt was with me—and that an effort had been made, through the mayor, to regain possession, which had not succeeded, and that we called upon him, as officers of the company, to ask him to go to the outer depot and exert his power, as sheriff of the county, to disperse the crowd assembled there, and to restore possession to the company of its property. I said I came as counsel of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and, that as it would probably be one of the most delicate exercises of power he could be called upon to make, I insisted he should send for his own counsel to accompany him, as if he found his power insufficient to disperse the mob, and to restore to the company possession of its property, we would ask him further to advise the Governor, so he might exercise his power, if he found it necessary. The sheriff replied that Mr. Carnahan was his counsel, and that he resided at East Liberty, and that he could not get him in time to go to the depot. He went for a deputy, who lived across the street—Mr. Haymaker, I think—and we all drove to the outer depot, on the way finding Mr. Pitcairn, who had arrived in a train from the East. When we reached the outer depot, General Pearson was there. He had been apprized by the Adjutant General. The sheriff was again informed of the desire of the company to obtain possession of its property, and have the crowd dispersed.
Q. Can you give the date of this?
A. I have said this was on the Thursday preceding the actual burning and destruction. As a matter of memory, my recollection is that it was the 19th, although I am cautious about dates, as I have not a good recollection about dates. The sheriff then went out with General Pearson to Twenty-eighth street. I did not go with him. He came back after the lapse of probably three quarters of an hour, reporting that he found himself unable to disperse the mob, and that he could get no force to enable him to disperse it. I then said to the sheriff that it was a question for him to determine whether he had exhausted his power for the protection of the company's property. He said he had exhausted it, and that he had made up his mind to ask the Governor to call out the troops to disperse the mob. At his request, I wrote a dispatch to the Governor, and submitted it to him, General Pearson, being present as I understood, acting as his counsel at the time. Some requests had come to send a dispatch to the Lieutenant Governor. I was satisfied that it was not such an occasion as authorized the Lieutenant Governor to act; but public information in the newspapers being that the Governor was absent from the Commonwealth, I suggested to the sheriff, as a matter of prudence, that a dispatch should be sent to the executive office, at Harrisburg, addressed to the Governor; that a copy of it should be sent to the Secretary of State, who was then in Beaver, we understood, with information that it had been sent to executive office; that another copy should be sent to the Adjutant General, who was understood to be in Philadelphia, and that the Lieutenant Governor should be informed of the fact that such a dispatch had been sent to the Governor, that he might have that information, and, if he had the authority to act, might exercise it.
Q. Who signed that dispatch?
A. The sheriff.
Q. At what time?
A. That was in the neighborhood of twelve o'clock that night. I am giving my judgment about those hours. Those dispatches signed by the sheriff were sent. There was a great deal of telegraphing that evening there, between myself and the officials of the railroad company, Mr. Pitcairn and others, the details of which I cannot now recollect. In the course of several hours after that dispatches were received from Mr. Quay and the Adjutant General by the Sheriff, informing him that the Governor had ordered out the troops. Dispatches were also received there by General Pearson, from the Adjutant General, giving him the same information. I cannot give the hour of those dispatches; but I know before we left the office, probably about five o'clock in the morning—four or five o'clock, perhaps—the sheriff and General Pearson had both received dispatches to the effect that the Governor had ordered out the military to the assistance of the sheriff, and that General Pearson had drawn an order, in pursuance of those dispatches, for one of his own regiments of this city to turn out. Probably about five or six o'clock that morning several of us left the office and went to bed at the Union depot. That was Friday morning. Now as to the actual progress of the strike. What occurred at the outer depot during Friday, I believe, I have no personal knowledge, and I do not know that I had any intercourse with any of the officials of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and not, probably, with the military officers, until about four or five o'clock that evening. There was delay in the military responding to the general's orders. Some information reached our office, where I was engaged in other business in the office of the Penn company, that General Pearson was about to open the tracks with the military, and was starting for that purpose from Union depot. Mr. Thaw and I went up there together. When we arrived, there was a company ready to go to Twenty-eighth street. Mr. Cassatt was there, one of the vice-presidents of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. I do not know what was said when I got there; but in some way my opinion was asked as to the propriety of the movement. Somebody asked me, I do not know who. There were a great many people around the dispatcher's office, where General Pearson was. I was asked the question. I said in reply, that as an officer of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company I had no opinion at all to give, that the civil power of the country having been called upon, and the sheriff having been called upon, and the military being there with General Pearson in command of them, I certainly would not give any instructions that would interfere with the discretion either of the sheriff or of General Pearson. I might reply, as a citizen of Pittsburgh, that there was no need of repeating the old maximum, which had got very trite, that there was no use in firing blank shot at a mob; but that when they were ready to strike, they should do it effectually, and disperse the mob. The General stated to me there the force he had, some sixty men in that company and a battery called Breck's Battery, the remainder of his force was at Torrens station. He also stated he had a number of men then at Twenty-eighth street.
Q. What is the distance of Torrens station from Twenty-eight street?
A. Out to East Liberty is four miles, and Torrens station is probably a quarter of a mile beyond that. From the length of time that had elapsed, and a number of the men not having responded, I felt satisfied it would be prudent to have more troops before striking, and I so telegraphed to Philadelphia. General Pearson, at that point, said: I believe I could take this battery up there and open the track at that point, but it would be with very great sacrifice of life.
Q. To whom did you telegraph to Philadelphia?
A. To the president of the road—Colonel Scott. I said in that dispatch, from the dilatory way in which the troops were coming, I thought that the troops ought to come from some other quarter than from Pittsburgh. General Pearson was evidently reluctant to sacrifice life, even if he could open the road by doing so, and wished Mr. Thaw and myself, as officers of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to sign a request asking him to delay his movement. I refused to do so, saying that I would not control his discretion as a military man—that what should be done, at that time, should be left to him to decide. I left then and went out home that evening, and staid at home Friday night and saw nothing more of the riot than a passenger would see in passing out through the large crowd assembled at and about Twenty-eight street. I cannot estimate the number there, but the road was blocked and the hill was largely covered, when we went out on Friday evening. I returned to the city on Saturday morning, but did not see what transpired along the Pennsylvania railroad during that morning, as I was busy in my own office at Tenth and Penn streets. There was a great deal of communicating back and forth between the officials of the road, between Philadelphia and here, and west of this point, in reference to the strike. I was not present when the troops arrived from Philadelphia. I was pursuing my business in my department that evening until I went over to go out to my home, at Shady Side. The train I took was delayed, the firing having already commenced at Twenty-eight street. Word had come by telegraph, before that train started, that the firing had occurred. I went out in that train, through a dense crowd, both of civil and military men, at Twenty-eight street; and I was at my home during that night. The firing began that night, probably about eight or nine o'clock. I came into the city the next morning, and went to the Union Depot Hotel with some ladies who had been left on the train that could not get in the night before. It is not necessary for me to say what occurred. I found a place of safety for them. I found that the Union Depot Hotel was not a safe place at that time. I saw at that time the fire progressing up, but I was not any nearer to the scene of the riot at that time than the Union Depot Hotel. Secretary Quay and Adjutant General Latta were in the Union Depot Hotel making preparations to leave it.
Q. State the distance of your residence from the Union depot.
A. The station where I get off is a fraction over three miles from the Union Depot Hotel, and my residence is probably four or five hundred yards from the station.
Q. State whether at this time there was any rioting nearer to the Union depot than Twenty-eighth street, at the time you speak about when General Latta and Secretary Quay were in the Union Depot Hotel.
A. The fire had progressed, and was then progressing on this side of Twenty-eighth street up toward the Union Depot Hotel. I cannot say where the fire first originated, but looking up Liberty street from the Union Depot Hotel, when I was there, I should say the fire was then some six or seven blocks from the Union Depot Hotel. I could see it distinctly spreading across the street. I was not at the scene of the riot during Sunday; I was with the officers of the railroad company in Allegheny City, in conference as to the best mode of preventing further trouble, destruction, and rioting over portions of the road west of Pittsburgh. I do not know that I can give any further information in giving my personal knowledge of what I saw of the actual disturbances.
Q. Have you any knowledge as to what was done by the railroad company after that time?
A. In the way of suppressing the riot?
Q. Yes.
A. I might state upon that subject, that upon Saturday afternoon, while the officers of the western lines were in Allegheny City, a committee of citizens—at least a committee appointed at a citizens' meeting—a representative of Bishop Twigg—one of his clergymen, whose name I do not recollect—and Reverend Mr. Scoville, of the Presbyterian Church, and James I. Bennett, came to see what we could do in the way of suppressing the riot, and asking that some concession should be made to the men on the road. We replied to them substantially, that so far as the railroad company was concerned, we thought the mob had done about its worst. This was when the Union depot was burning—at least Mr. Thaw and I were on the hill a short time before, and saw the fire so near that we supposed it was then burning. We said it had now ceased to be a question between the railroad company and the employés, and was one between the public authorities and the mob, between government and anarchy, and that so far as we had anything to do with the question, we were now in an utterly defenseless position, and we thought, being in that position, if we were to make the concessions which had been demanded in the beginning, we would be breaking down the only barrier between anarchy and their property, and that now the question for the citizens to determine was whether they would make any effort to stop that lawlessness which would next reach them after it had spent its fury on the railroad company. So far as the efforts to stop the rioting by negotiations or compromising with the men were concerned, I had no direct connection with them. That occurred between others—friends of the road, the general management, and the representatives of the men—and I knew of them only in a general way, from hearing what was said by the officers, which was substantially, that while the men were in the position of law breakers, and holding control of the company's property, we could not yield to the demands extorted by that kind of violence; but that, if things were restored to their normal condition, the company was perfectly willing to meet the men, and negotiate with them in regard to this matter just as in regard to any other difference.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Upon this Thursday you speak of, you say you found, at a certain stage, that the road was in possession of the mob—substantially a mob—that then you went to the sheriff, and then, with him, to the depot, and found General Pearson there. Now, can you state to us who called for, or who sent for the militia—who called upon the State Government?
A. I have already stated that the call for the militia was made by Sheriff Fife, after he had gone out with General Pearson, and endeavored to disperse the mob at Twenty-eighth street. He then came back and reported his inability to do so, and that he had no further power at his command, and announced his decision that he would call upon the Governor, and, at his request, I wrote a dispatch to the Governor, announcing his conclusion, and asking for the Governor's aid.
Q. At the request of the sheriff?
A. Yes; he signed that dispatch sent to the Governor.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you call upon the mayor for assistance before you called upon the sheriff?
A. I did not personally. Mr. Watt informed me he did. He can give you that.
Q. Was General Pearson connected with the sheriff's office at that time as a deputy?
A. I don't know.
Q. You stated he was counsel for the sheriff?
A. Oh, no. I stated to the sheriff that I was calling upon him as counsel for the railroad company, and I insisted that he ought to have his own counsel to guide him in determining his duty in this emergency; but, saying that Mr. Carnahan was his regular counsel, and that he could not send for him, he went to the depot without him, with a deputy named Haymaker. When we reached the depot General Pearson was there, saying he had been requested by the Adjutant General to be there. When Sheriff Fife saw him there, he turned to me and said: "Mr. Scott, I know him, and for this occasion I will be governed by his counsel." General Pearson was not there as a deputy or a clerk, but in obedience to the dispatch of the Adjutant General, and the sheriff, finding him there, was governed by his counsel at that time.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Have you any knowledge as to who sent for the troops at Philadelphia, who ordered them here?
A. I have no other knowledge of it than that which came in the dispatches that night, which was that the Adjutant General had ordered them. A dispatch came from Mr. Quay saying that the Governor had ordered out the militia.
Q. The Philadelphia troops of the First division?
A. I have no actual knowledge as to who ordered them out, except in a general way; the Adjutant General was here afterwards, and when those troops came it was my understanding, derived from my intercourse with General Latta and all the others, that the military had been ordered out by the Adjutant General, he being the military officer of the State under the Governor. In speaking of all this, I am giving what occurred by the dispatches in the outer depot while I was there.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Can you give the extent of the destruction of the railroad property by the fire?
A. I cannot, with any accuracy.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Approximately?
A. I have been informed that the officers of the road are yet engaged in making up a full statement of the losses of the company, and any estimate I might make would be so entirely unreliable that, if it is important to the committee, I prefer sending for those who have that subject in charge.
Q. Can you give the extent of the burning, the destruction of property in general?
A. My statement would be simply from observation—that the burning of property commenced at or very near the station of Lawrenceville.
Q. How far from the Union depot?
A. I would suppose a mile and a quarter or a mile and a half. That is an estimate. I do not know, I may be wrong about that. It is the second stopping place out from the Union depot. The destruction on the track, of cars that were there, and buildings extending from Lawrenceville all along past the Union depot and embracing property of the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railroad Company, on Seventh street, in this city, the number of cars burnt, the number of locomotives destroyed or disabled, the value of the goods in those cars, and the value of the buildings that were destroyed, and the injury done on the road are all matters of computation upon which my estimate would not be worth anything. It will have to be obtained from actual examination of those who inspected them.
By Mr. Means:
Q. Was the first burning of cars or of buildings?
A. I cannot say, except as a matter of public information. I was not present. I have already stated I was at Shady Side on Saturday evening, when the fire commenced.
Q. Have you any knowledge about what time that fire commenced?
A. I saw the light in the evening about nine or ten o'clock, and sent my son in to ascertain the state of things.
Q. Of your own knowledge you do not know whether it was a car that was first burned or a building?
A. Of my own knowledge I cannot say at what point the fire began, or by whom it was kindled.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Can you state of your own knowledge what classes of men composed the rioters during the burning. Whether the mob was composed of railroad employés or of others than those, and if of others, of what class?
A. That would be in part my personal knowledge, but I could not give an answer to that without confounding together my personal knowledge and matters of information. I will give the result, if you wish it.
Q. State it?
A. The first difficulties, which were brought on by the employés of the company taking possession of the engines and trains, were, so far as I could judge, or saw, exclusively by those who had been railroad employés up to that point. The action which Mr. Pitcairn took with reference to that when they took that possession I cannot state. Things went on, with a great crowd accumulating from that Thursday morning, and while I say, as a lawyer, that there was a riot and mob there from Thursday morning down until the firing began, with a crowd constantly accumulating, as it would on account of any disturbance that had occurred, yet there seemed to be a feeling that it was not that kind of a riot or mob that called for the interposition of a very vigorous public sentiment to put it down; but, when the military were brought for the purpose of regaining possession of the property, and the collision was actually brought on, I can say that the mob was made up of a great many other people than railroad employés. I did not see them, nor was actually among them so I could identify any of the railroad employés, or any persons outside, but from my knowledge of the immense crowd which was assembled at Twenty-eight street as I went in and out, there were undoubtedly a great many other than railroad employés about the scene of violence, and I have no doubt participating in it.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. You say that while the employés were in possession of the cars of the company, there seemed to be no such riot as required the intervention of public sentiment to put it down?
A. I did not intend to say that, but that while it was confined to railroad employés public sentiment did not seem to manifest itself as requiring any decided interposition to put that down. In other words, I am bound in candor to say, when asked for it, that public sentiment here very clearly distinguished between the act of breaking the law on the part of the employés in taking possession of the railroad property, and stopping commerce at this point, and the act of rioting and incendiarism which followed in consequence of that initial breaking of the law.
Q. That is, that public sentiment did not assert itself vigorously against the employés taking possession of the cars and engines prior to the actual outbreak and destruction of property?
A. That is what I mean.
Q. In other words, public sentiment sympathized with the rioters?
A. I am a citizen of Pittsburgh, and here along with the rest of them, am bound to say that the newspapers pretty fairly reflected the public sentiment in what they said. If you wish to see what it was, instead of asking my opinion, owing to my relation with the railroad company, if you will take the editorials of the various morning and evening newspapers from the 19th of July, from the day on which this thing occurred, down until some days after the actual firing occurred, I think you will find that the editors evidently tried to reflect the public sentiment, and I think they succeeded pretty well in doing it. If you wish to get that you had better ask the sheriff what responses the people made to him when he asked them to become part of his posse. I did not hear what was said, but the sheriff knows.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did the sheriff succeed in raising a posse comitatus?
A. He said to us in the Union depot he could not, and reported to me the next morning that he could not do it.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. Have you any knowledge whether the mayor tried to subdue the riot or assist the sheriff in trying to subdue the riot?
A. I have not any personal knowledge of the mayor's action.
Q. Was he in the city during the time, or not?
A. Not to my personal knowledge, again. I did make one effort to have accomplished what I thought would have conduced somewhat to the public peace that afternoon, Saturday afternoon. That is the only fact within my own knowledge. About one o'clock, Saturday, seeing a large number of people attracted to the depot, and knowing that a large number of operatives were free from work that afternoon, I thought it a measure of precaution for the mayor to close the drinking saloons in the city. I drew up a paper, stating this fact, as politely as I could, and that paper was signed by Mr. Thaw and Mr. McCullough, officers of the company, and I took it over and had Secretary Quay and Adjutant General Latta sign it also, and then sent it up to the mayor, and the messenger reported to me that he had left it at the mayor's office in the hands of his chief clerk, I think he said; I never heard any more of it.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Who was that messenger?
A. His name I cannot give you, but I placed it in the hands of D. H. Rudy; he can give you the name of the messenger who sent it up. That is the answer that I got, that he left it in the mayor's office. What was done with it I do not know.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. Do you know whether he complied with it or not?
A. I can only say that the drinking saloons were not closed, and I did not see any proclamation closing them.
Q. So if you were not a citizen of Pittsburgh, do you suppose you would think that the mayor had done his duty, as an officer ought to, at that particular time?
A. Being a citizen of Pittsburgh, I cannot put myself in the position of not being one. I will have to leave you to judge.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. At the time you first spoke of meeting the crowd of employés, and their taking possession of the engines on Thursday—the first outbreak you spoke of what was done on the part of the railroad company to ascertain the cause of that commotion?
A. I did not understand that there was any secret about the causes of it all. I am giving now the public understanding. My understanding was simply this: That an order had been made—Mr. Pitcairn can tell you more fully about that—an order requiring the running of, what are called double header trains—two engines to one train, and some of the employés alleged that that imposed on them additional work without additional pay. I believe that is the short of it, and rather than comply with it, they struck. I understood that was made the cause of beginning the disturbances here.
Q. Did you or any one, on behalf of the railroad company, communicate with those men?
A. I did not. I understood the operating officers did, but I cannot tell what occurred between them.
Robert Pitcairn, sworn with uplifted hand:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. What is your residence?
A. Shady Side.
Q. What is your official connection with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company?
A. General agent or superintendent of the Pittsburgh division.
Q. How long have you held that position?
A. I came here the last time in the spring of 1865. I have been here three times. Since that spring I have been superintendent of the division.
Q. Now give us your statement about the riots. Tell us whether there were any differences of opinion or disagreements between the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the employés prior to the 20th of July last.
A. There were no more differences than there have been since the road has been opened. There have always been differences.
Q. Was there any difference existing at that time?
A. No more than heretofore. The company reduced the wages of all officers and employés ten per cent. in June.
Q. Of 1877?
A. Yes. There was a good deal of friction and complaint. Committees called upon me, and committees from the different divisions of the road visited Mr. Scott, the president, and had conferences with him on the subject. They complained because of the reduction. He explained that the cause of it was the condition of the country, and that as soon as business would become brighter, that then the company would entertain their petitions and would act fairly with them, when the committee, as they informed me, as Colonel Scott and others informed me, professed their satisfaction, and said there would be no trouble, but that they would work harmoniously.
Q. That was on what date?
A. I cannot remember the date; it was after the ten per cent. reduction.
Q. What was the date of that?
A. I think it was in June—May or June.
Q. Was there any further reduction after that time, and prior to the riot?
A. There was no reduction in wages.
Q. Was there an increase of duty or work placed upon the employés?
A. That is a question of opinion altogether. The company for many years back—the officers have been trying all in their power to economically manage the road, loading the engines to their full capacity and making them up differently. There is hardly a year passes, but that some of the officers finds some way of more economically running the road. There was an order given to make up what we call double-headers between Pittsburgh and Derry. Since the road has been opened we have always run double-headed, and sometimes three engines ahead and one behind, between Altoona and Conemaugh. The object in running the double-headers to Derry was for the purpose of making the trains go through to Philadelphia without being divided; that is, it takes two engines to haul a train from Pittsburgh to Derry, whether two engines ahead or behind, or two separate trains; and to avoid the delay of running two separate trains to Derry, one ahead waiting for the other, we put two engines in front of the trains, when one engine cuts the train going to Conemaugh, and the one put behind goes down to Altoona, and goes through from there.
Q. What was the date of that order?
A. The order of running double-headers on all through trains was the morning of Thursday, but we had always run double-headers between Pittsburgh and Derry, perhaps from one half to two thirds. The order was to take effect on that Thursday, and was to make them all double-headers.
Q. Did the men make any complaint about that order?
A. They made no complaint.
Q. To you or to any other officer of the road?
A. Not that I am aware of. Up to that time we always considered the double-headers a question of economy.
Q. Did that order require the discharge of any number of men, or did it not?
A. It did.
Q. By that order you could run your trains with a less number of men?
A. We could run them with a less number of conductors and brakemen, but not of engineers and firemen. As many double-headers as we had would take off one single crew of conductors and brakemen each.
Q. You heard no complaint about that order?
A. Not that I am aware of; but the men were always complaining about something.
Q. That was on Thursday. What was the first riotous occurrence showing that the men were dissatisfied after the issuing of that order?
A. I had leave of absence on Thursday morning to go to Philadelphia. For a few days previous I had asked the men—asked the subordinate officers—as I always do when I see them, if there is any trouble. I was assured then that our men were more satisfied and loyal than they had been, and I was perfectly free in my mind in going away on Thursday morning. I left in the day express on the Thursday morning when the trouble began.
Q. How far did you go before receiving intelligence of the trouble?
A. When I reached Altoona I got a telegram from Mr. Watt, who represented me here, saying that a few of the men, after the train I was on had left, had refused to go out on the double-headers, and that they were trying to create a disturbance, and saying what action he had taken, and that his idea was that it would be all right, and for me not to stop off but to go on, that the matter would be all right.
Q. What hour did you receive that?
A. About twelve twenty, when I reached Altoona. I had no train to return on and I thought I would go on the day express and think over the subject, and when I reached Lewistown I made up my mind that I would return. So I arranged for my family, who were accompanying me, to go on, and I returned on the fast line from Lewistown, reaching here at eleven thirty.
Q. In the evening?
A. Yes; eleven twenty-five. On my way west I telegraphed to my subordinate officers to meet me in Pittsburgh. I intended to get off at the outer depot, Twenty-eighth street, but there was a large crowd there, and I came to Union depot, and walked up to where my office then was, at Twenty-sixth street, and on my way I met a carriage with the Honorable John Scott and Mr. Watt and the sheriff. I got in the carriage and went to my office, at Twenty-sixth street, and there found my subordinate officers, and General Pearson was there.
Q. Who were your subordinate officers?
A. Joseph Fox, road foreman; John Major, road foreman; David Garrett, assistant trainmaster; Edward Pitcairn, trainmaster; Joseph McCabe, general dispatcher. Mr. Scott, the sheriff, and all the parties there were consulting and talking together, when the sheriff made up his mind to go up to Twenty-eighth street, where the crowd was interfering and preventing trains from running. I wanted to go up and talk to the men, when my subordinates prevented me, and said there was no use of my going up, because none of our men were there. Few, if any, of our own men were there. It was a crowd. They persuaded me to remain, while the sheriff and General Pearson went up to Twenty-eighth street. They came back and reported the result of their attempt to disperse the crowd, when the communications, as stated by Mr. Scott——
Q. What did the sheriff and General Pearson report to you?
A. They said they went up and went to the crowd and called to the crowd to disperse and go to their homes, and they made no impression, and received nothing but vulgar abuse.
Q. Did they go alone?
A. Unless one or two of my men went with them. One or two went with them.
Q. At what hour was that?
A. About twelve o'clock, Thursday night.
Q. What then occurred?
A. Then came the communications to the different parties. The Governor, and Mr. Quay, and Lieutenant Governor Latta, and Adjutant General Latta, and then came the replies, and the message to General Pearson to order out one of the regiments, I think, which he did.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. From whom did this order come?
A. Adjutant General Latta.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. What time did he receive that dispatch from General Latta?
A. Between twelve and half past four in the morning. I think the order calling out the troops came after the Governor's message. All left the office about half past four. General Pearson, who had written his orders about the regiment before, and I parted at the Union depot. General Pearson went down town, and Mr. Scott, Mr. Watt, and myself went to the Union depot hotel for the purpose of retiring.
Q. When you came in from Altoona did you notice the disturbance at Twenty-eighth street?
A. Yes.
Q. To what extent?
A. It was dark, and I could not see any of the crowd. I do not know how many were there.
Q. What was the crowd doing then?
A. Yelling—talking loud.