AFTERNOON SESSION.

Pittsburgh, Thursday, February 21, 1878.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at three o'clock, P.M. Mr. Lindsey in the chair, and continued the taking of testimony. All members present except Senator Reyburn.

Colonel P. N. Guthrie, resumed:

Q. When we adjourned you had got at Torrens station. I wish you would state to us how large a crowd you found there, what the appearance of the crowd was, and so on, and give your movements from that time?

A. When I got to Torrens station I found at least twelve hundred men there, composed of strikers, and the crowd and mob—not a mob—lookers on. I had no trouble in getting into position, no trouble of any kind. Was not greeted with hisses, noise, or demonstration of any kind whatever. As soon as I got my command in the position I wanted them in, I brought them to a rest. Then I went around on the tracks to see what the condition of affairs was. I found, as I stated before, that the mob contained two elements there—strikers and lookers on. I sent for the man who was represented to me to be a leader among the strikers, had him brought down to my position, and had a long conversation with him. I informed him that I had been sent out there with orders from General Pearson to see that all trains passed through the stock-yards. It was my duty to keep the tracks clear, and keep the crowd from interfering with the passage of trains, &c. I didn't want to have any trouble or any disturbance of any kind; but the moment a train approached there it was going to go through. He told me that the strikers had no intention, no disposition to interfere with the passage of the trains, that the Pennsylvania railroad might send all the trains through they had got. He said they could not send any through because they could not get the men to man them; but if they could, they could send them through; they didn't intend to interfere. I told him I was glad to hear that, that it would probably make things a great deal easier, because if the crowd interfered outside of the strikers a man would have less hesitation in dealing with them. This conversation with this leader of the strikers occurred immediately after I got there, as soon as I got my command into a position and gave the command rest. Almost immediately after, and during my conversation with this man, a train came up to the stock-yards from Pittsburgh. That was a freight train or a passenger train—I have forgotten. I did not probably look at that time; but I think it was a freight train; but that train was loaded down with roughs on the cars, and platforms of the cars, the engine, cow-catcher, and every available space. I think the train was crowded with the most infernal lot of scoundrels that a man ever saw. I do not think that they were strikers entirely, though. There were a great many men from Pittsburgh that I recognized; but there was a large element on that train I could not account for at all. They became very noisy and offensive. All of them got off that train and crowded on to any trains that were stationary there—cars standing on the track, which brought them within a very few feet of my regiment. Their remarks became so offensive to me that I was afraid that if it was allowed to continue it might bring about trouble. I had the bayonets fixed on my guns, and I charged bayonets on this crowd. They broke and fled away, and got some distance off. In the interval I formed my men in another position more satisfactory to me—got them on the street, and in what we call column of companies. Before, I was in line of battle. I remained in that position for some time. I would say here that the understanding between General Pearson and myself, when I went to the stock-yards, was that the trains would be sent out immediately. I urged it upon General Pearson. I believed it was the best thing then, and I believe so now, that a train should have been started, that if one train could have got through, all the rest would have followed, and even one train would have broken the force of the strike; but I waited and waited and waited in position there until the men could stand it no longer. The crowd three times during my stay at the stock-yards annoyed me, and crowded close on my lines, and became somewhat demonstrative, so much so that I was afraid to allow the thing to continue, and I charged bayonets. Every time I charged bayonets the crowd dispersed, and twice I loaded the guns in the presence of the mob, and the moment the guns were loaded the crowd fled and dispersed; but would return almost immediately after. As soon as the crowd would go away from my front I would take the cartridges out of the guns to prevent the men from recklessly firing and bringing about any conflict between the troops and the crowd. That continued time after time during my whole stay at the stock-yards. These men were easily driven away by me. At any appearance I would make of a disposition to fire upon them or use force against them, the mob would disperse—the crowd would disperse, because it was hardly a mob. I could not see that they were armed at all. If they were armed they had pistols—they had no guns of any kind.

Q. Had they thrown any missiles?

A. The second time I charged on them, they began throwing, but it didn't amount to anything—no more than five or six men were engaged. One man who stood on the top of the cars—a man known as Monkey John, a man who has since been tried by the courts here—was the most offensive in the whole crowd. He expressed a great desire on his part to split my head open, but he didn't try it. He was within a few feet of me, and I was strongly tempted to split his head open, but I thought I had better not. During the time I remained at the stock-yards, I was frequently visited by General Pearson, and to all of my inquiries, why trains had not started out, his answer was, the troops were not ready in the town, and hadn't been able to get possession of Twenty-eighth street, which brings me back to my original assertion, that, if the first troops had gone to Twenty-eighth street, we might have had the trains moving. General Pearson, every time he came out, was accompanied by some of the railroad officials, and all of them seemed to be very anxious with regard to my ability to hold that place; but I told them there was no mob in front of me, only a crowd, that might become a mob if they got the upper hand, and so long as they didn't have the upper hand they were a crowd. That was the state of affairs until the arrival of the troops from Philadelphia. At the time they arrived, General Pearson informed me that as soon as they got into the Union Depot hotel they would be disembarked, and brought out to Twenty-eighth street, and placed in position at Twenty-eighth street, and the Fourteenth, and Nineteenth, and Breck's battery would be sent out to me, and the trains moved. I waited until nearly two o'clock that night, (Saturday,) waiting for trains, and waiting for information. Not a train appeared, and not a word of official information reached me until Sunday morning. On Sunday morning, about half past two o'clock, I received a communication from James W. Latta, Adjutant General, which was the first information I had that General Pearson was not in command, and that General Latta was directing affairs—informing me that ammunition would be sent out to me by wagon, under the charge of an officer of the staff. Upon the arrival of that ammunition, I would be joined by troops from Walls station, and, when that junction was formed, I was to march into town to the relief of General Brinton, besieged in the round-house. I prepared my men for marching, and waited the arrival of the ammunition. Sometime after that the ammunition arrived, and I am not able to state the time exactly, because my watch had run down, and everybody else's around. When the ammunition reached me, an order also came with it, stating that the troops at Walls station were without ammunition, that the engineer was unable to bring the train in, and they could not make a movement until they had ammunition. That all the approaches to the city from Walls station were crowded by rioters. That all points along the railroad, suitable for their purpose, was in possession of the rioters—a fact which I demonstrated afterwards by sending men out of my own command to determine whether that was the case or not. I received orders also to send ammunition by wagon out to these men. As soon as that ammunition was received, they were directed to continue to march in to me, and, when they joined me, I was directed to complete the movement as ordered in my first dispatch. I hired a wagon, and sent a squad of men out with it. They had to take a roundabout way to get there. I sent, I think, five thousand rounds of ammunition out to these men. Time was passing away very rapidly, and it was nearly ten o'clock before these men got to Walls station with that ammunition.

Q. Ten o'clock on what day?

A. On Sunday morning. In the meantime I had made up my mind that the Walls station troops could not get in. About five o'clock I had made up my mind that the troops from Walls station could not get in to me in time to make the junction and march in to the relief of General Brinton, and I sent Captain Aull, of my regiment, in to General Latta, with instructions to tell him that, in my opinion, these forces couldn't join me, and to countermand the order so far as Walls station troops were concerned, and order me into the city. On the way in to General Latta, Captain Aull witnessed the leaving of the round-house by General Brinton's command. He conveyed that information to General Latta. General Latta then sat down and wrote an order to General Brinton, ordering him to unite with me at the stock-yards, and sent a copy of that order out to me. Of course that prevented me acting on my own responsibility, and I was compelled to remain at the stock-yards. The order reached General Brinton, and General Brinton refused to join me—at all events he didn't join me. I waited there until about twelve o'clock, and I was satisfied then that it was not General Brinton's intention to come to me—that he had left the city, and he didn't intend to return. I then made up my mind I would go into town and see myself what was going on. In all this time I hadn't one word of official information concerning what was going on in town. Colonel Smith came to my camp on Sunday morning, and gave me the first information of the state of affairs in Pittsburgh. Of course I could see a dim light in town, but the extent of what had occurred I didn't understand—I could hardly believe—and I could hardly believe that the large force of well drilled men under General Brinton could not control any mob that might be brought against them. At twelve o'clock and about ten minutes, these troops from Walls station came down to Torrens station.

Q. Twelve o'clock Sunday night?

A. Twelve o'clock noon on Sunday. At that time I knew, from the officers I had sent out after Brinton, that Brinton was not going to come back to Pittsburgh. I had official information from the staff of the Sixth division that the Fourteenth regiment and the Nineteenth had been disbanded by General Brown, and there was no military force in the city of Pittsburgh. I didn't deem that the troops from Walls station were of any assistance to me whatever, at that time. I thought they were a great hinderance to my efforts. I ordered them back to Walls station, and to go from there to Blairsville, which would be, I thought, almost necessary that Brinton should make a junction. 1 didn't see how he was to get home unless he did go to Blairsville in some way or another. I then came into town to see how affairs stood. I went to the Union Depot hotel; reached the Union Depot hotel just about the time it had been fired—it was then in a blaze, commencing to burn, though the fire was not thoroughly under way. I went to the end of the building, and I saw some fifty or sixty men on the tracks engaged in burning and pillaging. I think at that time that twenty-five good men could have checked that whole business. There was a large crowd in the open space in front of the Union Depot hotel, and a large crowd on Liberty street. I went through the crowd in front of the hotel, and went through the crowd on Liberty street, and I am satisfied there were not men enough in the Sixth division to stop that burning. The crowd on Liberty street and in the space in front of the Union Depot hotel was merely lookers-on, but it only needed a demonstration of some kind against them to have made every one of those men, or nearly every one of those men, part and parcel of that mob engaged in pillaging and burning. They would have gone to the defense of those men without any question. I satisfied myself of this matter pretty thoroughly. I was not hasty about it—calmly went through that crowd and heard them talk, and knew exactly what they meant. They were men that were not disposed to take upon themselves to burn or pillage, because there was no necessity, since they had other men to do it for them.

Q. Were you in military uniform?

A. No, sir; I was not. I could never have got into town with a military uniform on. I came into town not only disguised, but in a great measure hidden. I did that for the reason that men that joined my command, within a few moments of leaving, had told me of being stopped on the way themselves. They had to take a roundabout way to go out to the camp. I saw on my way in there were crowds of men everywhere who would have put a stop to any person coming into town in uniform. I went to the Union Depot hotel for the purpose of finding General Latta, and discover what was being done and what had been done. The moment I got there I saw for myself what had been done by the rioters, but what the military authorities were doing, of course, I couldn't ascertain until I had found General Latta. 1 hunted around through the town and found General Latta at the Monongahela House. He was regretting very much, at that time, that General Brinton had gone out of the city instead of going out to me or coming into the city. He was powerless to do anything, he had no troops under his command except my own regiment. I went to my armory, and I sent out to Colonel Smith and the adjutant general of the Fourth brigade instructions to my regiment to march into town. Through some delay on the part of Captain Aull, the regiment was delayed about two hours. They reached here about dark.

Q. By what route?

A. They came in on Fifth avenue, the only route they could have gotten into town. The crowd was very large on Penn avenue. Notwithstanding, they came into town, I believe, without any demonstrations of any kind against them whatever; marched down to the armory. We remained there on duty continually. Colonel Howard came in and he brought his regiment together. Colonel Gray, of the Fourteenth, got his regiment together. On Monday morning the three regiments were here in the city of Pittsburgh ready for duty, and on Monday morning, the three regiments, I believe, paraded through the streets. Colonel Howard's and my own regiment paraded together. I think I remember, after going back to the armory, seeing Colonel Gray's regiment return to the armory after their parade. I am not certain about that, but I think I did. Those two regiments returned to their armory, were ready, and could have been assembled had anybody taken the trouble to order them—could have been assembled in a very short time. On Monday morning, I believed that I was in command of the troops of the Sixth division. I certainly was in command of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth regiments, because Colonel Howard was then in my armory with his regiment and had agreed to obey orders under me. General Brown came in and assumed command on Monday morning, and I refused to recognize or obey any orders from him. He remonstrated, but I insisted that I wouldn't obey his orders. I was in command of the troops, and I intended to handle them, and he went out and various men came in and thought it was a very serious thing to have dissensions in the military at that time—the city was apparently in the hands of the mob, and it would be better for the military to proceed as a military body, without any dissensions in rank. After listening to them, I agreed to serve under General Brown, and I so notified him. From that time until the troops were ordered to Luzerne, and until we returned, I served immediately under the command of Brigadier General Brown. That is the outline of my service.

Q. Did you receive any orders from General Brown to disband your regiment at any time?

A. On the 31st of July, about one o'clock in the afternoon, General Brown sent an officer of his staff to my head-quarters, requesting my presence at his head-quarters. I think it was the 31st of July. I went up to General Brown's head-quarters, and he gave me a verbal order to dismiss my regiment. I asked him by what authority the regiment was disbanded. He said he had just come from the Governor's head-quarters, or he had received an official communication from the Governor's head-quarters, I have forgotten which. At all events, the orders were from his superior officers that my regiment, and also Colonel Gray's and Colonel Howard's were to be disbanded. I think he had sent to Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray also. I determined that I wouldn't disband my regiment, and I couldn't see why the Sixth division should be dismissed when the Governor was rapidly assembling all the troops of the State in this city. Could not understand it, and felt there was a mistake of some kind about it. I went back to the armory. That afternoon I paraded my regiment, and before I got through the parade I had official knowledge that the Sixth division was to go to the coal regions, which demonstrates fully to my mind that there had been a mistake made somewhere, or there never was a communication of the Governor's that the Sixth division should be dismissed at all. So far as official knowledge of what took place in the city of Pittsburgh on Friday after half-past one o'clock, and on Saturday until six o'clock, I know nothing at all. I was not present with my regiment and knew nothing at all about it, except on Sunday afternoon, when I came in myself. With the burning of the elevator on Sunday afternoon, I think all danger of a mob had passed. The men had got all the whisky they could get hold of, and the whisky had worked its effect on these men. The burning and pillaging of this city was stopped by the giving out of whisky, and with the natural working of the whisky on the human body. The men were dead drunk. On Monday morning there was no mob in the city of Pittsburgh that I could see, though the railroad property and trains were in the possession of the strikers, and remained so until the arrival of Governor Hartranft with the national guard.

Q. What day was that?

A. I do not remember what day that was; that was probably the 25th or 26th of July—it was later than that. I cannot state the date of his arrival. They were here on the 31st of July. I remember that, because I went to out to see General Brinton on that day.

Q. Did you have any trouble in assembling your regiment—in getting them together?

A. When they were first ordered out?

Q. Yes.

A. Oh, I had a great deal.

Q. What I mean is, were the men willing to serve?

A. Oh, yes; no trouble of that kind in my regiment whatever. The only trouble was in getting hold of the men.

Q. Was there any disposition among your men to aid or sympathize with the strikers?

A. Not a bit, sir.

Q. Could you have depended on them, do you think, for any emergency?

A. Depended on them for any emergency whatever. I had no trouble of that kind. I never gave a thought of trouble of that kind. I had no personal worry or annoyance with the men in my regiment. I do not believe there was much of that thing in any of the other regiments.

Q. How much, or under what circumstances, would you deem it proper for an officer under command, in the face of a mob, to give the order to fire. That is, how much resistance on the part of the mob, or demonstration on their part, before an officer would be justifiable in firing, or giving the word of command to his men to fire?

A. I would hesitate some before I would give an order to fire, unless there was a shot fired. The firing of a gun or pistol into the ranks of my men would, I believe, justify me in giving an order to fire, and I would at once do it. A man in command of troops has to judge a good deal of the disposition of the crowd, as he can see it. I can hardly tell you exactly what I mean. Sometimes you find a crowd in front of you good-natured, meaning no harm, and you generally find among the crowd a lot of men who are working the mischief—see an element of that kind in a crowd. I do not think an officer is justified in hesitating at all, because these men can soon influence a crowd to do as they want to. If a crowd attempted to seize hold of the guns of my command, I should certainly give an order to fire. I would not give the order recklessly to fire. I would give the crowd time to get out of the way, by simply announcing to them that I would fire if the crowd did not disperse. If they had been firing into me, and committing acts imperiling the lives of my men, I do not know that I would give them that warning. These are little things a man would have to judge of as they occurred. I believe an overt act committed by a mob justifies the officer who commands the troops to fire.

Q. Would the hurling of missiles into your men by the mob be a provocation sufficient to justify the commander giving an order to fire?

A. I believe it would, but the commander would consider the previous acts of the mob and all the conditions of it, the character of it, and the character of the people in it, &c. I believe whenever a mob in the presence of the military does damage to the military that the military are justified in doing damage to the mob, and doing it right quick.

Q. And use the necessary efforts to disperse the mob?

A. Yes; fire at them, and do it quickly, and do enough of it to prevent them ever coming back. I do not believe a man in command of troops has any right to act rashly, and would hesitate some before he would do a thing of that kind. My idea of the military has always been that they are subordinate until the sheriff is satisfied he can do nothing—that then they step in and act quickly. Probably there would be no demonstration against the military if the military officer would inform the mob that if they did not disperse within a certain time, he would fire upon them, and if necessary, load in the presence of the mob, and ninety-nine times out of one hundred, I believe, there would be no mob by the time they got loaded.

Q. Did the mob flee or disperse before your men every time you gave the order to load?

A. They scattered every time. I had no trouble at all with the mob—I did not consider that I had a mob in front of me. I simply had a large crowd, which I believe would have been a mob if they could have got the upper hand in any way.

Q. You ordered to charge bayonets once or twice?

A. Three times.

Q. In the charge bayonets, did the crowd stand until your men came close to them?

A. No, sir; they fled in a good natured way. Laughed—no trouble at all to get rid of them. My object only was to prevent them coming too close. If the men get close enough some men in the crowd might feel like taking a musket away, and that would bring about a disturbance. It is better to prevent anything of that kind than to allow it to come and then act afterwards.

Q. Your object was to preserve the military character of your regiment?

A. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Keep the troops and the mob separate?

A. Yes. I never let the mob in with my troops at all, sir.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You were in active service during the last war, were you not?

A. I was.

Q. In what capacity?

A. I went out in the service as second lieutenant, and came back a major—filled all the intermediate ranks.

Q. How long were you in the service?

A. Three years and seven months.

Q. You were speaking about taking command of the three regiments—the regiments commanded by Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray—did you take command by virtue of your seniority over them?

A. I would, but I do not think I spoke of taking command of the three regiments, as I had not seen Colonel Gray. I do not know what he would do if he had been dismissed by General Brown. I suppose he would think General Brown had his reasons for that. Colonel Howard had voluntarily offered to join with me, and I did assume command. I had no conversation with Colonel Gray at that time, nor for weeks afterwards. I did say that on Monday, when Colonel Gray and myself were parading the streets, that, to the best of my knowledge, as we were returning, I saw Colonel Gray out with his regiment doing the same thing. That continued during the time we remained in our armory afterwards. In other words, I am satisfied that the Fourteenth regiment was organized and ready for duty on Monday.

Q. After they had been dismissed by General Brown?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You say you refused to receive orders from General Brown on Monday?

A. I did.

Q. Give us the reason for that?

A. My reason for that was, that General Brown had dismissed his command, and when he dismissed his command, his authority ceased over them until he re-organized. The act of re-organizing or bringing together the Nineteenth regiment, was a personal matter on the part of Colonel Howard; General Brown had nothing to do with that; it was between Colonel Howard and myself, until General Brown got a brigade together. He could not command me. One regiment does not need a brigadier general and a colonel to command it; there would be a conflict of authority at once; those were my reasons.

Q. Did you not regard him as your superior officer, if you were the only man in his brigade?

A. I would regard him as my superior officer. I believe I could have done better service than he. I was willing to take the responsibility. I think that is the trouble with all the National Guard—there are too many officers.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. And not enough men?

A. And not enough men.

Q. Was there any reason you had for disobeying his orders or receiving orders from him?

A. There was. I believe that General Brown has been suffering from sickness more or less. He was physically weak, and I did not believe was fully equal to the fatigues and annoyance of the command. I had no disposition to ignore General Brown, but I did think that in the great excitement of that day I could have handled my regiments better without being hindered by orders from brigadier generals.

Q. In other words, you regarded him incapacitated for his position in consequence of his illness and mental distress?

A. I did.

Q. And that would justify you?

A. That would have been my defense if I had got into any trouble.

Q. If it had not been that, as a disciplinarian and a military man, you would have considered it your duty to obey?

A. I would. I considered General Brown, under ordinary circumstances, was fully competent for his command; a braver man, I know, never breathed than General Brown—possesses every quality for bravery. His military capacity can hardly be doubted, when a man has filled the various commands that he had in the army.

Q. That is, when he is in good health?

A. When he is in good health, he is a good man.

Q. Did you see anything of General Brinton's command during this trouble, up to the time the collision occurred at Twenty-eighth street?

A. I saw nothing of any troops, except my own regiment, until Sunday night or Monday morning, when I came to town. I saw the troops of General Brinton in the cars, as the passed the stock-yards on their way to Pittsburgh. That is all I saw of them.

Q. As an officer of experience in the army and active service, did you think it was prudent for General Brinton to retire to the round-house when he did?

A. I would not like to have done it. If I had had command enough to have guarded every approach to the round-house, and to have had a guard around the round-house, for the purpose of allowing one portion to sleep while the other was on duty, I might have taken the round-house.

Q. For the reserves?

A. Yes, for the reserves; but under no circumstances would I go into the round-house, without I was certain that every approach to the round-house was thoroughly and properly guarded, and, if it was going to take too many men to guard the approaches to the round-house, I would not go into it then.

Q. Where would you have stationed your men?

A. The hill side there furnished an excellent position. Men could have slept there, and with a small portion of them guarding it, and been free from attack. They could have been free from danger. I like to be out in the open air myself, where I can swing free and clear.

Q. Could you have intrenched yourself on the hill side, so as to make the position secure and safe?

A. I do not think it needed any—it is naturally a strong position. If it was necessary they could have gone to the top of the hill, and nothing could have come in there. A very small force would have guarded any approach. It would not be likely that anybody would have crawled up there.

Q. If there would have been an assault made, would not the troops have been exposed without entrenchments?

A. Not to any extent. Men could have hidden behind a house here and there, and might have taken advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and no large body could have got there.

Q. That hillside is terraced with ravines and wash-outs, which would have given your men as much protection as the enemy?

A. Just as much, and with the advantage that a man in command of the troops would have the selection of the ground. I never walked over the ground particularly—I walk by there twice a day, and I am familiar with the appearance of the hill. What the number of inequalities of the ground are, I do not know, but it is a hill, at all events, and the mob would come from below.

Q. The hill would have been the most eligible position for the force From your knowledge of the Union depot, would that have served as a fortification for General Brown's command to repel the mob, in case they had made an attack on the depot?

A. To go down to the Union depot?

Q. For instance, if they were in the depot?

A. Oh, no; I think not. I do not think that depot was a desirable place for any defense, because there was too much space between there and the transfer station, where General Brown was, but the Union depot was certainly the only place where these troops could get supplies, and it would have been a good thing to have kept that space open, between the Union depot and General Brown. I do not think that the force could have scattered them to the extent that you speak of, defending the Union Depot hotel and transfer station and the round-house. I do not think they had enough men for it.

Q. Was there any available position between the transfer station and the Union depot, where he could have entrenched himself and secured a position?

A. The hillside was there. I think there was too much space between Twenty-eighth street and the Union depot for General Brinton to have attempted to protect all that line of property. He had not enough for that.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Could he, with his men stationed at the Union depot, have gone out and driven off any crowd of men that might attempt to set fire to the cars and thus keep the space clear by sallying from the Union depot.

A. I think he could; and, if it was necessary for him to go into any house, I would have preferred taking the whole command down to the Union depot, than going into the round-house and transfer station.

Q. And then guarded it as far out as you could?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The reason for that would have been that the supplies were all at the Union depot?

A. All at the Union depot.

Q. And the ammunition?

A. The ammunition was there. However, I do not think that General Brinton knew anything about the ammunition, where that was, or anything about it, when he went into the round-house, and neither do I believe that General Brinton anticipated any trouble when he went into the round-house. Firing upon the mob and dispersing it, he was left without any disposition for some time, and then he went into the round-house.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Do you know whether General Brinton received the order from General Latta, to join you at the stock-yards?

A. No; I can only answer that by hearsay.

Q. Did he report that he received that order?

A. Yes, he does. The adjutant general in his report states that Colonel Norris and Colonel Stewart went out to deliver an order to General Brinton. General Brinton in his report states that at a certain time, Colonel Norris did join; he did not state whether Colonel Norris gave him, or what answer he gave Colonel Norris; but the two put together, demonstrate pretty clearly that he did receive an order.

Q. Was there anything to prevent General Brinton from joining you at the stock-yards?

A. Nothing at all, except, probably he might have not known the way out, but he could have found that by inquiring. There was not even that excuse, because he had an officer of the Sixth division with him, I believe, showing him the way.

Q. In his retreat or march from the city to Blairsville, how far did he pass from you, from the stock-yards, how near?

A. He was going away from me within fifteen minutes of the time he left the round-house—about fifteen minutes' march from the round-house he came to the junction of the Sharpsburg and East Liberty roads. The East Liberty led to the right and the Sharpsburg road to the left. He took the road to the left, so he was going away from me all the time after he got to where these two roads united. General Brinton did not get this order that General Latta speaks of in his report and that Colonel Norris carried to him—he did not get that order, and Colonel Norris did not join him until he got to the Sharpsburg bridge.

Q. Until he got to it—he received it before he crossed the river?

A. I think he did. This is only hearsay on my part. I do know that General Brinton had not received that order until he got to the Sharpsburg bridge, because Captain Aull of my regiment had a copy of the order. He had the written order. Colonel Norris had a verbal copy. Stewart and Norris reached General Brinton. Captain Aull did not. Captain Aull was in uniform, and had not the same facilities for passing through crowds that the other two men had who were in citizens' clothes.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. In the absence of the commander-in-chief, who is the senior?

A. The next officer of the line, the senior officer?

Q. Who is he—what person would be the next?

A. In these troops out here I believe General Pearson would be in command.

Q. Of the troops of the State who would be?

A. The Governor is the commander-in-chief. After the Governor, the next senior major general. I believe the senior major general was General Dobson or General Osborne. I have forgotten which. After him comes General Pearson in order of seniority, and after all the major generals had been exhausted the brigadier generals would come in; then the colonels.

Q. Is there any other person except the Governor as commander-in-chief who has authority to call out the militia?

A. I think not. That is a matter of law, and that I am not exactly able to give an opinion upon. My understanding as a military officer is that no one but the Governor can call the troops out. I certainly would hesitate a long time before I would obey an order from anybody else.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. In the absence of the Governor from the State is there any one that could call out the troops?

A. Unless he left orders with his adjutant general.

Q. Can he delegate that power as commander-in-chief to any person?

A. That is another fine legal point. I will say this: That if the Governor is absent and an order came signed by order of the commander-in-chief, James W. Latta, Adjutant General, I should obey it. It is not my business to know whether the Governor is present or not. The order the official——

Q. He might exercise his powers as commander-in-chief out of the State, and without the exercise of the power from him, could any other person exercise that power of commander-in-chief?

A. No, sir; there is no power can order out the militia but the Governor.

Q. Is there such a thing as a Governor pro tem. in the absence of the Governor?

A. I do not think there is such a thing as a Governor pro tem.

Q. The Lieutenant Governor, would he exercise the functions of Governor in case of the death of the Governor?

A. Of course in event of his death he becomes Governor at once. I do not understand that anybody can exercise the functions of the Governor but the Governor. That is a little bit of teaching I learned in the Democratic party when I was a very little bit of a fellow, and never forgot it. We have a respect for law and authority in our party.

Q. Is there anything else you can enlighten us on in regard to the military movements of the mob that you can think of?

A. There is nothing that I can say, except to give an opinion about the character of this mob, and the sufficiency of the military, and civil authorities, &c. I looked around very closely into this matter, and I am perfectly satisfied, in my own mind, that this mob was not to be dealt with by a trifling force. I do not believe it was in the power of the civil authorities to have put it down. I do not believe it was within the power of the small military force that was first called out to have put it down. It ceased to be a riot and got to be an insurrection almost instantly. The time was very short that intervened between the mob and the insurrection.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. What distinction do you make between a mob and an insurrection?

A. I believe that a mob is an uprising in a locality, either here or anywhere else—a small uprising that is within the power of the sheriff to look after. The sheriff, with what posse he might get together, may attempt to restore peace, and, failing in that, call out the local military. I make the dividing line as to when it becomes an insurrection when the executive of the state is compelled to interfere. If the sheriff and the Eighteenth regiment and the Fourteenth regiment and the Nineteenth regiment had put down that thing and restored peace and order, and placed the cars of the railroad in the hands of the company, I would have called it a riot.

Q. And then the difference between a mob and an insurrection is in strength and power?

A. Strength and power. If they overcome the local authorities and the State authorities have to interfere, then it is an insurrection. The sheriff is one arm of the executive. If he cannot quell it, then the executive himself has to come in.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. When you first arrived at the Union depot, that was on——

A. Friday, at noon.

Q. Would it have required a large force to disperse the mob then?

A. It would not—not at Twenty-eighth street. I did not get off the cars at Twenty-eighth street; and I did not go up to Twenty-eighth street; and I did not know what the disposition of the crowd was; and I do not know what was back there—what could be seen—but those that could be seen certainly did not appear over two hundred or two hundred and fifty men.

Q. If there had been active measures taken on Friday or Saturday, could not that mob have been dispersed and the rioting suppressed?

A. I believe it could on Friday. I do not believe it could on Saturday. On Friday it could, because the strikers were determined themselves not to go to work, and some of them were rioters. There is no doubt about it; because some of them had interfered with the civil authorities, and a great portion of them were simply determined that they would not work, and they would not furnish any assistance to the Pennsylvania railroad in running their trains. For that reason, I believe the trains ought to have been started at once. I believe if a train had been started, the backbone of the thing would have been broken. I believe so to-day; but it was impossible to move trains, because you could not get men to man them. They were afraid of the strikers. It was not necessary for a striker to go up and stick a pistol at a man's head, or say, "I will shoot you." Some of them would give a wink and lift a finger, which would be just as effectual as if they had shot at you. I saw one striker go on the back part of an engine tender of a locomotive and take hold of a brake that was there. The engineer attempted to start the train. He just lifted his finger and the engineer never moved that train.

Q. If these trainmen that were willing to run had received the protection either of the military or civil authorities, could they not have run out these trains, and do you not think they would have been run out?

A. I think everybody got all the protection it was possible to give them. The Pennsylvania railroad were not prepared to run these trains, and they knew what the riot was, and what it would amount to more than we did. I knew no reason why troops should be called out on the morning I was called out. Never heard of a disturbance of any kind. After the military had been called out, then affairs had progressed so far that to have started a train from Twenty-eighth street would have required to place upon that train a large force of military to protect it. You could have moved it, probably to the stock-yards, and through the stock-yards, because there was a military force to protect it there, but as soon as they got a little west, why something might be thrown upon the track—a demonstration made of some kind that would block the cars up. There was no certainty it could go very far after it had started. But for the reason that there had been no demonstration made at any point, I believe if the train had been started, it could have gone through; not that it was in the power of the small force, civil or military, to put down the strikers, had they determined to resist, because there were too many of those strikers and fellow helpers in the mob.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You think there was a necessity for calling on the military?

A. Oh, undoubtedly. There is no question about it in my mind. The only thing I find to regret was that the military did not have proper information as to what it meant. I am but an humble citizen of the city of Pittsburgh, and I know nothing about the strike on the Pennsylvania railroad, and what led to it, and what it meant. I went down to Union depot, and until I met General Pearson, or the sheriff, I knew no reason why the military should be called out. When I got back I could see why. There was a demonstration against law and order.

Q. There was a necessity?

A. There was a necessity, for the evidence proved that.

Colonel Joseph H. Gray, sworn:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside, Colonel?

A. I reside in Pittsburgh, East End.

Q. What is your official position in the National Guard?

A. I am colonel of the Fourteenth regiment.

Q. Were you in the war of the late rebellion?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What rank did you hold?

A. I was orderly sergeant of a company in the One Hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania regiment.

Q. How long were you in the army?

A. I went in in 1861, and remained in the service until the battle of Fair Oaks, where I was laid up from service.

Q. State when you received the orders calling you into service in July last—what day it was and what time?

A. I was not present. I had left Thursday morning and gone to the country, fourteen miles, and on Friday the order reached head-quarters for Colonel Glenn to assemble the regiment, about noon or after dinner some time.

Q. Was he lieutenant colonel?

A. Yes; lieutenant colonel. About Friday evening I heard that there was trouble in the city, and that the military was called out, and I also heard that the men could not be depended on—that they were not going to respond. Citizens from East Liberty came up. I jumped in my buggy and started to the city, and I met one company at East Liberty. I stopped there and, to my astonishment, found that the company had been assembled, and that a large majority of the company had responded to the call, and were ready for service, in their armory. I spoke a few words to the captain and told him to remain there until I came from the city, and he requested me to telegraph him immediately, and send him some orders. I stopped at my home, and put on my fatigue uniform, and came to the city, and went to the central armory and found there my adjutant, and that Lieutenant Colonel Glenn had taken what men had assembled there—there are three companies who have their armories there—and he had taken them to the Union Depot hotel. I immediately went there and reported for duty to General Brown. I inquired of my officers as to the number of men that had reported for duty, and then I had six companies in the city and four in the country. I inquired whether Captain Shof had been ordered out at East Liberty—he told me not. I went to the dispatcher's office, at the end of the hotel, and telegraphed to those companies to report to me immediately, at the Union Depot hotel. However, at that time they could not very well get in, and I changed the order to report to me on the first morning train coming into the city. About 7 o'clock Captain Nesbitt came up and Captain Glenn, of Mansfield, reported with their companies. That was Friday evening. It was six o'clock when I came to the Union depot, and they arrived at seven. I went out to the dispatcher's office the second time, to order Captain Perchman in. I then met, for the first time, General Pearson and told him what I proposed doing, and he said that he preferred that Captain Perchman should remain in his armory there for the present, and Colonel Moore, as chief of staff, told me he had communicated with Captain Perchman to this effect, that he should go and get his men rations and remain there, so that I then turned my attention to having my men fed. I asked the gentleman in charge of the depot if he had any cars in the … he should run them down, so that I could put my men into them for the night, until further orders. He immediately had cars run down. I did that because I wanted to get my men—there was a great deal of talking on the platform around the depot about the future operations. General Latta had just come in, and there was a good deal of excitement, and I did not want my men to know anything about it. I put them in the cars and kept them there until three o'clock, in the morning. Then I received an order, about twelve or one o'clock, to take my command, at three o'clock, sharp, to Twenty-eighth street, by way of Webster avenue. I marched out of the Union depot precisely at three o'clock, and General Brown and Colonel Smith and another gentleman. We went to Twenty-eighth street by a circuitous route, and took a position on the hill side center, opposite Twenty-eighth street, in line. There we remained during the day. I should say about nine o'clock, perhaps between eight and nine o'clock, General Brown sent his adjutant to me, asking the detail of one or two companies—I think he said fifty men.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. That was on Saturday?

A. That was on Saturday morning. I sent two companies to the foot of the hill, and they were on duty there for an hour, perhaps an hour and a half, and they were relieved by two other companies.

Q. From your regiment?

A. Yes, sir; during the forenoon I sent a request to General Brown that my two companies should be relieved. They had all been down, and I asked that they be relieved by the Nineteenth regiment. I thought we were doing more than our share of duty, and for other reasons I asked to be relieved.

Q. You speak here of Colonel Glenn?

A. Lieutenant Colonel Glenn. He assembled my regiment in the city, and reported to the Union depot.

Q. You say you were accompanied by Colonel Smith?

A. Colonel Smith.

Q. What regiment?

A. He is connected with another regiment.

Q. During the day, what companies were on duty at the foot of the hill?

A. They were not under my command. I never knew what orders they had that were detailed. I do not know to-day what their orders were. I know what duty they were performing. I was never down on the railroad myself until I was ordered off the hill. We were there when the Philadelphia troops came there, and we were witnesses of the conflict. About two o'clock in the afternoon I received an order—I think it was about that time—the only order I received from the time I had got an order to go to Twenty-eighth street—I received an order to have my command in readiness to move, at a moment's notice, on board a train. I immediately sent my commissary, Captain Wallace, to provide rations. While there was no explanation of that order, I understood his meaning that we should take charge of a freight train. I had the provisions there. The captain got the provisions at Twenty-eighth street, three days' rations, and we remained, momentarily expecting an order to move down the hill and get on board a train. At the time that the Philadelphia troops came out——

Q. Before you come to that—did I understand you to say that you had no knowledge of what orders those companies had that were detailed, and sent down to the crossing of the railroad?

A. They were detailed away from my command, and I had no knowledge of what was to be done.

Q. Who did they report to?

A. They reported to General Brown. I know what duty they were performing there—could see it all. I might just say here that I had great apprehensions of the whole matter. They were not the impressions I had since. Those were what I had then. I want to say this: that I gave orders distinctly and positively that my men should not be allowed to talk with, or in any way have any conversation with, the strikers, and I say, also, that that order was positive. Of course, men sometimes were away; it was a pretty hot day, and they had to go for water, and occasionally, perhaps, they talked; but I do not think my orders were violated at all in any respect. I stayed with my men all day long watching their behavior, and at this time I received an order to get my men ready to go on a train. I felt pleased at this, for I thought those who were at the head of affairs understood the situation. I had my doubts before that whether they did. Though we did not go on the train, we were there, ready to go on after the firing was over.

Q. Give us the circumstances of the affair; how it occurred—you were present there at the time, were you not?—as briefly as you can?

A. I would say, first, that the Philadelphia troops came out in as grand style as ever men went to any duty, and their position was good. There can be no exceptions taken to the position. They moved up the tracks. My recollection of the matter is that there was one company in advance of the First regiment. I did not know it was the First regiment at that time. I know that from the report. They moved, and they were formed in line and marched to the left to the round-house, cleared the tracks, and then the rear rank was about faced, and cleared the track, leaving an open space. Two other companies were brought up, and a Gatling gun brought up to that space, and the company in advance marched right into the crowd. They were as determined men as ever stood before anybody. I looked very earnestly, and with a good deal of solicitation, when the stones were thrown and pistol shots fired. I could not see whether there was many or not. There was a great deal of confusion, and the firing began and was kept up—a continuous firing.

Q. You say that pistol shots were fired from the mob?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And stones thrown from the mob and other missiles?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any firing from the troops before that?

A. There was not a shot fired until after they were attacked. The first thing I saw—I knew it was coming. I was not disappointed a particle in regard to the whole matter—the company charge bayonets on the crowd, and the first thing I saw was a man in the mob take hold of a gun, and one man wrenched the gun away from him, and struck him with the bayonet with a good deal of force.

Q. That is, one of the soldiers?

A. Yes; and then the pistol shots were fired. It was all done in a moment, and then the fire began by the soldiers.

Q. Was there any command given to fire?

A. It was too far away for hearing the command; but I may say it was effectually done, and if that was so, it was only a pity the command had not been given.

Q. Was it a volley or was it a scattering fire?

A. It was a scattering fire, but it extended all along the line. We were immediately in front of the rear rank that faced to the rear, and received a good share of the fire.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Was there a rush made by the mob towards the troops before the firing began?

A. The thing had been gathering momentum from ten o'clock. It was not a mob—the mob in front—that I was afraid of at all. It was the feeling that existed there, apparently strong outside, and when the mills closed that afternoon, it seemed to me they just came up there in hundreds.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Rolling mills, iron mills, and so forth?

A. Yes, sir; the crowd accumulated rapidly. They were going and coming all the time, and they were there in force.

Q. The mill hands are generally at leisure on Saturday afternoon?

A. I think they came right out of the mills, when they closed down. A great many, perhaps, came there out of curiosity, but there was a great many added to the mob down on Twenty-eighth street. The crowd increased rapidly at that time.

Q. From what you saw, would you consider an order to fire justifiable?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What took place after that?

A. The crowd ran away. Those that were on the hill side came up and devoted themselves to the carrying away of the wounded for a time. The Philadelphia troops moved up and took their position by the crossing, at Twenty-eighth street, and placed their Gatling gun in position there, and I ordered my companies, Captain Glenn and Captain Nesbitt, up in line of battalion. The crowd down the road, that had been there, collected again. However, they did not make any attempt to force themselves on to the railroad. The Philadelphia troops would strike terror into the crowd and they would run away for a time, and then would find there was no danger, and then they would come back.

Q. When did you go after that?

A. Five or six o'clock, after quiet had been restored, and the wounded had all been carried away, I received an order from General Pearson, to assist Colonel Howard, in moving Breck's guns to the round-house, and then go to the transfer office, and hold it against any attack. I sent that order—it was a written order—with my adjutant, to General Brown, who was with Colonel Howard, on my right and front, and reported to him that I was ready to move, in obedience to the order. However, I want to say, that was very reluctantly done.

Q. What was reluctantly done?

A. That movement by me. That was done, because their officers and their commands were there. Captain Breck came to me at that time, and said he had such an order, and asked me if I would not see General Pearson, and protest against the matter. I said to him that there were my men immediately in my line, and he commenced to explain the situation that he could be in, and I said to him, "Captain, I won't allow any discussion of that kind here." I told him to step to one side, and this order reached me, just at that time, and after I read the order, I found Captain Breck was waiting and I went to him. He asked me if I had concluded to do anything in the matter, and I said to him, we will obey the order. I felt then it was a great mistake.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. For what reason?

A. I did not think we had any business down on Twenty-eighth street.

Q. You went down to obey the order?

A. We obeyed the order. However, just immediately at that time the Philadelphia troops began moving into the round-house, commencing on the left, and moving in all the way up, and Captain Breck took this battery, and then went away, and left me on the hill. When I moved up they were all in the round-house, and the mob was pressing down this track. I moved down the hill. Had to go down by a flank movement. I anticipated trouble then, because I knew by their actions—they hooted and jeered and taunted the soldiers—the Philadelphians—as they went away. I anticipated trouble. However, we marched down by the gate-way, and marched through the crowd, and to the transfer station. Upon my arrival at the transfer station, I took a view of the station myself. Colonel Howard came and asked me in regard to the matter. Colonel Howard asked me if I would take command of the station. I told him General Brown was here, and he was in authority. I told him that I would throw out pickets on my front. The transfer station was separated by tracks in between. Colonel Howard was on the side next to the hill, and I was on Liberty street, and I told him I would take care of my side; that he could dispose of his own troops. We remained there, and the most of them went and laid down to sleep. It was dark, and most of my men, except those on duty, went to sleep. During the night General Brown came to me, and said that the place was untenable, and he advised me to get out of it. We commenced to consult about the matter, and I told him there was no trouble there, that it was a good place to rest, and that if we got into any trouble we could get out of it. A short time afterwards he and Colonel Howard came back, and I had the situation in my own mind, and had sent my officers out on the hill side, and at that very time I had sent Doctor McCandless, surgeon on my staff. He was well acquainted with the hill side in that part of town. I sent him up there to look at the situation—it is a very ragged hill—to see in case there was a necessity to pick out the best way, of a return by the way of the hill side to my old position on the hill side. When General Brown and Colonel Howard came to me, I told them what I had done, that I expected that our position was such we could not do any fighting, but we could from the hill side, and I had sent officers out to select a way by which we could get out, if necessary. There was no immediate danger. About ten o'clock General Brown came to me again, and said we must get out. He had information that we must leave that place. Says I, "General Brown, you cannot persuade me to leave this, I will obey your orders, but I do not see any necessity for leaving this position at this time." He immediately ordered me to take my command, and go to the Union depot. I formed my command, and we started, but the road was full of cars, and we had to go out the best way we could. We got out into the open track below, and when I got out there, I halted the advance of the regiment, re-formed and marched into the Union depot in good order.

Q. Will you please tell me about how far it is from the transfer station to the round-house, where the Philadelphia troops were?

A. From the transfer station?

Q. From where you were stationed?

A. I have very little knowledge as to the location of that transfer depot. I never passed through there, except going east on the train at night, but I do not think it is very far, probably two hundred yards.

Q. That is where you were stationed, about two hundred yards from the round-house?

A. I should think so. That is my idea of the distance there. When I arrived at the Union depot, I was pretty disgusted with the thing—had been all day, for that matter. After I re-formed my men, I had expected to get some rations. I knew my commissary was there getting some, and I sent an officer to inquire and find out. General Brown, I went to him, and asked him for orders, and to my utter astonishment he told me I could dismiss my command.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you obey him?

A. Not then. I called around my officers—those that were nearest to me—surrounded the general, and protested in the strongest terms that I was allowed to, in regard to the matter, that it was a disgrace to the officers and men that I had there willing to do their duty; that it was a disgrace also to desert the Philadelphia troops. The general was a little startled at my talk, and he says, "You remain here a few minutes, and I will see you again." He left me, and I did not see him again.

By Mr. Means:

Q. I would like to know where and when your regiment was disbanded?

A. When and where it was disbanded. It was disbanded a few minutes before eleven o'clock at the Union Depot hotel, by myself, in obedience to General Brown's order. And I want to say this in regard to that matter: After I remained there awhile, I went up to the office of the Union Depot hotel, and inquired for General Pearson, and they told me that the general was not there. I inquired for General Latta, and they told me he was not there. I wondered where he could have gone to, and I saw Mr. Murdock, who is one of the officers, and he made the same reply; and I had great confidence in him.

Q. Your head-quarters is here at the market-house, isn't it?

A. I had my head-quarters at my office. That is, our armory.

Q. Your regiment was not brought there, then, as a regiment, and disbanded?

A. Not that night. No, sir; because I had four companies who had to go home by railroad.

Q. Were any of the companies brought down here and disbanded?

A. That night?

Q. Yes, sir?

A. No, sir. I directed my staff officers to notify the commanding officers of companies that their services were not needed, and to take their men to the armories and dismiss them.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. What the captain wishes to get at is, did your men break ranks there at the Union depot?

A. I had a company in the next day at ten o'clock.

Q. They marched out by companies?

A. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Means:

Q. What I want to get at is this: If your regiment was disbanded at the Union depot; and after that, did you not have command of them as a regiment?

A. Well, sir, I dismissed my regiment at the Union depot. I also sent word to the companies who had to leave the city—I had four companies—that they were perfectly safe, and they better not go away till morning.

Q. What did they do with their arms, when you dismissed them?

A. They took them home, except one company; they could not get away that night, and stayed there. At ten the next day, I had three companies that went out on the eleven o'clock train.

By Mr. Means:

Q. The companies that left lived in the rural districts; they took their arms with them to their homes?

A. I think they all did, so far as I know, except one company.

Q. And they remained in the city?

A. That company was a home company, and remained at the Union depot until ten o'clock next day, before it left.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. How many rounds of ammunition had you?

A. I think we had about eight or ten rounds to a man. It was not very equally divided, but we averaged that during the morning. We had received our ammunition, our share of the ammunition, by requisition, a few weeks before that time, and had sent out to the arsenal, and they had not received it, and it was left at Captain Fox's armory, in Lawrenceville, and on that morning, I think that we hadn't enough, and I sent out a wagon and had a box of a thousand rounds brought in, and it was carried up from the crossing to my regiment, and a great many of the strikers came up to see what kind it was, and that was the only time that any of them was up there in any considerable number. That is, if there were any up there, they were strikers away from the fold. They came up, and I allowed them to remain there until the ammunition was distributed and issued, so that they could see what it was. Then I ordered them down the hill and they went. A few minutes after that one of their number, I presume him to be one of their number, came up and commenced to me about our being there, and I asked him who he was, and he said he was a striker, and that they were armed and that they were going to fight for their rights.

Q. This was on Saturday?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Before the Philadelphia troops came out there?

A. Yes, sir; he said they were armed and they were going to fight for their rights. I heard him, and told him if that was all the business they had up there he had better get down the hill, or I would arrest him. He left. That is the only man I talked to that day outside of my own regiment.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did you know who that man was?

A. No; I did not know him.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. At the time your dismissed your troops at the Union Depot hotel, about eleven o'clock, was the whole number with you that you took out in the morning?

A. No, sir; there was not.

Q. What had become of those that were not there?

A. I dismissed some men early in the day of Saturday morning, men whom I think were not in a condition to do service there under the circumstances.

Q. For what reason?

A. There was two of them got something to drink and got drunk. I think they were drunk, and I relieved them from duty and sent them away. That was one thing I had great care about. I believe that a commander is responsible for the morality of his men, and I was looking after that particularly on that occasion.

Q. How many less men did you have at night?

A. I had between thirty and forty.

Q. That were missing—some of those went off on their own account?

A. No, sir. I dismissed one company entire. I had one company after the firing of the troops—a great many of the killed and wounded were killed immediately in front of my line, and I saw the men raising their guns to fire, and I ordered my men to lie down, and I think I saved the lives of some of them by so doing. Immediately after that there was a great deal of excitement, and the crowd down on the hill side came rushing back and got in the rear of my line. I ordered the captains to examine the men to see that they had not loaded their arms. I did not anticipate that that was the end of it, but I wanted to know whether any of my men had loaded their arms under the excitement, and I found it was reported that some of them had. I saw some myself, and this company—the lieutenant had an altercation and tussle, and took a gun—the man refused to obey, and the lieutenant took hold of the gun and took it from him. It created a panic in the company, and they ran back of the line for a few yards, and I sent Colonel Glenn to see what the trouble was, and the men were a good deal excited. Afterwards the captain came to me and I sent an order to have them remain there in that position, and the captain came to me afterwards and asked me to order them back into the line, which I refused to do. I determined to send them home. I dismissed twenty-eight men in one company. I want to say that I believe I did these men a great injustice. Some of these men tried to get back here at night. I did not know the circumstances, and I supposed that under the excitement of the firing that they had run back. And when the matter was explained to me afterwards, I believe I did them a great injustice. I know I did, because they did service after worthy of all praise.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Did any of your men straggle off and desert?