The most comprehensive right of a state is the right to exist as a sovereign political unity. From this comprehensive right flow the general rights of independence, equality, jurisdiction, property, and intercourse and the obligations which the exercise of these rights imply. There are many classifications of the general rights of states. During the eighteenth century a classification into perfect and imperfect rights was common. A classification based on the essential nature of the state as a sovereign political unity, having (1) a right to existence and (2) from the point of view of international law, having relations to other states, has been widely followed. The rights based on the comprehensive right to existence were variously named as essential, fundamental, primitive, innate, absolute, permanent, etc., while the rights derived from the practice of states in their mutual relations were called accidental, derived, secondary, acquired, relative, contingent, etc. The view now most generally recognized is that from the single comprehensive right of states to exist, all other rights flow, and all other rights are therefore related, if not directly, at least by virtue of their common source.
Independence from the point of view of international law is freedom from external political control. While all states possessing freedom from external political control may not be admitted to the family of states, yet in order that a state may be admitted, it is regarded as essential that it be independent. The recognition of a state carries with it the recognition of independence. However, from the fact that there are states in the world having equal rights to independence, it follows that the field of action of each state is limited by the necessity of respect for the right of independence belonging to other states.
The recognition of a state presupposes autonomy as an essential for the existence of a sovereign political unity, and autonomy implies the right to determine and pursue such lines of action as may be in accord with its policy.
All states, the existence of which has been recognized by the family of states, are regarded as possessed of equal rights in political affairs, so far as legal competence is concerned.
This does not imply an equality of territorial area, population, wealth, rank, and influence, etc., or that a given state may not voluntarily limit the exercise of its powers.
The right of jurisdiction is the right to exercise state authority. The right of jurisdiction is in general coextensive with the dominion of the state. It may be "laid down as a general proposition that all persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction of a sovereign are amenable to the jurisdiction of himself or his courts; and that the exceptions to this rule are such only as by common usage and public policy have been allowed, in order to preserve the peace and harmony of nations, and to regulate their intercourse in a manner best suited to their dignity and rights."[89]
In international law, as against other states, a given state has the right of property or domain in the territory and fixtures within its limits. This right of property is not the right in the old feudal sense, for in the public law of the state the title of ownership may vest in the state only in a limited sense as over territory to which none of its subjects have title, and over such other forms it has ownership in corporate capacity, as public buildings, forts, arsenals, vessels, lighthouses, libraries, museums, etc. The right of eminent domain as a domestic right may also vest in the state. While from the point of view of international law, a state has the right of property over all territorial and non-territorial possessions within its limits as against other states, yet the effect of this right is somewhat modified by the fact of public or private ownership, particularly as regards the laws of war, neutrality, and intercourse.
In early periods of history intercourse among states was very limited and sometimes even prohibited. At the present time the necessities of state existence presuppose, in international law, the recognition of the right of intercourse in order that state business may be transacted. The principles upon which this intercourse is carried on are well established, and form the basis of diplomatic practice.
EXISTENCE
Besides the general rights of independence, equality, jurisdiction, property, and intercourse, the right of existence in its exercise may lead to certain acts for which the general principles of international law do not provide rules.[90]
(a) In face of actual dangers immediately threatening its existence, a state may take such measures as are necessary for self-preservation, even though not sanctioned by international law. Such measures, however, must be from "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation," and further "must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it."[91] The wide discussion of the case of the Virginius involved the principle of the limits of the right of self-defense.[92]
(b) The right to act in a manner which international law does not sanction or denies, even though it may be strictly to preserve the existence of the state so acting, cannot be upheld as freeing it from responsibility for such acts, and these acts may be regarded as hostile by states affected by them.
(c) As the domestic acts of a state are not within the province of international law, a state has the right to administer its internal affairs in such manner as it may determine fit to secure and further its existence. It may adopt any form of government; may plan for its growth by developing its resources, by encouraging immigration; may strengthen defenses and forces; may regulate trade, commerce, and travel. While acts of this character may work injury to other states, they are not in general just grounds for war, but may properly be met by like acts on the part of other states.
As the subjects of a state are necessary for its existence, the right of self-preservation has been held to justify certain acts of states to secure to their subjects in their relations with foreign states such rights as the foreign states would accord to their own subjects under similar circumstances. That a local tribunal within a purely domestic division of a state cannot secure to foreigners rights to which they are entitled, in no way frees that state, whose sovereignty extends over such domestic division, from responsibility for violation of the foreigner's right. International law recognizes only the personality of the sovereign political unity, and cannot cognize the administrative and other subdivisions. Hall says, "States possess a right of protecting their subjects abroad which is correlative to their responsibility in respect of injuries inflicted upon foreigners within their dominions."[93] "Fundamentally, however, there is no difference in principle between wrongs inflicted by breach of a monetary agreement and other wrongs for which the state, as itself the wrong-doer, is immediately responsible. The difference which is made in practice is in no sense obligatory; and it is open to governments to consider each case by itself, and to act as seems well to them on its merits."[94]
INDEPENDENCE
Strictly, there can be no limitation or restriction of independence, for it is a recognized principle that independence must be absolute and inalienable. In fact, every state voluntarily accepts either formally by treaty or tacitly by practice, many conditions which restrain it in the exercise of its powers. The independence of the state is not thereby violated, since the restraint is exercised by the state itself, and is not an act of external control. The number of these restraints which states voluntarily assume is continually increasing, owing to the closer relations of humanity.
The exercise of the right of independence involves the privilege of making treaties, alliances, contracts, and municipal laws, so far as these do not violate international law or the right of independence as possessed by other states. A state may go to war to maintain its independence. The international rights of a state are in general closely related to the right of independence, and derive force from this relationship.
Undoubtedly the idea of establishing a relationship among "neighboring states more or less connected with one another, by virtue of which no one among them can injure the independence or essential rights of another without meeting with effectual resistance on some side and consequently exposing itself to danger"[95] is not a modern idea. Ancient states united to prevent the growth of some neighboring power to such magnitude as would threaten their independence.[96] From the beginning of the modern period of international law, Peace of Westphalia (1648), the idea of maintaining an equilibrium among the powers of Europe has had great influence, and until the latter part of the nineteenth century was regarded as one of the fundamental principles of European international practice. Many treaties aim to preserve this balance among the European powers, and the words "balance" and "equilibrium" often appear.[97] The Treaty of Utrecht in its provision between Spain and Great Britain, July 13, 1713, gives as its object ad firmandam stabiliendamque pacem ac tranquillitatem christiani orbis justo potentiæ equilibro. The idea that independence was to be preserved by some balance of power reappears in successive treaties. This idea of the balance of power has led to most diverse action. Unjust rulers have made it the cloak for action entirely outside the sanction of international law. Many times it has "served as the pretext for a quarrel, and repeatedly made hostilities general which would otherwise have been shut up within a comparatively small area."[98] The feeling that the balance of power was a necessary policy for the preservation of European states, led to the idea that states should be constrained to certain lines of action, which would prevent, in many cases, normal growth. Frequently the independence of a state was violated to anticipate an action which might disturb the European equilibrium. The partitions of Poland show a violation of the principles of international law for the sake of giving equal compensation to the parties to it.
The doctrine of the balance of power is not a principle of international law, but merely a maxim of European political practice pretending to state the means of maintaining the independence of European states.[99]
Another maxim of political action is that which has become known as the "Monroe Doctrine." While enunciated by a single state, it had in view the maintenance of the independence of the states of the American continent. For many years after the Revolutionary War the opinion prevailed that Europe viewed with disfavor the growth of the American republic. The Holy Alliance, formed on the downfall of Napoleon, was followed by several congresses of European powers, at one of which, held at Verona in 1822, the subject of helping Spain recover her revolting colonies in America was discussed. This led to the declaration of President Monroe in his message of Dec. 2, 1823, that there should be, (1) no more European colonies on these continents, (2) no extension of the European political system to any portion of this hemisphere, (3) no European interposition in the affairs of the Spanish-American republics. This doctrine has been repeatedly affirmed by the United States, and in some instances very liberally interpreted. It in no way embodies a principle of international law, though the European and other states may regard it as expressing the attitude of the United States upon the points covered, and if desirous of avoiding friction, govern themselves accordingly. If it were a principle of international law, the United States would not be justified in changing its attitude upon the doctrine, but probably it would not be seriously maintained that the United States might not enunciate another policy setting aside the Monroe Doctrine. Reddaway well says, "that it produced its desired effect as an act of policy, but in no way modified the Law of Nations."[100] This doctrine cannot be considered as outlining a principle of non-intervention, as has sometimes been claimed, but it rather announces a policy of intervention on the part of the United States to anticipate intervention by other powers.
The doctrine has always failed of legislative indorsement, and has been strenuously opposed by European powers. That it has been recognized, however, to a certain extent, appears by the course of events.[101] It was recently applied in the case of the intervention by the United States in the dispute over the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. Great Britain and the United States settled the difficulty by a submission to arbitration.[102]
With the right of independence goes the correlative obligation of non-intervention, i.e. of refraining from all acts that would forcibly limit the freedom of another state. This obligation of non-intervention does not extend to the limitation of acts involving no display or threat of force, as in the case of mediation and arbitration. Nor can it be claimed that the obligation of non-intervention can be urged against measures undertaken by a state to preserve its fundamental right to existence. There is no right of intervention, as has been sometimes argued, though an act of intervention may be sometimes justifiable in itself.[103] Intervention is the attempt of one or more states, by means of force, to coerce another state in its purely state action. The making of an alliance between two may influence a third state in its action, but it cannot be considered an intervention, nor is the tender of friendly offices in the settlement of a dispute to which a state is a party, intervention; but when a state directly interferes with the exercise of the authority in another state or by another state, it constitutes intervention. Intervention may vary greatly in degree and in character, whether it be armed or diplomatic. Each case must be considered separately on its merits, and if in any degree a justifiable measure, it must be on the highest grounds, and the motives of the intervening state must be pure. While it is still necessary to discuss the question of intervention in its various forms, yet, as Hall says: "It is unfortunate that publicists have not laid down broadly and unanimously that no intervention is legal, except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a breach of the law as between states has taken place, or unless the whole body of civilized states have concurred in authorizing it."[104]
The nineteenth century might be called the century of interventions, for its whole political history has been closely related to the application of measures of intervention of the most varied sort. Naturally, all authorities do not agree as to the causes underlying the action of the several states, nor as to the nomenclature which should be used in describing these measures. A review of some of the cases of intervention during the nineteenth century shows that while the doctrine of non-intervention has been more and more widely professed, the practice has been strongly influenced by political expediency.
Intervention for any cause may always be regarded by the state whose independence is impinged as a hostile act, and a ground for war, thus putting the matter outside the international law of peace.[105]
(a) Intervention for Self-preservation. As the right of existence is the first right of a state and universally admitted, intervention may sometimes be used as a means of maintaining this existence. In such a case it is clearly a matter of policy as to the means which a state shall use, and if it resorts to intervention rather than other means, it must have ample grounds for its action in the particular case. A case of intervention on the grounds of self-preservation which has caused much debate is that of England in the two attacks upon Copenhagen in 1801 and 1807, on the ground that it was necessary for English supremacy of the seas, which formed her chief defense, to prevent the union of the Danish forces with those of the other powers. Intervention cannot be justified by any appeal to general principles which inhere in the act itself. "The facts of intervention are acts of the political existence of states. Good or bad, according as the intervention is injurious or beneficial."[106] Of intervention as a method of state action, Sir W. Harcourt says: "It is a high and summary procedure which may sometimes snatch a remedy beyond the reach of law. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that in case of Intervention, as in that of Revolution, its essence is illegality, and its justification is its success. Of all things, at once the most injustifiable and the most impolitic is an unsuccessful Intervention."[107] Non-intervention is the obligation which international law enjoins. It gives no sanction to a "right of intervention" which would be entirely inconsistent with the right of independence. The question of intervention is one of state policy only, and is outside the limits of the field of international law. Intervention is a method of state action which is justifiable only in rare cases, and less and less justifiable as the growing mutual dependence of states makes possible other methods less open to objection. International law at the present day undoubtedly regards intervention when strictly necessary to preserve the fundamental right of the intervening state to its existence as a permissible act though contravening the right of independence in another state.
(b) Intervention to prevent Illegal Acts. As international law must rest upon the observance of certain general principles, it may in extreme cases be necessary to intervene in order that these principles may be respected by certain states in their dealings with other states which, though weaker in physical force, have equal rights in international law. How far any state will act as champion of the law of nations is a question which it must decide for itself. Unquestionably international law would look with favor upon measures necessary for its own preservation.
(c) Intervention by General Sanction. Some authorities have maintained that intervention when sanctioned by a group of states is justifiable. It is probable that a group of states would be less liable to pursue an unjust course than a single state, and that intervention under such sanction would be more liable to be morally justifiable. It is, however, no more legal than the same act by a single state; and if general consent is the only sanction, while the act may be expedient, advantageous, and morally just, it cannot be regarded as upheld by international law, nor can a single act of this kind establish a principle. The several cases of such intervention under general sanction can hardly be regarded as sufficiently similar to establish a principle even upon the Eastern Question in Europe.[108] It may be concluded that while general sanction of a considerable group of states may, for a given interference, free a state from moral blame and warrant the act as a matter of policy, yet it does not give any international law sanction for intervention by general consent.
(d) Other Grounds of Intervention. Many reasons have been advanced as justifying such measures as intervention.
(1) Intervention to carry out provisions of treaties of guaranty was formerly common, e.g. intervention by one state to preserve the same form of government in the other or to maintain the ruling family. It is now held that no treaty can justify interference in the internal affairs of a state not party to the treaty.
In general, intervention, because of treaty stipulations, even when the state subject to the intervention is a party to the treaty, is a violation of independence unless the treaty provides for such measures, in which case the state has become a protected state or entered into relations by which it has not full state powers. Such treaties must be clearly state acts and not acts of individuals "who from their position have the opportunity of giving to their personal agreements the form of a state act."[109] While there is still difference of opinion as to the question of intervention under treaty sanction, the weight of opinion seems to be decidedly to the effect that such intervention has no ground of justification in international law.
(2) Intervention to preserve the balance of power, which was regarded as a necessary means for the preservation of European peace, has been considered as justifiable till recent times. Since the middle of the nineteenth century the position has received less and less support, though advanced in behalf of the preservation of the Turkish Empire and the adjustment of the Balkan states. In 1854 Great Britain and France, on the appeal of the Sultan for assistance against the Russian aggressions, determined to aid him, "their said Majesties being fully persuaded that the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present Limits is essential to the maintenance of the Balance of Power among the States of Europe."[110] The attitude at the present time is stated by Lawrence. "The independence of states is not to be violated on the ground of possible danger to some imaginary equilibrium of political forces."[111]
(3) Interventions upon the broad and indefinite ground of humanity have been common and were generally upheld by the writers to the time of Vattel. Since his day opposition to intervention of this kind has gradually obtained favor. What the grounds of humanity are, and which nation's ideas of humanity shall be accepted as standard, have been questions difficult to settle to the general satisfaction of states. For a state to set itself up as judge of the actions of another state and to assume that it has the right to extend its powers to settling and regulating affairs of morals, religion, and the relations of public authority to the subjects in another state, on the ground of maintaining the rights of mankind as a whole, is to take a ground which the conduct of any modern state, even the most civilized, would hardly warrant. While it is admitted that a state or states may sometimes interfere to prevent one state from unduly oppressing another, as in the intervention of the powers in Greece in 1827, yet it is generally held that to interfere because the internal affairs of a given state are not conducted in a manner pleasing to the foreign state is to give a sanction to an act that would result in far more evil than good. Such intervention has often taken place. The "Holy Alliance," in attempting to guard Europe from "the curse of Revolution," advocated in practice a most dangerous form of intervention.[112] Indeed, much of the European history of the nineteenth century is but a history of successive interventions. In spite of all this, as Walker says, "the rule regularly progresses towards more general recognition, that non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state is a law which admits of no exception to foreign powers, so long as the operations of that state are confined in their effect to the limits of the national territory."[113]
Nevertheless, the United States interfered in the affairs of Cuba on the ground of humanity. The President, in his message of April 11, 1898, says, after a long statement of the facts: "I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action."[114] By joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, demand was made upon Spain to relinquish its authority in Cuba, and the President was authorized to use land and naval forces to carry the resolution into effect.[115]
(4) In time of civil war, on invitation of both parties, a foreign state may act as mediator, but unless the revolting party has been recognized, this is mediation in a domestic sense rather than intervention in the sense of international law.
Under other conditions there is a diversity of view as to the proper course of action.[116] Some deny with Vattel, G. F. de Martens, Heffter, Fiore, Bluntschli, Woolsey, and others maintain or permit intervention in civil war at the request of one of the parties, though some of the authorities do not permit intervention except on the invitation of the parent state and not on that of the rebelling party. Bluntschli (§ 476) and Woolsey (§ 42) admit intervention only in behalf of the party representing the state; Vattel and some others permit intervention in behalf of the party which the intervening state considers to have the right of the contest, thus opening the arbitration of the contest to a foreign state. Both of these positions are receiving less and less of sanction. Intervention in behalf of the established state implies a doubt as to which power within the state is the de facto power, and as Hall says: "the fact that it has been necessary to call in foreign help is enough to show that the issue of the conflict would without it be uncertain, and consequently that there is a doubt as to which side would ultimately establish itself as the legal representative of the state."[117] It is plain to see that intervention in behalf of the rebelling party is a violation of the independence of the existing state. It is equally clear that international law does not give a foreign state a right to judge upon the justice or merits of domestic questions in another state.
The principle may now be regarded as established by both theory and practice that the invitation of neither party to a domestic strife gives a right to a foreign state to intervene, and that no state has a right to judge as to the merits of the contest and to interfere in behalf of the party it thinks in the right. Indeed, intervention because of civil war only is in no case justifiable, though the consequences of such a disturbance may warrant intervention upon other grounds.[118]
(5) Intervention on the ground of financial transactions is not now sanctioned. A state may make any injustice done its subjects by a foreign state a matter of diplomatic negotiations. It has sometimes been held that contracts running between a state and the subject or subjects of another state may, if violated, become grounds of just intervention, and that the subjects had a right to demand action by their sovereign. This ground is manifestly insufficient, though each state is judge as to what measures it will take in a given case. International law does not guarantee the payment of loans which are merely personal transactions between the individual and the state in its corporate capacity, nor can the public law of one state be expected to hold in another. Interference on such grounds is a matter of expediency and not a matter of right.
(e) Conclusion. In general, the best authorities seem to agree that at the present time, owing to the ease with which other measures may be taken, intervention can be admitted only on the single ground of self-preservation. The numerous cases of intervention upon varied grounds amply show that any other ground would be open to wide abuse, as has often been the case. For general purposes of remedy for injury such measures as retorsion, reprisals, embargo, and pacific blockade may be taken when a state deems it expedient and is willing to assume the responsibility for such measures.[119] While intervention is, for the sake of preserving the existence of a state, a justifiable measure, it is not a right, but merely a means sometimes justifiable to preserve a right,—the right of a state to exist, which alone supersedes the obligation of non-intervention.
EQUALITY
The equality of states was an early premise of international law. This equality, however wide may have been its meaning, as interpreted by some of the earlier writers, can now be held to extend only to legal status. A state from its very being as a sovereign unity must be legally equal to any other state. Only those states members of the international circle are regarded as possessed of this equality from the point of view of international law. So far as legal attributes as states extend, the states members of the international circle are equal, yet that their weight in the world of affairs may vary by virtue of other circumstances must be admitted. The legal status of states is the same; regardless of the form of state organization, whether monarchy or republic; regardless of origin, whether by division or union of former states or even if created in a region hitherto outside the jurisdiction of any state; regardless of area, population, wealth, influence, etc.; regardless of relations to other states provided sovereignty is not impaired; regardless of any change in the form of state organization, as from a republic to a monarchy or even of a temporary lapse in the exercise of sovereignty.
While all states, members of the family of states, are equal in international law so far as their legal attributes are concerned, they may be very unequal in other respects.
(a) One of the oldest marks of inequality is that of court precedence, which for many years was a fertile source of difficulty, and was at last settled to the extent of ranking by title of diplomatic representative by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.[120]
(b) Inequalities in matters of ceremonial of various kinds have not disappeared. These may be based upon tradition or conventional grounds, and frequently give rise to difficulties if disregarded. These ceremonials may be (1) political as between the sovereigns in their official personal capacity as emperors, kings, dukes, etc., (2) court and diplomatic in interstate negotiations, (3) treaty as in alternat or in the alphabetical signing of treaties, (4) maritime ceremonial in salutes, etc.
(c) Inequalities in weight of influence in affairs.
(1) In Europe there is distinctly recognized in political practice an inequality of the states, and they are classed as "the great powers," "the minor powers," and sometimes such states as those of the Balkan peninsula are referred to as "the little powers" or "third-rate states." These divisions are based merely upon political grounds, and states may pass from one division to another as their wealth, area, or influence increases or decreases.
At the present time "the great powers," generally mentioned officially upon the continent in the alphabetical order of their names in French, i.e. Allemagne, Angleterre, Autriche, etc., are Germany, Great Britain, Austria, France, Italy, and Russia. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Spain was numbered with "the great powers." Sweden was so ranked in the seventeenth century. Italy was counted with "the great powers" after 1870. The union of several powers upon certain lines of policy, since early in the nineteenth century, has been called "the concert of Europe," "the primacy of the great powers," etc. It was not the purpose of these great powers to establish new rules of international law; but as enunciated by the five powers, Nov. 15, 1818, it was "their invariable resolution never to depart, either among themselves, or in their relations with other states, from the strictest observation of the principles of the Rights of Nations."[121]
That the practice of the Great Powers has not been strictly in accord with these expressed principles, a glance will show. The immediate action of Austria, Russia, and Prussia in the Congress of Troppau, 1820, carried the principle of interference in the internal affairs of states so far that Great Britain found itself compelled to dissent. This continuance of the policy of the Holy Alliance in putting down movements in favor of popular liberty, wherever arising, led to gross violations of international rights. Nor did Great Britain become a party to the acts of the Congress of Verona in 1822, which led to intervention to prevent changes in the internal organization of Spain in 1823. The struggles of the Greeks for independence at about this time were naturally regarded by those upholding the ideas of the Holy Alliance as dangerous to those states desiring to prevent revolutionary movements. But the narrow policy of the Alliance was gradually losing support. The opposition of Great Britain and the death of Alexander of Russia in 1825 hastened its speedy fall. Meantime the idea of a collective authority in the Great Powers had been maintained. This began to be exercised in behalf of the Greeks in 1826, and has throughout the nineteenth century been repeatedly exercised in the same behalf, sometimes unselfishly, often from motives of mixed character. During the latter half of the nineteenth century the Great Powers have continually kept a close surveillance over Grecian affairs, and enforced their judgments in regard to Greece by force (destruction of Turkish fleet at Navarino, 1827); by providing form of government and naming monarch (1829 and later); by fixing and changing boundaries (1829 and often); by pacific blockade (1827, 1850, 1886, 1897); by regulating financial affairs, and by other means of varying degree of force.[122]
The Eastern question has particularly occupied the Concert, and the disposition of the territory once within the Turkish jurisdiction has offered a fertile field for varying policy.
The establishment of Belgium as a neutral state by the treaty to which Belgium was itself a party afforded another example of the influence of the Great Powers.
Since 1839 Egypt has also been subject to frequent control by the Great Powers.
Since 1885 the unappropriated portion of Africa has been brought into the range of action of the Concert by the theory of the sphere of influence.
The Concert of the Great Powers shows then a policy which is liable to change with expediency. The two great treaties of the Concert are those of Paris, 1856, and Berlin, 1878. Of these Holland says, "The treaties of Paris and of Berlin thus resemble one another, in that both alike are a negation of the right of any one Power, and an assertion of the right of the Powers collectively, to regulate the solution of the Eastern question."[123] The fact that the action of the Great Powers has been regarded as binding and tacitly accepted in Europe in certain questions in the East, Egypt, Greece, and Belgium does not give the sanction of international law to the action. The most that can be said is that it is an alliance of a loose character, whose authority is in proportion to the force behind its decisions.[124]
(2) Another feature in European politics giving rise to further inequalities in practice was introduced by the alliance of Germany and Austria in 1879 and Italy in 1883, which is now commonly known as the Triple Alliance. This belt of powers separating Eastern from Western Europe has materially affected the action of other powers.
The "friendly understanding" between France and Russia soon after the Triple Alliance affords a measure of counter-check upon the action of the other powers.
In spite of all these alliances and counter-alliances, the recognition of the weight of the decisions of the congresses and conferences of the Great Powers upon those subjects which are held to affect "the peace of Europe" have an influence comparable to that which might be assigned to a "Supreme Court of International Appeal."[125]
The United States upon the American continent in its enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, and the subsequent interpretation of it, has assumed a position as arbiter among the American states in some respects similar to that of the European Concert among the European states. This attitude of the United States has weight in international practice, but cannot be regarded as a part of international law.
JURISDICTION