TO SAMUEL ADAMS.

The Marquis de Lafayette did me the honor of a visit yesterday, and delivered me your favor of the 25th of October. I am not sorry, as things have been ordered, that mine of May 24th did not reach you till the 24th of October, because, as the new arrangement [42] was previously made, it cannot be said that I had any hand in accomplishing it. Yet I am glad the letter has arrived, because it will show that the new system is quite agreeable to me, that is, the appointment of a single Minister here. Believe me, Sir, it was become very necessary.

How Congress will dispose of me, I do not know. If it is intended that I shall return, this will be very agreeable to me; and I think that this is the most probable opinion, because Mr Deane's "Address" was on the 5th of December. Congress soon after resolved to enter on foreign affairs and go through them. The Alliance sailed on the 14th of January, and there is no resolution arrived here respecting me. I think, therefore, that it is my duty to return, and that is my present determination; but whether I shall go to Amsterdam, and from thence to St Eustatia, or to Spain, and thence home, or in a French man-of-war to Martinique, or an American frigate to America, I have not decided. Some hint that I am to go to Holland, others to Spain. This last implies the removal of Mr Lee, which would give me much pain on many accounts. I think him a faithful man and able. Yet what the determination will be upon the complaint of Mr Deane, I cannot say. This is a subject which I cannot write or talk about; I would not feel such another sensation to be made a prince. I confess I expected the most dismal consequences from it, because I thought it would render business and confidence between us three totally impracticable; that it would destroy all confidence between this Court and us, and that it would startle Spain; that it would alienate many in Holland from us, and that it would encourage the Ministry in England and disconcert opposition so much, that they would even make another vigorous campaign, besides all the evils it would produce among you. But the arrival of Dr Franklin's commission has relieved me from many of these fears. This Court have confidence in him alone. But I think they were cautious, even of him, when he had two colleagues, to whom he was obliged to communicate everything, one of whom was upon as bad terms with him as with Mr Deane. I have had a kind of a task here, as Mr Lovell expresses himself; determined to be the partizan of neither, yet to be the friend of both, as far as the service would admit. I am fixed in these two opinions, that leaving the Doctor here alone is right, and that Mr Lee is a very honest and faithful man.

You say that France should be our polar star in case war should take place. I was, I confess, surprised at this expression. Was not war sufficiently declared in the King of England's speech, and in the answers of both Houses, and in the recall of his Ambassador? Has it not been sufficiently declared by actual hostilities in most parts of the world? I suspect there will never be any other declaration of war. Yet, there is in fact as complete a war as ever existed, and it will continue, for you may depend upon it, the King of France is immovably fixed in your support, and so are his Ministers. Every suspicion of a wavering disposition in this Court concerning the support of American independence is groundless, is ridiculous, is impossible. You may remember, that several years ago, several gentlemen were obliged to reason, to show that American independence was the interest of France. Since my arrival in this Kingdom, I never yet found one man, nor heard of more than one, who doubted it. If the voice of popularity is anything, I assure you that this voice was never so unanimous in America in favor of our independence as it is here. It is so much so, that if the Court were to depart from its present system in this respect, it is my clear opinion it would make this nation very unhappy, and the Court too; but I again repeat, that the Court is as fixed as the nation. And this union of sentiment arises out of such principles in nature, as, without a miracle, cannot alter. Common sense in America supported independence; common sense in France supports the alliance, and will support it to the last. Nay, the common sense of Europe supports the common sense of France.

By the way, my regards to Mr Paine, and tell him, that I do not agree with him in his ideas about natural enemies. It is because England is the natural enemy of France, that America in her present situation is her natural friend; at least, this is one cause, although there are many others. Some of them are more glorious, for human nature.

France scarcely ever made a war before, that was popular in Europe. There is not a State, that I can hear of, but applauds her, and wishes her success. And in point of finance and naval strength, and in skill and bravery of officers, she seems to be superior to England. You may be surprised to hear me say naval strength, yet if you consider the wretched state of the British Navy, as to masts, yards, rigging, and men, you will not wonder, although their number of ships may be superior. I therefore think, that all is safe. We may have further trouble, and trials of our faith and patience. But trouble is to you and me familiar, and I begin to think it necessary for my health.

There is one thing in my letter to you exaggerated; the expenses of the Commissioners. I had been here but a short time, and wrote according to the best guess I could make, from what I had heard; but I now think I put it much too high, yet I cannot say exactly.[43]

February 20th. There is not the least appearance of the embarkation of troops for America, nor any intelligence of transports taken up. The national discontent is great, and tumults have arisen in Edinburgh and London. According to present appearances, they will have occasion for so many of their troops to keep their populace in order, as to be able to spare few for America. Their proclamations are all alike from Burgoyne's to those of the Commissioners. The weaker they are, the more they puff.

TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Last evening I had the honor of your letter of the 13th of this month, in answer to mine of the 11th.[44]

I thank your Excellency for the politeness with which you have agreed to my proposition, of a conference upon the subject of Mr Deane's "Address to the People of the United States."

At the time when my letter of the 11th was written and sent to your Excellency, there were three Commissioners here, representatives of Congress, between whom it appeared to me Mr Deane's Address had a tendency to destroy all confidence, as well as between your Excellency and them, for which reason I thought it my duty to endeavor, by a conference with your Excellency, to lessen those evils as far as should be in my power.

But within a few hours after my letter of the 11th was sent, the Aid-de-Camp of the Marquis de Lafayette arrived, with despatches from Congress to Dr Franklin, and from their Committee of Foreign Affairs to me, informing me of the new arrangement by which Dr Franklin is constituted Minister Plenipotentiary here, and I am restored to the character of a private citizen; by which, so wholly changed are the scene and the characters here, that I now think I have no right to do what, if I had continued in the character of a Commissioner, I should have thought it my indispensable duty to do.

This masterly measure of Congress, which has my most hearty approbation, and of the necessity of which I was fully convinced before I had been two months in Europe, has taken away the possibilities of those dissensions, which I so much apprehended. I shall not, therefore, give your Excellency any further trouble, than to take an opportunity of paying my respects in order to take leave, and to assure you, that I shall leave this kingdom with the most entire confidence in his Majesty's benevolence to the United States, and inviolable adherence to the treaties between the two powers, with a similar confidence in the good disposition of his Majesty's Ministers of State and of this nation towards us, and with a heart impressed with gratitude for the many civilities which I have received, in the short space I have resided here, at Brest, in the city, and in the country, and particularly from your Excellency.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

The conversation with which you honored me last evening, has induced me to give you the trouble of this letter upon the same subject.

It is certain that a loan of money is very much needed to redeem the redundancy of our paper bills, and without it, it is impossible to foresee what will be the consequence to their credit, and therefore every service, that may be rendered in order to obtain it from this kingdom, from Spain, or Holland, will be a most acceptable service.

But without some other exertions, even a loan perhaps would be but a temporary relief; with them a smaller loan might suffice. You know perfectly well, that the enemy in America are at present very weak, and in great distress in every part. They are weak in Canada, weak in Halifax, weak in Rhode Island, weak in New York, weak in the Floridas, and weak in every one of the West India Islands. A strong armament of ships of the line, with five thousand troops, directed against Halifax, Rhode Island, or New York, must infallibly succeed. So it must against the Floridas, so it must against Canada, or any one of the West India Islands.

You are very sensible, that in this state of weakness, the British possessions in America depend upon each other for reciprocal support. The troops and ships derive such supplies of provisions from Canada and Nova Scotia, that if these places or either of them were lost, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the other to subsist. The West India Islands derive such supplies from the Floridas, that if they were lost the others could hardly subsist. Their fleets and armies in Canada, Halifax, Rhode Island, New York, and the Floridas, receive supplies of rum, sugar, molasses, &c. from the West India Islands, without which they could scarcely subsist. Every part of their possessions in America, both on the continent and in the islands, receives constant supplies from Europe, from England, Scotland, and Ireland, without which they must fall. You perceive, therefore, that their dominions in America at present form such a chain, that the links mutually support each other in such a manner, that if one or two were taken away, the whole, or at least the greater part, must fall. In this state of things then, the obvious policy is to send a strong squadron of ships of the line to co-operate with the Count d'Estaing and the American army, in some expedition directed against New York, Rhode Island, Halifax or perhaps all of them in course. Five or six thousand troops would be quite enough. Above all, it is indispensably necessary to keep a clear naval superiority, both on the coast of the continent, and in the West Islands. This together with French and American privateers would make such havoc among the enemy's transports, passing from one of their possessions to another, as must ruin their affairs. The French have a great advantage in carrying on this kind of war in America, at present. The British ships are badly manned and in bad repair. They cannot send them into the American seas, without the utmost terror for their own coasts. And when they are in America, they have not such advantages for supplies of provisions, naval stores, &c. as the French.

The devastation, which was made among their ships of the line, frigates, transports, and traders, in the American seas the last summer, shows how much might be done, if a stronger force were sent there. As long as the enemy have possession of New York and Rhode Island, so long it will be necessary for us to keep up large armies, to watch their motions, and defend the country against them, which will oblige us to emit more paper, and still further to increase the depreciation. Now as long as they maintain the dominion of those seas, their troops will be protected by the cannon of their ships, and we could not dislodge them with an army, however large, at least we could not keep possession of those places. But if their force was captivated in those seas, as it might easily be by a sea force, co-operating with the land forces, we might reduce our army and innumerable other articles of expense. We need not emit any more paper, and that already out would depreciate no further. I should be happy to have further conversation with you, Sir, upon these subjects, or to explain anything by letter, which may be in my power.

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO JOHN ADAMS.

Translation.

I have received the letter, which you have done me the honor to write me on the 16th of this month. Although you are to be henceforth without a public character in France, be persuaded that the esteem and consideration, which you have justly acquired, are by no means diminished, and I flatter myself, Sir, that you will not deprive me of the pleasure of assuring you of it by word of mouth, and being at the same time the interpreter of the favorable sentiments with which the King honors you. They are the consequence of the particular satisfaction, which his Majesty has received from the wise conduct you have held during the whole time of your commission, as well as the zeal you have constantly displayed, both for the cause of your country, and for the support of the alliance which attaches it to his Majesty.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

I have received the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to write me on the 21st of this month. This testimony from your Excellency of those indulgent sentiments, with which his Majesty is pleased to honor my sincere intentions, cannot fail to be preserved by me and my posterity as a most precious monument; and what is of infinitely more importance, it cannot fail to give great satisfaction to my country, to find that a servant of theirs, who has been honored with no small share of their confidence in the most dangerous of times, and most critical circumstances, has been so happy as not to forfeit the confidence of their illustrious ally.

TO JOHN JAY, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

By the new arrangement, which was brought by the Marquis de Lafayette, I find myself restored to the character of a private citizen.

The appointment of a single Minister at the Court of Versailles was not unexpected to me, because I had not been two months in Europe before I was convinced of the policy, and indeed of the necessity, of such a measure. But I ever entertained hopes, that when the news of such an alteration should arrive, the path of my own duty would have been made plain to me by the directions of Congress, either to return home or go elsewhere. But as no information that we have received from Congress has expressed their intentions concerning me, I am obliged to collect them by implication, according to the best of my understanding, and as the election of the new Minister Plenipotentiary was on the fourteenth of September, and the Alliance sailed from Boston the fourteenth of January, and in this space of four months no notice appears to have been taken of me, I think the only inference that can be made is, that Congress have no further service for me on this side the water, and that all my duties are on the other. I have accordingly given notice to his Excellency, M. de Sartine, and to his Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary here, of my intentions to return, which I shall do by the first frigate that sails for any part of the United States, unless I should receive counter orders in the meantime. In a matter of so much uncertainty, I hope I shall not incur the disapprobation of Congress, even if I should not judge aright of their intentions, which it is my desire as well as my duty to observe, as far as I can know them.

By the papers enclosed with this, Congress will perceive the discontented and tumultuous state of the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, which is so great and so rapidly increasing, that the United States will have little to fear from reinforcements of their enemies the ensuing campaign. All their forces will be necessary to keep in order their own riotous populace, and to replace those which are daily consuming in the West Indies. There is, however, no prospect of their evacuating either New York or Rhode Island. The possession of those places is so indispensable for the preservation of their West India and other trade, as well as of their other dominions in America, that nothing but the last necessity will induce them to give them up.

The greatest source of danger and unhappiness to the States then probably will be a depreciating currency. The prospect of a loan in Europe, after every measure that has been or could be taken, I think it my duty to say frankly to Congress, is very unpromising. The causes of this are very obvious, and cannot be removed; the state of our country itself, and the course of exchange, would be sufficient to discourage such a loan, if there were no other obstruction, but there are many others. There are more borrowers in Europe than lenders, and the British loan itself will not be made this year at a less interest than seven and a half per cent.

I see no hope of relief, but from economy and taxation, and those I flatter myself will be found sufficient, if the people are once convinced of the necessity of them. When a people are contending not only for the greatest object, that any people ever had in view, but for security from the greatest evil that any nation ever had to dread, (for there is at this hour no medium between unlimited subjugation to Parliament and entire sovereignty) they must be destitute of sense as well as of virtue, if they are not willing to pay sufficient sums annually to defray the necessary expense of their defence in future, supported as they are by so powerful an ally, and by the prospect of others, against a kingdom already exhausted, without any ally at all, or a possibility of obtaining one. As this is the first time I have had the honor to address myself to Congress, since we received the news of your Excellency's appointment to the chair, you will please to accept of my congratulations on that event.

TO JOHN JAY, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

My last letter to Congress was on the twentyseventh of last month; since which an account of the new loan is received from London, and as this may, perhaps, afford to Congress the clearest proof of the weakness of their enemies, it is of importance, that it should be transmitted to them. Some accounts say, that the loan is to be seven millions, others eight. The conditions of the loan are, in general, the established interest of three per cent, an annuity for three and three quarters per cent for twentynine years, and seven lottery tickets for every thousand pounds.

100 3 per cent,	£61 00 00
£3 15s. annuity for twentynine years, at twelve years' purchase,	45 00 00
Two fifths of a year's interest and annuity, gained by both beginning from the 5th of January,
although the money is paid monthly, and not ended until December,	2 14 00
£3 premium of seven lottery tickets for each £1000, gives for each hundred,	2 2 00
	________
For each £100 paid, there is received	£110 16 00

This statement for the first year is pretty accurate. Another account makes it ten and one quarter per cent for the first year. The subsequent years, however it will not be so much. Yet for all the subsequent years, during the term of the annuity, it will be six and three quarters per cent. Upon the whole, it is generally looked upon as good as seven and a half per cent. In a country where the highest interest, that is tolerated by the standing laws, is five per cent, this is a terrible symptom.

While this system has any credit among the money lenders in Holland, Switzerland, Geneva, &c. Congress will perceive, that there is little hope of procuring a private loan for the United States from any of those places. Whether any may be procured from any State, or Prince, time must discover.

M. DE LAFAYETTE TO JOHN ADAMS.

Translation.

I beg leave to apply to you, in an instance where I am much concerned. The case I shall lay before you, and recommend to your care. There is an officer in Paris, whom I wish to send over to America on board the Alliance, and who I know would be of service in the American army. For that reason, besides his recommendations, I have a great regard for him. I wish the gentleman may find a passage in the frigate. Dr Franklin cannot officially send an officer, but I beg you would take him along with you, as I take upon myself the charge of presenting him to Congress. All the marks of kindness I ever met with from them, and the knowledge which the strictest friendship has given me of General Washington's sentiments, make me as certain as possible, that my officer will meet with the best reception in Philadelphia and in the army, who know I am acquainted with what may be convenient to them.

It is with a great concern, that I hear of discontents between Captain Landais and his officers, and I flatter myself, that you will again establish harmony and concord among them. I will take the opportunity of this frigate to write over to my friends in America.

The articles alluded to in your letter from Passy, I have been very busy about, but I did not meet with great success till now, and what is done is not equal to what I could wish. It is true, our circumstances are rather narrow at this moment, and I believe, that the Ministers are willing to do what they think possible, or advantageous, but we do not always agree in opinion. I hope, however, America will have more and more occasions of knowing the true attachment of this nation for her.

With great impatience I wait for your answer, that I may send the officer to Nantes. I hope you will not refuse your patronage on this occasion, and I may answer Congress will have no objection to take a gentleman whom I send them. You will, my dear Sir, in settling his passage, much oblige your humble servant,

TO ARTHUR LEE.

Your favors of June the 2d and 5th are now before me; that of the 29th of March I have answered, if I ever received it, for I have answered every one I have received from you, but not having my papers at hand cannot be particular. I thank you for the manuscript and the pamphlet.

I am happy to hear from you, and from all others, so agreeable a character of the Chevalier de la Luzerne, and M. Marbois, the last of whom I have had the pleasure to see.

I wish it was in my power to do more for Mr Ford, and to take him with me, but the frigate will be so crowded, I fear it will be impossible.

The declarations of the northern powers against the right of England to stop their merchant vessels, and arming to support their rights, are important events. The displacing of Mr Paine is a disagreeable and alarming one.

It is with no small astonishment, that I learn by your letter of the 5th, that by advices from America since your last to me, your enemies are determined to impeach your attachment to our country and her cause. Your request that I would give my opinion on that subject, from the knowledge I have had of your conduct, while we acted in commission together, can meet with no objection from me. But I hope I need not inform you, that my opinion upon this point is no secret at Versailles, Paris, Nantes, or elsewhere. Enclosed is a copy of a letter I did myself the honor to write to his Excellency the Count de Vergennes some time ago, which, for anything I know, is communicated to all the Court, but the answer shows that it was received. I had my reasons then for keeping it to myself, which exist now no more. I would transcribe the whole correspondence if it was in my power, but I have not time, and it is sufficient to say, that it was conducted by his Excellency with the most obliging politeness. It is my duty now to furnish you with a copy, lest any accident may befal me, which is by no means improbable. I thought then, and am confirmed in that opinion more and more, that it was my duty to communicate my sentiments at Court, upon that very extraordinary occasion, and from regard to my own reputation, I am very glad you have given me an opportunity of furnishing you with evidence, that I did this part of my duty so far forth. The letter was written, sent to Versailles, and received by his Excellency before the arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette, his Aid-de-Camp, or Dr Winship; that is, before the news reached Passy of the new arrangement.[45] But lest that letter should not be sufficient, I shall enclose another certificate, not without a heartfelt grief, that malice should have been so daring and so barbarous, as to make either such a letter or such a certificate from me either necessary or even pardonable.[46] Your hint, that I must correct some things that are amiss, extorts from me an involuntary sigh. I shall be in a situation critical and difficult without example, my own character at stake from various quarters, and without anything to support me but truth and innocence, and you need not be informed, that these are not always sufficient. I have little expectation of doing good; God grant I may do no harm. I shall not designedly. But I suppose Congress intend to examine me as a witness, and I must tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as far as I know it. If the task should end here, I should not be much embarrassed, but if they should proceed to demand of me opinions and judgments of men and things, as there is reason to expect they will, although I hope they will not, what will be the consequences? Upon the whole, truth must be my shield, and if the shafts of interested malice can pierce through this, they shall pierce me.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

On the 27th of February, I had the honor of writing to Congress, informing them of my intention of returning home, in consequence of the commission which superseded mine. On the first of March, I had again the honor of writing some information concerning the unprecedented interest, which the British Government are obliged to give for the loan of money for the service of the present year. On the 8th of March, I took my leave of the American Minister, and left Paris for Nantes, in expectation of there meeting the Alliance, and sailing in her for America in a few weeks. Upon my arrival at Nantes, I learned the Alliance was yet at Brest, and so embarrassed with nearly forty prisoners, who were supposed to have been concerned in a conspiracy to carry her to England, and with other difficulties, that it was uncertain when she would be ready.

The agent at Nantes at this time receiving a letter from his Excellency, Dr Franklin, desiring him to consult me about the direction of the Alliance, I thought it would expedite the public service for me to make a journey to Brest, about two hundred miles, which I undertook accordingly, and arrived at that port without loss of time. There, after an attendance of some weeks, and much negotiation with the Commandant, Intendant, and Agent, all things were prepared for the frigate to sail for Nantes, with about one hundred British prisoners, to be exchanged for a like number of American prisoners, arrived there from England in a cartel. I returned to Nantes, and the Alliance in a few days arrived in the river, the prisoners were exchanged, about sixty enlisted in the Alliance, and the rest in the Poor Richard, Captain Jones.

After accommodating all the difficulties with the British prisoners, the American prisoners, the officers and crew of the Alliance, and supplying all their necessary wants, Captain Landais, having orders to sail for America, and everything ready to proceed to sea in a few days, received unexpected orders to proceed to L'Orient, and wait there for further orders. I had the honor of a letter at the same time from his Excellency, enclosing one from the Minister of Marine, by which I learned, that the King had been graciously pleased to grant me a passage on board the frigate, which was to carry His Majesty's new Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, that the frigate was at L'Orient, and that the Minister would be there in a few days. I went in the Alliance from Nantes to L'Orient, where after some time the frigate, the Sensible, arrived, but his Excellency, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, did not arrive until the 10th of June. On the 14th of June, and not before, I had the pleasure to be under sail, and on the 3d of August, arrived in Nantasket Roads.

I have entered into this detail of disappointments to justify myself for not returning sooner, and to shew that it was not my fault, that I was not at home in eight weeks from the first authentic information, that I had nothing further to do in France. There is nothing remaining for me to do but to settle my accounts with Congress; but as part of my accounts are in conjunction with my late colleagues, with whom I lived in the same house during my residence in Paris, I am not able to judge whether Congress will choose to receive my accounts, or to wait until the other Commissioners shall exhibit theirs, and have the whole together, under one view, so as to do equal justice to all. I am ready, however, to render all the account in my power, either jointly or separately, whenever Congress shall order it, and I shall wait their directions accordingly.

It is not in my power, having been so long from Paris, to give Congress any news of importance, except that the Brest fleet, under the Count d'Orvilliers, was at sea the beginning of June, that Admiral Arbuthnot was at Plymouth the 31st of May, and that there was a universal persuasion, arising from letters from Paris and London, that Spain had decided against the English. The Chevalier de la Luzerne will be able to give Congress satisfactory information upon this head.

I ought not to conclude this letter, without expressing my obligations to Captain Chavagne, and the other officers of the Sensible, for their civilities in the course of my passage home, and the pleasure I have had in the conversation of his Excellency, the new Minister Plenipotentiary from our august ally, and the Secretary to the embassy, Monsieur Marbois.

The Chevalier de la Luzerne is a Knight of the Order of St John of Jerusalem, of an ancient and noble family, connected by blood with many characters of principal name in the kingdom, a grandson of the celebrated Chancellor de la Moignon, a nephew of Monsieur Malesherbes, perhaps still more famous as first President of the Court of Aids and as a Minister of State, a brother to the Count de la Luzerne, and of the Bishop of Sangres, one of the three Dukes and Peers who had the honor to assist in the consecration of the King, a near relation of the Marcéhal de Broglie and the Count his brother, and of many other important personages in that country. Nor is his personal character less respectable than his connexions, as he is possessed of much useful information of all kinds, and particularly of the political system of Europe, obtained in his late embassy in Bavaria; and of the justest sentiments of the mutual interests of his country and ours, and of the utility to both of that alliance, which so happily unites them, and at the same time divested of all personal and party attachments and aversions. Congress and their constituents, I flatter myself, will have much satisfaction in his negotiations, as well as in those of the Secretary to the embassy, who was recently Secretary to the embassy in Bavaria, and who is a counsellor of the Parliament of Metz, a gentleman whose abilities, application, and disposition cannot fail to make him useful in the momentous office he sustains.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

At the close of the service on which Congress have done me the honor to send me, it may not be amiss to submit a few remarks to their consideration on the general state of affairs in Europe, as far as they relate to the interests of the United States. As the time approaches, when our relations with the most considerable States in Europe will multiply and assume a greater stability, they deserve the attention of Americans in general, but especially of those composing their supreme council.

France deserves the first place among those powers, with which our connexions will be the most intimate, and it is with pleasure I am able to assure Congress, that from the observations I have made during my residence in that Kingdom, I have the strongest reasons to believe, that their august ally, his Ministers, and nation, are possessed of the fullest persuasion of the justice of our cause, of the great importance of our independence to their interests, and the firmest resolution to preserve the faith of treaties inviolate, and to cultivate our friendship with sincerity and zeal. This is of the more consequence to us, as this power enjoys in Europe at this hour an influence, which it has not before experienced for many years.

Men are so sensible of a constant tendency in others to excesses, that a signal superiority of power never appears, without exciting jealousies and efforts to reduce it. Thus, when Spain, under Charles the Fifth and his successor, made herself dangerous, a great part of Europe united against her, assisted in severing the United Provinces from her, and by degrees greatly diminished her power. Thus, when France, under Lewis the Fourteenth, indulged the spirit of conquest too far, a great part of mankind united their forces against her, with such success as to involve her in a train of misfortunes, out of which she never emerged before the present reign. The English, in their turn, by means of their commerce and extensive settlements abroad, arose to a degree of opulence and naval power, which excited more extravagant passions in her own breast, and more tyrannical exertions of her influence, than appeared in either of the other cases. The consequence has been similar, but more remarkable. Europe seems to be more universally and sincerely united in the desire of reducing her, than they ever were in any former instance. This is the true cause why the French Court never made war with so universal a popularity among their own subjects, so general an approbation of other Courts, and such unanimous wishes among all nations for her success, as at this time.

The personal character of the King, his declared patronage of morals and economy, and the great strokes of wisdom, which have marked the commencement of his reign, the active spring which has been given to commerce by the division of the British empire, and our new connexions with his subjects; all these causes, together with the two treaties of peace, which have been lately signed under his auspices and his mediation, have given to this power a reputation, which the last reign had lost.

The first of these treaties has determined those controversies, which had for a long time divided Russia and the Porte, and the parties have been equally satisfied with the conditions of their reconciliation, a circumstance the more honorable for the French Ministry, and the Chevalier de St Priest, their Ambassador at Constantinople, as it is uncommon. The ancient confidence of the Porte in the Court of Versailles has revived, and the coolness, or rather enmity, which divided France and Russia for near twenty years, gives place to a friendship, which is at this time in all its fervor, and will probably be durable, as these powers have no interest to annoy each other, but, on the contrary, are able to assist each other in a manner the most essential.

The peace of Germany, signed at Teschin, the 13th of last May, has not equally satisfied the belligerent powers, who were on the one part the Emperor, and on the other, the King of Prussia and the Elector of Saxony his ally.

From the multitudes of writings, which have appeared before and during this war, in which the causes, the motives, and the rights of it are discussed, it appears, that in 1768, at the extinction of one of the branches of the House of Bavaria, which has been separated from its trunk for near five centuries, the House of Austria thought itself able, and priests and lawyers among their own subjects were complaisant enough to tell her, that she had a right to put herself in possession of the best part of the patrimony of the extinguished line.

The King of Prussia, to whose interest this augmentation of power would have been dangerous, has crowned an illustrious reign, by displaying all the resources of military genius and profound policy in opposition to it. While he contended in the field, France negotiated, and the work, begun by his arms, was completed by the cabinet of Versailles.

The Palatine House of Bavaria, the Duke of Deux Ponts, and particularly the Elector of Saxony, have obtained all they could reasonably demand, and the empire has preserved its balance of power in spite of its head. The King of Prussia had covered himself with glory, to which he put the finishing stroke, by not demanding any compensation for the expenses of the war. All parties have been satisfied except the Emperor, who has disordered his finances, ruined his Kingdom of Bohemia with immense fines, has not obtained any advantage over his adversary, and consequently has destroyed among his own troops the opinion they had of their superiority, and, in fine, has sustained a loss the most sensible for a young Prince just beginning to reign, the reputation of justice and moderation. It is the influence, the address, and ability of the French Minister, joined to the firmness of Russia, which have completed this work; and Lewis the Sixteenth has restored in Germany to the nation over which he reigns, that reputation which his grandfather had lost.

The merit of the Chevalier de la Luzerne, who was Ambassador in Bavaria during the transaction of this business, and that of M. Marbois, the Secretary to that embassy, in accomplishing an affair of such importance, which was rendered peculiarly delicate by the late family connexion between the Courts of Vienna and Versailles, was probably a motive for sending them now to America, a mission of no less importance and no less delicacy.

It is not probable, however, that they could have succeeded so soon, if England could have afforded subsidies to the Emperor. The Revolution in America, in which the French King has taken an earlier and a greater part than any other Sovereign in Europe, has operated so as to conciliate to him a consideration that is universal. The new Minister will give to Congress information the most precise in this respect, and touching the part which Spain is taking at this time, for which reason I shall refrain from entering into it, and content myself with observing, that all these considerations ought to induce us to cherish the alliance of France; and that every good citizen of the United States ought to endeavor to destroy the remains of those prejudices, which our ancient rulers have endeavored to inspire us with; that we have nothing to fear and much to hope from France, while we conduct ourselves with good sense and firmness, and that we cannot take too much pains to multiply the commercial relations, and strengthen the political connexions between the two nations; provided always, that we preserve prudence and resolution enough to receive implicitly no advice whatever, but to judge always for ourselves, and to guard ourselves against those principles in government, and those manners, which are so opposite to our own Constitution and to our own characters, as a young people, called by Providence to the most honorable and important of all duties, that of forming establishments for a great nation and a new world.

In the opinion of some, the power with which we shall one day have a relation the most immediate, next to that of France, is Great Britain. But it ought to be considered, that this power loses every day her consideration, and runs towards her ruin. Her riches, in which her power consisted, she has lost with us, and never can regain. With us she has lost her Mediterranean trade, her African trade, her German and Holland trade, her ally, Portugal, her ally, Russia, and her natural ally, the House of Austria; at least, as being unable to protect these as she once did, she can obtain no succor from them. In short, one branch of commerce has been lopped off after another, and one political interest sacrificed after another, She resembles the melancholy spectacle of a great wide spreading tree, that has been girded at the root. Her endeavors to regain these advantages, will continually keep alive in her breast the most malevolent passions towards us. Her envy, her jealousy, and resentment, will never leave us, while we are what we must unavoidably be, her rivals in the fisheries, in various other branches of commerce, and even in naval power. If peace should unhappily be made, leaving Canada, Nova Scotia, or the Floridas, or any of them, in her hands, jealousies and controversies will be perpetually arising. The degree, therefore, of intercourse with this nation, which will ever again take place, may justly be considered as problematical, or rather the probability is, that it will never be so great as some persons imagine; moreover, I think that every citizen in the present circumstances, who respects his country, and the engagements she has taken, ought to abstain from the foresight of a return of friendship between us and the English, and act as if it never was to be.

But it is lawful to consider, that which will probably be formed between the Hollanders and us. The similitude of manners, of religion, and in some respects of constitution, the analogy between the means by which the two republics arrived at independency, but above all the attractions of commercial interest, will infallibly draw them together. This connexion will not probably show itself, before a peace or a near prospect of peace. Too many motives of fear or interest place the Hollanders in a dependance on England, to suffer her to connect herself openly with us at present. Nevertheless, if the King of Prussia, could be induced to take us by the hand, his great influence in the United Provinces might contribute greatly to conciliate their friendship for us. Loans of money, and the operations of commercial agents or societies, will be the first threads of our connexions with this power. From the essays and inquiries of your Commissioners at Paris, it appears, that some money may be borrowed there, and from the success of several enterprises by the way of St Eustatia, it seems that the trade between the two countries is likely to increase, and possibly Congress may think it expedient to send a Minister there. If they should, it will be proper to give him a discretionary power to produce his commission or not, as he shall find it likely to succeed, to give him full powers and clear instructions concerning the borrowing of money; and the man himself above all should have consummate prudence, and a caution and discretion, that will be proof against every trial.

If Congress could find any means of paying the interest annually in Europe, commercial and pecuniary connexions would strengthen themselves from day to day, and if the fall of the credit of England should terminate in bankruptcy, the Seven United Provinces, having nothing to dissemble, would be zealous for a part of those rich benefits, which our commerce offers to the maritime powers, and by an early treaty with us secure those advantages, from which they have already discovered strong symptoms of a fear of being excluded by delays. It is scarcely necessary to observe to Congress, that Holland has lost her influence in Europe to such a degree, that there is little other regard for her remaining but that of a prodigal heir for a rich usurer, who lends him money at a high interest. The State which is poor and in debt has no political stability. Their army is very small, and their navy is less. The immense riches of individuals may possibly be in some future time the great misfortune of the nation, because the means of defence are not proportioned to the temptation which is held out for some necessitous, avaricious, and formidable neighbor to invade her.

The active commerce of Spain is very inconsiderable; of her passive commerce, we shall not fail to have a part; the vicinity of this power, her forces, her resources, ought to make us attentive to her conduct, but if we may judge of the future by the past, I should hope we had nothing to fear from it. The genius and interest of the nation incline it to repose. She cannot determine upon war but in the last extremity, and even then she sighs for peace. She is not possessed of the spirit of conquest, and we have reason to congratulate ourselves, that we have her for the nearest and principal neighbor. Her conduct towards us at this time will perhaps appear equivocal and indecisive, her determinations appear to be solely the fruit of the negotiations of the Court of Versailles. But it ought to be considered, she has not had motives so pressing as those of France to take in hand our defence. Whether she has an eye upon the Floridas, or what other terms she may expect from Congress, they are no doubt better informed than I am. To their wisdom it must be submitted to give her satisfaction, if her terms are moderate, and her offers in proportion. This conduct may conciliate her affection and shorten delays, a point of great importance, as the present moment appears to be decisive.

Portugal, under the administration of the Marquis de Pombal, broke some of the shackles by which she was held to England. But the treaty, by which a permanent friendship is established between the Crowns of Spain and Portugal, was made in 1777, an event that the English deplore as the greatest evil, next to the irrecoverable loss of the colonies, arising from this war, because they will now no longer be able to play off Portugal against Spain, in order to draw away her attention as well as her forces, as in former times. But as Portugal has not known how to deliver herself entirely from the influence of England, we shall have little to hope from her; on the other hand, such is her internal weakness, that we have absolutely nothing to fear. We shall necessarily have commerce with her, but whether she will ever have the courage to sacrifice the friendship of England for the sake of it is uncertain.

It would be useless to consider that infinite number of little sovereignties into which Germany is divided, and develope all their political interests. This task is as much beyond my knowledge as it would be useless to Congress. They will have few relations friendly or hostile with this country, excepting in two branches of commerce, that of merchandise and that of soldiers. The latter, infamous and detestable as it is, has been established between a nation, once generous, humane, and brave, and certain princes, as avaricious of money as they are prodigal of the blood of their subjects; and such is the scarcity of cash, and the avidity for it in Germany, and so little are the rights of humanity understood and respected, that sellers will probably be found as long as buyers. America will never be found in either class. The State of Germany, with which we may have commerce of an honorable kind, is the House of Austria, one of the most powerful in Europe. She possesses very few countries, however, near the sea. Ostend is the principal city, where she might have established a trade of some consequence, if the jealousy of the maritime Powers had not constantly opposed it. France, Spain, Holland, and England, have been all agreed in their opposition, and the treaty of Utrecht, ratified more than once by subsequent treaties, has so shackled this port, that it will be impossible to open a direct trade to it, without some new treaty, which possibly may not be very distant. England may possibly make a new treaty with Austria, and agree to privileges for this port, in order to draw away the advantages of the American trade from France and Spain; and in such a treaty Holland may possibly acquiesce, if not accede to it. The port of Trieste enjoys liberty without limits, and the Court of Vienna is anxious to make its commerce flourish. Situated as it is at the bottom of the Gulf of Trieste, the remotest part of the Gulf of Venice, tedious and difficult as the navigation of those seas is, we could make little use of it at any time, and none at all while this war continues.

This Court would seize with eagerness the advantages, that are presented to her by the independence of America, but an interest more powerful restrains her, and although she is certainly attentive to this revolution, there is reason to believe she will be one of the last powers to acknowledge our independence. She is so far from being rich, that she is destitute of the means of making war without subsidies, as is proved by the peace which has lately been made. She has occasion for the succors of France or of England to put in motion her numerous armies. She conceives easily, that the loss of the resources and credit of the English has disabled them to pay the enormous subsidies, which, in former times, they have poured into the Austrian coffers. She sees therefore with a secret mortification, that she shall be hereafter more at the mercy of France, who may choose her ally, and prefer at her pleasure either Austria or Prussia, while neither Vienna nor Berlin will be able, as in times past, to choose between Paris and London, since the latter has lost her past opulence and pecuniary resources. It is our duty to remark these great changes in the system of mankind, which have already happened in consequence of the American war. The alienation of Portugal from England, the peace of Germany, and that between Petersburg and Constantinople, by all which events England has lost, and France gained, such a superiority of influence and power, are owing entirely to the blind division of that policy and wealth, which the English might have still enjoyed, from the objects of their true interests and honor, to the ruinous American war.

The Court of Berlin flatters itself, that the connexions which have heretofore so long united France and Prussia will renew themselves sooner or later. This system is more rational than that which subsists at this day. The king of Prussia may then wait without anxiety the consequences of the present revolution, because it tends to increase the resources of his natural ally. The jealousy between the Emperor and the King of Prussia, and that between the Houses of Bourbon and Austria, are a natural tie between France and Prussia. The rivalry between France and Great Britain is another motive, too natural and too permanent for the former to suffer the King of Prussia to be long the ally of the latter. One of the favorite projects of Prussia, that of rendering the port of Emden a place of flourishing trade, interests him most powerfully in our independence. Silesia, one of his best provinces, has already felt the influence of it, and, sensible of the force that empires derive from commerce, he is earnestly desirous to see it introduced between America and his States; which gives ground to believe, that as Austria will be one of the last so Prussia will be one of the first to acknowledge our independence; an opinion which is rendered more probable by the answer, which was given by the Baron de Schulenburg to Mr Arthur Lee, and the influence of the King of Prussia in the United Provinces, which is greater than that of any other Power, arising from his great military force, and the vicinity of his dominions. His near relation to the Stadtholder and the Prince of Brunswick, is an additional motive to cultivate his friendship. The Electorate of Saxony, with a fruitful soil, contains a numerous and industrious people, and most of the commerce between the east and the west of Europe passes through it. The fairs of Leipsic have drawn considerable advantages for these four years from our trade. This Power will see with pleasure the moment, which shall put the last hand to our independence. The rest of Germany, excepting Hamburgh and Bremen, have no means of opening a direct commerce with us; with the latter we have no connexion at present; in the former all the commerce of Lower Germany is transacted; here we shall soon have occasion to establish an agent or consul.

Poland, depopulated by the war and a vicious government, reduced by a shameful treaty to two thirds of her ancient dominion, destitute of industry and manufactures, even of the first necessity, has no occasion for the productions of America. Dantzic sees her ancient prosperity diminish every day. There is, therefore, little probability of commerce, and less of any political connexion between that nation and us.

Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, comprehended under the denomination of the northern powers, have been thought by some to be interested in our return to the domination of Great Britain. Whether they consider themselves in this light or not, their late declarations against the right of England to interrupt their navigation, and their arming for the protection of their commerce on the ocean, and even in the English channel, are unequivocal proofs of their opinion concerning the right in our contest, and of their intentions not to interfere against us. It is very true, that the articles of commerce which they produce, are in many respects the same with those of America. Yet if we consider that we shall have occasion to purchase from them large quantities of hemp and sailcloth, and that our productions of timber, pitch, tar, and turpentine, are less profitable with us without bounties, than some other branches of labor, it is not probable that we shall lower the price of these articles in Europe so much as some conjecture, and consequently our increased demand upon those countries for several articles will be more than a compensation to them for the small loss they may sustain, by a trifling reduction in the price of those articles. It is not probable that the Courts of Petersburg, Stockholm, and Copenhagen have viewed with indifference the present revolution, if they have been apprehensive of being hurt by it in some respects, which however I think must have been a mistaken apprehension; yet the motive of humbling the pride of the English, who have endeavored to exercise their domination, even over the northern seas, and to render the Danish and Swedish flag dependent on theirs, has prevailed over all others, and they are considered in Europe as having given their testimony against the English in this war.

Italy, a country which declines every day from its ancient prosperity, offers few objects to our speculations. The privileges of the port of Leghorn, nevertheless, may render it useful to our ships, when our independence shall be acknowledged by Great Britain, if, as we once flattered ourselves, the Court of Vienna might receive an American Minister. We were equally in error respecting the Court of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, where an Austrian prince reigns, who receives all his directions from Vienna, in such a manner that he will probably never receive any person in a public character, until the chief of his house has set him the example. The King of the two Sicilies is in the same dependence on the Court of Madrid, and we may depend upon it, he will conform himself to all it shall suggest to him. This prince has already ordered the ports of his dominions to be open to American vessels, public and private, and has ordered his Ambassador at Paris to apply to your Commissioners for a description of the American flag, that our vessels might be known, and receive no molestation upon their appearance in his harbors.

The Court of Rome, attached to ancient customs, would be one of the last to acknowledge our independence, if we were to solicit for it. But Congress will probably never send a Minister to his Holiness, who can do them no service, upon condition of receiving a Catholic Legate or Nuncio in return, or in other words, an ecclesiastical tyrant, which it is to be hoped the United States will be too wise ever to admit into their territories.

The States of the King of Sardinia are poor, and their commerce is very small. The little port of Villa Franca will probably see few American vessels, nor will there be any close relations, either commercial or political, between this prince and us.

The republic of Genoa is scarcely known at this day in Europe, but by those powers who borrow money. It is possible that some small sums might be obtained there, if Congress would fall upon means of insuring a punctual payment of interest in Europe.

Venice, heretofore so powerful, is reduced to a very inconsiderable commerce, and is in an entire state of decay.

Switzerland is another lender of money, but neither her position nor her commerce can occasion any near relation with us.

Whether there is anything in these remarks worth the trouble of reading, I shall submit to the wisdom of Congress, and subscribe myself, with the highest consideration, your most obedient and humble servant,