M^r Randolph moved that the last sentence "each member shall have one vote," be postponed.

It was observed that this could not be necessary; as in case the sanction as to originating money bills should not be reinstated, and a revision of the Constitution should ensue, it w^d still be proper that the members should vote per Capita. A postponement of the preceding sentence allowing to each State 2 members w^d have been more proper.

M^r Mason, did not mean to propose a change of this mode of voting per capita in any event. But as there might be other modes proposed, he saw no impropriety in postponing the sentence. Each State may have two members, and yet may have unequal votes. He said that unless the exclusive originating of money bills should be restored to the House of Representatives, he should, not from obstinacy but duty and conscience, oppose throughout the equality of Representation in the Senate.

M^r Gov^r Morris. Such declarations were he supposed, addressed to the smaller States in order to alarm them for their equality in the Senate, and induce them ag^st their judgments, to concur in restoring the section concerning money bills. He would declare in his turn that as he saw no prospect of amending the Constitution of the Senate & considered the section relating to money bills as intrinsically bad, he would adhere to the section establishing the equality at all events.

M^r Wilson. It seems to have been supposed by some that the section concerning money bills is desirable to the large States. The fact was that two of those States (P^a & V^a) had uniformly voted ag^st it without reference to any other part of the system.

M^r Randolph, urged as Col. Mason had done that the sentence under consideration was connected with that relating to Money bills, and might possibly be affected by the result of the motion for reconsidering the latter. That the postponement was therefore not improper.

Question for postponing "each member shall have one vote,"

N. H. div^d. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

The words were then agreed to as part of the section.

M^r Randolph then gave notice that he should move to reconsider this whole Sect: 1. Art. V. as connected with the 5. Sect. Art. IV. as to which he had already given such notice.

Art. V. Sect. 2^d taken up.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert after the words, "immediately after," the following "they shall be assembled in consequence of," which was agreed to nem. con. as was then the whole sect. 2.

Art: V. Sect. 3. taken up.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert 14 instead of 4 years citizenship as a qualification for Senators: urging the danger of admitting strangers into our public Councils. M^r Pinkney 2^d him.

M^r Elseworth, was opposed to the motion as discouraging meritorious aliens from emigrating to this Country.

M^r Pinkney. As the Senate is to have the power of making treaties & managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety in opening its door to those who have foreign attachments. He quoted the jealousy of the Athenians on this subject who made it death for any stranger to intrude his voice into their Legislative proceedings.

Col. Mason highly approved of the policy of the motion. Were it not that many not natives of this Country had acquired great merit during the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility into the Senate, to natives.

M^r Madison was not averse to some restrictions on this subject; but could never agree to the proposed amendment. He thought any restriction however in the Constitution unnecessary, and improper, unnecessary; because the Nat^l Legisl^re is to have the right of regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of residence or conditions of enjoying different privileges of Citizenship: Improper; because it will give a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution: because it will put it out of the power of the Nat^l Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers & because it will discourage the most desirable class of people from emigrating to the U. S. Should the proposed Constitution have the intended effect of giving stability & reputation to our Gov^ts great numbers of respectable Europeans; men who love liberty and wish to partake its blessings, will be ready to transfer their fortunes hither. All such would feel the mortification of being marked with suspicious incapacitations though they s^d not covet the public honors. He was not apprehensive that any dangerous number of strangers would be appointed by the State Legislatures, if they were left at liberty to do so: nor that foreign powers would make use of strangers as instruments for their purposes. Their bribes would be expended on men whose circumstances would rather stifle than excite jealousy & watchfulness in the public.

M^r Butler was decidedly opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the Country. They bring with them, not only attachments to other Countries; but ideas of Gov^t so distinct from ours that in every point of view they are dangerous. He acknowledged that if he himself had been called into public life within a short time after his coming to America, his foreign habits opinions & attachments would have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs. He mentioned the great strictness observed in Great Britain on this subject.

Doc^r Franklin was not against a reasonable time, but should be very sorry to see any thing like illiberality inserted in the Constitution. The people in Europe are friendly to this Country. Even in the Country with which we have been lately at war, we have now & had during the war, a great many friends not only among the people at large but in both houses of Parliament. In every other Country in Europe all the people are our friends. We found in the course of the Revolution, that many strangers served us faithfully, and that many natives took part ag^st their Country. When foreigners after looking about for some other Country in which they can obtain more happiness, give a preference to ours, it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite our confidence & affection.

M^r Randolph did not know but it might be problematical whether emigrations to this Country were on the whole useful or not: but he could never agree to the motion for disabling them for 14 years to participate in the public honours. He reminded the Convention of the language held by our patriots during the Revolution, and the principles laid down in all our American Constitutions. Many foreigners may have fixed their fortunes among us under the faith of these invitations. All persons under this description, with all others who would be affected by such a regulation, would enlist themselves under the banners of hostility to the proposed System. He would go as far as seven years, but no further.

M^r Wilson said he rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar; mentioning the circumstance of his not being a native, and the possibility, if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being incapacitated from holding a place under the very Constitution, which he had shared in the trust of making. He remarked the illiberal complexion which the motion would give to the System & the effect which a good system would have in inviting meritorious foreigners among us, and the discouragement & mortification they must feel from the degrading discrimination now proposed. He had himself experienced this mortification. On his removal into Maryland, he found himself, from defect of residence, under certain legal incapacities which never ceased to produce chagrin, though he assuredly did not desire & would not have accepted the offices to which they related. To be appointed to a place may be matter of indifference. To be incapable of being appointed, is a circumstance grating and mortifying.

M^r Gov^r Morris. The lesson we are taught is that we should be governed as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings as possible. What is the language of Reason on this subject? That we should not be polite at the expence of prudence. There was a moderation in all things. It is said that some tribes of Indians, carried their hospitality so far as to offer to strangers their wives & daughters. Was this a proper model for us? He would admit them to his house, he would invite them to his table, would provide for them comfortable lodgings; but would not carry the complaisance so far as, to bed them with his wife. He would let them worship at the same altar, but did not choose to make Priests of them. He ran over the privileges which emigrants would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived of that of being eligible to the great offices of Government; observing that they exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in any part of the world; and that as every Society from a great nation down to a club had the right of declaring the conditions on which new members should be admitted, there could be no room for complaint. As to those philosophical gentlemen, those Citizens of the World as they called themselves, He owned he did not wish to see any of them in our public Councils. He would not trust them. The men who can shake off their attachments to their own Country can never love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which uphold all Governments. Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to increase the commerce of France: an Englishman, he will feel an equal bias in favor of that of England. It has been said that The Legislatures will not chuse foreigners, at least improper ones. There was no knowing what Legislatures would do. Some appointments made by them, proved that every thing ought to be apprehended from the cabals practised on such occasions. He mentioned the case of a foreigner who left this State in disgrace, and worked himself into an appointment from another to Congress.

Question on the motion of M^r Gov^r Morris to insert 14 in place of 4 years

N.H. ay. Mass. no. C^t no. N.J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On 13 years, moved by M^r Gov^r Morris

N. H. ay. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On 10 years moved by Gen^l Pinkney

N. H. ay. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

D^r Franklin reminded the Convention that it did not follow from an omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution that the persons in question w^d be actually chosen into the Legislature.

M^r Rutlidge. 7 years of Citizenship have been required for the House of Representatives. Surely a longer time is requisite for the Senate, which will have more power.

M^r Williamson. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in this case than the other House. Bribery & cabal can be more easily practised in the choice of the Senate which is to be made by the Legislatures composed of a few men, than of the House of Represent^s who will be chosen by the people.

M^r Randolph will agree to 9 years with the expectation that it will be reduced to seven if M^r Wilson's motion to reconsider the vote fixing 7 years for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of that period.

On a question for 9 years

N. H. ay. Mass. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. div^d. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The term "Resident" was struck out, & "inhabitant" inserted nem. con.

Art. V. Sect. 3. as amended agreed to nem. con.

Sect. 4. agreed to nem. con.

Article VI. Sect. 1. taken up.

M^r Madison & M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out "each House" & to insert "the House of Representatives;" the right of the Legislatures to regulate the times & places &c. in the election of Senators being involved in the right of appointing them, which was disagreed to.

Division of the question being called, it was taken on the first part down to "but their provisions concerning &c."

The first part was agreed to nem. con.

M^r Pinkney & M^r Rutlidge moved to strike out the remaining part viz but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United States. The States they contended could & must be relied on in such cases.

M^r Ghorum. It would be as improper take this power from the Nat^l Legislature, as to Restrain the British Parliament from regulating the circumstances of elections, leaving this business to the Counties themselves—

M^r Madison. [20] The necessity of a Gen^l Gov^t supposes that the State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expence of their local conveniency or prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of the States, supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrouled right of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, sh^d all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district; these & many other points would depend on the Legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments. Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would produce a like inequality in their representation in the Nat^l Legislature, as it was presumable that the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a controuling power to the Nat^l Legislature? Of whom was it to consist? 1. of a Senate to be chosen by the State Legislatures. If the latter therefore could be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. 2. of Representatives elected by the same people who elect the State Legislatures; Surely then if confidence is due to the latter, it must be due to the former. It seemed as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the State Legislatures this great authority over the election of the Representatives of the people in the Gen^l Legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their Representatives in the State Legislatures.

M^r King. If this power be not given to the Nat^l Legislature, their right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Altho this scheme of erecting the Gen^l Gov^t on the authority of the State Legislatures has been fatal to the federal establishment, it would seem as if many gentlemen, still foster the dangerous idea.

M^r Gov^r Morris observed that the States might make false returns and then make no provisions for new elections.

M^r Sherman did not know but it might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient confidence in the State Legislatures. The motion of M^r P. & M^r R. did not prevail.

The word "respectively" was inserted after the word "State."

On the motion of M^r Read the word "their" was struck out, & "regulations in such cases" inserted in place of "provisions concerning them" the clause then reading–"but regulations in each of the foregoing cases may at any time, be made or altered by the Legislature of the U. S." This was meant to give the Nat^l Legislature a power not only to alter the provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.

Art. VI. Sect. 1. as thus amended was agreed to nem. con.

Adjourned.

Friday Aug^st 10. in Convention

Art. VI. Sect. 2. taken up.

M^r Pinkney. The Committee as he had conceived were instructed to report the proper qualifications of property for the members of the Nat^l Legislature; instead of which they have referred the task to the Nat^l Legislature itself. Should it be left on this footing, the first Legislature will meet without any particular qualifications of property; and if it should happen to consist of rich men they might fix such qualifications as may be too favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic influence in the Constitution but he thought it essential that the members of the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges, should be possessed of competent property to make them independent & respectable. It was prudent when such great powers were to be trusted to connect the tie of property with that of reputation in securing a faithful administration. The Legislature would have the fate of the Nation put into their hands. The President would also have a very great influence on it. The Judges would have not only important causes between Citizen & Citizen but also where foreigners are concerned. They will even be the Umpires between the U. States and individual States as well as between one State & another. Were he to fix the quantum of property which should be required, he should not think of less than one hundred thousand dollars for the President, half of that sum for each of the Judges, and in like proportion for the members of the Nat^l Legislature. He would however leave the sums blank. His motion was that the President of the U. S. the Judges, and members of the Legislature should be required to swear that they were respectively possessed of a cleared unincumbered Estate to the amount of –— in the case of the President &c &c.

M^r Rutlidge seconded the motion, observing that the Committee had reported no qualifications because they could not agree on any among themselves, being embarrassed by the danger on one side of displeasing the people by making them high, and on the other of rendering them nugatory by making them low.

M^r Elseworth. The different circumstances of different parts of the U. S. and the probable difference between the present and future circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have either uniform or fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the S. States, and they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them to the latter, and they will serve no purpose in the former. In like manner what may be accommodated to the existing State of things among us, may be very inconvenient in some future state of them. He thought for these reasons that it was better to leave this matter to the Legislative discretion than to attempt a provision for it in the Constitution.

Doct^r Franklin expressed his dislike of every thing that tended to debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation, it was not less true that the possession of property increased the desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with, were the richest rogues. We should remember the character which the Scripture requires in Rulers, that they should be men hating covetousness. This Constitution will be much read and attended to in Europe, and if it should betray a great partiality to the rich will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal and enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from removing to this Country.

The Motion of M^r Pinkney was rejected by so general a no, that the States were not called.

M^r Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Gov^t and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorized to elect. In all cases where the representatives of the people will have a personal interest distinct from that of their Constituents, there was the same reason for being jealous of them, as there was for relying on them with full confidence, when they had a common interest. This was one of the former cases. It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges. It was a power also which might be made subservient to the views of one faction ag^st another. Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction.

M^r Elseworth, admitted that the power was not unexceptionable; but he could not view it as dangerous. Such a power with regard to the electors would be dangerous because it would be much more liable to abuse.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out "with regard to property" in order to leave the Legislature entirely at large.

M^r Williamson. This would surely never be admitted. Should a majority of the Legislature be composed of any particular description of men, of lawyers for example, which is no improbable supposition, the future elections might be secured to their own body.

M^r Madison observed that the British Parliam^t possessed the power of regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious parties.

Question on the motion to strike out with regard to property

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. [21] no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

M^r Rutlidge was opposed to leaving the power to the Legislature–He proposed that the qualifications should be the same as for members of the State Legislatures.

M^r Wilson thought it would be best on the whole to let the Section go out. A uniform rule would probably never be fixed by the Legislature, and this particular power would constructively exclude every other power of regulating qualifications.

On the question for agreeing to Art. VI. Sect. 2^d

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

On motion of M^r Wilson to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 2; so as to restore 3 in place of seven years of citizenship as a qualification for being elected into the House of Represent^s.

N. H. no. Mass. no. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.

Monday next was then assigned for the reconsideration; all the States being ay. except Mass^ts. & Georgia.

Art: VI. Sect. 3. taken up.

M^r Ghorum contended that less than a majority in each House should be made a Quorum, otherwise great delay might happen in business, and great inconvenience from the future increase of numbers.

M^r Mercer was also for less than a majority. So great a number will put it in the power of a few by seceding at a critical moment to introduce convulsions, and endanger the Governm^t. Examples of secession have already happened in some of the States. He was for leaving it to the Legislature to fix the Quorum, as in Great Britain, where the requisite number is small & no inconveniency has been experienced.

Col. Mason. This is a valuable & necessary part of the plan. In this extended Country, embracing so great a diversity of interests, it would be dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small number of members of the two Houses to make laws. The Central States could always take care to be on the Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones, or wearying their patience, and outstaying them, could carry such measures as they pleased. He admitted that inconveniences might spring from the secession of a small number; But he had also known good produced by an apprehension, of it. He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia. He thought the Constitution as now moulded was founded on sound principles, and was disposed to put into it extensive powers. At the same time he wished to guard ag^st abuses as much as possible. If the Legislature should be able to reduce the number at all, it might reduce it as low as it pleased & the U. States might be governed by a Juncto–A majority of the number which had been agreed on, was so few that he feared it would be made an objection ag^st the plan.

M^r King admitted there might be some danger of giving an advantage to the Central States; but he was of opinion that the public inconveniency on the other side was more to be dreaded.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to fix the quorum at 33 members in the H. of Rep^s & 14 in the Senate. This is a majority of the present number, and will be a bar to the Legislature: fix the number low and they will generally attend knowing that advantage may be taken of their absence, the Secession of a small number ought not to be suffered to break a quorum. Such events in the States may have been of little consequence. In the national Councils they may be fatal. Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break up a quorum, they may seize a moment when a particular part of the Continent may be in need of immediate aid, to extort, by threatening a secession, some unjust & selfish measure.

M^r Mercer 2^ded the motion.

M^r King said he had just prepared a motion which instead of fixing the numbers proposed by M^r Gov^r Morris as Quorums, made those the lowest numbers, leaving the Legislature at liberty to increase them or not. He thought the future increase of members would render a majority of the whole extremely cumbersome.

M^r Mercer agreed to substitute M^r King's motion in place of M^r Morris's.

M^r Elseworth was opposed to it. It would be a pleasing ground of confidence to the people that no law or burden could be imposed on them by a few men. He reminded the movers that the Constitution proposed to give such a discretion with regard to the number of Representatives that a very inconvenient number was not to be apprehended. The inconveniency of secessions may be guarded ag^st by giving to each House an authority to require the attendance of absent members.

M^r Wilson concurred in the sentiments of M^r Elseworth.

M^r Gerry seemed to think that some further precautions than merely fixing the quorum might be necessary. He observed that as 17 w^d be a majority of a quorum of 33, and 8 of 14, questions might by possibility be carried in the H. of Rep^s by 2 large States, and in the Senate by the same States with the aid of two small ones.–He proposed that the number for a quorum in the H. of Rep^s should not exceed 50, nor be less than 33, leaving the intermediate discretion to the Legislature.

M^r King. As the quorum could not be altered with^t the concurrence of the President by less than 2/3 of each House, he thought there could be no danger in trusting the Legislature.

M^r Carrol. This would be no security ag^st a continuance of the quorums at 33 & 14. when they ought to be increased.

On question on M^r King's motion "that not less than 33 in the H. of Rep^s nor less than 14 in the Senate sh^d constitute a Quorum which may be increased by a law, on additions of the members in either House.

N. H. no. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Randolph & M^r Madison moved to add to the end of Art. VI. Sect. 3, "and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members in such manner & under such penalties as each House may provide." Agreed to by all except Pen^a which was divided.

Art. VI. Sect. 3. agreed to as amended nem. con.

Sect. 4. Sect. 5.

}

Agreed to nem. con.

M^r Madison observed that the right of expulsion (Art. VI. Sect. 6.) was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused. He moved that, "with the concurrence of 2/3," might be inserted between may & expel.

M^r Randolph & M^r Mason approved the idea.

M^r Gov^r Morris. This power may be safely trusted to a majority. To require more may produce abuses on the side of the minority. A few men from factious motives may keep in a member who ought to be expelled.

M^r Carrol thought that the concurrence of 2/3 at least ought to be required.

On the question requiring 2/3 in cases of expelling a member.

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a div^d. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art. VI. Sect. 6. as thus amended agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. Sect. 7. taken up.

M^r Gov^r Morris urged that if the yeas & nays were proper at all any individual ought to be authorized to call for them; and moved an amendment to that effect.–The small States may otherwise be under a disadvantage, and find it difficult to get a concurrence of 1/5.

M^r Randolph 2^ded y^e motion.

M^r Sherman had rather strike out the yeas & nays altogether. They never have done any good, and have done much mischief. They are not proper as the reasons governing the voter never appear along with them.

M^r Elseworth was of the same opinion.

Col. Mason liked the Section as it stood, it was a middle way between two extremes.

M^r Ghorum was opposed to the motion for allowing a single member to call the yeas & nays, and recited the abuses of it in Mass^ts. 1 in stuffing the journals with them on frivolous occasions. 2 in misleading the people who never know the reasons determing the votes.

The motion for allowing a single member to call the yeas & nays was disag^d to nem. con.

M^r Carrol. & M^r Randolph moved to strike out the words, "each House" and to insert the words, "the House of Representatives" in Sect. 7. Art. 6. and to add to the section the words "and any member of the Senate shall be at liberty to enter his dissent."

M^r Gov^r Morris & M^r Wilson observed that if the minority were to have a right to enter their votes & reasons, the other side would have a right to complain, if it were not extended to them: & to allow it to both, would fill the Journals, like the records of a Court, with replications, rejoinders &c.

Question on M^r Carrol's motion to allow a member to enter his dissent

N. H. no. Mass. no. Con^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M^r Gerry moved to strike out the words "when it shall be acting in its legislative capacity" in order to extend the provision to the Senate when exercising its peculiar authorities and to insert "except such parts thereof as in their judgment require secrecy" after the words "publish them."—(It was thought by others that provision should be made with respect to these when that part came under consideration which proposed to vest those additional authorities in the Senate.)

On this question for striking out the words "when acting in its legislative capacity"

N. H. div^d. Mass. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Adjourned.

Saturday Aug^st 11 in Convention

M^r Madison & M^r Rutlidge moved "that each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, & shall publish the same from time to time; except such part of the proceedings of the Senate, when acting not in its Legislative capacity as may be judged by that House to require secrecy."

M^r Mercer. This implies that other powers than legislative will be given to the Senate which he hoped would not be given.

M^r Madison & M^r R's motion was disag^d to by all the States except Virg^a.

M^r Gerry & M^r Sherman moved to insert after the words "publish them" the following "except such as relate to treaties & military operations." Their object was to give each House a discretion in such cases.–On this question

N. H. no. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

M^r Elseworth. As the clause is objectionable in so many shapes, it may as well be struck out altogether. The Legislature will not fail to publish their proceedings from time to time. The people will call for it if it should be improperly omitted.

M^r Wilson thought the expunging of the clause would be very improper. The people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings. Besides as this is a clause in the existing confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a pretext by which weak & suspicious minds may be easily misled.

M^r Mason thought it would give a just alarm to the people, to make a conclave of their Legislature.

M^r Sherman thought the Legislature might be trusted in this case if in any.

Question on 1^st part of the section down to "publish them" inclusive: Agreed to nem. con.

Question on the words to follow, to wit "except such parts thereof as may in their Judgment require secrecy."

N. H. div^d. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.

The remaining part as to yeas & nays,–agreed to nem. con.

Art VI. Sect. 8. taken up.

M^r King remarked that the section authorized the 2 Houses to adjourn to a new place. He thought this inconvenient. The mutability of place had dishonored the federal Gov^t and would require as strong a cure as we could devise. He thought a law at least should be made necessary to a removal of the Seat of Gov^t.

M^r Madison viewed the subject in the same light, and joined with M^r King in a motion requiring a law.

Mr. Govern^r Morris proposed the additional alteration by inserting the words, "during the Session" &c.

M^r Spaight. This will fix the seat of Gov^t at N. Y. The present Congress will convene them there in the first instance, and they will never be able to remove, especially if the Presid^t should be [a] Northern Man.

M^r Gov^r Morris such a distrust is inconsistent with all Gov^t.

M^r Madison supposed that a central place for the seat of Gov^t was so just and w^d be so much insisted on by the H. of Representatives, that though a law should be made requisite for the purpose, it could & would be obtained. The necessity of a central residence of the Gov^t w^d be much greater under the new than old Gov^t. The members of the new Gov^t w^d be more numerous. They would be taken more from the interior parts of the States; they w^d not like members of y^e present Cong^s come so often from the distant States by water. As the powers & objects of the new Gov^t would be far greater y^e heretofore, more private individuals w^d have business calling them to the seat of it, and it was more necessary that the Gov^t should be in that position from which it could contemplate with the most equal eye, and sympathize most equally with, every part of the nation. These considerations he supposed would extort a removal even if a law were made necessary. But in order to quiet suspicions both within & without doors, it might not be amiss to authorize the 2 Houses by a concurrent vote to adjourn at their first meeting to the most proper place, and to require thereafter, the sanction of a law to their removal.

The motion was accordingly moulded into the following form: "the Legislature shall at their first assembling determine on a place at which their future sessions shall be held; neither House shall afterwards, during the session of the House of Rep^s without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor shall they adjourn to any other place than such as shall have been fixt by law."

M^r Gerry thought it would be wrong to let the Presid^t check the will of the 2 Houses on this subject at all.

M^r Williamson supported the ideas of M^r Spaight.

M^r Carrol was actuated by the same apprehensions.

M^r Mercer, it will serve no purpose to require the two Houses at their first meeting to fix on a place. They will never agree.

After some further expressions from others denoting an apprehension that the seat of Gov^t might be continued at an improper place if a law should be made necessary to a removal, and the motion above stated with another for recommitting the section had been negatived, the section was left in the shape in which it was reported as to this point. The words, "during the session of the Legislature" were prefixed to the 8^th section–and the last sentence "But this regulation shall not extend to the Senate when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the –— article" struck out. The 8^th section as amended was then agreed to.

M^r Randolph moved according to notice to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 5. concerning money bills which had been struck out. He argued 1. that he had not wished for this privilege whilst a proportional Representation in the Senate was in contemplation, but since an equality had been fixed in that house, the large States would require this compensation at least. 2. that it would make the plan more acceptable to the people, because they will consider the Senate as the more aristocratic body, and will expect that the usual guards ag^st its influence be provided according to the example in G. Britain. 3. the privilege will give some advantage to the House of Rep^s if it extends to the originating only–but still more if it restrains the Senate from amend^g. 4. he called on the smaller States to concur in the measure, as the condition by which alone the compromise had entitled them to an equality in the Senate. He signified that he should propose instead of the original section, a clause specifying that the bills in question should be for the purpose of Revenue, in order to repel y^e objection ag^st the extent of the words, "raising money," which might happen incidentally, and that the Senate should not so amend or alter as to increase or diminish the sum; in order to obviate the inconveniences urged ag^st a restriction of the Senate to a simple affirmation or negative.

M^r Williamson 2^ded the motion.

M^r Pinkney was sorry to oppose the opportunity gentlemen asked to have the question again opened for discussion, but as he considered it a mere waste of time he could not bring himself to consent to it. He said that notwithstanding what had been said as to the compromise, he always considered this section as making no part of it. The rule of Representation in the 1^st branch was the true condition of that in the 2^d branch.–Several others spoke for & ag^st the reconsideration, but without going into the merits.–On the Question to reconsider

N. H. ay. Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. J. [22] ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. div^d. Geo. ay.–Monday was then assigned—