Tuesday August 7. [17] In Convention

[17] Although the secrecy of the proceedings was guarded carefully, the reason of the long adjournment was generally known outside of the Convention.

"The Convention adjourned about three weeks ago and appointed a Committee consisting of M^r Rutlege, M^r Randolph, M^r Wilson, M^r Elsworth, & M^r Gorham to draw into form the measures which had been agreed upon–they reassembled last Monday sen'night to receive the report–I suppose we shall have the result of this great business in a few weeks more."–Edward Carrington to Monroe, August 7, 1787.

Monroe MSS.

Cf. King's account of the debate confirming the accuracy of Madison's report (King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 617).

M^r Pinkney moved that it be referred to a Committee of the whole. This was strongly opposed by M^r Ghorum & several others, as likely to produce unnecessary delay; and was negatived, Delaware Mary^d & Virg^a only being in the affirmative.

Art: III considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety of giving each branch a negative on the other "in all cases." There were some cases in which it was he supposed not intended to be given as in the case of balloting for appointments.

M^r Sherman. This will restrain the operation of the clause too much. It will particularly exclude a mutual negative in the case of ballots, which he hoped would take place.

M^r Ghorum contended that elections ought to be made by joint ballot. If separate ballots should be made for the President, and the two branches should be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention & confusion may ensue. These inconveniences have been felt in Mas^ts in the election of officers of little importance compared with the Executive of the U. States. The only objection ag^st a joint ballot is that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight; but this ought not to prevail over the respect due to the public tranquility & welfare.

M^r Wilson was for a joint ballot in several cases at least; particularly in the choice of the President, and was therefore for the amendment. Disputes between the two Houses during & concern^g the vacancy of the Executive might have dangerous consequences.

Col. Mason thought the amendment of M^r Gov^r Morris extended too far. Treaties are in a subsequent part declared to be laws, they will therefore be subjected to a negative; altho' they are to be made as proposed by the Senate alone. He proposed that the mutual negative should be restrained to "cases requiring the distinct assent" of the two Houses.

M^r Gov^r Morris thought this but a repetition of the same thing; the mutual negative and distinct assent, being equivalent expressions. Treaties he thought were not laws.

M^r Madison moved to strike out the words each of which shall in all cases, have a negative on the other; the idea being sufficiently expressed in the preceding member of the article; vesting the "legislative power" in "distinct bodies," especially as the respective powers and mode of exercising them were fully delineated in a subsequent article.

M^r Madison wished to know the reasons of the Com^e for fixing by y^e Constitution the time of Meeting for the Legislature; and suggested, that it be required only that one meeting at least should be held every year leaving the time to be fixed or varied by law.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out the sentence. It was improper to tie down the Legislature to a particular time, or even to require a meeting every year. The public business might not require it.

M^r Ghorum. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution, disputes will arise in the Legislature; and the States will be at a loss to adjust thereto, the times of their elections. In the N. England States the annual time of meeting had been long fixed by their Charters & Constitutions, and no inconvenience had resulted. He thought it necessary that there should be one meeting at least every year as a check on the Executive department.

M^r Elseworth was ag^st striking out the words. The Legislature will not know till they are met whether the public interest required their meeting or not. He could see no impropriety in fixing the day, as the Convention could judge of it as well as the Legislature.

M^r King could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting every year. A great vice in our system was that of legislating too much. The most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the Nat^l Legislature were but few. The chief of them were commerce & revenue. When these should be once settled alterations would be rarely necessary & easily made.

M^r Madison thought if the time of meeting should be fixed by a law it w^d be sufficiently fixed & there would be no difficulty then as had been suggested, on the part of the States in adjusting their elections to it. One consideration appeared to him to militate strongly ag^st fixing a time by the Constitution. It might happen that the Legislature might be called together by the public exigencies & finish their Session but a short time before the annual period. In this case it would be extremely inconvenient to reassemble so quickly & without the least necessity. He thought one annual meeting ought to be required; but did not wish to make two unavoidable.

Col. Mason thought the objections against fixing the time insuperable: but that an annual meeting ought to be required as essential to the preservation of the Constitution. The extent of the Country will supply business. And if it should not, the Legislature, besides legislative, is to have inquisitorial powers, which cannot safely be long kept in a state of suspension.

M^r Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as well as for frequent meetings of the Legislative body. Disputes and difficulties will arise between the two Houses, & between both & the States, if the time be changeable–frequent meetings of Parliament were required at the Revolution in England as an essential safeguard of liberty. So also are annual meetings in most of the American charters & constitutions. There will be business eno' to require it. The Western Country, and the great extent and varying state of our affairs in general will supply objects.

M^r Randolph was ag^st fixing any day irrevocably; but as there was no provision made any where in the Constitution for regulating the periods of meeting, and some precise time must be fixed, untill the Legislature shall make provision, he could not agree to strike out the words altogether. Instead of which he moved to add the words following–"unless a different day shall be appointed by law."

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out Dec^r & insert May. It might frequently happen that our measures ought to be influenced by those in Europe, which were generally planned during the Winter and of which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.

M^r Madison 2^ded the motion, he preferred May to Dec^r because the latter would require the travelling to & from the seat of Gov^t in the most inconvenient seasons of the year.

M^r Elseworth. The summer will interfere too much with private business, that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature being more or less connected with agriculture.

M^r Randolph. The time is of no great moment now, as the Legislature can vary it. On looking into the Constitutions of the States, he found that the times of their elections with which the election of the Nat^l Representatives would no doubt be made to coincide, would suit better with Dec^r than May. And it was advisable to render our innovations as little incommodious as possible.

M^r Read moved to insert after the word "Senate," the words, "subject to the Negative to be hereafter provided." His object was to give an absolute Negative to the Executive–He considered this as so essential to the Constitution, to the preservation of liberty, & to the public welfare, that his duty compelled him to make the Motion.

M^r Rutlidge. Altho' it is agreed on all hands that an annual meeting of the Legislature should be made necessary, yet that point seems not to be free from doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion, "Once at least in every year," were inserted, nem. con.

Art. III with the foregoing alterations was ag^d to nem. con., and is as follows: "The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of 2 separate & distinct bodies of men; a House of Rep^s & a Senate. The Legislature shall meet at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the 1^st Monday in Dec^r unless a different day shall be appointed by law."

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out the last member of the section beginning with the words "qualifications of Electors," in order that some other provision might be substituted which w^d restrain the right of suffrage to freeholders.

M^r Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered by the Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided. It would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for those in the Nat^l Legislature.

M^r Gov^r Morris. Such a hardship would be neither great nor novel. The people are accustomed to it and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the States. In some the qualifications are different for the choice of the Gov^r & Representatives; In others for different Houses of the Legislature. Another objection ag^st the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications of the Nat^l Legislature depend on the will of the States, which he thought not proper.

M^r Elseworth. thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the most proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The people will not readily subscribe to the Nat^l Constitution if it should subject them to be disfranchised. The States are the best Judges of the circumstances & temper of their own people.

Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not attended to by those Gentlemen who wish for innovations on this point. Eight or nine States have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders. What will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised. A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the Legislature.

M^r Butler. There is no right of which the people are more jealous than that of suffrage. Abridgments of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland where they have at length thrown all power into the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves, and form a rank aristocracy.

M^r Dickinson. had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a necessary defence ag^st the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property & without principle with which our Country like all others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in his opinion chimerical. The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it.

M^r Elseworth. How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to levy & dispose of his money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers, who will bear a full share of the public burthens be not allowed a voice in the imposition of them. Taxation & representation ought to go together.

M^r Gov^r Morris. He had long learned not to be the dupe of words. The sound of aristocracy therefore had no effect on him. It was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his principal objections to the Constitution as it is now before us, is that it threatens this Country with an aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment. The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers. Will such men be the secure & faithful guardians of liberty? Will they be the impregnable barrier ag^st aristocracy?–He was as little duped by the association of the words, "taxation & Representation." The man who does not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because they have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest. He did not conceive the difficulty of defining "freeholders" to be insuperable. Still less that the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people are at present freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As to Merch^ts. &c. if they have wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not they don't deserve it.

Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains of antient prejudices, and view things too much through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification in England, & hence it is imagined to be the only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was that every man having evidence of attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society ought to share in all its rights & privileges. Was this qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no other kind of property but land evidence a common interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment. Ought the merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own Country to be viewed as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens.

M^r Madison. the right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in which aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him depend much on the probable reception such a change would meet with in States where the right was now exercised by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of property. These will either combine, under the influence of their common situation: in which case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or which is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on another side. The example of England has been misconceived (by Col. Mason.) A very small proportion of the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders. The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs, in many of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it is in any one of the U. S. and it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the Counties, that bribery most prevailed, & the influence of the Crown on elections was most dangerously exerted. [18]

[18] "Note to speech of J. M. in Convention of 1787, August 7^th.:

"As appointments for the General Government here contemplated will, in part, be made by the State Gov^ts, all the Citizens in States where the right of suffrage is not limited to the holders of property, will have an indirect share of representation in the General Government. But this does not satisfy the fundamental principle that men cannot be justly bound by laws in making which they have no part. Persons & property being both essential objects of Government, the most that either can claim, is such a structure of it as will leave a reasonable security for the other. And the most obvious provision, of this double character, seems to be that of confining to the holders of property the object deemed least secure in popular Gov^ts the right of suffrage for one of the two Legislative branches. This is not without example among us, as well as other constitutional modifications, favouring the influence of property in the Government. But the U. S. have not reached the stage of Society in which conflicting feelings of the Class with, and the Class without property, have the operation natural to them in Countries fully peopled. The most difficult of all political arrangements is that of so adjusting the claims of the two Classes as to give security to each and to promote the welfare of all. The federal principle,–which enlarges the sphere of power without departing from the elective basis of it and controuls in various ways the propensity in small republics to rash measures & the facility of forming & executing them, will be found the best expedient yet tried for solving the problem."–Madison's Note.

"Note to the speech of J. M. on the [7^th.] day of [August].

"These observations (in the speech of J. M. see debates in the Convention of 1787, on the [7^th.] day of [August]) do not convey the speaker's more full & matured view of the subject, which is subjoined. He felt too much at the time the example of Virginia.

"The right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in Republican Constitutions. The regulation of it is, at the same time, a task of peculiar delicacy. Allow the right exclusively to property, and the rights of persons may be oppressed. The feudal polity, alone sufficiently proves it. Extend it equally to all, and the rights of property, or the claims of justice, may be overruled by a majority without property or interested in measures of injustice. Of this abundant proof is afforded by other popular Gov^ts and is not without examples in our own, particularly in the laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

"In civilized communities, property as well as personal rights is an essential object of the laws, which encourage industry by securing the enjoyment of its fruits; that industry from which property results, & that enjoyment which consists not merely in its immediate use, but in its posthumous destination to objects of choice and of kindred affection.

"In a just & a free Government, therefore, the rights both of property & of persons ought to be effectually guarded. Will the former be so in case of a universal & equal suffrage? Will the latter be so in case of a suffrage confined to the holders of property?

"As the holders of property have at stake all the other rights common to those without property, they may be the more restrained from infringing, as well as the less tempted to infringe the rights of the latter. It is nevertheless certain, that there are various ways in which the rich may oppress the poor; in which property may oppress liberty; and that the world is filled with examples. It is necessary that the poor should have a defence against the danger.

"On the other hand, the danger to the holders of property cannot be disguised, if they be undefended against a majority without property. Bodies of men are not less swayed by interest than individuals, and are less controlled by the dread of reproach and the other motives felt by individuals. Hence the liability of the rights of property, and of the impartiality of laws affecting it, to be violated by Legislative majorities having an interest real or supposed in the injustice: Hence agrarian laws, and other leveling schemes: Hence the cancelling or evading of debts, and other violations of contracts. We must not shut our eyes to the nature of man, nor to the light of experience. Who would rely on a fair decision from three individuals if two had an interest in the case opposed to the rights of the third? Make the number as great as you please, the impartiality will not be increased; nor any further security against injustice be obtained, than what may result from the greater difficulty of uniting the wills of a greater number.

"In all Gov^ts there is a power which is capable of oppressive exercise. In Monarchies and Aristocracies oppression proceeds from a want of sympathy & responsibility in the Gov^t towards the people. In popular Governments the danger lies in an undue sympathy among individuals composing a majority, and a want of responsibility in the majority to the minority. The characteristic excellence of the political System of the U. S. arises from a distribution and organization of its powers, which at the same time that they secure the dependence of the Gov^t on the will of the nation, provides better guards than are found in any other popular Gov^t against interested combinations of a Majority against the rights of a Minority.

"The U. States have a precious advantage also in the actual distribution of property particularly the landed property; and in the universal hope of acquiring property. This latter peculiarity is among the happiest contrasts in their situation to that of the old world, where no anticipated change in this respect, can generally inspire a like sympathy with the rights of property. There may be at present, a Majority of the Nation, who are even freeholders, or the heirs or aspirants to Freeholds. And the day may not be very near when such will cease to make up a Majority of the community. But they cannot always so continue. With every admissible subdivision of the Arable lands, a populousness not greater than that of England or France will reduce the holders to a Minority. And whenever the majority shall be without landed or other equivalent property and without the means or hope of acquiring it, what is to secure the rights of property ag^st the danger from an equality & universality of suffrage, vesting compleat power over property in hands without a share in it: not to speak of a danger in the meantime from a dependence of an increasing number on the wealth of a few? In other Countries this dependence results in some from the relations between Landlords & Tenants in others both from that source & from the relations between wealthy capitalists and indigent labourers. In the U. S. the occurrence must happen from the last source; from the connection between the great Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce and the numbers employed by them. Nor will accumulations of Capital for a certain time be precluded by our laws of descent & of distribution; Such being the enterprise inspired by free Institutions, that great wealth in the hands of individuals and associations may not be unfrequent. But it may be observed, that the opportunities may be diminished, and the permanency defeated by the equalizing tendency of our laws.

"No free Country has ever been without parties, which are a natural offspring of Freedom. An obvious and permanent division of every people is into the owners of the soil, and the other inhabitants. In a certain sense the country may be said to belong to the former. If each landholder has an exclusive property in his share, the Body of Landholders have an exclusive property in the whole. As the Soil becomes subdivided, and actually cultivated by the owners, this view of the subject derives force from the principle of natural law, which vests in individuals an exclusive right to the portions of ground with which he has incorporated his labour & improvements. Whatever may be the rights of others derived from their birth in the Country, from their interest in the highways & other parcels left open for common use, as well as in the national edifices and monuments; from their share in the public defence, and from their concurrent support of the Gov^t, it would seem unreasonable to extend the right so far as to give them when become the majority, a power of Legislation over the landed property without the consent of the proprietors. Some barrier ag^st the invasion of their rights would not be out of place in a just and provident System of Gov^t. The principle of such an arrangement has prevailed in all Gov^ts where peculiar privileges or interests held by a part were to be secured ag^st violation, and in the various associations where pecuniary or other property forms the stake. In the former case a defensive right has been allowed; and if the arrangement be wrong, it is not in the defense but in the kind of privilege to be defended. In the latter case, the shares of suffrage, allotted to individuals have been with acknowledged justice apportioned more or less to their respective interests in the Common Stock.

"These reflections suggest the expediency of such a modification of Gov^t as would give security to the part of the Society having most at stake and being most exposed to danger. Three modifications present themselves.

"1. Confining the right of suffrage to freeholders, & to such as hold an equivalent property, convertible of course into freeholds. The objection to this regulation is obvious. It violates the vital principle of free Gov^t that those who are to be bound by laws, ought to have a voice in making them. And the violation w^d be more strikingly unjust as the law makers become the minority. The regulation would be as unpropitious, also, as it would be unjust. It would engage the numerical & physical force in a constant struggle ag^st the public authority; unless kept down by a standing army fatal to all parties.

"2. Confining the right of suffrage for one Branch to the holders of property, and for the other Branch to those without property. This arrangement which w^d give a mutual defence, where there might be mutual danger of encroachment, has an aspect of equality & fairness. But it w^d not be in fact either equal or fair, because the rights to be defended would be unequal, being on one side those of property as well as of persons, and on the other those of persons only. The temptation also to encroach tho' in a certain degree mutual, w^d be felt more strongly on one side than on the other: It would be more likely to beget an abuse of the Legislative Negative in extorting concessions at the expence of property, than the reverse. The division of the State into two Classes, with distinct & independ^t Organs of power, and without any intermingled agency whatever, might lead to contests & antipathies not dissimilar to those between the Patricians & Plebeians at Rome.

"3. Confining the right of electing one Branch of the Legislature to freeholders, and admitting all others to a common right with holders of property in electing the other Branch. This w^d give a defensive power to holders of property, and to the class also without property when becoming a majority of electors, without depriving them in the meantime of a participation in the Public Councils. If the holders of property would thus have a two-fold share of representation, they w^d have at the same time a two-fold stake in it, the rights of property as well as of persons, the two-fold object of political Institutions. And if no exact & safe equilibrium can be introduced, it is more reasonable that a preponderating weight sh^d be allowed to the greater interest than to the lesser. Experience alone can decide how far the practice in this case would correspond with the Theory. Such a distribution of the right of suffrage was tried in N. York and has been abandoned whether from experienced evils, or party calculations, may possibly be a question. It is still on trial in N. Carolina, with what practical indications is not known. It is certain that the trial, to be satisfactory ought to be continued for no inconsiderable period; untill in fact the non-freeholders should be the majority.

"4. Should experience or public opinion require an equal & universal suffrage for each branch of the Gov^t such as prevails generally in the U. S., a resource favorable to the rights of the landed & other property, when its possessors become the minority, may be found in an enlargement of the Election Districts for one branch of the Legislature, and an extension of its period of service. Large districts are manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over competitors depending on the personal solicitation practicable on a contracted theatre. And altho' an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely happen to many districts at the same time. The tendency of a longer period of service would be, to render the Body more stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction, till reason & justice could regain their ascendancy.

"5. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inadmissible, and universal suffrage and very short periods of elections within contracted spheres, be required for each branch of the Gov^t, the security for the holders of property when the minority, can only be derived from the ordinary influence possessed by property, & the superior information incident to its holders; from the popular sense of justice enlightened & enlarged by a diffusive education; and from the difficulty of combining & effectuating unjust purposes throughout an extensive country; a difficulty essentially distinguishing the U. S. & even most of the individual States, from the small communities where a mistaken interest or contagious passion, could readily unite a majority of the whole under a factious leader, in trampling on the rights of the minor party.

"Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the Mass of Citizens should not be without a voice, in making the laws which they are to obey, & in chusing the Magistrates who are to administer them, and if the only alternative be between an equal & universal right of suffrage for each branch of the Gov^t and a confinement of the entire right to a part of the Citizens, it is better that those having the greater interest at stake namely that of property & persons both, should be deprived of half their share in the Gov^t than, that those having the lesser interest, that of personal rights only, should be deprived of the whole."–Madison's Note.

Doc^r Franklin. It is of great consequence that we sh^d not depress the virtue & public spirit of our common people; of which they displayed a great deal during the war, and which contributed principally to the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable refusal of the American seamen who were carried in great numbers into the British Prisons during the war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of the Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism with a contemporary instance in which the British seamen made prisoners by the Americans, readily entered on the ships of the latter on being promised a share of the prizes that might be made out of their own Country. This proceeded he said from the different manner in which the common people were treated in America & G. Britain. He did not think that the elected had any right in any case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons having freeholds of a certain value; observing that this Statute was soon followed by another under the succeeding Parliam^t subjecting the people who had no votes to peculiar labors & hardships. He was persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed would give great uneasiness in the populous States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at being disfranchised, and there are a great many persons of that description.

M^r Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in many points, but in none more than the present. He objected to the footing on which the qualification was put, but particularly to the mode of election by the people. The people can not know & judge of the characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in Virg^a as an example in point. The people in Towns can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; & by that means always prevail over the people of the Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes among a variety of candidates.

M^r Rutlidge thought the idea of restraining the right of suffrage to the freeholders a very unadvised one. It would create division among the people & make enemies of all those who should be excluded.

On the question for striking out as moved by M^r Gov^r Morris, from the word "qualifications" to the end of the III article

Wednesday Aug^st 8. In Convention

Art: IV. sect. 1.–M^r Mercer expressed his dislike of the whole plan, and his opinion that it never could succeed.

M^r Ghorum. he had never seen any inconveniency from allowing such as were not freeholders to vote, though it had long been tried. The elections in Phil^a, N. York & Boston where the Merchants & Mechanics vote are at least as good as those made by freeholders only. The case in England was not accurately stated yesterday (by M^r Madison). The Cities & large towns are not the seat of Crown influence & corruption. These prevail in the Boroughs, and not on account of the right which those who are not freeholders have to vote, but of the smallness of the number who vote. The people have been long accustomed to this right in various parts of America, and will never allow it to be abridged. We must consult their rooted prejudices if we expect their concurrence in our propositions.

M^r Mercer did not object so much to an election by the people at large including such as were not freeholders, as to their being left to make their choice without any guidance. He hinted that Candidates ought to be nominated by the State Legislatures.

Col. Mason was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not chuse to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern us. Citizenship for three years was not enough for ensuring that local knowledge which ought to be possessed by the Representative. This was the principal ground of his objection to so short a term. It might also happen that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for insidious purposes. He moved that "seven" years instead of "three," be inserted.

M^r Gov^r Morris 2^ded the Motion, & on the question, all the States agreed to it except Connecticut.

M^r Sherman moved to strike out the word "resident" and insert "inhabitant," as less liable to misconstruction.

M^r Madison 2^ded the motion, both were vague, but the latter least so in common acceptation, and would not exclude persons absent occasionally for a considerable time on public or private business. Great disputes had been raised in Virg^a concerning the meaning of residence as a qualification of Representatives which were determined more according to the affection or dislike to the man in question, than to any fixt interpretation of the word.

M^r Gov^r Morris, was opposed to both and for requiring nothing more than a freehold. He quoted great disputes in N. York occasioned by these terms, which were decided by the arbitrary will of the majority. Such a regulation is not necessary. People rarely chuse a nonresident–It is improper as in the 1^st branch, the people at large, not the States, are represented.

M^r Rutlidge urged & moved, that a residence of 7 years sh^d be required in the State Wherein the Member sh^d be elected. An emigrant from N. England to S. C. or Georgia would know little of its affairs and could not be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time.

M^r Read reminded him that we were now forming a Nat^l Gov^t and such a regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one people.

M^r Madison suggested the case of new States in the West, which could have perhaps no representation on that plan.

M^r Mercer. Such a regulation would present a greater alienship among the States than existed under the old federal system. It would interweave local prejudices & State distinctions in the very Constitution which is meant to cure them. He mentioned instances of violent disputes raised in Maryland concerning the term "residence."

M^r Elseworth thought seven years of residence was by far too long a term: but that some fixt term of previous residence would be proper. He thought one year would be sufficient, but seemed to have no objection to three years.

M^r Dickinson proposed that it should read "inhabitant actually resident for –— years." This would render the meaning less indeterminate.

M^r Wilson. If a short term should be inserted in the blank, so strict an expression might be construed to exclude the members of the Legislature, who could not be said to be actual residents in their States whilst at the Seat of the Gen^l Government.

M^r Mercer. It would certainly exclude men, who had once been inhabitants, and returning from residence elsewhere to resettle in their original State; although a want of the necessary knowledge could not in such cases be presumed.

M^r Mason thought 7 years too long, but would never agree to part with the principle. It is a valuable principle. He thought it a defect in the plan that the Representatives would be too few to bring with them all the local knowledge necessary. If residence be not required, Rich men of neighbouring States, may employ with success the means of corruption in some particular district and thereby get into the public Councils after having failed in their own State. This is the practice in the boroughs of England.

On the question for inserting "inhabitant" in place of "resident"–ag^d to nem. con.

M^r Williamson liked the Report as it stood. He thought "resident" a good eno' term. He was ag^st requiring any period of previous residence. New residents if elected will be most zealous to conform to the will of their constituents, as their conduct will be watched with a more jealous eye.

M^r Butler & M^r Rutlidge moved "three years" instead of "one year" for previous inhabitancy.

Gen^l Pinkney & M^r Pinkney moved that the number of Representatives allotted to S. Carol^a be "six." On the question,

M^r Williamson moved to strike out "according to the provisions hereinafter made" and to insert the words "according to the rule hereafter to be provided for direct taxation."–See Art. VII. Sect. 3.

M^r King wished to know what influence the vote just passed was meant to have on the succeeding part of the Report, concerning the admission of Slaves into the rule of Representation. He could not reconcile his mind to the article if it was to prevent objections to the latter part. The admission of slaves was a most grating circumstance to his mind, & he believed would be so to a great part of the people of America. He had not made a strenuous opposition to it heretofore because he had hoped that this concession would have produced a readiness which had not been manifested, to strengthen the Gen^l Gov^t and to mark a full confidence in it. The Report under consideration had by the tenor of it, put an end to all those hopes. In two great points the hands of the Legislature were absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could not be prohibited–exports could not be taxed. Is this reasonable? What are the great objects of the Gen^l System? 1. defence ag^st foreign invasion. 2. ag^st internal sedition. Shall all the States then be bound to defend each; & shall each be at liberty to introduce a weakness which will render defence more difficult? Shall one part of the U. S. be bound to defend another part, and that other part be at liberty not only to increase its own danger, but to withhold the compensation for the burden? If slaves are to be imported shall not the exports produced by their labor, supply a revenue the better to enable the Gen^l Gov^a to defend their Masters? There was so much inequality & unreasonableness in all this, that the people of the Northern States could never be reconciled to it. No candid man could undertake to justify it to them. He had hoped that some accommodation w^d have taken place on this subject; that at least a time w^d have been limited for the importation of slaves. He never could agree to let them be imported without limitation & then be represented in the Nat^l Legislature. Indeed he could so little persuade himself of the rectitude of such a practice, that he was not sure he could assent to it under any circumstances. At all events, either slaves should not be represented, or exports should be taxable.

M^r Sherman regarded the slave trade as iniquitous; but the point of representation having been settled after much difficulty & deliberation, he did not think himself bound to make opposition; especially as the present article as amended did not preclude any arrangement whatever on that point in another place of the Report.

M^r Madison objected to 1 for every 40.000 inhabitants as a perpetual rule. The future increase of population if the Union sh^d be permanent, will render the number of Representatives excessive.

M^r Ghorum. It is not to be supposed that the Gov^t will last so long as to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain one nation?

M^r Elseworth. If the Gov^t should continue so long, alterations may be made in the Constitution in the manner proposed in a subsequent article.

M^r Sherman & M^r Madison moved to insert the words "not exceeding," before the words "1 for every 40.000." which was agreed to nem. con.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert "free" before the word inhabitants. Much he said would depend on this point. He never would concur in upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious institution. It was the curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed. Compare the free regions of the Middle States, where a rich & noble cultivation marks the prosperity & happiness of the people, with the misery & poverty which overspread the barren wastes of V^a Mary^d & the other States having slaves. Travel thro' y^e whole Continent & you behold the prospect continually varying with the appearance & disappearance of slavery. The moment you leave y^e E. States & enter N. York, the effects of the institution become visible, passing thro' the Jerseys & entering P^a every criterion of superior improvement witnesses the change. Proceed southw^dly. & every step you take thro' y^e great regions of slaves presents a desert increasing, with y^e increasing [word is illegible] proportion of these wretched beings. Upon what principle is it that the slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? Then make them Citizens and let them vote. Are they property? Why then is no other property included? The Houses in this city (Philad^a) are worth more than all the wretched Slaves which cover the rice swamps of South Carolina. The admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections & damns them to the most cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Gov^t instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of P^a or N. Jersey who views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice. He would add that Domestic slavery is the most prominent feature in the aristocratic countenance of the proposed Constitution. The vassalage of the poor has ever been the favorite offspring of Aristocracy. And What is the proposed compensation to the Northern States for a sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse of humanity. They are to bind themselves to march their militia for the defence of the S. States; for their defence ag^st those very slaves of whom they complain. They must supply vessels & seamen in case of foreign Attack. The Legislature will have indefinite power to tax them by excises, and duties on imports: both of which will fall heavier on them than on the Southern inhabitants; for the bohae tea used by a Northern freeman, will pay more tax than the whole consumption of the miserable slave, which consists of nothing more than his physical subsistence and the rag that covers his nakedness. On the other side the Southern States are not to be restrained from importing fresh supplies of wretched Africans, at once to increase the danger of attack, and the difficulty of defence; nay they are to be encouraged to it by an assurance of having their votes in the Nat^l Gov^t increased in proportion, and are at the same time to have their exports & their slaves exempt from all contributions for the public service. Let it not be said that direct taxation is to be proportioned to representation. It is idle to suppose that the Gen^l Gov^t can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the people scattered over so vast a Country. They can only do it through the medium of exports imports & excises. For What then are all the sacrifices to be made? He would sooner submit himself to a tax for paying for all the negroes in the U. States, than saddle posterity with such a Constitution.

M^r Dayton 2^ded the motion. He did it he said that his sentiments on the subject might appear whatever might be the fate of the amendment.

M^r Sherman, did not regard the admission of the Negroes into the ratio of representation, as liable to such insuperable objections. It was the freemen of the Southⁿ States who were in fact to be represented according to the taxes paid by them, and the Negroes are only included in the Estimate of the taxes. This was his idea of the matter.

M^r Pinkney, considered the fisheries & the Western frontier as more burthensome to the U. S. than the slaves. He thought this could be demonstrated if the occasion were a proper one.

M^r Wilson, thought the motion premature. An agreement to the clause would be no bar to the object of it.

On the suggestion of M^r Dickinson the words, "provided that each State shall have one representative at least,"–were added nem. con.

M^r Pinkney moved to strike out Sect. 5. As giving no peculiar advantage to the House of Representatives, and as clogging the Gov^t. If the Senate can be trusted with the many great powers proposed, it surely may be trusted with that of originating money bills.

M^r Gov^r Morris. It is particularly proper that the Senate sh^d have the right of originating money bills. They will sit constantly, will consist of a smaller number, and will be able to prepare such bills with due correctness; and so as to prevent delay of business in the other House.

Col. Mason was unwilling to travel over this ground again. To strike out the Section, was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part. The duration of the Senate made it improper. He does not object to that duration. On the Contrary he approved of it. But joined with the smallness of the number, it was an argument against adding this to the other great powers vested in that body. His idea of an Aristocracy was that it was the govern^t of the few over the many. An aristocratic body, like the screw in mechanics, work^g its way by slow degrees, and holding fast whatever it gains, should ever be suspected of an encroaching tendency. The purse strings should never be put into its hands.

M^r Mercer, considered the exclusive power of originating Money bills as so great an advantage, that it rendered the equality of votes in the Senate ideal & of no consequence.

M^r Elseworth did not think the clause of any consequence, but as it was thought of consequence by some members from the larger States, he was willing it should stand.

M^r Madison was for striking it out; considering it as of no advantage to the large States as fettering the Gov^t and as a source of injurious altercations between the two Houses.

Thursday, Aug^st 9. in Convention

Art: IV. Sect. 6. M^r Randolph expressed his dissatisfaction at the disagreement yesterday to Sect. 5. concerning money bills, as endangering the success of the plan, and extremely objectionable in itself; and gave notice that he should move for a reconsideration of the vote.

M^r Wilson, gave notice that he sh^d move to reconsider the vote, requiring seven instead of three years of Citizenship as a qualification of candidates for the House of Representatives.

M^r Wilson objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied by the Executives of the States. It was unnecessary as the Legislatures will meet so frequently. It removes the appointment too far from the people; the Executives in most of the States being elected by the Legislatures. As he had always thought the appointment of the Executives by the Legislative department wrong; so it was still more so that the Executive should elect into the Legislative department.

M^r Randolph thought it necessary in order to prevent inconvenient chasms in the Senate. In some States the Legislatures meet but once a year. As the Senate will have more power & consist of a smaller number than the other House, vacancies there will be of more consequence. The Executives might be safely trusted he thought with the appointment for so short a time.

M^r Elseworth. It is only said that the Executive may supply vacancies. When the Legislative meeting happens to be near, the power will not be exerted. As there will be but two members from a State vacancies may be of great moment.

M^r Williamson. Senators may resign or not accept. This provision is therefore absolutely necessary.

On the question for striking out "vacancies shall be supplied by the Executives"

M^r Williamson moved to insert after "vacancies shall be supplied by the Executives," the following words "unless other provision shall be made by the Legislature" (of the State).

M^r Elseworth. He was willing to trust the Legislature, or the Executive of a State, but not to give the former a discretion to refer appointments for the Senate to whom they pleased.

M^r Madison in order to prevent doubts whether resignations could be made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved to strike out the words after "vacancies," & insert the words "happening by refusals to accept, resignations or otherwise, may be supplied by the Legislature of the State in the representation of which such vacancies shall happen, or by the Executive thereof until the next meeting of the Legislature."

M^r Gov^r Morris this is absolutely necessary, otherwise, as members chosen into the Senate are disqualified from being appointed to any office by Sect. 9. of this art: it will be in the power of a Legislature by appointing a man a Senator ag^st his consent, to deprive the U. S. of his services.

M^r Randolph called for division of the Section, so as to leave a distinct question on the last words "each member shall have one vote." He wished this last sentence to be postponed until the reconsideration should have taken place on Sect. 5. Art. IV. concerning money bills. If that section should not be reinstated his plan would be to vary the representation in the Senate.

M^r Read did not consider the section as to money bills of any advantage to the larger States and had voted for striking it out as being viewed in the same light by the larger States. If it was considered by them as of any value, and as a condition of the equality of votes in the Senate, he had no objection to its being re-instated.

M^r Wilson–M^r Elseworth & M^r Madison urged that it was of no advantage to the larger States, and that it might be a dangerous source of contention between the two Houses. All the principal powers of the Nat^l Legislature had some relation to money.

Doc^r Franklin, considered the two clauses, the originating of money bills, and the equality of votes in the Senate, as essentially connected by the compromise which had been agreed to.

Col. Mason said this was not the time for discussing this point. When the originating of money bills shall be reconsidered, he thought it could be demonstrated that it was of essential importance to restrain the right to the House of Representatives the immediate choice of the people.

M^r Williamson. The State of N. C. had agreed to an equality in the Senate, merely in consideration that money bills should be confined to the other House: and he was surprised to see the smaller States forsaking the condition on which they had received their equality.